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PREFACE 
Historians have analyzed t he We s tern r esponse to 
Soviet Russia from a number of vantage points. 1 Surpris-
ingly, however, t he attitudes of one i mportant po l itical 
group have not been s t udied adeq uately. Hi s torian s have 
claimed freq uen tly t h at Brit ish Conse rvatives we re 
violen tly hostile t owa r d t he "bogey " of Bolshe v i s m and 
that, the r efore , Tory gove r nments we r e pe r sis t e ntly 
hostile toward Sovie t Russ ia. 2 Conse rvative s domi nated 
British politics d uring the inte rwar per iod and p l aye d a 
major role in formulating l'lestern policy tm•a rd t he Bol-
sheviks. Thus an analysis of Tory v iews wi ll he l p to 
exp lain the ori gi n s of t he long- s tanding es trangemen t 
betwee n Sovi e t Russ ia and t he We s t. But t his s tudy a l s o 
will de mon s trate t ha t t he r e was no monolithic Tory 
r esponse and t hat Tory op inions ofte n shi ft e d . :·lo rcove r , 
since 
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the Soviet question ~ as , on occasion, almos t as conte ntiou s 
an issue for t he Tories a s it was for t he Labour p arty. 
For some Co n servatives , dislike of Communism as an ide o l ogy 
was tempe r ed at times by a d es i r e to mak e accommoda t i ons 
with the Russian Comm uni s t s tate . 
As i t is today, the Tory p arty during the int e n :ar 
period was c ompo s ed of t hree di s tinct groups : t he parlia-
mentary party , the loca l c on s titue ncy a ssoci a tion s which 
formed the tlationa l Union of Conse rva tive a nd Unioni s t 
Associations , and the Conse rva tive and Unioni s t Cen tral 
Office. 3 l'lhether as Prime l'lini s t e r or a s l eade r of t he 
Oppo si tion, t he party l e a d e r had s up r eme autho rity. He 
guid e d party policy a nd a ppo inte d t he t op o f ficial s of the 
Central Office. In office h e chose the Cabi ne t; in o ppo -
sition he c hose t h e s had o1-1 Cu.b ine t. AltjlOugh the l eader' s 
powe r s we re a l mos t dictato rial, he could no t ignore t he 
sentime nts of hi s fo llo~e rs . 
Tories could i nf l ue nce t he ir l e ade r i n se v e r a l 
way s . The p arl iarne n t ary Co nse rva tive :!embe r s ' Commit t ee 
(o ften c a lled the 1 922 Comnittee , afte r the yea r of i t s 
fo rma tion) was a s ound ing boa r d for t he bac kbe nche r s ' 
vi ews . If backbenche r s di s l ike d a c e rtai n po licy , the 
Prime 1-l inis t e r tr ied to conve rt t hem . If uns uccess ful he 
3Thi s ana l ysis 
o n R. T . 11c Ke n z.ie , Bri---·· - - - - - ---- - - ----- · - ··- __ _ 
tr i b ut ion of Power l-hth1n ~ f- ~- - - .. -~: ... ---' • - • -·· -
Pa rties (2d ed . ; :lew York , 
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often modified h is proposa l; whe n he did not , bac kbenche r s 
could rally par ty s u pport t hroug h t he p r ess and by mee t -
ing s . But because of t he tradi tion of party loyalty, fe w 
conflict s were aired in p ublic . lfuen, f or e x amp l e , a 
group of backbenche r s pub l ic l y r ebuked t hei r l eader ' s 
Russian policy in the mid-1920 ' s , i t was dep lored as o pe n 
r ebel l ion. The con s titue ncy a ssoci a t ion r esolut ion s p r e-
sented at the Annu a l Confere nces of t he Na t iona l Un ion 
informed t he party l eade r of l ocal se n t i men t s . Although 
not o b liged to adopt t hem , he could not e asily dismi ss 
strong motions . Powe rful p r e s s ure from t he Na t iona l Un i on 
sometimes did inf lue nce him . The Na t ional Union , howe v e r, 
had no control ove r t he parli amen t a ry pa r ty . The Ce ntral 
Office , t he t hird of t h e t h r ee Tory organizations , was 
conce rn e d prima r i l y with o pe rat ing a n e ff i cie n t pa rty 
organ ization. Be cause it was t he pe r s onal machine of the 
lead e r, it had no independe nt rol e in po l icy formu l ation . 
The propaganda lite rature of t he Cen tral Offic e ' s p ub -
licity depa r tment touched on l y o n ge ne r al po l i c y . 
lfue n t he Tories we r e in oo~er , a se r iou s divis ion 
of Cabine t ooi nion us ually wa s r esol ved ei t he r t h r o uqh t he 
resignation of t he dissidents or by a c hange in t he 
leade r's po licy. Bu t in t he 192 0 ' s a f ew Tory Cab ine t 
membe r s publicly di sputed the Pr i me 'lin is t e r' s Russ ian 
policy without re s i g n ing , a s tr iking dev e l opme nt in v i e w 
of t he s trong tradi tion o f Cabine t uni ty on i mpo r tant 
i.x 
is s ues . The l eade r a l s o ha d to cons i de r t he v iews of non-
party org a n izatio ns with he a vy Tory r ep r ese ntation (s uch 
as t he Fede r a t ion o f Driti sh I nd us tries or t he /\ s soc ia tion 
of Briti sh Chaml.>e r s of Comme rce ) on i ss ues affe cting t h ei r 
inte r es t s . 
It is i mpo ssiG l e to s tudy with a ny accura c y t he 
o p inions of ~1e hund r eds of t ho us a nds of To r y party mem-
bers in the 1 9 20 ' s . Pub lic o p ini on polls we r e not intro -
duce d u n til t he 193 0 ' s , and t he Co nservat i ve An nua l Confe r -
ences d id no t a l way s gi ve a r e liab l e ind ication of grass -
root s sen t imen t s . Th i s pape r t he n dea l s o n l y with Con-
s e rvat i ve pol i t icians and t he Conse rva tive p r ess . :1any 
attitude s are e xamined , but i t i s i mpo ssibl e to de t ermi ne 
how mu c h popular supoo rt each one had . 
The pol iticians ' opinions have been t a k e n p r ima r i l y 
from p r ess r epor t s , pa rli amen t a r y deba t es , p r i vate pa~e r s , 
memoirs , and documen t s fr om t he PuUlic Re co r d Office and 
the Tory pa rty a r ch ives . The p r ess edi tor ia l s a r c t ak e n 
from a cross section of Torv j o urn a l s and ne~soaoe r s . 
iograph i es an d nonog r aphs ha ve provide d backg r ound , Lut 
~~e genera l pictur e is s till i ncomp l ete . ~any To r ies ~e re 
hesitan t in d iscuss ing Russia , espe c ially du r ing the ~-o·o r ld 
War, but a l s o a s l ong as Da v id Lloyd Geo r ge r ema i ned i n 
power. The r e c ords o f Cabine t mee tings arc so ske tc hy a t 
times as to be almost meani ng l ess . The tradi t ion of a 
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straight party vote on important pa rli ame ntary i s sues also 
makes it difficult to pinpoint t hose who dis s ente d from 
the main party l ine on Russia . Tories rare l y have engaged 
in t he fratricidal conflicts ove r for e ign po licies whicl• 
have plagued the Labour party . At present, moreover , the 
private papers of such p romine nt Con se rvatives as Winston 
Churchill, Lord Birke nhead , and Lord Curzon s till a r e 
unava il au l e . All b ut a handfu l of Tory cons titue ncy a s so-
ciation ne wsletters and ma g azines p rior to 1 9 45 have bee n 
los t. And f or some unknown reas on Con s ervative p a rty 
officials have withhe ld t he minutes of t he 1 922 Co!1Ul1 ittee , 
a serious loss to hi s torians . 
A s tudy of opinions i s a ri sky venture vlhic h e a s ily 
can become a string of diffuse co!1Ul1ents and q uotation s . 
Moreover , it is some time s d if f i cult to de line ate ~ith p r e -
cision t he f a ctors mo l d ing o p i n i o n . In t he case of t he 
Tori e s and Sovie t Russ ia, t h i s i s espec i ally true . Tory 
o pin ion s we r e not fo rmed so l e ly on t he ba s i s of t heir 
understanding of t he ool s he v ik "expe rimen t . " Sovi e t 
uss i a was a t e rrito r ia l sta t e as ~e ll a s t he c e n t er o f a 
internationa l r e volutiona r y movemen t . Labour ' s r espon se 
to the Soviets, t he s tate of Briti sh comme rce , ind us tr i al 
unrest , a nd othe r domes t i c fac tor s al s o influe nce d To r y 
vi ews. The attitudes of mos t Con s ervatives p roba b ly we re 
sha pe d uy a comb ination of t hese and othe r facto r s . On l y 
in a few cases c a n a dominant issue be identif ied. Some 
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Tory backbenche rs, for example, entertained moderate 
opinions of Russia because t hey ho ped that expanded ~~glo­
Soviet trade would relieve unemp loymen t in their con s titu-
encies. The political standing of the Tory party at a 
give n time sometimes o bscured genuine opinions . When in 
power, Tories in t he government general l y were mo re r eason-
able toward Russia than thei r colleagues on the outside . 
But when in oppos ition, leade r s and backbenche r s more often 
were united in o pposing Soviet Russia . 
The paper relies heavily on parliane ntary debates 
and press editorials; and y e t both politicians and news-
paper editors ofte n s ay things they do not be lieve. ~fter 
all, they us ually court t he p ub lic for se lfi sh purpo s es. 
Those holding one v iew in public c ou ld adhere to anothe r 
in private . Eut in the c ase of Russ ia t he pub lic and 
private o p inions of Tory po l i t icians and edito r s u s ually 
seem to have coincid~d. 4 
Tories rarely p roduced a bs tract di s courses on 
Soviet theor v or practice. For t he mo s t part t hei r opi n -
ions of Sovi e t Russia we r e s tate d ~ithi n t he conte xt of 
Anglo-Sovie t comme rci a l a nd di p lon atic r e l a tion s . In 
larg e part, t hen , t h is s tudy 1·1ill e x am ine the ef fect s of 
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Tory opinions on t he formulation of British po licy toward 
Russia. It is not easy to trace t his causa l r e lationsh i p . 
In some instance s Tory o pi nion s seem to have exe rci sed a 
dominant role in t he make -up of British policy; in othe r s 
they a pparently h ad only a ma r gina l influence . Bu t in 
general every British government fr om 1917 to 1 92 7 had to 
consider Tory o pinion s whe n shaping t he ir policies t owa rd 
Russia. 
This is neithe r a dip lomatic histo r y nor a s urvey 
of Briti sh history. Fo r eign and domestic e v e nt s and t he 
vi ews of other oo l itical parties towa rd Ru ss ia wi ll be 
exp lai ned only i n enough de t ai l to elucidate Tory o p inions . 
For examp l e , a know l edge of Lloyd George's po l icy t oward 
Ru ssi a i s nece ss ary to unde r s tand To r y r eactions du ri ng 
t he Coalition pe r iod . It iE a ssumed t ha t t he r eade r ha s a 
gene r a l k nowl edge of t he politica l and diplomatic histo r y 
of both Sovie t Russi a and Gr e at Br i t ain . Fina lly , t he 
pape r wi ll conc ent r ate on Sovie t Russia , and no t on Com-
muni sm . The t~o c a n be se para t ed . 
To r y o p inions of Sovi e t Russi a after 1 91 9 c an DC 
divided into f ou r categories . On the ext r eme r igh t a 
small band of "ultras" inte r p r e ted Sovie t Russ ia as t he 
incarnation of metaphys ical evi l. Those a dhe ring to t h i s 
nonrationa l or irrational viewpoint were i mpe rvi ous to 
c ha nging po litica l de ve l o pme nts . Fo r t hem any ass ociation 
whatsoeve r with the Soviet s was a n invitation t o national 
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suicide . A second and much l arge r n umbe r of Tories made 
up the "rightists." This group be lie ved t he Sovi e ts ~·e r e 
using real di sconten t s within mode rn s ociety a s an excuse 
to impose dictatorship. Although their denunciations of 
Russia sometimes we r e a s in t ens e a s those of the "ultras , '' 
the "rightists" used compa rative l y rational argume nts . 
Moreover, thei r opinio ns of Ru s sia could and some times did 
change unde r c e rtain circumstances . The l a r ge st number of 
Tories compri s e d the "centri s t" group . Thei r o p inions of 
Russia we r e large l y non-polemical. The y tre ate d ~u ss i a 
like any other unfr iend ly gove r nme nt and always maintaine d 
a sense of proportion in the face of infl ammatory Soviet 
remarks. Th e y di d not fear an Anglo -Sovi e t d e t e nte but 
r emained wary of t he Soviet s . l\. s mal l band of "conci l i -
ators ," the fourth g roup , wo r~ ed active l y f o r a rapp r o c he -
me nt. They s a w t he Sovi e t s as a toug h bu nch of o rac tica l 
politician s with whon Eritain c oul d h ave mutua lly be ne-
ficial r e l ation s . 
These four grou~ s rare ly ag r eed . The ir es t ima t es 
o f t he inte r na l condit ions in Russia , the Sov ie t t h r ea t to 
Britain , and t he So vi e ts' ultima t e inte ntion s ( to name 
just a f ew things ) v a ri e d a nd s ome times diffe r e d signifi -
cantly . In fact, t he To r i es he l d only o ne c ommon o pinion 
about Russ ia--the y al l di s liked t he So viets . 
The chrono log ica l s truc t ure of t he pape r he l ps in 
und e r s tanding t he e vo lu tio n a nd changes in Tory att i t ude s . 
x i v 
The s tory beg in s , natura lly , in 1917, and 1 92 7 i s a logi c a l 
conc l ud ing point . Aft e r Ang lo-Sov ie t d ip l omatic r e l a t i on s 
we r e t e rminate d i n May, 1 92 7, Tory inte r es t i n Russ ia 
s l ackene d c on s i d e r a b l y . l~oreove r, t he wo rld e c o nomic 
depress ion , t he Sov iet Five-Year Plan s , a nd Na t iona l Soc i a l -
i s m s oon a l t e r ed t he story dra s t ica lly. The pe r i od fron 
1 917 to 1 92 7 i s l ong e no ugh to d emon s trate both c hang e and 
continu i t y in Tory at t i t udes . These t e n yea r~ a l s o saw t he 
To ri e s in all t h r ee pol i t i c a l c omb inat i on s --in o ppo s i t i o n , 
i n a c oa lition, and i n powe r wi t hout all i es . 
In d e3 crib ing c h a nge a nd c on t i nu i t y in g e ne r a l To r y 
po l icy , h i s tor ians of t e n point t o t h e t wo t r adi t ion s f r om 
wh ich Con s e rva t ive s ' po l i t ica l v i ews arc dra~m . One s ou r c e 
s tre s s es t he p ractica l, s k i ll f ul go v e r ni ng o f s ocie t y; t he 
othe r cx o r e sses a n a l mos t mys ti ca l v e ne r a tion o f tradi t io n -
a l i n s titut i ons a nd v a l ues . 5 Although some To r ie s a r e 
5Th i s e v a lu a t i o n of Tory p rinc ip l es i s ba sed o n 
Harve y Gl i c kma n , "The To r y ne ss o f Eng li sh Con 3crva t i sm ," 
J ourna l of Or itish Studi c~ , I ( Wo vc~bc r , 1 96 1) , 1 11 - 4 3 ; 
Ha rvey Gltckman , 'To ry Ethos and Co nserv a t i ve Poli c y in 
Br itai n: t he P.ol c o f Pa r ty I deas i n Pa r ty Policy , 1922-
1 93 9" (unpu b li shed Ph . D. dissertation , Harvard Un i vcr>ity , 
1 95 8 ); and J ohn Sa l oma , "B r i t ish Conse r va t i sm and t he We l -
f are S t a t e : a n Ana l ysis of t he Policy-Process Hi t hin t he 
Br i t i s h Co n s e r va t i ve Pa rty " (u np uLlished P~ . D . d isse r ta-
t ion, Ha rva r d Unive r s ity , 1 96 1 ). 
Tory po lit icians spe ll ed o u t t hese be l ie f s du r ing 
t he 19 20 ' s . Some s t a t e me nt s were q uite p r og r e ssive , and 
o t he r s we r e mode r a t e ; s ur pri s ing l y , none were r eac tiona r y . 
A se l ect l i s t o f t he p r og r essi ve wr i t ings wou ld include 
Noe l Ske l t o n, "Cons truc tive Conse rvati sm , " §_eectator , C:<XX 
(/\p r i l 28 , 1 92 3 ), 6 98-99 , U!ay 5 , 1 923 ), 7 45-46 , (:lay 1 2 , 
1 923 ), 789 -9 0 , (!·l ay 1 9 , 1 923 ) , 83 7- 38; and Lord Robe r t 
Ceci l, "Na t iona l Uni t y ," Qua r te r ly Re v iew , CCXLI (Ap r i l , 
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p r edomi nant l y pragmatists and others a r e e sse n t ia lly r oman-
tics , virtua lly a ll shar e be l iefs f r om bo t h tradi t ions . 
I n t h e To ry v iew men a r e bas i c a l ly i r ra t iona l a nd unefj ual. 
Strong l eade r sh ip by the state a nd a pa t e r na l is t i c s truc -
ture of a utho r i t y a r e both na tura l and ne cessa r y to keep 
soci e t y fu nc t ioning. The i ndi v idua l i s r e spected , bu t 
u nb ri d l ed i ndi v idua l ism is r ejected . His t orica lly , Con-
servatives hav e di s t r u sted t he masses , d emoc r acy , and 
r e a s on. Such es t ab l ishe d in s ti t u t ions as t he Church , 
Crown, and Empi r e a re v e n e r ated because t hey are t radi -
tiona!. Although gradu a l cha nge is accerted g rudging l y , 
stabi lity and orde r are almos t sacr ed . 
Schol a r s sometimes c l aim t ha t thi s To r y ethos 
e x p lains why Conservatives have accep ted t he mode rn we l -
far e s t a t e . 6 Although t he ethos has infl ue nced domes tic 
1 92 4,) 43 3-52 . l'illthony !:den , Olive r S t a n ley , Harold .'1ac-
t i v ist 
s on 
Bee r , Br i t ish Po l itics in t he Collec-
1 965 ) . 
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policy, t he re is cons iderab le di spute over its impact on 
foreign po licy. Some historians be lie v e t hat ideals d e t e r-
mine for e ign policy, arguing that th e "national inte r es t " 
includes the di sseMination of che ri shed institutions or 
ideas abroad. 7 Othe r s see a di s tinction be tw e en for eign 
policy o bjective s and domestic i dea l s . 8 
This controve r sy i s e specially rele vant in eval-
uating Tory attitudes toward Sovi e t Ru ss ia. Was the ideo-
logical clas h IJe t ween Bo l s hevism and "Toryi s m" t he key 
factor in t he compo s ition of Tory attitudes toward Rus s ia, 
or was it of little or no importance? 9 lli s tor ians have 
sugges t ed a n umbe r of different ans we r s . 
Adh e ring clos ely to the ltarx is t- Lc ninist analysis 
of history, Sov ie t s c ho lar s mainta in t ha t t he Tories ' 
attitudes were de t ermined sole l y by t hei r dominant cl a ss 
7E . g ., Max De l off, I moeria l Sun s e t , Vo l. I: Br i t -
ai n ' s Li i.Je r a l Er.~pirc , 189 7=192 1 (Londo n ,-1 969 ), p . l :f. - -
8E.g., Hilli am 
(Lo ndon, 1 96 1), pp . 13 - 20 . Jose ph Fr an ke l p r e 5en t s an 
inte r es ting and r eadab l e s tudy of for eig n po l icy for mula-
tion in ~1c Maki ng of Fo r e i ¥ n Po l i cy : an An a ly s i s o 
Deci sion- ' !ar.Ti1_9. ( t\e w Yo r l. , 963 ) . 
9The di ame tr ica lly o pposed t ene t s of Bols he vi sm and 
the Tory creed need not be exp la ined here . A k no~o.• ledge of 
the soc i a l backg r ound of Tory politic ian s he l ps in unde r-
standing t he c o ntra s t to Bolshe v ism . For a b r i ll ia n t 
analysis o f t he ir cla ss s tructure in t he t we ntieth c e ntury , 
s ee 1'1 . L. Gutt sman, The Briti sh Political Eli t e (New York , 
19 63 ). 
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interests exp r essed in an anti-Bolshevi k ide ology. 10 These 
historians claim t he Tories used every conceiv a b le Yleapo n 
to destroy the Sovie t Union in it s infancy. After British 
military interve ntion in Rus si a had fail ed , Engli s h worke r s 
forced Britain to negotiate with Russia . However, reac-
tionary Tories launche d a powe rful anti-Sovi e t crusade to 
fight close r Ang lo-Sovi ~ t tic~; in late 1924 t his campaign 
returne d t hem to power . The Tories t he n worked feve ri s hly 
to create an anti-Soviet Euro pean bloc, but these p lans to 
force the restoration of cap itali sm in Russ ia were nulli-
fied uy e me rging inter-impe rialist antagoni sms and by the 
heroic defense of the Sovi e t pe o p l e . 
In a milder v e r sion of t h i s Sovi e t t hes is, Dorothy 
George charges that To ri es we r e unab l e t o confront di p -
lomatic r ealitie s because of t hei r ove rrid ing fear of Com-
muni sm : 
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The Con s ervative Re d - o bsessio n wa s tra n s lated 
in the inte rw a r pe r iod into o bs tina t e gove rn-
mental rej e ction of Sovie t a t temp t s to s e ttle 
primary i ss ues be t wee n t he t wo n a t ions and a 
steady Communi s t -bait i ng in domes t i c a f fai r s . 
• • • But that t he deepe r e l emen t o f To r y an ti-
Communism was an a l mo s t o bsessiv e f e a r o f its 
ultimate eff e ct s wa s we ll illus tr a t e d i n t he 
reactions to social p r o b l ems in t he po s t- Bo l -
shevik world, t he r e vol u t iona r y ji tte r s o f t he 
ruling cla sses in s uc h cr i s es , s a y , a s the 
General Strike of 1 926 .11 
Donald Lamme r s places minimal e mphas i s on this 
anti-Re d hypothe s is in hi s study of Briti s h foreign pol-
icy.12 Alth ough conce ding t hat Tories we re hos til e t oward 
the Soviets , Lamme r s a s se rt s t h at t he re wa s no conne ction 
"betwee n t hes e r e lat i v e ly un spe c if i e d attitudes . • . and 
those concre te hi s t o ri ca l s itua t ions in v1hi c h it wa s 
eithe r po ss i b l e or m.:~ nd atory for Br i t ai n to act •..J ith re -
spect to t he Sovi e t Unio n.• 13 For him t he anti -Re d t hes i s 
ove r s i mp lifies t he comp le x ities i nhe r e nt in policy fo rm u -
lation. Aft e r e xami ning t he Mu nich crisi s he c on c ludes 
t h at t he Tories ' di f f e ri ng po l i cy s ugge s ti on s "attenua t es 
the conne ction b e t wee n cl a s s o rig i ns and i de o l ogy a l mo s t 
to th e va n i sh ing point." 14 In sum , the Tor ies we r e not 
11Th e War~ed Vi s ion: Br it ish Fore i gn Po l icy , 1 9 33 -
193 9 ( P ittsburg~ , l 96Sl , pp . 21 23 . Fo r r.e r genera l 
analys i s , see pp . 3- 35 . 
1 2r: 1 . . . h h h f . . ~e a~ n~ ng 1\un~ c : t c Sea r c o r ~lo t ~ve ~n 
British POI~cy ( S tanfo rd~G6 ) . See a l s o Geo r ge ' s r ejoi n-
aer ~n he r r e v iew of h is book in Jl.mc r ica n Hi s to r i c al 
LX XII (July , 1 967), 13 9 9. 
13Lamme r s , Exp l aining ~•unich , p . 3. 
14rl:Jid ., p. 13. 
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blinde d by the s pecte r of Comnuni sm . 
Each of t hes e t h ree inte r p r e t a tions i s marre d by 
methodological errors. Soviet h istoria n s limit t he ir 
source s p rimarily to Soviet doc ume nt s a nd publicat ion s by 
British Communi s ts and left- wing La bourite s . Be caus e t he 
Soviets u se a prior i r easoning, t he y ma ke n ume rous a bs urd 
allegations and eve n di s tort Tory attitudes d e libe r a t e l y . 
In short, their worl' s are almo s t totally unre liab l e . 
George constructs he r t heo r y with little a naly s i s of 
events. Lamme r s critici z e s George for th is , but his s tudy 
is limite d to :1unich; and hi s sampling t e c hniq ue i s too 
narrow l y based. The thesis of t h i s pape r r e s t s somewh e r e 
between t he pol a r ize d vi ews of Georg e and La~e r s . 
As me ntione d a bov e , Tory v i e v1s t owa r d Ru s s ia are 
not r ed uc i b l e to a simp le fo rmula. A b r i e f ove rv i e w o f 
t he content s o f t h e paper wi ll d e mon s tra t e t his mo r e 
clearly. The s tory d ivides c onveni e nt l y i nto t h r ee p a rts : 
background , 1 917 to 1 919; negotiations , 1 92 0 to 1 92 4; 
bre a kdown , 1925 to 1 92 7. Dur ing t he fir s t t wo yea r s of 
Bo l she v i }: r ule , To ry o p in ions e v o l v ed s l o1 : l y into s t r ingent 
oppos it i o n to t he Sov i e t s . At t his t i me the Bo l she v i k s 
we r e see n p rima r i ly as inte rn a t iona l r e vo l u tionar ies r a t he r 
than a s rul e r s o f a s o ve r e i g n s t a t e . Desp ite t he To r ies ' 
paramo un t interes t i n t he All ied wa r effort, mo s t of t hen 
withi n a nd e ve n ou t s ide of t he Coa l i ti on gove r rune nt Y.•e r e 
onl y mi l d l y c r i t i c a l o f t he Bo l shev i ks un t i l t he f a ll o f 
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1918. Dut t he nearly simultane ou s occurre nce of t he 
Armistice, the eme r gence of t h e White o ppo s it i on in Russia , 
and espe cially t he sacking of t he Briti sh embassy in Pctro-
grad conve rted most Tories to ra b id anti -Bolshevi sm . De-
sides popularizi ng t he White cause in 1 919, a numbe r of 
Tory politicians worked hard to p r event Prime Minister 
David Lloyd Ge orge f r om negotiating wi th the Soviets . Bu t 
when the failure of the Whites became apparent in the fall 
of 1919, the Tori e s ' nea rly una nimo u s attitude toward t he 
Soviets bega n to cra ck as some advocated a ne w a pp r oach to 
Russia. 
From 1920 to 1924 Tory opinions c e nte r ed p rima r i l y 
on the attemp t s of s uccessi ve Briti sh gove r nments to n e go-
tiate a set tl enent with Russ ia. Also during t hese years 
the four diffe r e nt g roup inq s of Torv o o inion ve re s ol idi-
fi ed . Large l y t hrough Lloy d Georg e ' s ef fort s Britain 
si gne d a Trade Agreemen t wi t h Russ ia in Ma rch, 1921. But 
the Tory r ight used bombastic Sov iet state~e nts and the 
Ru sso -Po li s h war to harass the Prime :linister and p rolong 
t he neqot iations . In the 1-1 in t e r of 1 921-22 Con s e r va t ives 
preven t ed g r ea t er Briti sh assistance for the victims of 
the Russian f amine . The followi ng spring To r y pres s ure 
forced Lloyd Ge orge t o adop t a strong po si tion during n ego-
tiations at Genoa and Th e !!ag ue , which had bee n inte nd e d 
to normalize r e l a tions wi t h Russia . As u s u a l, intempe r a t e 
Soviet r emarks r einforced t he arg~ents of Tory opponents . 
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In 1921, and e specially in 1 922 , t he o pposi tion to Lloyd 
George's Russi an policy was p romp t ed inc r easing l y by the 
desire of many Tories to topp l e t he Coalition . Torie s in 
t he gove r nmen t were forced to balance t heir conf licting 
loyalties to th e Prime Minis t er and to t he ir party . The 
Tories assume d powe r alone in l ate 1 922 , and in the fol-
lowing yea r Foreign Se cr e tary Lord Curzon is5ued an ulti-
mat um d emanding t hat the Sov iets ceas e forei g n p rop aganda 
or l ose t he Trade Agreement. rtos t Torie s s upported him. 
The Soviets backed down unexpected ly , but the c onf rontation 
mere ly r einforced their es trangeMent from Cons e rvatives . 
The Labo u r gove rnmen t of 1924 exte nde d d e jure r e coonition 
to Russ ia a nd nego t iate d t wo Treaties s upposed l y normal -
izing r e l ations . For t wo reasons v i rtually a ll Tories 
strongly denounced La bour a nd t he Sov ie t s : t he Tre aties 
r eal l y s e ttled no th i n g be t ween t he t wo countri e s , and t he 
Torie s hoped to dis lod ge t he La bour g ove rnmen t. Labour 
did r esig n , and d u r ing t he el e ction c ampai g n of 1 924 t r.e 
Tori es ' frenzi ed anti-Bol s hevik r he tor i c crea t ed a Red 
sca r e . T~e publica tion of t he f amous Zinoviev l e tte r 
sho rtly be for~ t he e l e ct ion prob ab l y hel oed to insure a 
lop s ided Tory victory . 
F r om 1925 to 1927, t he l a s t par t of t h e s tory , t he 
Tory gove r nne n t attemp t ed to ma intai n t he Trade Agre ement 
and the di p loMa t i c l ink desp ite t he se rious d amage in -
flict ed in 1 9 24 . For t he fir s t v ea r and a ha lf Fo reign 
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Secretary Auste n Chambe rl ai n a ttempte d to di s arm his Tory 
cri tics by keepi ng t he Soviet s at arm' s l e ng t h . The 
Soviets' minimal involveme nt in inte rnationa l intrig ue at 
thi s time greatly a ss i s t e d him. But Ch ambe rlain' s p lan to 
achieve a settle me nt with the Sovie t s by i gnoring t he ir 
occas ional anti -Br i ti s h outb ur s t s s uff e r ed a se r i ou s blow 
when th e y tried to inte rve ne in t he Br iti sh g e ne ral s tri ke 
and we re imp lica t e d in t he Chines e r e volution. Th e s e t wo 
deve lopme nts , foll owi ng in t he wake of t he 1 9 24 e l e ctio n and 
the Zinoviev l e tte r, conv i n c e d mos t To r ies t ha t t he Sovi e t s 
really we r e i n t e nt on des troy ing Britain. In r espo nse , many 
Tory politici a ns s up ported a mov e ment with in t he party to 
force t he ir g o ve rnme nt t o b r e a k all t ies with Rus si a. I n 
part to q ui e t t he ir Tory crit i c s , t he go v e r nme nt is s ue d a 
ste rn warning t o Rus sia in Feb r u a ry, 1 92 7. Dut t he uncom-
promi s ing t one of t he no t e lef t no doub t t ha t ano t he r Sov i e t 
provocation c o u l d no t be t ole r a t e d . In May , 1 927, So v i e t 
tra de and di p l ona t ic o ffi c ia l s in Br i t a in we r e c h a r ged with 
e sp ionage . Thi s inc ide n t proved t oo d amag ing f o r t he gov-
ernme nt t o r e pai r . Chambe rl ain fina l l y succ umbe d to To r y 
pres s ure by b r eak ing r e lat ion s wi t h Ru s s ia . 
Even t h i s synops is o ve r s i mp l i f ies t he di f f icul ties 
of t he s ub j e ct. Hopefully , t he pa pe r' s s c he ma t i c f r ame -
wor k will ma ke t he s t o ry c omp r ehe n s i b l e withou t o b s c u r ing 
the comp l exity .lS 
lSA gu i d e t o t he ma j o r Con s erv a t i ves in t he t ex t 
is p r ov ide d in Appendix I II . 
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C H A P T E R I 
THE BAC KGROUND 
Conse rvat i v e s and Tsaris t Ru ss i a 
Russia b eg an to threaten Great Br ita in's European 
interes t s during the f i rst h a l f of t he nine t eenth c e ntury. 1 
In the latte r third of the c e ntury the a r ea o f conflict 
spille d ove r in t o Asia , wh e r e t he t wo Powe r s compe t ed for 
politica l and comme rc ia l d omin ation in Pers i a , Afgha ni s t a n, 
and China . Mo s t l e adi ng membe rs o f Tory g ove r nments a t t ha t 
time r a r e ly spoke in pub li c abou t Russi a, appa ren tly fearf ul 
of wor sening alre ad y str a i ned r e l ations . Wh e n the y did 
speak, the ir r emark s we r e t empera t e and , a t times , e v e n 
concilia to r y . 2 Tory c ondemna t i ons o f Russia c ame l a r ge ly 
from the pr e ss a nd fr om two wings withi n th e pa r ty . To ry 
radica ls l ike Lord Rand o l ph Churchi ll a nd Joseoh Chambe rlain 
of 
in 
Pers i a, 
2s ee e xtracts from thei r speeche s in a memorandum by 
Walli s Mye r s (Director of Publications , Na tiona l Wa r Ai ms 
Committee ), n. d . [1 921? ] , Lo ndo n , Be averb rook Library , 
David Ll oyd Geor ge Pape rs , F/20 4/3/7. This interesti ng 
docume n t con t ains an e xcelle n t analy s is of prewar Conserv a -
tive opinions of Ru ssia . (He re i nafter r eferr ed t o as Myers 
memorandum .) 
occasionally denounced the Russian autocracy's domestic 
policies. 3 Conservative I mperialists feared Russia would 
attack India, the essential link in the impe rial chain. 
Young George Curzon and others often wrote of the alleged 
threat. 4 
2 
At the turn of the century Lord Salisbury's govern-
ment began looking toward Russia to counter the growing 
German threat, but radicals and Imperialists r e maine d un-
reconciled. Occasional questions from Tory bac kb e nche rs 
concerning religious persecution in Russia were answe red 
by governme nt spokesme n claiming that Britain could not 
interfere with anothe r country's dome stic policies.5 
Lord Curzon, then Vice roy of India, warned of incre as e d 
Russian activity in Pe rsia , but the Cabine t ne gle cte d his 
notes. 6 
Two incide nts in parti c ul a r mirrore d the dive r gent 
views of the Tory g ove r nme nt a nd some of t he ir s u pporte r s . 
In October, 1904 Ru s si a n warshi ps mi s t akenly a tta c ked a 
fleet of English trawle r s in the Nor t h Se a . Large segments 
of the Tory p a rty and p r ess d emanded war i f Russ i a did no t 
of fer r e para tions, but the concili a t ory attitude s of both 
)Ibid. 
4E.g., George Curzon, Russ i a in Ce ntra l As i a in 
1889 and t he Ang l o - Russ i a n Question (Lvndon , 1869 ). 
5
willi am P.Coa t es and Ze l da Coates , A l!i s t o ry of 
Anglo- Sovi e t Re l a tions (London , 1 9 45 ), p . 339. 
6Ka ze mzadeh , Russ i a a nd Britain in Pe r sia , pp . 14 0-5 0. 
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governments averted hostilities. 7 Barely three months late r 
many Britons hailed the outbreak of revolution in Russia, 
but governmen t leaders remained silent. 8 
The Anglo- Russian Conve ntion signed by the Liberal 
governme nt in Apri l, 1907 settled outstanding diffe rences in 
Tibet, Afghani stan, and Persia. The Tory hi e rarchy, worried 
about Germany, supported the pragma tic accord.9 Howe v e r, 
radical Tories claimed the ag reement violate d moral princi-
ples, and Impe rialist s like Cur zon denounced it for harming 
British interests in Cen tra l Asia. 10 
Bonar Law, who bec ame party l eade r in 1911, continue d 
to plead for a lasting accord with Russ ia.l1 Most of his 
followe rs, however, feared a Russia fully r ecove r ed from 
the losses inflicted by Japan. Allege d Russia n infractions 
of the Conve ntion continued to enr age t he I mpe rialists . 12 
?Roge r Schinness , "The North Sea Incident of 190 4" 
(unpub li shed M.A. thesis , State Universi ty of New York a t 
Bingh amton, 19 66 ). 
8Myers memorandum . 
9crea t Br itain , Parli ament , Pa r l i ame ntary Debates , 
4th s e r., CXC (June 4, 19 08) , col s . 246- 52 . 
lOror Curzon's ass essmen t, see I bid ., CLXXXIII 
(Feb. 6, 190 8 ), cols . 999 -1 024 . --
llcrea t Bri tain, Parl i amen t, Parli amentar 
(House o f Common s ), 5th ser. , XL (July 10 , 1912) , cols . 
2035-36. (He r einafter r eferred to as Debates .) See also 
Count Benckendorff (Russ i an ambassador to Grea t Dri t a in) to 
Lord Lansdowne (former Tory Fore i g n Secr etary) , July 11, 
1912, London, Beaverbrook Libr a ry , Bon a r Law Papers , 26/5/2 4 . 
12Impe rialist sentil1e nts we re expressed in Debates , 
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But the views of the party leadership prevailed as Britain 
entered the World War. 
During the 1920's Labourites freque ntly accused 
Tories of having sympathized with political and religiou s 
repression in Tsaris t Russia . 1 3 Admittedly, some Conse rva-
tives had defended the Russia n autocracy as necessary f or 
such a vast land populated by dive r se nation a lities and an 
illite rate peasantry.l4 Howe v e r, the a llegation r emains 
unprove n because Labourites ove rlooked the minority vi ew-
point in the Tory party . Moreover, in the e r a of "old 
diplomacy• gove r nment l eaders from eithe r ma jor party 
rarely criticized the internal policies of othe r countr i es . 
Even such Libera l s as Lord Palme r s t on and Wi lli am Gl adstone 
had made fri e ndly gesture s to Russia.l5 Si l e nce , howe ver , 
did not me an s ympa thy . Once Bri t ain sig ned th e Conve ntion, 
Conservativ e leade rs allowed e x ped i e ncy to prevail- - ye t 
fear r emained . 
XL (July 1 0 , 1 912 ), cols. 1934-44, 1 977- 80. "Sa t urday " 
Hand book for Union i s t Ca nd i dates (London , 1 909 ) , pp . 22 7-
28, conta~ns a typ ~c a l es timate of Ru ss i a n inte ntion s . 
13 Backbenche r Tom Shaw's indic tme nt in De b a t e s, 
CLXIX (J an . 1 6 , 19 24), col. 159, is typ ical. 
14For a r ejoinde r, see the r e ma rks of b a ckbe nche r 
J.D. Rees in Ibid ., XL (July 10, 1912), cols . 20 1 5- 20. 
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The March Revolution 
When the World War began, Cons e rva tives laid aside 
their old animosities. Initially, Russia contributed 
grea tly to the Allied wa r effort , but by ear ly 1917 a 
combination of factors weakened mi litary and civilia n 
morale. On March 12 the Tsarist governme nt collapsed. The 
Cons e rvative press reacted to the March Revolut ion with 
surprise and expectation. Many believed that Russians had 
revolted t o throw off pro-German conspirators in th e gove rn-
ment.16 J. L. Garvin, edi tor of the week ly Obs erve r and 
the ablest Tory journalist, cl a imed tha t the Re volution 
united the Allies in the c ause of liber ty and fr eedom . The 
Spe cta tor ag r eed. l7 
Speaking for the Coalition government in the !louse 
of Commo ns on March 15, Bonar Law c o ngratu lated the Russian 
people 
u pon the establi shment among them of free ins ti-
tutions in full conf i dence that th e y will l ead 
not only to the r apid and happy progre ss of the 
Russ ian nation but t o t he prosecution with r e -
newed s teadfas tness and vigour of t he wa r agains t 
the stro ngho ld of a n autocrat ic mi lita ri sm which 
threa t ens the liberty of Lurooe . 
In his closing r emar ks Law sympa t hize d with the Tsar, "our 
l6Th e Times (London ) , Ma rch 1 6 , 1917, p. 7; Morning 
Post, March 1 6 , 191 7 , p . 4; Dai ly Tel egraph , Ma rch 1 6 , 1917 , 
p. 4; Da ily Mail , March 16, 1 917, p . 4 . 
17obse rver , ~la rch 18, 1 917, pp. 9-10; Specta tor . CXVI I I 
(March 24, 1917) , 3 5 7 . 
loyal Ally • who had laid u pon him by his birth a 
burden which had prove d too he a vy for him."l8 Tories 
habitually portraye d Nichc : a s as a humble, but ine pt , 
patriot who had succumbed to d a nge rous advice fro m in-
competent advisors.l9 
The Tory press' initially o p timi s tic recep tion 
of the Re vo lution soon was t empe r e d. British correspon-
dents in Russia transmitted r eports of the difficultie s 
confronting the ne w Provi siona l government, emphasizing 
especia lly the pacifist propa ganda of t he Pe trograd 
Soviet o f Workmen ' s and Soldi e r s ' De l ega t e s . 20 While the 
Liberal and the Labour press we r e still c ong r a tulating 
6 
the Ru s s ian pe ople, Conse rva tive pape r s focu sed on Russ i a ' s 
internal prob l e ms. The Time s sta t e d tha t extre mi s t 
elements must be dealt with qu i ck ly. Eve n t he Horning Pos t 
acknowledg e d a widesp r ead demand f o r po liti ca l and socia l 
fr e edom , but i t p l eaded with r e vo lutionary l ead e rs t o 
r e membe r tha t Ge rman y ' s defea t was t he ir prima ry g o a l . 
It al s o urge d t hem to b e c aut i ous be c a u se "the age of 
1 8o e ba t es , XCI (Ma rch 15, 1917) , cols . 1421-22. 
19 E .g., I bid ., XC I (Ma rch 1 9 , 1917), col. 1 538 . 
20ouri ng t he life span o f th e Pr ovi s iona l gov e r nme n t, 
Allied corre sponde nts were a c co r ded g r e a t f r e edom o f i nqu i ry , 
intervi e wing t op gov e r nme nt and mili tary l eade r s and tra ve l-
ing wi dely. But ma ny r eporter s fo r Cons e rva tive newspaper s 
reruaine d s ympa t he t ic to the Tsaris t gover nment , and t he i r 
di s pa tch es r ef l ec t e d this bia s . Fo r t he ac t i vit i es of The 
Ti me s ' c orrespondent, Robe r t Wi lton , see The Hi story of--
The Ti me s (Lo ndon , 19 5 2) , IV , Part I , 24 5 .x 
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freedom does not arrive in a night." Just a fortnight after 
the Revolution, the Saturday Review exhorted the Russians 
to submit to an autocrat for the dura tion of the wa r. How-
ever, the Spectator f ea red Bri ton s would make a "great 
mistake" if they bec ame "unduly alarmed" by the activities 
. 21 
of the Petrograd Sov~et. 
Liberals, and especially Labourites, organized mass 
meetings to welcome the Re volution, but To r ies we r e con-
spicuously absent from the podiums . The Mi nister of 
National Service, Neville Chamberlain, perhaps stated the 
feelings of man y Tori e s whe n he wrote, "Th is Russian 
Revolution which by a grim sor t o f irony is rec e ived with 
shouts of approva l by our people as though it we r e going 
to win the wa r for us, is fermenting in a ll the unsteady 
brains of the world."22 
The Provisional governme nt struggled to ma inta in 
Tsarist treaty comm i tments , but t he Socialis t-dominate d 
Petrograd Soviet compounded the ir difficulti e s. Although 
unoppos e d to a d e fensive wa r, the Soviet in s i s t ed on a 
redefinition of war aims. The dissemination of such 
21The Times , March 19, 1917, p. 9; Horning Pos t, 
March 20 , 1917, p . 6; Saturday Revie w, CXXIII (Ma rch 24 , 
1917), 266 ; Specta tor , CXVIII (Ha rc h 24 , 1917), 38 1. The 
Observer, March 18, 1 917, p . 8, agreed with the Spec tator . 
22 Keith Fei l ing , The------·· - ·-----·· - ·- - ----· · 
(London , 1946), pp . 79- 80 . For r eports o f t h r ee o f tnese 
meetings , see The T i mes , March 31, 1917, p. 10 . In Br itish 
Labou r and the Russ ~ an Revolution , pp . 17 - 20 , Graubard 
de ta ~ls Labour 's react~on to t he ~larch Re vo lution . 
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propaganda within t he Russ i a n a r my undermined t he already 
threatened Eas tern fro n t. A l eading pro-Allied membe r of 
the gove rnment wa s forced to r es i gn in early May . The r e -
organized ministry, dominated by soc iali s t Alexander 
Kerensky, notifi ed the Alli es that Russia would seek 
neithe r anne xations no r indemni ties afte r the war. 23 
By this time Tori e s r ea lized the Revolution had 
erupted in oppos itio n to the war and not in support of it. 
Although publicly applaud ing Ke ren sky's policie s, s e ve ral 
Conservative membe rs of the Coa lition private ly expressed 
concern for Russia 's plight . 24 The Tory press also be -
trayed increas ing annoyance a nd alarm. The Time s hope-
fully explaine d that the " peace without a nnexa tion and 
indemn ity" formula r eally was no different from Allied war 
aims . The Observe r, howeve r, charged that such ohra-
seolog y c ould benef i t t he Ce ntral Powers . J. L. Garvin 
also attacked t he Petrograd Soviet fo r its a nti-British 
propaganda c ampaign . 7he Na t ional Review bluntly asked 
the Russians if they r ea lized that freedom depe nded u po n 
23wi lliam He nry Ch ambe rlin , The Russian Revolution , 
1917-1921 (New York, 1935 ), I, 10 0-21, 14 2 - 65 . 
24cf. Bona r Law 's stateme nt in Debates , XCII (April 26, 
1917), col. 2554, with a memorandum by Curzon , May 1 2 , 1917, 
Birmingham , Bi rmingham Unive r sity Library, Sir Auste n 
Chamber lain Papers , AC 20/78 . For another pessimisti c 
estimate , s ee Lord Milne r (Ministe r without Port f olio) to 
Sir George Buchanan ( a=~assador to Russia ), May 15 , 1917, 
cited by Eve lyn Wrench , Alfred Lord Milne r: t he Man of 
No Illusions, 1 854 -1 925 (Lonc.lo n , l958) , p . 32 8 . Forme rly 
a Libe ral , Ml. lne r was , in effec t , a Unionist bv thi s time . 
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Germany's defeat. The Saturday Review typifie d Tory press 
opinion when it exclaimed its inability to understand the 
malaise in Russia. However, the Spe cta tor continued to 
hope that Russia would solve her difficulties without 
. . 25 jeopard~z~ng the war effort. 
Conservative b a ckbenchers spoke out during a 
parliamenta ry debate on war aims held on May 16. Left-
wing Opposition M.P.'s introd uced a motion urgi ng Britain 
to join the Provisional government in renouncing annex-
ations a nd indemni ties. Several pacifist members of the 
Independe nt Labour party praised Russ ia's action, but 
Unionist Halford Mackinder labelled such idealistic 
verbiage as mome nta rily irre levant, and criticized the 
Petrog rad exponents of "anarchy and disorder." In con-
eluding he denounced the folly of allowi ng d emocratic 
procedures during a war against autocracy . Arch-Tory 
General Henry Page Croft stated t ha t the March Revolution 
had been directed against Prussiani sm and not ag a inst the 
war, as had been conte nded by seve r a l Labou r speakers . 
Page Croft insi sted that all Russian political parti es , 
extremists included , were expansionist-minded; he begged 
the government to di sregard their rhetoric. After p ro-
claiming "a vote of c ensur e" ag a ins t the Revo lution , 
22, 1917, p . 7; Observer , Ma y 6 , 
Na tional Revie w, LXIX (Hay , 1 917), 
~ ~ '·· " " " " ' 7) , 446; Spectator , 
Aubrey Herbert exp l ained that all nations use d such 
language to impress world opinion. The Opposition 
. 26 
motion was defeated eas~ly. 
On Ma y 9 the Petrog rad Soviet requested that 
socialists from belligerent countries mee t to discuss 
ways of ending the war. 27 British s ocialis ts responded 
enthusiastically, but many Conse rva tives denounce d the 
Soviets as traitors. The Obse rve r alone s upported the 
proclamation, Garvin feeling that the British govern-
ment would alienate sincere Russian soci a lists if the y 
10 
reacted with ho s tility. 28 Although the g ove r nmen t granted 
permission for three ILP members to attend a pre-confere nce 
meeting in Petrograd, the Seamen's Union r efused to t ake 
them. In Commo ns on June 11 a group of Tory backbench e r s 
attempted to have the passports r escinded . They criticize d 
the Russian government for suppo rting the conference 
and portrayed the country as foundering in chaos. In 
reply Bonar Law s ympathized with Russia ' s plight bu t 
refused to withdraw the passports. 29 
26 Debates , XCIII (May 16, 191 7), cols . 1650-5 7, 
1716-19, 16 90 . 
27The Times , May 12, 1917, p . 6. Merle Fainsod , 
International Socia li sm and the \Vo r ld l•la r (Camb r idge , Mass ., 
l935), pp . 1 6 3-9 0 , examines the abor tive Stockholm Confe r ence . 
28 Observer, June 2, 1917, p. 6. 
29 Debates , XCIV (June 11, 1917), col s . 697-7 30. 
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In the summer the Provisional gove rnment's power 
eroded rapidly when the dis a strous Bru s ilov offensive 
increased Bols hevik influe nce in the Petrograd Soviet. 
The Conservative press now blamed the Bolsheviks for 
Russia's troubl e s. Most Conservatives alleged that the 
Bolshevik minority (also terme d "anarchist" or "Ma ximalist") 
had conspired with their Ge rman p a yma ste rs to drive the 
country out of the war. According to The Time s , "The 
Germans have neve r found so good an inve stme nt for the ir 
forged note s as in financing this d e adly parasite of the 
democratic Revolution.• 30 Many Tory pape rs picture d 
Kerensky and his foll owe rs as vi s ionaries une quip pe d to 
deal with the ex tre mist threat; the y urged Brita in to stop 
supporting him. 31 Se v e ral journal s now r e gre tted the 
Tsar's downfall. In r e ve rsing its pre vious stand, t he 
Saturd a y Re v i ew f e lt, "We should t oday be in sigh t of 
peace had it not b ee n for the March Re volution." 32 Eve n 
the forme rly o p timistic Spe c t a tor c oncluded that Brita in 
30The Time s , Ju l y 2 4 , 1 917, p . 7. On J u l y 20 , p . 6, 
The Times o ff ered "def inite" pr oof t ha t Le nin was i n 
Ge rmany 's p a y . For s i mila r sta t ements , see Dai ly Te l egraph , 
Aug. 2, 1917, p. 4; Specta to r, CXI X (Aug . 4, l 917) , llO - ll ; 
and a s p e ech by Rowl a nd Hunt i n Deba t es , XCV I (Ju l y 31, 
1917), col. 190 3. 
31E.g., Da ily Ma i l , July 2 , 1917, p . 4; Sa t u r d a y 
Review, CXXIV (Aug . 4, 1 917), 81 ; a nd Na ti o na l Re v iew , 
LXIX (July, 1917), 523 . 
also Na t iona 
CXXIV (Aug . 4, 1 917), 58 . See 
(J uly , 1 917), 52 3-24. 
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must proceed with the war as if Russia did not exist . Only 
the English Re vi ew and the Obs e rve r held out glimme rs of 
33 hope. 
In Septembe r the Commande r in Chief of the Russia n 
Army, Gene ral Lavr Kornilov, marched on Pe trog rad to ove r-
throw the tottering gove rnme nt. An avowed rightis t, 
Kornilov wa s supported by severa l British military and 
diploma tic officials in Petrograd. Officially the govern-
ment refused to t ake side s, but Prime Minister David Lloyd 
George and Lord Milne r, among othe rs, priv a t e ly sympathiz ed 
with the Russian genera1. 34 A f ew Conserv a tive papers 
applauded the rebe ls: a lthough acknowl edg ing Kere nsky's 
patriotism, The Times and the Sa turd a y Revi e w felt only 
Kornilov was strong enough to counte r the anarch ical 
Petrograd Soviet. 35 But most journals r ema ine d noncom-
mittal, judging tha t t he tragic confrontat ion would l ead to 
civil war and fin a lly el i mina t e Ru ss i a fr om the war . 3 6 
33
specta tor , CXIX (Ju ly 28 , 1917 ), 76; Eng li sh 
~eview , XXV (July , 1917), 72; Ob s e rve r, Sep t. 2 , 1 917, p . 6. 
1 9 17 -
9 61/ 1 
a 
York , 
35The Time s , Sept. 11, 1917, p. 7; Saturday Re v iew, 
CXXIV (Sept . l S, 1917), 197. 
36o a i1y Mail , Sept . 12, 1 917, 
Sept. 12, 1 917 , p . 4; Specta t o r, CXIX 
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Kere nsky's triumph helped the Bolsheviks, for 
governmental authority virtua lly disappeared . On the 
Eastern front German troops ad vanced almost unopposed . 
During the fall, Tory newspapers drastically r e duced 
coverage of Russian events. The few edi torials depicted 
. 1 . . 37 Russ1a a s a morta 1y-str1cken g1an t. The Observer 
prophesied a successful Bolshe vik r e volution . 38 
One can only outline the Tories ' vi ews between 
the Harch and the Novembe r Revolutions . Rigid wartime 
censorship and the numerous rumors from Russia prevented 
Conservatives , or indeed anyone , from obtaining t he in-
formation nece ssa ry to form accurate judgme nts . Horeover, 
the gove r nme nt forbad e exte nded d e bate on Russia . The 
source material, although fr agmen t a ry, is sugges tive . 
Tories evalua t ed Russian d e velopments a l most exc l usive ly 
within the context of the wa r. Ba ckbe nc he r Halfor d 
Mackinde r p robably sta t e d the i r viewpoint mos t clearly: 
"At this moment it r emains to be seen what will be the 
final vi e w of t he Russ i an d emocra cy , not on general i deals , 
On September 13, p . 7, The Times assumed a neutral pos ition. 
This should serve as a usefu l c o rr e ctive to t he widesp r ead 
belief that Conse r vative ne wspapers almos t unanimously 
supported Kornilov. For an e xamp l e of this misconcep tion, 
see Robert D. Warth , The All ies a nd t he Ru s si a n Re vo lutio n 
(Durham, N.C., 195 4), p . 2 . 
37Mo r ning Pos t, Oct . 6, 1917, p . 4; The Times , 
Oct. 18, 1917 , p. 6. 
38 Obse r ve r, Se pt . 30, 1917, p. 6. 
but on the question--the practical question--of the im-
mediate conduct of the war."3 9 Labour leade rs often 
14 
charged that Conservative s were unsympathe tic to the March 
Revolu tion . 40 With some justification, Tories denied the 
allegation. 41 As the Russian war effor t faltered, howe ve r, 
they deplored t he events which de nied Britain the ass istance 
of he r eastern ally. They did not unders tand how Russians 
could want peace whe n the "hate d Hun" r emai ned unconq uered. 
To the Tories , all Russian extremists we re simply German 
agents. 
The Tories' aversion to British socialism also 
helped to prejudice them a gainst Russ i a. Socialists 
domi n a t ed the Provisional gove r nment after May, 1917, but 
Tory papers failed to und e rstand the Ru s sian socialist 
move me nt. Such phrase s as "ope n diplomacy" and "no 
annexations" were equate d with the trai t orous propos a ls 
of socialist pa cifists li k e Philip Snowde n a nd Ramsay 
MacDonald. On separate occasions t he Eng li s h Review 
and the Spectator ex amine d the tenets of internationa l 
socialism and the i deology of the Petrogra d Sovie t , in-
eluding extracts from the writings of Ka rl Marx . The 
Engli sh Re view article , written by edi tor Austin Harri son , 
39 oeba t es , XCIII (Ha y 16, 1917), col. 16 51. 
40Ibid. , col. 1656, and XCVIII (Nov. 6, 1917), 
col. 2035.--
41Ibid ., XCVI (July 26, 1917), col. 15 20. 
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concluded that Britain would lose Russia's friendship if 
Tories continue d to depict Russian socialists as visionary 
dreame rs, German agents, or anarchists.42 But such 
articles were too few and too l a te to convince the Torie s, 
whose worst fears abo u t Russ ia materialized in November. 
42 Eng li s h Re v i e w, XXV (J uly, 1 917), 69-73; Spec t a t or , 
CXIX (S ept. 1, 19 17 ) , 206-7. 
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C H A P T E R I I 
THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION 
The Bolsheviks Leave the War 
Tory papers offe r ed only brief commentarie s on the 
November 7 Revolution. The T imes calle d it "hardly sur-
prising,• adding that "real Russia ft would neve r conclude 
a separate peace . The Daily Mai l fe lt it made "ve ry 
little difference" to the Allied cause. The Spectator 
echoed othe r journa ls when it predicted that the "An-
archist Gove r nrnen tft would not survive. 1 
The Bolsheviks quickly adopted a series of 
domestic measures at vari a nc e wi t h accep t ed Western g ove rn-
mental practice . On Decembe r 15 at Bres t-Li t ovs k Russia 
signed an a rmistice with the Cent r a l Powe r s . Bol shevik 
foreign po licy s eemed d e signed to p rovoke the Allies . 
They published t he fts ecret trea ties ft between t he Tsa r a nd 
the Wes t, treated foreig n di p l omats with disdain , and 
appealed to the colonial peoples to r e volt. 2 Conservative 
journals generally d i d not c o mment as the Bo l s he vi ks 
embarked on th e ir crusade . The Time s, for exampl e , printed 
1917, o. 2 : Soecta tor. CXIX (Nov. 10. 1 917 ). Sll. See a l s o 
Dail 
Nov. 
2r saac Deut sche r examines So vi e t po licie s a t t his 
time in The Pr oohe t Armed : Trot sky , 1 879-1921 (New York, 
1954), pp . 325 - 60 . 
17 
only two editorials on Russia until the first week of 
Decembe r; and these were conce rned with Soviet foreign 
policy. The whole range of domestic legislation was 
large ly ignored. Such an omission may have been prompted 
by British c ensorship of .r epor t s fro m Petrog r ad; and the 
Bolsheviks b e gan to ha rass for e i gn correspondents. 3 
The Bolsheviks we re dep i c t ed by t he Tory press as 
a band of fan a tic a narchists acting under Germa n instructions; 
only the Daily Telegraph d i ssented . The Morning Post , 
The Times , and the Dai ly ~1ai l claimed the ringleade rs were 
of mixed Russian and German Jewish extraction , t he latter 
paper stating that Le nin was really"Z ede r blum . " 4 No 
Bolshevik act ion surprised t hese ne ws papers. As The Times 
once explained, "We already know what to expect until the 
saner elements among the Russians reassert themse lves. " 5 
The press , however, was not uniformly hostile . The Daily 
Te l eg r aph, and e s pecially the Spec tator , avoided polemics. 
The latter journal believed the "secret treaties " showed 
"Tsarist treachery to have b e en wo r se than the o pen mis-
chiefmak ing of Lenin and his crew."6 Although the p r ess saw 
3The History of The Ti mes , IV , Part I, 256-60. 
4Mornin~ Post~ Dec . 22, 1 917 , p . 4; The Times , Nov. 23, 
1917, p. 7; Da ~ly Ma ~l, Nov. 9 , 1917, p . 6 . See also 
National Rev~ ew , LXX (December , 1917) , 414. 
5The Times , Dec. 5, 1917, p. 9. 
6specta t or , CXIX (Dec . 1, 1917), 63C. . 
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the Bolsheviks as a transi t ory irritant, a few journals 
suggested a need for Allied inte rvention. 7 The Sa turday 
Review and the Morning Post i mp lored Russian " pa triots" 
to revolt and restore Tsardom ; the y argued that only a 
monarchy could rule such a vas t land unschooled in 
8 
democratic principle s. 
Despite the Bolshevik threa t to the war effort, 
Conservative members of the Coalition government were not 
overtly hostile toward them. On December 3, after several 
weeks of discuss ion, the Wa r Cabine t agreed to guarantee 
financial support for A. M. Ka l edin , a pro-Allied Cossack 
general, and other Russians willing to fi gh t again s t 
Germany. Whe n instructed to s e nd agents to the se anti-
Bolshevik g rou p s , ambassador George Buchanan in Pe trog r ad 
replied that a ttempts to continue the strugg l e in war-
weary Russia would "emb itte r her pe ople a g a in s t us ... 9 
Foreign Secre t a ry Arthur Ba l four , also objecting t o the 
policy formulated d u ring hi s absence in Paris, cautioned 
7The Times , Dec. 5, 191 7, p . 7; Morning Po s t, 
Nov. 19, 1917, p. 6. 
8saturda y Re vi ew, CX XIV (D e c . 1, 1917), 431; 
Horning Po s t , De c . 22 , 1917, p . 4. 
9Lord Robert Ce ci l (Tory Unde r-Se cre tary fo r Fore i g n 
Affairs ) to Bucha nan , Dec . 3, 1917, cite d by Loui s Fi sche r, 
Rus s ia' s Ro a d from Peac e to Wa r: Sovi e t Forc i n Re l a tion s , 
~ ew Yo rk , 9 9 , p . 16 ; Bucha na n to Ba our , 
Nov. 27 , 1917, cited b y Si r Ge orge Bucha na n , Mt Mi ss io n t o 
Russi a and othe r Di p l oma ti c Memorie s (Londo n , 923 ) , II , 225. 
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against treating the Bo l sheviks a s avowed enemi es: 
I entire ly dissent fr om this view and believ e it 
to be found e d on a misconcep tion. If, for the 
moment, t he Bo l sheviks show p e culiar virul e nce in 
dealing with the Bri t ish Emp ire , it is probab ly 
because th e y think that t he Bri ti sh Empire i s t he 
grea t obstacle to i mmed iate peace ; but the y a re 
fanatics to whom the cons titutio n of eve ry Sta te, 
whe the r monarchica l or r epublican , i s equ a l ly 
odious . Their appea l i s to every revolutionary 
forc e , economic , social, r acia l, or r eligious , 
which can be used to upse t the existing political 
organisations of mankind .... They a r e dange rous 
dreamers , whose power , be it gre at or small, tran-
sitory or pe r ma ne nt, d e pe nds par tly on Germa n go ld, 
partly on t he determination of t he Ru s si a n army to 
figh t no more; but who wou ld gen uine ly like to put 
into practice the wild theo r i es which hav e s o long 
bee n germinati ng in the shadow of the Ru ss ian 
autocracy . Now, contrary to t he opinio n of some of 
my colleague s , I am clearly of opinion that it i s to 
our ad vantage to avoi d , a s lo ng as poss i b l e , an o pe n 
breach with this crazy system . If this be dr i fting , 
the n I am a drifter by de l i be rate po licy. 
In essence, any provoca tion would give the Bolsheviks a 
reason for welcoming t he Ge rmans as "frie nds and de liv e r e rs." 10 
Bal four ' s r easoning proved convincing . On Decembe r 10 
the Cabinet approve d t he r e l ease of s e ve r a l incarcera t e d 
Bolshevi k a ge nt s and discussed informa l contac ts with the 
Soviet r eg i me . Several min i ste rs we re dubiou s , "Was it 
de s irab l e to treat with both Trot sk i and Kaled in at one and 
the s ame time ?" 11 As the unofficial emis sary to the 
lOMemorandum b y Balfour , Dec . 9 , 1917, Great Brita in, 
Pub lic Record Office , Cabine t Hemoranda , CAB 24/35 . 
(Cabinet Memoranda h e reinafte r cited as CA B 24/ .) 
11\~ar Cabine t minutes , De c. 10, 1917, Grea t Britain , 
Public Re cord Off i ce , Cabine t Minutes , CA B 23/4 . 
(C abinet Hinute s here inafte r ci t e d as CAB 23/ . ) 
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Bolsheviks, the Cab ine t later chose R. Bruce Lockhart , a 
consul recently returne d from Moscow. Convinced that Lenin 
and Trotsky we re German agents, only Lord Rob e rt Cecil 
1 . d 12 2 . . d apparent y obJ e cte . On December 3 Br~ta~n an France 
divided Russia into spheres of influe nce to faci litate 
assista nce to the anti-Bolsheviks . 13 
Britain mai ntai ned this dual policy toward Russia 
aimos t unt i l t he end of the war. A memo randum p r epa r e d by 
Milne r and Cecil summarized the government ' s position . The 
link with the Soviet s was to be us e d primarily to counter 
German influe nce and to a ssure the Bo lshe vik s that aid fo r 
Kal edi n and othe rs wa s a milita ry necessity . It wa s me r e ly 
an accid e nt th a t anti-German forc es a lso we r e anti-
Bols he vik.14 This po licy wa s h a zardous , but as a conve rte d 
15 
Cecil noted , "I think we must be prepa r ed to t ake ri sks . • 
Early in 1918 the Bo l shevik gove r nme n t is sued t h r ee 
decrees which discredi t e d them more wide ly in Dri t ain : 
the Constitue nt As sembly was d is persed , the Orthodox Church 
di s e stabli shed , and all for e i gn loa ns repudia t ed . Some 
12 R. Bruce Lockhart , Brit i s h Agen t (New York , 1933 ), 
pp. 197-98. 
13John Bradle y , Allied Inte rve ntion in Russia (New 
York, 19 68 ), p . 13 . 
14Me morandum by Mi lne r and Ce ci l, De c. 23, 1917 , 
Appendix to Wa r Cabi ne t Minute s , Dec. 26 , 1917, CA D 23/4 . 
15Minu te by Ce cil , J an . 5 , 191 8 , cited by Ull man , 
Interven t ion and t he Wa r , p . 57 . 
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Conse rva t i v e pape r s we r e es pecia lly outra ged b y the d is-
mi ssal of t he Ass e mb l y . 16 Bucha na n late r r ecalle d t ha t 
this ac t ion tu r ne d him aga i ns t the Bolshev iks . 17 The full 
impac t of d e b t r e pudia t ion wa s no t f e lt until af t e r t he 
war, but the Satu r da y Revi ew r emarke d t ha t it exposed t he 
Sovi e t s a s des t royers of world l aw a nd ord e r. 18 
In Brita in at this t i me a gre a t dea l o f a t tent i on 
was c e nte r ed on t h e Bres t -Li tovs k d e l ibe r a t ion s . Le on 
Trotsky k e p t Germany a t arm ' s l e ng t h fo r a l mo s t two months 
with a mixture of t hrea ts and c once s s ions . 19 As t h is d e ad-
lock continued r the Briti s h go ve r nme nt u nde r took a f ulle r 
discus sion o f t he ir Ru s si a n po l icy , pa rticul a rly s i n c e 
Lock h a rt had d epa rted withou t s pec i fi c i ns truction s . 
Haxim Li t v inov h ad b ee n a ppo inted as the Bo l she v i ks ' 
prov isiona l ple ni po t en ti a ry to Brita in , and a f e w Brito n s 
a dvoc a ted a r e ci proc a l ges t ure . 20 Balfour r e a soned th a t a n 
officia l l ink wou l d s treng the n t he Sovi e t s , a mo ve h e n ow 
r egar d e d a s ne c essa ry since Tro t sky' s tactics a t Brest -
Litovs k r e in fo r ced hi s c onvic t i o n t h a t t h e y we re no t 
16E . g ., Spec ta tor , CXX (J an . 2 6 , 1 91 8 ) , 74. 
1 7Bucha n a n , My Mi ss ion t o Ru s s ia , II , 256 . 
18 d . Sa t ur a y Re v1 e w, CXXV (Feb . 16 , 19 1 8 ), 13 0 . 
19J ohn Whee l e r- Benne tt , The Fo r~o tten Peac e : Br es t-
Litovs k, Ma r c h , 191 8 (Londo n , 1 939 ) , 1 s a s t a nd a rd account . 
20 willi am P . Co a t es , Armed Inte rven ti o n i n Russ i a , 
191 8- 192 2 (London , 1 935 ) , p . . 
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German dupes. 21 At a War Cabinet me eting on February 7, 
the Foreign Secreta ry sugges ted giving Lockhart politica l 
credentials. Two fellow Tories ob jec t e d. Lord Rob e rt 
Cecil dissented be cause of the Bolsheviks' anti- British 
propaganda. Lord Curzon r easo ne d th a t e xte nd ing r e cog -
nition while the y we re ncgctiating with the enemy would 
have a "very unfortuna t e ef f e ct in this c ountry." The 
Prime Minister d e cided the matte r; Lockha rt was gra nted 
political credenti a l s to und e r s core the importance of 
his mission. 22 
In Petrogra d Trotsky convince d Lockhart tha t h e 
would coope r a te with the Alli e s if t hey aband o ne d t he 
counterre vo lutiona rie s an d e xte nd e d trade f aci li tics . 23 
Balfour' s equivoca l r e sponse to Lo c khart' s plea f o r 
acceptance unders c o r e d Brita in' s d iff icu lty. Al though 
not disavowi ng coll abo r a ti on , he no t ed t hat t he s ame 
rationa l e h a d l e d t o a s s is t a nc e fo r t he anti- Bo l s hev iks . 
Britain would not c ease su pporting t h e s e g r o ups since 
21wa r Cab ine t mi nu t e s , J a n . 17, J a n. 22 , 1918 , 
CAB 23/5 . The Da i l y Te l eg r aph , J an . 5 , 19 18 , p . 6 , like 
most Tory pape r s , stro ng l y obj e c t ed to o ff i ci a l ties . 
23Lockh a rt, Bri ti sh Age n t, p p . 2 24-2 6 . 
23 
Bolshevik rule would not last. Moreover, the Soviets first 
would have to cease propagandizing in Allied nations. 24 
Britain's dilemma was r esolved in t.he s p ring whe n the 
Bolsheviks accepted harshe r peace terms following a re-
· newed German offensive. 
The Bolsheviks' cond uct at the Brest-Litovsk 
negotiations impressed some Tory papers. Previous ly, only 
the Daily Telegraph had r ef u sed to labe l them as German 
agents. By January, howe v e r, othe rs began to concur. The 
Spectator sugges ted the y we r e "idealists genuinely inspired 
by their mania." The English Review state d: 
The Bolsheviks have undoubted ly scored a moral 
victory at Brest-Litovsk thro ug h the shee r sin-
cerity of bot.h their aims a nd of t heir expos ition. 
For the first time t he old secrecy a nd selfishness 
of dipl omacy h a ve bee n exposed and f lounted before 
the world , and in the process the significance of 
Trotsky has become a world symbol.25 
Despite Brest-Litovsk, some papers continued to print 
•docume ntary" stories of Bo l shevik connec tions wi th the 
Kais e r. 2 6 The Daily Mai l ignored th e pa radox , while 
The Times stated that the Bolsheviks i nc luded both 
idealists and tra itors . 27 However , all Conserv ative 
24 ullman, Intervention and t.he Wa r, pp. 74-75. 
25spec tato r, CXX (Jan. 19, 1918), 55-56; English 
Review, XXVI (February, 19 1 8 ), 179. 
26For a typical expos6, see The Times, Feb. 9, 1918, p. 6. 
27oai ly Mai l, Feb. 26, 19 1 8 , p. 2; The Times , Feb . 26, 
1918, p. 7. 
journals denounced the ir acceptance of the peace terms . 
The Spectator and the Saturday Revi e w c haracterized them 
as cowards. The Time s and t he Daily Te l eg raph f e lt the 
terms were a fitting reward for their d e struction of 
Russia's military might . 28 
24 
Although the British government refused to allow a 
lengthy debate on Russia, Tory backbe nche rs expressed the ir 
attitudes on tange ntial issues. Much of the ir atte ntion 
centere d on Maxim Litvinov, who repeated ly urged British 
workers to spearhead a pe ace movement . Conse rvative 
demands for his expu l s ion revealed a deep-seated fear of 
Bolshe vik ideas on the home front. One Tory described him 
typically as a " rolling stone - -a d ange rous chara cte r." 29 
The gove r nment r e fus ed to e xpel him for f ea r of r eprisals 
against Britons s till in Ru ss ia. 30 Howe v e r, Tory Home 
Secre t a ry Sir Geo r ge Cave pub licly protested . 31 Conser-
vatives applauded t he governmen t's expulsion of Bo l shevik 
agent Leo Kame nev whe n he stopped in Eng l a nd en route 
cxxv 
Dail 
29 oeba t es , CIII (F eb . 25, 191 8 ), cols. 1100-1. 
)Olbid ., CIII (Pe b. 27, 1918), col. 1492. 
Re view, 
7; 
31 rbid ., CIII (F eb . 28, 191 8 ), col. 1624. The e di tor 
of the NatiOnal Revi e w, L. J . 11axse , attacked Conservatives 
in the h'a r Cab~ne t for al l ow ing Li tvi nov t o r ema in fr ee ; 
see Nationa l Re view , LXXI (Ma r ch , 1 9 1 8 ), 1 01 . 
32 to Fra nce . 
Cons e rvative s i ncreas i ng ly equ a t ed t he Bri t i s h 
pacifi s t moveme nt with Bolshevi sm . Ha ny could see no 
diffe r e nce between the Sov i e ts ' pronounc emen ts and those 
25 
of left-wing Labour i t es . Ramsay MacDona l d ' s plea s fo r a n 
unde rstanding o f Russ i a 's p ligh t increased t heir suspicions . 33 
Facing Mac Dona l d in t he House o f Commo ns , Martin Arc hcr-Shee 
no doubt exp r essed the sent ime n t s of fe llow backbenche rs 
whe n he cried , "Your friends are revolutioni s t s .• 34 Ear ly 
in 1918 Tory pape rs a l so b eg an accusing the Labour party 
h . h . . 35 of a rbor~ng Bo l s ev~ k sent uoents . Anxious to a void a 
confli ct with Labou r , the government eve n offe r ed the m a 
f . 1 " . 1 . 3 6 e w ~nnocuous po ~ t ~ca conces s ~on s . 
It is d i ffic u l t t o specify t he na ture of t he Tories ' 
f ear of domes tic r e volut ion . Arno ~ayer ooints to the 
f amous Lansdowne Letter of ~ovember 29 , 191 7 to show t hat 
some f ar - sighted Tories e ve n p r efe rred a compromise peace 
rath e r t han fa ce socia l revolution . 37 In hi s oublic letter 
32Da ilv Mail . Feb . 11 . 1918 . o . 2. 
33 E . g ., Debates , CIII (Feb . 2 7, 19 18 ), col s . 14 81- 82 . 
34Ib i d ., CII I (Fe b . 1 2 , 191 8), col. 47 . 
35Daily Hail , Jun e 24 , 1918 , p . 3; Daily Tele grafh , 
Ma r ch 8 , 1918 , p . 4; Na t iona l Re v iew , LXXI (June , 1918 , 432 . 
36Arno J. Haye r, 
of t he New Di plomacy , 1 
37 I bid ., p. 282 . 
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t he respected Tory elde r state s ma n suggested t ha t a 
continua tion of t he wa r would lea v e t he victo rious All i es 
f . - . 3 8 too exhausted to pro ~t Lrom v~ctory . Maye r r epea t ed ly 
uses t he term "La n sdowne Conse r v a tives , " wh i ch s ugges t s 
a l a r ge and important numbe r of Tory s ympa t h i se r s . 
Haye r's the si s mu s t be app r oa c hed with c au t ion i nasmuch 
as t he l e tte r wa s c r i t icized by mo s t Con se rva tive n ews -
p a pe rs , and La nsdowne f ormu l a t ed hi s ideas l o ng before 
39 
e ven the Harch Rev o lution . Moreov e r , Maye r fa il s to 
n ame a singl e Conse rva tive (othe r tha n Lord Milne r) who 
s h a r ed Lan s d own e ' s vi e wpoint . In s wn , May e r seems t o 
ove rstate t he i mpor t ance of a La n sdowne f ac ti on . Al f r e d 
Go ll i n and othe r hi s tor i<:~ns a r gue tha t ~! ilne r a nd ce rta in 
unn ame d Tory l eaders had conside red a c omp r omise peace by 
gi v ing Germa ny a "f r ee hand" in Bo l shev i k Russ i a . 40 I n 
f a c t , the e v idence i nd i ca t es most Conservativ es wante d 
to block a German t akeove r of Russia . 41 
3Boa il 
39 Lo r d Newton , Lord Lansdowne : 
19 29 ), pp . 4 63 , 469-70 . 
p . 4. 
(London , 
40Go l lin , Proconsu l in Politics , pp . 52 2-77; E . H. 
Carr, A History of Soviet Russ~a , Vols. I - III : The 
Bol shevik Revolut~on , 1917-1923 (London , 195 1- 53) , I II , 
41
rn his exh a u st ive r esearch into British policy 
t oward Russ i a , Ullma n , Int e rvention and t he War , p . 66 , 
f ound no thing to subs tantiate Go llin's claim . For a 
r e c ent rejoinder to th e Gol lin-Hayer thesi s , see Be loff, 
Britain ' s Libera l Emp ire , p . 249 . 
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War time Interven t ion 
Tor ies s uppo r ted All ied in t ervention in Russia 
long bef o re it c omme nced . I n J anuary, 1 918 the War 
Cabinet conc l uded tha t J apan shou l d send a "sufficie n t 
. . 42 forc e" to Vlad~vostok to protect Al l ied s uppl ~ es . 
For the nex t several mon ths the Allies eng ag ed in intense 
d . . . . 43 1scuss ~on s on Japanese ~n tcrvent~on . Ba l four al so 
belie ved it would p r e v e nt Germany from expl oiting the 
. 1 1 f ' b . 44 agr~cu tura r e sources o wes t ern s ~ e r~ a. 
In the con f using pe r iod dur i ng the Dres t-Li t o v s k 
negotiat i ons , Lockha rt often wa rned Ba lfou r t ha t pre -
cipitous ac t ion wou l d throw the Bo l sheviks into Germany ' s 
arms , b ut t he For eign Sec r e t a ry r ep lied t hat he wa s unable 
to understand Bo l shevik fe a rs be c a use the J apa nese wo uld 
come as friends , not invade r s . He r e ite r a t ed that Brita in 
had no desir e to inte rf e re with Russia ' s domes tic affai r s . 4 5 
The Bolsheviks increasing ly accused British "impe =ial is ts" 
of plo tti ng against them . Such outbur s ts p r ompted Ba l fou r 
4 2 . f h . For Lord Robe rt Cec~l ' s r eport o t e meet~ng , see 
George F . Kenn a n , Sovie t - Ame ric a n Re lations , 19 17-1 9 2 0 , 
Vol. I : Russia Le aves t he l-Iar (Princeton , 1 956 ) , pp . 3 16-17 . 
43 Ullman, I ntervention and t he lvar , pp . 9 1-104 . 
44 I b i d ., pp . 104 - 5 . 
45 Ba l four to Lockha r t , March 6 , 1 918 , cited b y I bid ., 
p. 12 3 . --
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to send Lockhart a tel egram detailing his growing 
irritation: 
I accept without r eserve the s tateme nt tha t 
Trotsky and Le nin are not traitors but only 
fan a tics, i f those who know the m say so . But if 
this be the c ase I should h a v e thought that by 
care ful search it would na v e be e n poss ible to 
d e t e ct in Russian policy some a spect that did 
not favour the Germans and did favour the Al lies . 
There is none t hat I c a n find .... They hi nd e r 
us in every way from he lping them and have done 
nothing to he lp the mse lves . It is only on the 
North and the East that t he Alli e s can reach 
Russia with assistance .4 6 
Other Tory ministers we r e e ven l ess conce rned with Bolshevik 
sensitivities . Lord Robert Cecil told r eporters, "I should 
be gl ad if Japan will t ake what action she may see fit • . . 
h . . f . .47 to prevent t e German1zat1on o Russ1a . 
Cons e rvative papers advocate d interve ntion for 
variou s r e asons . The S pectator hoped it would prevent the 
Bolsheviks from capturing t he supplies a t Vladivos tok for 
Germany . The Time s counse l e d t ha t it would afford "the 
Russ ian people t ime ... to recons titute s oci e ty and the 
State upon trul y democr a tic line s ." The Da ily Te l eg r aph 
claimed t ha t Bol sh e vik ob j e ctions we r e not pronounceme nts 
b . 48 y a sovere1gn state . 
On March 14 Commons defeated a n Oppos ition motion 
4 6Ba l £our to Lockh a rt, Marc h 13, 1 918 , cited by I b id ., 
pp. 12 5-26. --
47The Time s , March 11, 191 8 , p . 5. 
48 Sc- ----- · March 14 I \ n , n 
CXX (April 13, 1918 ), 391 ; The Time s , 
9 ; Dai l y Te l e g r aph , Ma rch 2 , l 9lB , p. 4 . 
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against Briti s h involvement in any Sibe ri a n ve nture. 
Among Tory b a ckbenc he rs, Rona l d McNei ll de nied th a t t h e 
Bolsheviks s poke for Russia. Ge orge (la t e r Lord) Lloyd 
believe d they already we re ne stle d in Germany's a rms. 
After chara cte rizing the motio n a s a n i nsult to a loya l 
Ally, J. D. Rees sta t e d tha t only J apan could s a ve 
49 
"prostrate" Ru ss ia from the "Pr e tori a n s at Pe t e r sburg ." 
Responding for the g ov e r nme nt, Balf our d e ni ed a nimo s ity 
toward the Bol shevi ks a nd defende d would - be inte r vent ion 
as an attemp t to r escue defense l ess Ru s s i a ns from Germa n 
50 
enslavement. In sum , Tor ies employed both mi litary and 
politica l a r gume nts to s upport interv e ntio n . 
Inte rventio n s eemed mo re ne cessary af t e r Germany 
launche d he r Western offensiv e in Ma r ch , 191 8 . At t e mp t s 
. . d 51 . h to secure Do l shev~k approva l we re d~scarde . Dur~ng t e 
s umme r Briti sh fo r c e s l ande d in North Russia t o thwar t 
expe cted Germa n a ttacks agai nst Allied supp l ies in the 
region. A sma ll de t achmen t occupied Baku to preve n t t he 
oil f i e l ds f r om fa l ling into Tu rkish ha nd s . In No r th 
Russia t he Br it ish soon e ngaged l oca l Bol shevik forc es . 
More i mpo rtan t, t ens of thousand s o f Al l ied troops poured 
49 Deba t es , CIV (Ma r ch 14, 191 8 ), cols. 52 5-JO, 
531-32, 532- 35 . 
50 Ib id ., cols. 54 5-54. 
51
ul lman, I nte rvent i on and the Wa r, pp . 129 -35. 
L__., 
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. i 52 into Vlad1vostok n August. 
Throughout this period Tory ministe rs reite rated 
the government's inte ntions. As Lord Robert Cecil told 
Commons: 
In our view the domestic polic y of Ru s sia is a 
matter for Rus s ia a l one . Wha t e ve r gove r nme nt t he 
Russians de sire to h a v e , t he Russians o ugh t to 
have, and it is not for u s to inte r fe r e in any 
way in that matter . . . , but we wi sh to s ee 
Russia preserve d a s an Allied c o un t r y , or, if 
that is impos s ible, a s a non -G erma n one .53 
Other Conse rvatives s u pporting inte rve ntion 
disagreed with these o f fici a l declara t ions . Lord 
Sydenham, an old Tory I mpe ri a list, hoped th a t Alli ed a rm i es 
would succor those Ru ss ians "who c he ri s h na tion a l pa triot-
ism" in the i r ef f ort s to r es tore "orde rly gove r nme nt.• 54 
Sir Samue l Hoare, a p r om ine nt b ac kbenche r, advised the 
Foreign Secre t a ry th a t inte rven tion would r a lly anti-
Bolshevik Russ i a n s and caut i oned tha t a f e eble occ u pa tio n 
army would insu lt t hem. 55 Hen r y Page Croft u rged t he Allies 
to proclaim a pro-1'/es t ern t sar, who wou l d t he n form a 
52Ge orge 
192 0 , Vo l. II: 
pa.5Sim. 
53 Debates , CVI (May 1 6 , 19 18), c o l s . 624- 25 . 
54 Lord Sydenham , "Russia , Germany , and the Allie s," 
The Ninetee nth Century and Afte r , LXXXIV (July , 1 918 ), 188- 93 . 
55 Ho a r e to Balfo ur, April 1 8 , 1918 , Camb ridge , The 
University Lib r ary , Lord Templewood (Sir Samue l Hoa r e ) 
Paper s , Box II, Fil e 2. 
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New Russian Army in Siberia with a nucleus of 6,000 
voluntee rs from the Russian community in Britain . With 
the "assistance" of 700,000 Al lied troops, t he t sa r could 
march westward to destroy the Bolsheviks a nd , pre sumably, 
Germany. 56 
In most Tory papers there we re f ewe r reports on 
Russia because atte ntion was focused on the climactic 
struggle in the Wes t; and most Br itish corresponde nts had 
left Russia voluntari ly during the spring or h a d been 
57 h . 
expelle d. T e Tory press applauded the l a nd 1ngs a t 
58 Murmansk and Archange l, As the summe r wore on, t hey 
castigated t he Allies' failure to s e nd troops more quick ly 
to Vladivostok. 59 The o peration was , in t he words of the 
Daily Mail , "too lit tle a nd too l ate. • 60 Most papers 
intimated that intervention also would assis t t he 
"libe r ation" of Russia. 6 1 The Morni ng Post a lone proclaime d 
56 Page Croft to Law , May 4, 1918, Bona r Law Pape r s , 
83/3/14. 
-- -- - ··- -_._v iew , LXXI (June , 19 1 8 ), 405-6; The Times , 
April ~ ~ 5 . 
Times , ~1ay 7, 1918 , p . 7; Dai l y Ma il, J uly 13 , 
1918, 
59 Daily Te l egraph , July 10, 1 918 , p . 4; Daily Mail, 
July 13, 1 918 , p . 8 . 
60 Daily Mai l, Aug . 17, 1918, p . 2. See also Spe ctator, 
CXXI (Aug . 10, 1918) , 150, and The Time s , Aug . 15, 1 918 , p . 7. 
61The Times , Ma y 7, 1918 , p . 7; Dai l y Mai l, July 8 , 1918, 
p. 2; Spectator , CXXI (July 20 , 191 8 ), 62-63 
that intervention "was evide nce that Britain finally de -
cided to interfe r e in Russia's dome s t i c politics." 62 
The Obse rve r and othe r pape rs often spoke of a •real 
Russia" secretly c a rrying t he torch of fr eedom . This 
prompted the Daily Teleg r aph t o qu i p , "It is dif ficult 
to find that r ea l Russia .• 63 Mos t n e ws papers c o unse l e d 
that the Bolsheviks we r e a bout to succumb to p a trio tic 
Russians. 64 In fact, the Soviets did lose the ir earlie r 
confidenc e a t thi s time . 
The Cromie Incide n t 
Bolshe vik l e ade rs r esponded to interven tion b y 
32 
d e nouncing Allied " impe ri a lists. " On Aug u s t 30 Le nin was 
shot and wound e d . The Bolshevi ks suspected Wester n 
comp l icity . Lockhar t was a rres t ed , and on Augu s t 31 
an a rmed mob inv aded t he Briti s h e mb as s y in Pe trogr a d . 
A nava l a ttach6 , Ca p tain F . N. Cromie , r esis t ed the 
intruders but wa s shot after k ill ing at l eas t one 
attacker. The embassy was sacked and t he s t a ff a rrested; 
Cro mie ' s mutila t ed b ody was dragged throug h the stree t s 
62Morning Pos t , Aug . 12, 191 8 , p . 4. 
63obse rve r , May 19 , 1918 , p . 5; Da i l 1 - - ~ -A--c .. 
July 10, 191 8 , p . 4. 
64 
Dai ly Mai l, July 13, 1918, p . 2; The Time s , Aug . 13, 
p. 7, Aug . 17, l9 1 8 , p . 7; Da ily Te l e g raph , Aug . 13 , 1 918 , 
p. 6. 
then left, unburied . A Red t e rror c ont inued for several 
weeks. 65 
This incident outra ge d t he Tories more than any 
preceding Soviet action. Litvinov and two dozen othe r 
Bolshev iks in Britain we re arrested and de t a ined as 
33 
hostages . Ba lfour t e l egr aphed the Sovie t Fore ign Ministe r, 
Gregory Chiche rin: 
Should the Russi a n Sovi e t gove r nme nt f a il to 
give complete sati sfaction or should an y furth e r 
acts of viol e nce be c ommi tted aga ins t a Briti s h 
subject, His Majesty's Govc r nne nt will ho ld the 
members of the Sovie t gove r nrr.e nt individua lly 
responsible and will make e ve ry endeavour to 
secure that the y shall be treated as outl aws by 
the gove rnme nts of a ll civilize d na tion s and t ha t 
no place of r e fug e s ha ll be l ef t to t hem . 6 o 
Conservative journa ls r~buk ~d th e Sovie t s in 
near-hyste ric a l editorials . e Times now c al l ed them 
"savages out s ide t he pa l e of civilisation." The Daily Ma il 
dismiss e d th em as "so many v ampires . • Ev e n t he Spec t a tor 
concluded , "It i s s ure ly i d l e to pretend any long e r tha t 
1 h . . . ,67 the Bo s cv~k l eade rs are no t our b~tter enem~ es .' 
Previous ly, t he Sovie t s had no t been s ubj ecte d to such 
65Lockhar t, Briti sh Agen t , pp . 305 -2 0 . 
66The Ti mes , Sept. 5 , 19 18 , p . 6 . Af t er sev e r a l weeks 
of inte nse negot~ations , the t wo ; i des ag r eed to r e l ease 
their hostages ; see Ul lma n, Intervention and the Wa r, 
pp. 293- 96 . 
Times , Se p t. 5, 1918 , p . 6; Da ily Nai l, Sept. 18, 
1918, p. 2; Specta tor , CXXI (Sep t . 7, 1918 ), 240 . See a l s o 
Daily Tc l egrapn , Sept . 10 , 19 1 8 , p . 6 , a nd Saturday Revie w, 
CXXVI (Scot . 7 , 191 8), 809 . 
34 
intense Tory abuse. Admittedly , such a rch-Tory publi-
cations as the Morning Post and the National Review were 
consistently hostile . 68 However, othe r journa l s like the 
Spectator , the Eng lish Review , and the Obse rve r made some 
attempt to understand the ideological basis of the Soviets' 
actions ; the y were desc ribed occasiona lly as hones t, if 
. "d d f . 69 m1 sgu1 e , anat1cs . At time s the press attrib uted t he 
chaos in Russia to ignorance of d emocra tic institutions . 70 
A few papers o pe ned their columns to Soviet sympath ize rs; 
even the Daily ~ail once printe d a perceptive estimate of 
Bolshevism by Hamilton Fyfe , a we ll-known partisa n. 71 
The Times pub li s hed seve r a l l etters fr om Litvinov and even 
. . . 
72 f . ff . an 1nte rv1 e w w1th Trotsky. Be ore the Crom1e a a1r , 
editorials r a r ely ment ioned Bo l shevik a trocities; the 
execution of Tsa r Nicho las, f o r examp l e , was virtually 
ignored .73 The Cromie incident al so incensed Tory 
68 Na tional Revi e w, LXXI 
~·Aug . 13 , 1918 , p . 4 . 
(July, 1918 ), 102; Horning 
69
s ee 
174 -75, and 
CXXV I (J uly 
16 , 191 8 ) , 
19 1 8 ), 17 8-79. 
, 191 8 ), 64 
71Daily Mai l, Jan. 9 , 1918 , p. 2 . The Tirr.e s , Dec.l3, 
1917, p . 7, and Obse r ve r , Dec. 16, 1917 , p . 10, also 
prin t ed t empe r ate a ccoun ts by contributor s . 
72The Times , Dec . 7, 1917, p. 8 . 
73 ror one of the f e w editori als, s ee Morni ng Po s t, 
July 29, 19 1 8 , p . 4. No Conservative in Commons e x p ressed 
regret when t he Tsar ' s dea t h was a nnounc ed . 
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politicians. Balfour's harsh note contras ted sharply with 
his earlier concili a tory statements. In the following 
decade Tory backbenchers r e called t h is outrage more often 
than any othe r. 
Steadily incre asing Tory hos tility towa r d the 
Bolsheviks during 1918 was based on current political 
and milita ry d e v e lopme nts. Soviet ide olog y wa s only a 
minor conside ration; indeed , mos t Conservatives mis-
unde rstood or disregarded the ge nes is of Dolshevism . They 
probably would have r eacted as strong ly had the Dolshe viks 
been capitalists. Politicians and newspapers seeking their 
ouster were distraught by the specter of a Germa nized 
Rus sia . However, the unexpe cted Armistice suddenly 
eliminated the rationale fo r intervention. Paradoxically, 
Tories we r e not di smay e d. Cromie ' s death and the eme r ging 
~fuite movements e nable d them to d e v e l op and mainta in a new 
justification for overthrowing the Bol shev i ks long afte r 
the de f ea t of Germany . 
C H A P T E R I I I 
POSTWAR INTERVE NTION 
Attempts to Formulate Policy 
When the World War was e nd ing, Britain discarde d 
veiled interve ntion in favor of a clearly anti-Bols he vik 
policy. After receiving German pe ace f ee lers in early 
Octobe r, Balfour directe d various mini s t e rs to prepare 
position pa pe rs on future Ru ss ian policy. 1 Tory Lord 
36 
Robert Cecil wrote that b e c a use of fin a ncial and dome stic 
considerations Brita in could not afford to keep troop s in 
Russia indefinitely. As an alte rn a tive , he s ugges ted that 
the Alli e s combine their a rm i es in a gre at "crusade " to 
1 . f . 2 prevent Bo shev~ sm r om engul f ~ng a d efea t e d Germany. 
Balfour's own memorandum r ef u sed to c on t emp l a t e an Allied 
invasion: "This cou n t r y would c erta i nly r e fu se to see its 
forces, af te r more th an four yea r s o f s t renuo us f i ghting , 
dissi pa t e d ove r the h uge expan s e o f Russ i a in o rde r to carry 
out polit ica l r e forms i n a Sta t e wh ich is no longe r a 
bellig e r e nt Ally." Howe v e r, he c on t i nued , Br i t a in was 
1war Cab ine t minutes , Oc t. 1 8, 1 918, CAB 23/8 . For a 
recent a na l ysis of the fo rmation of Br itish po l icy a t t his 
time, s e e Mic hae l Fr y , "Bri ta i n , the Allies , and t he Pr ob l em 
of Ru ss i a , 1 918-19 19 ," Ca nad i an Journ a l of Hi s tory , II 
(September, 1 96 7), 62- 84 . 
2Memorandum by Ce cil, Oct. 20, 1918, CAB 24/67. 
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morally obliged to offe r arms and money to the White govern-
ments founded unde r Allied protection. The policy was im-
perfect, but "it is all that we can accomplish in existing 
circumstances." 3 This me morand um offe r ed a d e f e nsible 
justification for Britain's pos twar inte rve ntion. To those 
desiring a total pullout, the Cabine t could s ay tha t 
abandoning the White s would be dishonorab l e ; mo r e ove r, 
Britain was not r e ally conce rne d with inte rna l Rus s i a n 
affairs. On the othe r h a nd, p ropone n ts of a deepe r in-
volvement could b e told tha t the gov e r nment was doing eve ry-
thing possible with s uch limite d means. 
Two days afte r the Armistice a conf e r e nce of gove rn-
ment official s prai sed Ba l f our's pap e r. Lord Robert Ce cil 
summari z ed the pre va iling sentiment, "Our ob j ec t should be 
to help the [ a nti- Sovi e t) Russ i ans t o stand by themse lves . " 
The group ag r eed t o ma in ta in Bri t ish f orces i n Murmansk , 
Archangel, a nd Siber i a , and o f fer de facto r e cogni tion a nd 
military h a r dwa r e f o r the Wh ite a dministra t ion in Si beri a . 4 
On Novembe r 14 the Cab ine t endorsed t h i s pla n, b ut 
3Memorandum b y Ba lfou r, Nov.l, 1918, Appe nd ix t o Yla r 
Cabine t mi nutes , Dec. 10 , 191 8 , CAB 23/8 . See a l so a simi l a r 
memorandum b y Sir Henry Wilson (Commande r in Chief of t he 
Imperial Gene r a l S t aff) , Nov . 1 3 , 1918 , cited by Ar no J. 
Mayer, Pol i ti cs a nd Di l omac of Peacema kin : Contai nment 
and Counterrevolut~o n a t Ve rsa~ l cs , 9 - 9 l.e w Yo r k , 
1967), pp . 31 0-1 2 . 
4Minutes of a Co nfe r e nce o f ~in is ters , Nov. 13, 191 8 , 
Appendix to Wa r Cabine t minutes , Nov. 14, 191 8 , CAB 23/8 . 
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several ministers feared the public might consider their 
policy to be a disguised anti-Bolshevism. After repea ting 
Balfour's rebuttal, Cecil also pointed out that Britain 
had not supported the anti-Bolshevik Ukrainian puppet 
government set up recently by the Germans. However, Milner 
felt that "where there was in existence a friendly anti-
Bolshevik Governme nt which i t was to our advantage to 
support, we should support it, and we ought to support it, 
even though it e ntaile d anti-Bolshevik a ction." The Cabinet 
concluded, "The principle stated by Lord Milne r should b e 
accepted." 5 Thus Milner stated unequivocally the thesis 
which Balfour had c amou flag ed in his memor andum . 
On Decembe r 10 the Cab ine t aga in r e turned to the 
Russian issue. After this time the Prime 1-!inis t e r dominated 
Cabine t discussions of Russia . Skeptica l about r ecent ly 
adopted policy, he stated that because t he ant i-Bo l shev iks 
were weak , Brita in wa s foolish to keep 10,00 0 t roops in 
Russia "until Bolshe vi sm was d e f eated ." Moreove r, th e 
soldiers would mutiny if st a tioned there indef initely. 
Bal four and Curzon wanted t o hold t he troops there a t l east 
until the Whites we re stronge r. Discussion was the n 
6 postponed . 
At an I mpe rial War Cabinet meeti ng on December 23, 
War Se cre t ary Winston Churchill eme r ged as t he strongest 
5
war Cabine t minutes , Nov. 14, 1918, CAB 23/8. 
6 r bid ., De c. 10, 1918 . 
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advocate of massive Alli ed inte rven t i on. He r easoned t ha t 
small forces would b e usele ss in the vast e xpanse of Russ i a . 
The Allies must eit~er withd raw comp l e t e ly or invade with 
enough volunte ers to ove rthrow the Sovie ts. Lloyd George 
denounced the latte r ide a on military and political g rcunds , 
adding that the Ru s si a n pe o p l e a ppea r e d to b e sympathe tic 
to the Bolshe viks . Britain's policy wa s inc on s i s t e nt, 
he continue d: she obj e cted to Sovi e t p ropag a nda , but h e r 
troops were shooting Bol s he vi k s on Ru ss ian s oil. Lloyd 
George concluded tha t r ece ntly r e ce ive d Do l she v i k pe a c e 
feelers should b e s tud i e d s e riou s ly. The I mperi a l War 
Cabinet accepted t he sugg e s t i on, with n e ith e r Churchi ll no r 
his chief supporte r s , Milne r a nd Cu r z o n, ob j ec ting . 7 
In the eve nt, th e Soviet p r opo s a l s we r e ne v e r 
consid e r ed by the Cabine t. 8 At t he i r l as t me e t i ng before 
the Peac e Confe r e nce c onve n ed , the I mpe ri a l l~a r Cab ine t 
again watch e d a v e rba l sparri ng ma tch betwe e n Ch u rchill and 
Lloyd Ge orge . The c omba t a n ts a g r e ed o nly t ha t s ome 
definitive d e c i s i on wa s ne ce s s a ry to avo i d "d i sas t e r ." 
Wa r Ca b i ne t mee t ing o f 
Richard H. Ul l ma n , 
o l . I I : Br itain and t he 
··--- -- ·· --· - - .. __ , .. - · - ··-- - , - - - - __ b r uary , 1920 ( P r ~ ncc ton , 
Cn.r n \ n n ~"~""' ""'- T - ! - , • - ~ -'-! _ .._ wa s composed of 
fr om t he Empi r e 
8Ibid ., pp. 93- 9 4. Ul l ma n a t t rib ute s t hi s to Ba l fou r ' s 
dilator y attitude i n sec ur i ng d efinite pr opo s a ls fro m Maxim 
Litvi nov, a nd especi a l l y t o F r e nch o ppos i tion . 
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Since Lloyd George believed that a deeper All ied commitment 
would strengthen Bo l shevism, he hoped the Cabinet would 
allow "representatives of all sections of Russia" to re-
concile their diff e r e nces at the Peace Conference. Lord 
Rober t Cecil seemed especially concerned that th e Whites 
IDight be abandoned. The I mperial Wa r Cabine t's conclusion 
supposedly provided a Russian policy: 
It was generally ag r eed tha t, in ca s e s wh e r e there 
was an external ag g r es sion by the Bol s he vi ks aga ins t 
an existing Government with which we had been co-
operating, we should be enti tl e d to support th a t 
Government in any manne r which did not involve mili -
tary intervention, and t hat our gen e ral policy shou l d 
be that o f ••. "walling o ff a fire in a mine." 
This new "genera l policy" only e l iminated mass ive inter-
vention. It did not deal with British troops then fighting 
the Bolsheviks. In essence , the Cab inet did not come to 
grips with t he Russi a n prob l e m. 
The se Cabinet discussion s off e r only limi t ed in s i ghts 
into t he vi ews of Tory mini s t e rs. Official minutes a re 
sketchy, the o pin ions of some ministers are u nk nown , and 
others , like Lord Rob e rt Cecil , apparently c hang e d the ir minds 
frequently. Fin a l ly , Lloyd Ge orge inhibited his colle a g ue s . 
In hi s pre sence they ofte n said little or did not ex oress 
their true fe e ling s . Their me ch anical affirma tions of his 
suggestions sometime s fal se ly ind icate concurr e nce. With 
9Excerpts from the minu t es of the I mperial War Cabinet 
meeting of Dece mbe r 31 , 19 18 can be found in David Ll oyd 
George , Memoirs of the Peac e Conf e r e nce (N ew Haven , 1939) , 
I, 214- 1 . 
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the poss i b l e e xcep t i on of Ba l fou r, mos t To ry minis t e rs may 
well have desire d a pos twa r inva sion of Russ i a , b ut the y 
accepted the counte r arg uments without quest i o n. The 
coincidence of the Cromie incide nt with the Armi s tice per-
haps crysta llize d t he ir dorma nt a nti- Bolshev ism . Howe v e r, 
their moral conce rn for the Whites c a nnot be di smi ssed 
lightly; the arg ume nt n e ver would h a v e b ee n emp loyed so 
frequently at Cab ine t mee ting s if it were me r e ly a fa~ade . 
Tories fail e d to realize tha t the lfhites could ove rcome the 
Soviets only if Britai n we r e p r epared to of fe r e xtens ive 
assistance . I ronically, Churchill d i d . In s um, Cons e r-
vative minis te rs' o p inions r es t ed somewhere be twee n th e 
polarize d vi e ws of Churchill a nd Ll oyd George . 
During these mo n ths the g overnmen t did not pub l i cize 
their Ru ss i a n pol i cy. 10 Labour M. P .'s e xp r essed con c e rn 
over the presence of British troops i n Russ i a , but th e ir 
questio ns wen t una nswere d .ll Lord Rob e rt Cecil p l eased 
some M.P.'s wh e n he told Commo ns o n Nov embe r 18 th a t Brit a in 
would no t u nde rtak e "seriou s mi l i t a r y operations " anywhe re. 
But he added tha t the gov ernme nt would have been "mo r e tha n 
12 justified " in r espond i ng to the embassy o u tr age with " arms ." 
lOA l e fti s t p ub licist has sugges t ed tha t th is s ilence 
was part of a gov e r nme ntal conspi r ac y to p revent the Bri t i sh 
public fr om knowing t he r ea l po licy of ma s s ive inte rven tion ; 
see Coa t es , Armed Inte rve ntion in Ru ssia , p . 1 38 . 
llcraubard, British Labou r and t he Russian Re v o l ution, 
pp. 64-67, exami nes Labour activ1ty at th 1s t1me . 
12 Deba t es , ex (Nov. 18, 1 9 1 8 ), c o l. 326 3. 
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Conservative papers con t a i ne d f ew c ommen ts on Ru s sia 
at this time . Officia l sile nce promp t e d the Specta t o r to 
13 
remark, "We are all in t he d a rk about the facts." In 
mid-Decembe r the ve il wa s lifte d brie f ly when Lord Mi l ne r, 
without Cabine t a pprova l, p ub li s he d a l e tte r i n t e nd e d to 
dispe l doubts about the gove r nme nt's inte nti on s . He wrote 
that abandonme nt of the "thousand s " of loy a l Russ i a n allies 
before they we r e se lf-supporting wou l d be "contra ry to e ve ry 
British ins tinct of ho nour a nd huma n i ty." He concluded: 
If the Allie s we r e all to s cra mb l e ou t of Ru s s i a 
at once , t he r e s ult would almos t c e r t a inly be t ha t 
the barba ri s m, wh ic h a t p r e s e nt r e i g n s i n a pa rt 
only of t ha t country , wou l d spr e a d ove r t he whol e 
of it, inc luding t he v as t r e g i o ns o f Northe rn a nd 
Ce ntral As i a , wh ich we r e i nc lud e d in the d om in i ons 
of the Ts a r s . The ult i ma t e c on s equences o f s uc h 
a dis a ste r c anno t b e for e seen.l4 
Conse rva tive pub lica tions a ccep t ed t he e x p l a nat i o n , b ut t he 
Daily Te l eg r a ph added , "The c o untry i s e ntitled to mo r e i n-
formati o n t ha n t hat." 15 By t he end of De c e mbe r a f e w 
Conse rvative j ourna l s c ritici zed Milne r' s s ug g e s t ion o f a 
phase d troop with d r a wa l. Be lie v i ng t ha t pe ace wo u l d no t 
come until th e Bols hevi k "inf e ct i on" was cur e d , the Ho rning 
Post and th e Sa t urd ay Re vie w s ugges t ed a pa inless r e med y--
13slectato r , CXX I (De c. 28, 19 1 8), 748. See al s o The 
History o The T~me s , IV, Part I, 458 . 
14Th e T ime s , De c. 19, 191 8 , p. B. 
15Ibid., Dec. 19, 191 8 , p . 9 ; Specta t o r , CXX I (De c. 21, 
1918), 7r8;Daily Ha i l , J a n. 10, 1919 , p . 4 ; Da i l y Te l e g raph , 
Dec • 19 , 19 1 a , p . 6 . 
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a small army of Allied volunteers to overthrow the Soviets. 
Even the moderate Spectator asserted that the Allies could 
not avoid policing the world. 16 
The results of the national election held in Decem-
ber influenced Anglo-Soviet relations. 17 Many issues con-
fronting the coming Peace Conference were debated, but Russia 
was virtually ignored by Tory politicians and newspapers . 
The Conservative party printe d only one small l eafle t on 
the question. The detailed El e ction Note s distributed by 
the Tory Central Office just briefly mentioned Soviet 
desertion during the war and the excess e s of their 
•experiment.• 18 
Domes tic "Bolshe vism," however, was a lively issue. 
Stalwart Unionists accused Labour candidates of selling 
themselves to the Soviets. 19 Eve n Coalition leaders 
blurred the distinction between British socialism and 
Bolshe vism. On election eve Llo yd George prophesied 
Britain's destruction if Labour triumphe d. 20 The Tories 
16Morning Pos t, De c. 21, 1918, p . 4; Saturd a y Re vi e w, 
CXXVI (De c . 28 , l 91 8 ) , 11 9 5 ; Specta t o r , CXXI (De c . 2 8 , l9 l8 ), 
748. Se e also Na tio na l Review, LXXII (J anuary, 19 19 ) , 547 . 
ana l ys is of t h e e lection, see A. J. P. 
-··9u - ·· ·· - - - - ry , 19 14 -1 9 45 , Ox ford History of Eng land 
' • ~n < 125- ) 0 . 
a re in Rus sia (London, 1918), pamphlet no. 1916; 
------- ·· ··--- - f o r 19 18 (Londo n, 191 8), pamphle t no . 1859. 
19The Times, De c. 3, 1918, p . 6. 
20Maye r, Politics and Dipl omacy o f Pe a c emak i ng , p. 159. 
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secured an independent majority, while Labour's pacifist 
wing and the independent Libe rals were decimated . Arno 
Mayer note s correc tly that Lloyd George's tri umph was •too 
complete•; he now ne eded the Conse rva tives more t han the y 
needed him. 21 Lloyd Ge orge soon found that he had to move 
cautiously with parliament on Russia. 
The First Signs of Tory Dis c onte nt 
In the we ek s following t he Armistice Britai n h ad 
developed he r Russian policy in isolation from he r Allies, 
but Russia b e c ame a commo n problem soon after the Peace 
Confe r ence conve ned in J a nua ry. 22 Ba lfour and Cec il were 
the only Cons e rva t ive me~bcrs of t he Bri ti sh Empire De l e -
gation, and they were not within the Allies' d e ci sion-
making e lite . At Versai lles t he Prime Ministe r i mmediate l y 
asked for a con fere nce with the va rious Rus s i a n governme nts 
to di s cuss pe ace . At a mee t ing of t h e Big Fo ur on J a nua ry 16, 
Lloyd George attempted to c alm t he Fre nch , who a dama nt ly 
oppos ed any conta cts with t he Sov i e ts. He was not , he s a id , 
advocating Bo l shevik r ecogn itio n , nor wa s he offe ring them 
See al so Wh a t ----··- · --- - ---- -- -· .. · ·-- --· ·- ___ ··--- -- _ _ 
would li ke to J ?! ' -' / .,._ .3- \ n,n \ \- \ .._ - i n A 
21Mayer, Polit i cs and t he Diplomacy of Peac e makin g , 
p. 163. 
22The best work on Ru s sia and the Peace Confe r ence is 
John M. Thomps o n , Bol s he vi sm , and t he Versa illes 
~ (Prince ton , . 
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a s e at at the Peace Confe r ence. He wa s me r e ly facing 
reality b e c a use the Sovi e t s could not be d i s l odged b y an 
invas ion o r e v e n a c o r don s a nitai r e . The French we r e un-
moved, but Presid e nt Woodrow Wilson supporte d Ll oyd Geor ge . 23 
The Prime Ministe r b e c ame f ur i o us wi t h French i n t ransigence. 
Bonar Law, the Tory l eader, told him that i f h e p r essu red 
France t he Coa lition would coll apse b e cause " t he Co nser-
vative p a rty fe lt stro ng l y on t he s u b j e ct of Bol shevi sm ." 
Lloyd Ge org e r e t o r ted , "I f t ha t is the c ase t he gove r nme n t 
had b e tte r be broken.• 24 He i g no r e d t he wa r ni ng. 
At a British Empire De l ega tion mee t i ng on J an uary 2 0, 
Balfour backed Law. After Ll oyd George t hreate ned to pul l 
Britain o u t o f Russia un l ess h is conference was he l d , the 
De l egation agree d t o support h i m. 25 France c oncurred 
reluc t an t ly . The All i es asked t he wa rring factions to 
arrange a truce and then mee t with them i n mid-February at 
a Bl a c k Sea r e sort to arri v e at " s ome unde rst and ing and 
agreeme nt b y which Ru s sia may wor k out her own purpo ses .• 26 
The so-ca l l e d Pr inkipo invitation was d e nounced by 
2 3Excerpts from t he minu t es of t he mee ting a 
pri n ted in Lloyd Geor ge , Memoi r s of t he Peace Con 
I, 217- 22 . 
24
ullman , Britain and t he Russ i a n Civi l Wa r , pp . 105-6 . 
25Ex c e rpts f r om the minutes of the mee ting are r e -
printed in Lloyd Geor ge , Memoirs of the Peace Conference , 
I, 22 6- 32. 
26 h . d f . . d T e e n t1re ra t 1 s r epr1nte in I bid . , pp . 2 3 8- 39 . 
conservatives in most Allied c ountries . 27 Quite sur-
prisingly, it received an initially mixed r esponse in 
Tory publications . Some journa ls attacked Lloyd George 
28 
for negotiating with the Bo l shevik u s urpe rs. On the 
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other hand , the Observ e r, the Spectator, and The Times f e lt 
the Bolsheviks should h a v e an opportunity to di sp lay the ir 
good faith. 29 The Times later r eversed this stand whe n 
correspondent 11. Wickham Steed became convinced that 
Prinki po was dividing France and Bri tain. 30 
The Prinkipo plan soo n was i mpe riled when the Whites 
. . "k 31 . h" refus e d to neg ot~ a te w~th the Bo l shev~ s. Aga~nst t ~s 
backdrop the Prime Mini s t e r returned to Eng l and in ea rly 
February . Backbench opponen ts of Pr inkipo expr essed the ir 
views when the new parli amen t convened . Clement Edwa r ds , 
lead e r of the Nationa l Democ r a tic par ty (a pro -Coali ti on 
breakaway fr om t he Soc i al i s t par t y ), warne d the Prime 




of Peacema ki nq , pp. 
J a n. 26 , 1919, p . 6; S.------- -
0; The Time s , Jan . 23 , ' ft • ft 
CXXII 
11. 
30The History of The Time s , IV, Part I, 465-66. 
31John 1\ . White , The Siberi an In te rve ntion (Prince ton, 
1950), pp . 334-36. 
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action. 32 Gene r al Henry Page Croft, head of the National 
party (a splinter group o f e xtremist Tori e s forme d during 
the war), accus e d Lloyd George of contrave ning t he electors' 
anti-Bolshevik ma ndate . 33 Lord Curzon, Coalition l eader in 
the House of Lords, e mphasize d that Prinkipo did not en-
vision Bolshevik r e cognition. Perhaps to protect himse lf 
from criticism, he then d e nounce d the Soviets f or a ttemp ting 
to foment domestic r e volution. Lo rd Salisbury applauded 
curzon's speech but stated that if the plan failed, the 
government might be forc e d to use volunte er armies to root 
1 . 34 out Bo shevl.sm. 
To quiet his critics the Prime Minister appe ared in 
Commons o n February 12. Before he spoke Tory Walter Guinne ss 
chara cterized Bo l s hevi sm as an e ph eme r a l movement fin a nce d 
32 oeba t e s , CXII (Feb. 11, 1919), col. 8 2. The Na tiona l 
Democratlc par ty r e c e ived 200 , 000 v o t es in t he 1 9 18 e l e ctio n 
and s ea t e d 9 M. P. ' s . It wa s virul e nt l y an ti-Bol she v ik . 
33 Ibid ., col. 86 . In De c embe r , 19 1 8 National p a rty 
candidate s r ece ived 94 , 000 votes and we r e success ful i n 
only 2 constituencies . In 192 0 t he membe rs r e tur ned to the 
Tory fold. Ve ry little is k nown abou t the ir o pe rations . 
In his autob i og r aphy , M~ Life of Strife (London, 1948 ), 
Lord Crof t provides an 1nco~p lete p l.cturc . One his to r ian 
claims the p a rty' s i d eology wa s qu ite simi l a r to t h a t of 
Cont inenta l p r o t o- f asc i s t gro u ps , bu t 
overdrawn the c ompa r ison ; see Mayer , 
of Pea c e.making , pp . 77- 8 2. 
34 For the speeche s of Curzon and Salisbury, s ec Gr ea t 
Britain, Parli ament, Pa r l i ame ntar y Debate s (hous e of Lords ), 
5th ser., XX XIII (Fel.J . 11, 19 1 9 ) , cols . 38-44, 46-4 7. 
(Hereinaf t er r e f e rred to as Lo r ds De bates .) 
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by German gold. Raving suffe red terribly, loyal Russians 
now asked for moral encouragement and arms to overcome the 
usurpers; but the government wanted to abandon the m. "The 
safety of civilisation" required support for the exponents 
of "law and order." Sir Samuel Hoare saw in Prinkipo "the 
embodiment of this policy of uncertainty and he sitation." 
The government must decide une quivocally to support either 
the Reds or the Whites. Although conce ding that the 
Bolsheviks controlle d most of Russia, Hoare be lieve d that 
recognition would betray t he principles u pheld by the war. 
Besides, their absurd economic policie s would d e stroy the m 
"in the nea r future." Moral a nd military ass ista nce to the 
Whites was mandatory. Perhaps with an e ye on the Labour 
benche s, Hoare asserte d that the White s were not r e actiona ry, 
or even cons e rvative , since the y include d r ad ical s ocialists. 35 
In his fir s t parli ame nta ry speech on Russ ia since the 
Bolshe vik Re volutio n, Lloyd Georg e s tressed tha t Prinkipo 
was the only r eali s tic wa y to r es tore orde r. 36 His defe ns e 
apparently f a iled to convince some Tor ies . John Gre tto n 
followe d wi th a s tir r ing a p pea l on b e ha lf of t he Whites .37 
d 1 . . . . 38 Lord Lans owne ater vo1 ced h 1 s s c ept1c1 s m. Se ve ral 
35o e ba tes, CXII (Fe b. 12, 191 9 ), cols. 183-85, 187-89. 
36 Ibid., cols. 194-98. 
37 Ibid., cols. 198-99. 
38Lords Deba t e s , XXXIII (F eb . 13, 1919), col s . 96-101. 
Cabinet ministers also disapproved . Balfour privately 
confided his misgivings to Churchill. 39 When the War 
Cabinet discussed Russia on February 12, Curzon and 
Churchill characte rized PrinJ<ipo as a serious blow to 
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White prestige. They requested additional aid for the an ti-
Soviets. However, most ministers, including the ne w 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Auste n Chamberlain, s e conded 
Lloyd Ge org e 's pessimistic summary of the Whites' position. 
Lloyd George's obj ections prevailed, and the mee ting ended 
with nothing to replace Prinkipo, which was finally 
abandoned a short time later. 4° For the ne xt six wee ks 
the Peace Confer e nce also turned fr om the Russian question. 
During this interlude Balfour reflected on Britain ' s 
dilemma. The Red Army, he wrote, was rapid ly increasing in 
strengthi whil e the Whites we r e unable to advance. Uni-
lateral withdrawal would be tr a y the Whites and perhaps 
encourage the Bo lshevi ks to attack the West. Significantly, 
he could not offe r any policy suggestions. 41 In contrast, 
Winston Churchill called u pon t he Allies e ithe r to attack 
or ma ke peace with the Bolsheviks : "They a r e pausing mid-
way betwee n these two cours e s with an equal dislike of 
39Balfour to Churchi ll, Feb. 16, 1919, British Museum, 
Lord Balfour Papers, Add. MSS, 4969 4. 
40war Cabine t minutes , Feb. 12, 1919, CAB 23/9. The 
War Cabinet was r e taine d u n til l ate in the year. 
41Mernorandum by Balfour, Feb.lS, 1919, Ba lfour Papers , 
Add. MSS, 497 51. 
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either.-42 
Tory backbenchers also were unde cide d on a Russian 
policy. During the lull at Versailles some M.P.'s were 
content to denounce Prinkipo. 43 A few we re intere sted only 
in the safety of British troop s in Rus s ia. 44 Most we re 
concerned with the fate of the White s if British troop s 
were withdrawn. Sir Samuel Scott vividly portraye d the ir 
apprehension, "If we leave them unprote cte d we h a nd the m 
over to be killed by Chine s e execution." 45 At this time 
Conservatives we re unimp r e s sed by the White s' military 
capabilities . Some Tory backbenche rs argue d that British 
troops should r emain to pre ve nt a catastrophic union of 
Bolshevik and Ge rma n force s. 46 Appare ntly alone in his 
party at this time , Lord La nsd owne calle d for an e a rly 
withdrawa l of Briti s h force s for financial and domes tic 
reasons.
47 A f ew b a c kbencher s ob j e cte d to furthe r troop 
42
churchill to Lloyd Ge o r g e , Feb . 27, 191 9 , cite d b y 
Winston Churc hill, The Af t erma th , 1 9 1 8-1 928 (Ne w Yo r k , 
1929), pp. 179- 80 . 
43 E.g., the r e ma r ks of Wi l f r e d As h l e y a nd Wa l t e r 
Guinness in De b a t e s , CXII (Feb . 20 , 1 91 9 ), col. 110 3 , a nd 
CXIII (March 3 , 1 919 ), c o l. 92 . 
44 E.g., the speech by Sir J. H. David s on in I b i d ., 
CXIII (March 3, 1919 ), col. 16 2. ----
45 b ' I l.d., col. 104. 
46Ibid., CXIII (March 5, 1919 ), col. 538. 
47 Lord s De ba t es , XXXIII (F eb . 25, 1919), cols. 273-76. 
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commitments. Howe ver, Martin Arc he r-Shee , among othe rs, 
felt that a Western voluntee r army of 1 50,0 0 0 me n could 
destroy the Soviets. 49 Finally, ma ny Tory M.P.'s use d 
vague or ambiguous language . In sum , the Torie s ' sug-
gested Russi a n policies r a nged f ar a nd wide . 
Most Conse rvative publica tions were more r e tice nt 
about policy. A few right-wing journa l s continued to urge 
further Allie d involvement. The Obs e rv e r joine d t he ir 
ranks, "It is time to stop t he fut i l e t es ti ng of qua ck 
nostrums for the Bolshe vi s t dis e a se . The r e is only one 
remedy.• 50 Howe ver, ma ny r e fu sed to take a stand until 
the gove r nment a c t e d. The Spec t ator d emanded a pos itive 
policy, eithe r pro- Red or pro-Wh i te. 51 Acco rding to the 
Daily Mail, "If t he Bolsheviks h a ve e xi sted for nearly two 
years, this was not d ue to any c a pacity of t h e irs , but 
solely to Allied p r eoccupatio n and indecision .· 52 In 
contrast to the f ew editoria ls o n Ru sso- Brit ish r e l a t i on s , 
48E.g., th e c omme n t s o f Freder i ck Young and Mo n t ag ue 
Barlow in Debate s , CXI II (Ma rch 3, 1919 ), co l . 157, a nd 
CXIV (Ma r ch 27 , 19 19 ), co l. 753 . 
49 I b i d ., CXI V (Ma r ch 27, 1919 ), col. 75 4. See a l s o 
Lord Denb~gh ' s l e tte r in The Times , Harch 29 , 19 19 , p . 7. 
50 . Observe r, Apr~l 1 3 , 19 19 , p . 11. See al so Sa tu r day 
Review, CXXVI I (Ha rc h 29 , 1919 ), 29 4. 
51s pec tator , CXX II (Apr il 12, 19 19 ), 58 7. See a l s o 
L. J. Maxse (editor o f the Na tiona l Review) to Hoa re , 
March 3, 1919, Temp l ewood Pape rs , Oox 11 , File 2 . 
52
oai ly Ma il, Hay 13, 19 19 , p . 6 . See a l so The Times , 
5, 1919 , p . 13 . 
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Tory publications abounded in ant i-Sovie t polemics. 
The Emergence of Rabid Anti-Bolshevi sm 
After the Cromie i ncident Tory papers g e ne rally did 
not comme nt on the Sovi e ts again until the spring of 1919. 
But during the r e maind e r of the year virtua lly every Tory 
journal fr e que ntly expressed hatred for Bolshe vi sm . The 
Daily Teleg ra ph portrayed it as 
a pitiless policy of blood and fir e di r e cted 
again s t all me n, wome n, a nd c hi l d r en who at t emp t 
or are be lie v ed to be sympathet ic with any attempt 
to impede the onward prog r ess of t hese mons t e r s of 
disorde r, murde r, and r obbe ry, who appea l to t he 
lowest in s tincts o f the i gnorant , the needy , and 
the criminals. SJ 
The Daily Ma il s a w Bo l shevism as a disease feeding on h unger 
and want, "a barre n po licy of disorganization and destruc t ion." 
To the Spect ator it was •rooted in t he foul e st crimes of 
which the huma n brute is c apab l e ." The Mo rning Pos t 
char acteri zed it as a "te rrib l e comb ina tion of Ye llow Peril, 
Red Te rror, and the Black Hand ." 54 Such evaluations we r e 
promp ted , in part, by r epor t s rece ived fr om Russ i a . 
Tory pape r s no l onger e mp l oye d corresponde nts in 
Bolshevik-occupied a r eas , the ir informa tion being supplied 
53oai ly Te l eg r aph, March 20, 1919 , p . 8. 
54oailt Mai l, May 13, 191 9 , p. 6; Specta tor , CXXII I 
(Nov. 22, 19 9 ) , 678; Norning Pos t , Jan. 16 , 19 19 , p. 4. 
See also Observer , Feb . 16 , 191 9 , p . 9 . 
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chiefly by reporte rs in Vl adivosto k, He lsink i, Wa rs aw, a nd 
White-controlle d area s who r o uti ne ly transmitte d to London 
virtually every story or r umor provided by t he Whites . The 
Helsink i corres ponde nt for The Ti mes o nce d e scribed dog 
flesh selling ope nly in Pe trog r ad ma r ke ts for fifty roubles 
per pound; rats pres umab ly we r e more p a latab le be c ause the y 
were bringing a hig he r price . 55 Such fictitious a ccounts 
were publi s he d without editoria l e v a lua tion. A Da i ly Mail 
editorial of March 7, 19 19 c onta ined a typ i ca l des cription 
of life unde r the Bol s he vik s , telling how the y murde r e d 
their enemies and starved t h e populace into submis s ion. 
Chines e me rce n a r ie s shot a ll We s t Euro pea ns on sight. 
Marriag e was outlawe d; wome n we r e " nation a lized" and became 
mere ch a tte ls. Rus sia had become a g i gant ic brothe l, a 
•living he ll" on ear th. Eve n suc h mode r a t e To ry pu b l i-
. h . d . . l . 56 cat1ons a s t e Spe ctato r pa1nte s 1m1 a r oort ra1ts . 
The ir r eade r s pe r haps r e li shed these ta l es . The 
Time s once a nnounce d that a widespre a d pub lic dema nd r e -
quired r eprinting a l e tte r f r om a Briti sh o ff i c e r in South 
Russia who h ad r ecounted a se r ies of a lleged Bolshe v ik 
excesses wh i c h woul d h a v e c h illed the mos t avid r ead e r o f 
SSThe Times , Ma r ch 17, 1 919 , p. 10. 
56 oa il~ Ma il, Ma rch 7, 19 19 , p . 4; Specta t or , CXX I I I 
(July 5, 191 ) , 2. Re f e r e nces to "Chine s e me rc e na ri e s " 
appeared quite fr e quent l y. App a r e n t l y they we r e Ce n t r a l 
Asiatic Bo l she vik trooos . 
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Gothic horrors. 57 Some Tory M.P.'s we re distressing ly 
impressionable: Sir Park Goff onc e wrote , "Ch inese l eg ions, 
who perform executions for the Bo l shevi sts at 50 roub l es a 
head, are selling the fl esh of the ir v ic tims for h uma n 
consumption, passing it off as veal a t f abulous price s. · 58 
The Conservative press indicted t he Bo l s h e vik s for 
much of t he turmoil the n rocking t he Western world. In 
this r egard Bo l s he vi sm was vie we d usually as a n i mpe riali sm 
or as a disease , frequ e ntly inf lue nz a . The Observ e r called 
it an "all-de vouring" contami nator . The Times agreed: 
"With a log ic-mad creed like t his mod e ration is suic i de . 
It must be e xtreme or peri sh . It mu s t force itse l f on othe r 
nations." The Specta t or s tated : "To expec t them to se ttle 
down as an orde rly politica l party is v ery much like expect-
ing a r efo rmed Be nga l t i ge r to draw a milk c a rt. • 59 
The ubiq uitous Sovi ets al so we r e a ccus e d of p r omoting 
poli tic a l, socia l, and ind u s tri a l unres t in Latin Ame r ica , 
f . d . 60 h . ab . A r~c a, an As~a . T e T ~mes once r eported an ort~ve 
MBol shevi k " r evolution in t he r emote Goulburn Is l and., , 
located o ff t he coast of northe rn Australia : a native had 
57 
The Times , Nov. 14, 1 9 19, pp. 13-14. 
58 Ibid., March 1 5 , 191 9 , p . 9. 
59 o bse rve r, J a n . 26, 19 19 , p . 6; The Times , Aug . 12, 
1919, p. l l; Spec t ator, CXXII (J an . 25, 1 91 9 ) , 9 0 . 
60The Times , April 23, 19 19, p . 13. 
become infected through contac t with a passing Europe an 
h . 61 s l.p. 
Surprising ly, Tory papers minimized t he role of 
Soviet agents and money in fomenting unrest in Britain. 
Even the rig ht-wing Saturd ay Revi e w dismissed rumors of 
their domestic machi na tions a s "nonse ns e ." A nwnber of 
55 
Tory backbenchers agreed, b ut it is unclear if t heir words 
were motivated by conviction or by a des ire to avoid 
exacerba ting domestic t ens ions. 62 However, they spared no 
words in condemning so-call e d "British Bo l shevists ," a 
label applied to Sovi e t apologists . Labour-spons ored 
action groups , such a s t he ''Hands off Russ i a Committee ," 
. 63 
were espec1.ally abused. 
Conservative s rema in~d dee p ly concerne d with th e 
specte r of German d omina tion of Bol shevi sm . The Daily Ma il, 
for one , proclaime d th a t t he Re d Army depe nded o n Ge r many 
for supplies. But mo s t newspape r s we re l ess c e rta in. At 
one point The Times s t a t ed th a t the Red Army was dire cted 
61 r b i d. , April 1 5 , 1919, p . 11. 
62
saturd a y Revi ew , CXXVIII (Aug . 16, 1 919 ), 14 5 . Tory 
democra t Lord Hen r y Cave ndish - Oen tinck c a lle d it a "pure 
bogey"; se e Deba tes , CXI II (Ma rch 17, 1919 ), col. 17 20. Se e 
also the dou b t s expressed by Sir Wi lli am Hal l in Deba t es , 
CXIV (April 2 , 1919) , col. 1330 . The Na tiona l Rev1.ew , LXXIII 
(Marc h , 191 9 ), 16 , agr eed . 
63E.g., The Times , J an . 20, p. 4, Aug . 12, p. 12, 
Nov • 11 , 19 19 , p . 16 . 
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secretly by Ge rman g e ne r a l s employing Ge r man cons cripts ; 
later it d e nie d any Ru s so-German a ffili a tion. The Sa tu rday 
Revi e w once claimed that the Bols he vi k s we r e su s t a ined by 
German support, but l a t e r it c a lled for Ge r man a ss istance 
64 
to topp le them . 
Some Tory publications g rud g i ngly beg an to r e cogniz e 
the abilitie s of Bolshe vik l eade r s . The press pre vious ly 
had d escribed t hem a s a g roup, ne ve r a s i n d ivid u a l s . In 
March, 1919 The Times publi shed a se ries wh i c h char ac t er i zed 
Lenin as a maniacal genius wi U1 Sparta n pe rs o na l hab its . 
Trotsky and othe rs we r e c a lled me n of boun dless e nerg y a nd 
organizing tale n ts . The Obs e rver saw Le nin a s a ne w 
Mahome t, "an hone st and sinis te r fa n a tic o f i mme ns e abil i ty 
whom some of t ho se who hav e had the bes t o pportunity of 
studying h im r egard him as t he mos t form i dab l e s i ng l e 
figure t h r ow n u p b y t h e war . " 65 
Duri ng t he wa r a f e w To r y j o u rnals had made halting 
attempts to desc r ibe Bo l shev ik doctr i ne . ow t he y i gnored 
Marxi sm a l mos t c omp l e t e ly. Occas i ona l r e f e r e nce s to the 
"ma d c reed " we nt unexp l a i ne d . I n 19 19 The Times ment i one d 
64 Daily Ma i l, Ma r ch 25 , 19 19 , p. 4; The Times , 
March 25 , p . 1 3 , Ju l y 17, 19 19 , p . 1 3 ; Sa t urda y Re vi e w, 
CXXVII (J an . 11, 1 919 ), 25 , CXXVII I (Oct . 25 , 19 19 ), 3 77. 
65 
Th e Times , March 25 , p. 11, Ma rch 26 , p. 11, 
April 7, 1919 , p . 1 0 ; Obs erve r, Ma rch 30, 1919 , p . 1 0 . 
See al so Da ily Te l eg r aph , March 20 , 1 9 19 , p. B. 
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Marxism only twice in its editorials pages, and these 
citations were superficial and hardly accurate: 
The Bolshevist ideal state would stif l e the soul 
and mind o f the individua l more comp l ete ly than the 
narrowest , th e mos t degrading of r e ligion s , and 
would delive r his body and all of his possessions to 
an abject and hopeless slavery. Lenin and his 
accomplices are prepared to wade to their utopia 
through a sea of innocen t blood. Were ma n ever 
to endure Bolshevist equality , he would assuredly 
be •little more than a monkey."66 
The government supported Tory depictions o f Bol-
shevism by publishing a White paper on April 5 entitled, 
11 . f . . . .67 h •A Co ect~on o Reports on Bolshev~sm ~n Russ~a . T e 
report had originated with a Cab ine t decision in November , 
1918 to inform the public of Bolshe vik e xcesses. Lord 
Curzon directed Foreign Office officials to interview 
recently repatriated re sidents of Russia and to solicit 
reports fro m civil and military officials assigned to the 
White governments. 68 
The ninety-page r eport rival ed and ofte n surpassed 
the credulous narrative s printed concurren tly in Tory 
papers. Exagge rated tales by r epa tria ted citizens are 
understandable be caus e ma ny had been i mprisoned by t h 
66The Times , Oct . 22, 1919, p . 13; see a lso April 1, 
1919, p. 13 . 
67 . . 1 ' 1' Great Br~ta~n, Par 1arnent, Par ~ arne ntarl Pafers , 
(Hous e of Commons and Comm and) , (Russ1 a no . 1, 919 , 
Cmnd. 8, (London, 1919). 
68war Cabinet minutes, Nov. 14, 1918, CAB 23/8. 
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Bolsheviks. Anonymity also prote cted them . However, the 
government accepted at face value the dispatche s filed by 
their agents. General Frederick Poole, for example, wrote 
from South Russia: 
Commissariats of fr ee l ove h a v e bee n established 
in several towns, and r espectable wome n flogged 
for r efusing to yie ld. Dec r ee of n a tionalisation 
of women has been put into forc e , and seve r a l ex-
periments made to n a tionalise child r e n.6 9 
Most of these stories were bas e d on informa tion supplie d by 
•trustworthy" Whites , who eithe r ha d witnessed the allege d 
incide nts or who had "close connec tions" in Soviet-occup ied 
areas. 
The Conservative Central Office r eprinted the White 
Paper under the title , "Bolshevism in Russia or Re volutionary 
Sociali sm in Pr actice.• 70 The r eport also had a grea t i mpact 
on the Tories , who were then dea li ng with anothe r of Lloyd 
George ' s attemp ts to solve the Russ ian problem . 71 
Tory Pres s ure Intens i f i es 
After t he Russ i a n factio ns f ai l e d to mee t a t Prinkipo , 
Lloyd Ge orge and Presiden t Hil son sent an unofficia l mission 
to Moscow to r eques t t h e Soviets ' t erms for ending the civil 
69
·A Collection of Report s on Bolshevis m in Russ i a ," 
p. 19. 
70 (London, 1919), p amphlet [no number). 
71 . 1 . Obse rve r , April 13, 1919 , p. 11, and Nat~ona Rev~ ew, 
LXxiii (May , l 9l9) , 41 6 , o ffered fa v o r ab l e c omments . 
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war. William Bullitt, a membe r of the Ame rica n d e l egation 
at Versailles, led the group. 72 Bullitt found that the 
Bolshevik proposal s we re close to the t e rms th a t the 
United States and Britain alre a dy had ag r eed u pon: an 
immediate ceas e fire, withdra wal of all foreign troops, 
demobilizatio n of all native Rus s ian armi e s and, signifi-
cantly, mainte nance of the t e rritorial and political 
status quo. 
Whe n Bullitt r e turned to Paris at the e nd of March, 
he discove r e d tha t his own d e lega tion ha d los t interes t in 
the project, but he met with Lloyd Ge orge on ~arch 27. 
When hande d the Sovie t propo s a l s , the Prime Minis t e r pointed 
to a typical anti- Bol s h e vik ed itori a l in t he Da ily Ma il 
(Paris edi tion) and excla i med, "As long as the British 
Press is d o i ng thi s k ind of thing how c a n you expect me to 
be sensibl e abou t Ru s sia? " Although be li e ving t ha t t he 
terms we r e sincer e , Ll oyd Geor ge arg ue d tha t t he Briti sh 
public would no t a ccep t t hem becau se o f Bull i t t 's youth a nd 
known r ad i ca li sm . 73 Writte n by the editor, H. Wi c kham Steed , 
the Da i l y Mai l ar t i cl e a l so i n t i ma ted tha t t he Allies 
72 For the detai l s o f t he Bull it t mi ssion , see 
Thomps on, Russ i a , Bolshe vi sm , and th e Ve r sai ll e s Peace , pp . 
131-77, 23 -
73willi am Bull it t, The Bullit t Mi ss i on (New Yo r k , 
1919) 1 PP • 66 - 67 o 
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were contemp l at1ng anot e r Pr1,~1po-type s cheme . 
London soon was filled with rumors about a ne goti-
ated s e ttleme nt with the Soviets . 75 In Commons on April 3 
Sir Samuel Hoare asked if the gove rnme nt kne w a William 
"Bullet" [sic) who h ad arrive d r ecen tly in Paris with 
Bolshe vik peace proposals. Give n advance notice , Bonar Law 
replied that the Prime Ministe r h ad just disavowed any 
knowledge of Bullitt. 76 This deni a l and a l a ter one f ailed 
to satisfy disgruntled backbe nche r s . 77 During the same 
week the circulation of the White Paper on Bolshe vism 
intensified Tory unres t. 
After r e c e iving i nforma tion doc umenting Bullitt's 
mission,Cl eme nt Edwa r ds moved an adjournme nt of the House 
on April 9. Altho ugh he was unsure of some of the Sovie t 
proposals : "The r e are one or two terms that we do know 
of to a certain ty, and one of the t erms i s this, tha t t he 
whol e of t he Rus s i an people are to be r ecognized as subj ec t s 
of the Bolshevik r eg i me ." Edward s charged t ha t "if fo r any 
miss i o n. 
The Time s , April 3, 1919, p. 11. 
7 6oe bates , CXIV (April 3, 1919), eels . 13 27-30 , 1334. 
77Ibid., CXIV (Apri l 7, 1 919 ), col. 164 8 . 
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reason s . this country saw fit to grant r ecognition in 
that way, the vas t majority of the House of Commo ns would 
. . .78 repud~ate ~t. 
In seconding the adjournme nt motion Henry Page Croft 
emphasized that discus s ion s with the Soviets would weaken 
Britain's stand against her own "Bolsheviks." If the go-
vernrnent did not stand by "rea l Russia ," Bol shevism would 
spread to Germany and possibly China, bring ing "the end of 
civilisation, the end of Christi a nity. ."Walte r 
. 79 . . Gu~nness concurred . Other 'l'ory speakers echoed S~r John 
David son who r ema rked , "Personally, I h a ve neve r been in 
favour of making a pact with the devi1 .• 80 Edwards withdrew 
his motion after being as sured tha t the Prime ~!inis te r would 
be informed of their conce rn. 
On Page Croft's advice , al a r me d backbe nche rs sent a 
telegram to Lloyd Ge orge urg ing th e gove r nme nt not to re-
cognize the Bolshevik s. Cons ervatives p robab ly were h eavily 
repres e nted among the 200 sig natori es . 81 When shown this 
telegr am and ano the r pro testing against a soft pe ace with 
Germany , Bo nar Law convi nc e d t he Pr i me Ministe r to r e turn 
78 I bid ., CXIV (April 9, 191 9 ), cols. 2142-48 . 
79
rbid ., cols. 2153, 21 5 4-6 0 . 
80 rbid ., col s . 2165-66 . 
81The Times , April 10, 1919, p . 13. Apparently no 
list of t he s~gnator i es has survived . 
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home "to que ll the threa tened upri sing .• 82 
Lloyd George wa s greeted by hostile Tory p r ess 
editorials. 83 Whe n addressing parliament on April 16, he 
attempted to d ispe l Tory fears by again d e nying that Soviet 
recognition had eve r b ee n discussed . Although denouncing 
Bolshe vik horrors, h e ruled out an invasion on fin a ncial 
grounds. A binding mora l obligation ne cessitated con tinued 
support for the h'hites and the Border States , but he s till 
hoped for a peac eful solution . 84 
Subsequen t Tory s peakers r esponded c a utiou s ly. 
Samue l Hoa re seemed quite relieved, but he asserted that 
only White r ecognition wou ld destroy Bol shevi sm a nd end the 
vacill ation a t the Peace Confere nce . Walter Guinness 
apologized to the Prime Ministe r for the troub l e s caused by 
hi s parli amenta ry critics, yet he, t oo , echoed Hoare's 
suggestion . J . G. J ameson r ebuked the containment policy , 
"You c an keep sheep in a r in;ed fenc e but not r avenous 
wolves , like the Bo l shevi ks." Since he be l i e ved Brita in 
eventual l y would have to fi gh t, "I think it would pay the 
Governme nt t o strike a b l ow a t t h e vita ls of Bol shevi sm a nd 
. . .as prevent ~t r unn~ng ove r Eu r ope. 
82 Lloyd George , Hemo irs of the Peace Conference , I, 37 5 . 
83 E.g., Observe r, April 13, 1919, p. 11, and The 
History of The T ~me s , IV , Part I, 499 . 
84
oebatcs, CXTV (April 16 , 1919), col s . 293 9-46. 
85 I bid ., cols . 29 8 4- 86 , 2995-96 , 302 1-22 . 
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Although Tory press crit icisms did not c ease , Lloyd 
George survived the threate ned parliamentary revolt un-
scathed.86 By denying any knowledge of Bullitt he showed 
a willingness to sacrifice truth for expediency. More ove r, 
his uncomp romising attack on Bolshevism dur.ing t he debate 
contrasted sharply with his moderate tone at Cabinet 
meetings. Ironica lly, the crisis had been fueled by back-
bench misunderstanding of the Soviet proposals . Both sets 
of terms had called for all Russ i an governmen ts to r e tain 
control of their occupied t e rritories. But shortly af t er 
the April d ebate it appeared as if the Tories should n e v e r 
again have to worry about the Sovi ets . 
Kc;;lchak 's Advance and Tory Hopes 
Until the spring of 1 9 19 Wh ite forces had been unable 
to advance against the Red Army. Then in March Admira l 
Aleksandr Kolchak ' s Siberian army launched a three-prong e d 
attack. By the end of April h is forces had drive n to 
within 200 miles of Hoscow. In the South Denikin's Volun-
teer Army mov ed northward . A White army wa s form e d in 
Northwest Russia . At the same time , the various anti-
Bolshevik governments acknow l edged Kolchak as their supreme 
86 . . . E.g., The T1me s, n.d., Morn1ng Post , n.d., c1ted by 
Mayer, Politic s a nd Dl p loMa cy of Pe a cema k ing , p. 645; and 




Anticipating a possible Bolshevik collapse, the War 
Cabinet decided on April 29 that the Allies shoul d con-
ditionally r ecognize Kolchak. 88 In Paris Lloyd George 
also strong ly supported t he ~'hites. He finally convince d 
a reluctant Preside nt \'/i lson that the Allies could prevent 
Kolcha k from wande ring from his self-professed d e mocratic 
path. 89 On May 26 the Allies offered conditional r e cog-
nition to Kolchak, but his affirma tive reply was not re-
ceived before a Red counteroffensive in June had forced him 
. h d 90 to retreat rap1dly. The proposa l was t en droppe . 
When Kolchak moved forward, Conservative papers 
abandoned the ir non-committal stand on Russo-British 
relations by rallying around t he Wh ite banner . With each 
new victory the y increas ing ly d emanded full de jure recog -




ullma n , Brit a in a nd t he Ru ss i a n Civi l Wa r , 
pp. 162- 63. 
89 1 . . . . Mayer, Po 1t1cs and D1p l omacy of Peac emak 1 ng , 
pp. 818-24. 
90The Allied note and extracts fr om Kolcha~s r ep ly 
are reprinted in Church ill, The Aft erma t h , pp . 1 83- 86 . 
91E.g., Dail~ Tele! r aph , Ma y 23, 1919 , p . 10; The 
Times , Ma y 1 9 , 191 , p . 3 ; a nd Na tiona l Re vi ew, LXXIII 
(June, 1919) , 486 . 
65 
. 92 . d1tional terms . Tory backbenchers a lso J umped on the 
White bandwagon. Before the mid-April Easte r r ecess, 
Thomas Inskip was the only o ne among them who took a s t and 
against r ecogni tion at the momen t. 93 
Throughout the entire period o f Allied intervention, 
many Tory M.P.'s tried to rally support for the Whites , 
and their ex t ra-parliamentary activities peaked during 
Kolchak 's spring of fensive . Those most intere ste d in the 
Russian question j oined the Coalition Foreign Affairs Group . 
Founde d early in 1919 it included about thirty-five Con-
servatives and very few Coalition Libera l s and Labourites. 
Samue l Hoare was e l ec ted Chairman , and Walter Guinness 
served as Secretary. Tory membe rs repres en t ed all sec tors 
within t he party, including young progressive backbenchers 
like Earl Winte rton , Edward Wood ( later Lord Ha lifax), 
Willi am Ormsby-Gore , Lord Henry Cavendi sh- Bentinck , and 
Oswa ld Mosle y . 
After studying the Russian prob l em the Group con-
elud e d tha t Wes tern security r equire d the des truction of 
Bolshevism . To this e nd, they advoca t ed ex tensive mili t ary 
. f h . 94 . d h . ass1 stance or t e Wh 1tes. Gu1nnes s an Hoare we re t e 1r 
92 ( . Spe ctator , CX XI I Ma y 31, 1919) , 68 9; Da 1lr Te l e g r aph , 
Hay 27, 1 9 19 , p . 10; Mo r n in~ Post , Ma y 27, 1919 , c1te d b y 
Coates , A.rme d Interve ntion 1n Russ i a , p . 213 . 
93 De bates , CXIV (March 27 , 1919), col. 756. 
94 Hoare to Churchill, Feb . 27, 1919 , Lloyd Georg e 
Papers , F/8/3/24 . This l etter also include d a li s t of the 
Group ' s me mb e r s hip . 
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parliamentary spokesmen. Apart fr om spee c hes , t he ir main 
activity seems to have been writing l etters to their Cabi ne t 
hero, Winston Churchill. Whe ne ve r the Whites we re on the 
verge of a military breakthroug h, the Group promp tly urged 
. . B . . h 95 h~m to ~ncrease r~t1s support. 
The Group established close contac t s with White 
representative s at Ve r sailles . The t ask was made e a s i er by 
Hoare's pers onal fri e nd sh ip with s uch prominen t figures as 
Peter Struve and Se rgei Sazonov, Ko l chak's politica l 
representative in Paris . Hoare fr equently upda t ed t hem on 
British public o pinio n and cautioned th em to wear a libe ral 
96 
mantle . When IVhite dig nitaries visited England , Hoa r e or 
Guinness ofte n acted as t he ir hosts . In May, 1919 Hoare 
arranged for Sazonov to meet unoff icial ly with severa l 
mini sters . Although a schedu l e d meeting with Churchill was 
neve r he ld, Sazonov d id t alk with a numbe r of Tory back -
benchers.9 7 Private dinne r par ties give n by Guinne ss and 
Hoare in hi s honor were attended by a f ew Cab inet mini ste r s , 
95 . . . . ff . For a typ1ca l plea, see Coal~t1on Fore1gn A a1 r s 
Grou p to Chur c hill , July 12 , 1919 , Ibid ., F/9/1/7 . 
96 E.g ., Hoare to Struve , May 28 , 19 19 , Temp l ewood 
Papers, Box II, File 3. One Tory M. P ., Comma nde r Olive r 
Locker - Lampson , conside red a r equest by Sazonov tha t he go 
to Paris to work clo se ly with the Wh ites , bu t at t he l ast 
moment he became Austen Ch ambe rlain ' s parliamentary private 
secretary ; see Locker-Lampson to Chambe rlain, J a n . 28 , 19 19 , 
Auste n Chambe rlain Pape r s , AC 24/1/3 6 . 
97The Times , May 27, 1 919 , p . 1 4. See a lso Hoare to 
Churchi ll, ~lay 14 , 1919 , and Hoare to Lord Crewe (ambassador 
to France ), May 20 , 1919, Templewood Papers , Box II , File 3 . 
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including Lord Curzon. 98 Gene r a l Golovin, Kolchak ' s mili-
tary representative , visited a t leas t twice in 1919. In 
March he dis c uss e d t he ~~ites ' prospects with the Group. 99 
In May he pleaded for gre a t e r ass i s t a nce. During this l atter 
visit Hoare arra ng ed for Golovin to see Churchill privately. 
After two meetings with the War Se cre t ary, he l e ft England, 
100 
apparently satisfied . 
The Coalition Foreign Affairs Group h ad li tt l e 
influence on Britain ' s Russian policy. Their ch amp ion in 
the Cabine t, Churchill, was hims e lf ofte n in a minority of 
one. But, unlike Churchill, th e Group neve r sought an in-
vasion of Russia. Hoare re a lized t he ir h e lplessne ss , 
"The re wa s little t ha t I o r th e group of Me mb e r s with whom 
. ,101 I work could accomp ll. s h.' 
Many anti- Bo l she vik Torie s sent l e tte r s t o Conser-
vative ne ws pa pe r s , and a f e w wrote pres s a rticles , u s u a lly 
weavi ng stories of Bo l shevik horrors with urg e nt p leas on 
98 Hoare to Sazonov , Hay 12, 1919, I b id . 
99 
See Hoare ' s l e tte r in The Times , July 7, 19 20, p . 10 . 
1 00 Hoa r e to Ch urc h il l, May 3 , 1 9 19 , Temp l ewoo 
Box II, File 3; Ar n o t , The I mpa c t of t he Russ i a n Revolution 
in Brita in, p . 17 3 . Whe n the se i n t e rv iews we r e mad e p ub l i c 
1n July , 19 20 , La bou ri t e s a tta c ked t he g o ve r nme nt fo r h aving 
allowe d them ; see Deba t es , CXXXI (July 5 , 19 20 ), col s . 
1006-9. Appa r e ntly-l~were he l d without t he Cabine t's 
knowl edg e . 
101Hoa r e to Churchill, May 31, 19 19 , Temp l e wood Papers , 
Box II, File 3. 
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behalf of the Whites. 102 Some wrote for The Russian 
1 k . 1 ' . . 103 Out oo , a promlne nt Eng 1s h ant1- Bolshev1 k weekly. 
Several long-established Russo- British fraternal 
organizations which h ad turned anti- Bolshevik ofte n invited 
k h . f . 104 h . . . Tory spe a e rs to t e 1r unct1on s . T e Br1t1sh Ru s s1a 
Club was the most i mportant of thes e groups . Founded in 
1918, primar~ly by Britis h bu s inessmen expe lle d from 
Russia, it serve u a s a clearing house for the lates t 
information from Rus s i a . Althoug h the Cl ub was non- partisan, 
a n umber of Tory politicia ns we r e involved in its activities. 
Sir George Bucha na n, the last amb a s sador to Russ ia and now 
k . 1 . . d 105 an outs po e n ant1- no s he v1k Tory, s e rved as p r es 1 e nt. 
Promine nt Tori e s a nd White Ru s sians ofte n s po ke at it s 
102E.g., Samue l Hoare , " Russia and t he Allie s," 
Nationa l Review , LXXIII (Apr il, 1 9 1 9 ), 221-33. 
103E.g., Pa r k Goff , "Guil ty o r Not Gu i l ty," The Russ i a n 
Outlook , I (May 1 0 , 1 9 1 9 ), 6- 7, and Hen ry Pag e Croft , "Our 
Duty t o Russ i a , " The Russian Outlook , I (Ma y 2 4, 19 1 9 ) , 60 . 
Thi s journa l was edi t ed by Sta ffo r d Talbot, a noted anti -
Bolshevik, a nd i t deal t with t he l a t es t i nformat i o n on the 
Russi a n civil wa r. 
104 f . f h . h For news o the mee t1 ngs o t e Rus s 1a n Lunc eon 
Club, t h e Russo-Bri t ish Fraterni t y , and t he United Ru~s ia 
Socie t ies Assoc iation , see The Times , Dec . 23 , 1 9 1 8 , p . 8 , 
Jan. 7, p . 7, April 12, 1919 , p . 1 0 . 
105 s ee Geor ge Buchanan , "Gr ea t Br i t ain and Russ i a ," 
Nationa l Revi ew , LXXI II (Na y , 1 9 19 ), 3 46 - 58 , and hi s ~ 
M1S s 1on t o Russia , II , 255 . For a r e vi e w of t he Club ' s 
act1v1 t 1e s, s e e Th e Russ ian Outlook , I ( ~ay 10, 1 9 1 9 ), 
11. 
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. 106 frequent mee t1ngs. 
Conservative clubs, like the Primrose League and the 
British Empire Union, sponsored programs and s eminars on the 
Soviet threat. 107 Dozens of organizations were founded 
specifically to c omba t Bolshevism; most were concerned 
primarily with indigenous "Bolsheviks." 108 Although many 
of these groups vanis hed quickly, they underscored wid e -
spread concern with the twin threats of Sovie t Russi a and 
domestic unrest. 109 A few Tory backbenchers organized pro-
White demonstrat ions at which anti-Bolshevik rhetoric 
110 
reached a delirious p itch. But Cons e rvatives proved to be 
!air-weathe r friends . 
106 
The Times , Nay 28 , p . 15, July 18, 1919 , p . 12, 
listed t wo of the se mee tings . 
107 
For a r eport, s ee I bid ., May 15, 1919, p. 7. 
l08A listi ng of these organiza tions can be found in 
~., Feb . 17, p. 5 , Ju ne 5 , 1919 , p . 11. For a r eport 
on the newly foun ded ~a tional Security Union , s ee The 
Rus sian Out l ook , I (!'tay 17, 191 9 ), 34-39 . 
109c. L. Mowa t, Britain Be tween t he Wars , 1918-1940 
~hicago , 1 955 ), pp . 
this t ime . 
110 f 1 . . d Repor t s o such arge Conse rva t1ve -organ1ze 
s tra ti ons can be fou nd in The Times , Feb . 10, 1919, 
0, and The Russian Ou tlook , I (Ha y 27, 1919) , supplement, 
i. For a typ 1cal Conservative diatribe at such mee ting s , 
Lord Ampth ill's speech in The Time s , Ma y 16, 1919 , p . 9 . 
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Tory Concern Ebbs 
After Kolchak began retreating in June, Tories 
tecame less vocal. The government also became more retice nt: 
after Lloyd George's April 16 speech, Russia was discussed 
in parliament just a few t imes until mid-summer. On these 
occasions Churchill defended British policy against in-
. b . . 111 . h . creas~ng La our oppos~t~on. Then, w~t out warn~ng, the 
government announce d in Commons on July 29 tha t British 
troops in North Russia we re to be withdrawn before the 
winter. 
The decision came after months of Cabinet deba te. 
On March 4 the Cabine t had agreed to terminate the North 
Russian operation s in the coming summer because of t he 
serious drain on the Treasury. The Cabine t also fear ed a 
public outcry if the conscripts stayed in the frozen was tes 
. 
112 
. h . 11 for another w~nter. A short t~e later Churc ~ p e r-
suaded Lloyd George to s e nd a relie f force of 8,000 
volun teers to cove r the North Ru s sian r etreat . In the 
meant ime, Kolch a k ' s spring offensive had advanced to 
within 200 miles of the Allied forces at Archange l. Churchill 
and Cur zon wanted to link up wi th the White forces, but 
llloebates, CXVI (Hay 29, 1919), cols. 1519-30, and 
CXVI (June 6, 1919), cols. 2447-74. 
1 12war Cabinet minutes, March 4, 1919, cited by 
Ullman, Brita in and th e Russ ian Civil liar , pp . 134 -35, 
172-73. 
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113 plan was thwarted by Kolchak 's unexpected reve rse s. 
At a meeting of the full Cab inet on July 29 the 
question was d ebate d in d e t a il. Kolchak's retreat 
George not to supply the Sibe rian Whites 
because they lacked popular b a c k ing . Howeve r, De nikin 
,bould be supporte d until early in the foll owing year. The 
rrime Minister called his new policy a •med ium cours e.• 
that Kolchak could reverse his defea ts, 
not want to confront De n i k in with a d e finit e 
A Libe ral a nd a La bour minis t e r calle d for 
Immediate pe ace, and some Conservatives al s o we re unea s y. 
Acting Secre t a ry for Fore i g n Aff a irs Lord Cu rzon ch a r a c-
terized Kolcha k a s a "reac tio nary." He would help De nikin 
only if he had a r easonab le ch a nce of s ucc e eding . Aus t e n 
Chamberl a in warned t h a t t he Tre a sury c o u l d no t s upport t he 
Whites much longe r. The Hinis t e r witho u t Portfolio, Sir 
Eric Gedd e s , wa nted De n i kin t o ha l t h i s of f e ns ive and 
consolidate hi s t e rrito r y . If h e did no t, Gedde s e x p l a ine d , 
•There was no e nd to the exte n t to wh i c h we mi g h t c omm i t 
ours e l ve s , and it was not cle r wha t ob j e c t wa s in vi ew." 
Bonar La w strong ly suppo r t e d Ll oyd Ge org e 's po li c y, wh i c h 
did prevail. The Cab i ne t al s o r e a f f i rme d Lloyd Ge orge ' s 
113 Ross Horning , "Wins t on Churc i ll and Briti sh Po licy 
Toward Russ i a , 191 8- 19 19 " (un ubli s he d h . D. di ss r ta tion , 
The Ge orge Wa s h ington Unive r s i t y , 1958 ), pp . 27 1-9 7, r e vi ews 
thes e e ve n ts . 
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promise (first g i v e n in Commo ns on April 1 6 ) not to nego ti-
ate with t he Bolsheviks. 114 At t h i s mee ting Conse r va t i v e 
ministers fir s t e nunci a t ed d o ub ts about i nte rvention . 
Curzon' s r emarks r e fl ected a be lief tha t the Whi tes we r e o n 
the brink of d i saste r. Leadi ng Tory backbenche r s gene r a lly 
concurre d. 
Before Chu r c h ill announced t he decision s in Commons 
that af ternoon, Lo rd Robe r t Cec i l, now a pr iva t e Member, 
attracted con s i de r ab l e a tten ti o n b y urging t he government 
to promo t e a c easefire and ove r see peac e nego t ia t i ons , 
"without r e f e r e nce to the jus tness of t he quar r e l." tie had 
arrive d at thi s c onc lusion, he expl ained , a fte r r ea l izin g 
that a creed c o ul d no t be d e s t roye d by a rme d migh t. I f 
inte rve ntion c ont inue d , Bol shevism wo u ld spread t h r oughou t 
the world ; i f l ef t alone it wo u ld d i e . 115 Sir Samue l Hoare 
probab l y s t ated the f ee l ings of most Tori es whe n he l a t e r 
criticized Ce c il : 
In his des i re for peace , a des ire t ha t a ll o f u s 
share , he d raws no distinction be tween e ussians 
who hav e fo ug h t for th e Al l i es a nd t he Ru s si ans w o 
a t t he ost critic a l moment i n t he hi s to ry o f t e 
War betrayed our c a use a Dr cs t-Litov s k . I t i s t he 
d u ty of the Al lies to ma ke v ry c o nce ivab l e f o rt 
t o r e stor e peace t o Russ i a , to t ake a ny an ve ry 
f ai r chance for pe ce that come s within the ir r each , 
bu t n e v e r again to ma ke the fat l istake o f Prin-
kipo by wh i ch t hey confou nde f ri end and ene y . If 
ll4 rla r Cabinet minutes, Ju l y 29 , 1 919 , CAB 23/ll. 
ll 5o e bate s , CXVIII (July 29 , 1919 ), co l s . 19 82- 85 . 
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and when the re is to be an Armistice, the proposal 
must come from Ko lchak or De nikin. The att mp t to 
impose an Armistice upon our Allies , still mor e t he 
attemp t to treat them upon the same footing as our 
enemies , is not only a fal se and ungene rous policy 
but also a foolish a nd hope less r epe tition of the 
Prinkipo failur e .l l6 
Tory backbenche rs received Churchill's speech on 
July 29 without con~ent, perhaps because he had already 
informed Hoare a nd Guinness of the Cabine t's decision. 117 
The two spokesmen for t he Coalition Fore i gn Affairs Grou p 
replied that the y had arrive d at the s ame conclusion . 
Fearing a Labour attack on the new policy, they even line d 
n n 1 • • , f 118 up ten trusty M.P. s to ass1st Church1ll 1 necessary. 
Several weeks earlier Hoare had conceded t hat 
growing domes tic o pposition necess itated an ea rly withdrawal 
119 
of all British troops . But his Group was not prepared to 
120 
abandon the Whites al tog the r . Hhen Hoa r e told Sazonov 
116 For the entire analysis, see Samue l Hoare, "The 
Ru ssian Problem ," Th e l ine t eenth C ·ntury and After , LXXXVI 
(Septembe r, 1 919 ), 4 26 - 35 . 
117 For his speech , see Debates , CXVIII (Ju ly 29, 1919), 
cols. 198 5-99 . 
11 8Hoarc to Chu r chi ll, J u ly 30 , 1919, Temp l ewood apers, 
Box II, File 3. 
119 Hoare to Curz on , July 15, 1919, cited by Arthur 
Slavin, "Churchill's ' olshevi sm o n t he B ain ': Int r-
vention a nd Hy ocri s y," Buckne ll Re view , XV (Ma r ch , 196 7), 
82. Few Tory oliticians ob)ec e to the troop wi thd r awa l . 
For a dis senting vi e w, se e Lord Sydenham ' s l e tter in The 
Times , Sep t. 23 , 1919 , p. 6 . 
120 Hoare to Churchi ll, July 30, 1919 , Templewood Pape rs , 
Box II, File 3 . 
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about the ne w policy, he explained that Kolchak's collapse 
had had a disas trous effect , "eve n u pon ma ny influe ntial 
people to whom we ha ve p reviously looked for support." The 
Whites thus should have been ha~py that the Cabine t had not 
deserted Denikin . 121 Hoare's sombe r tone contrasted s ha r p ly 
with his earlie r enthu s iasm. 
Only the Saturday Re v iew and the Na tional Revi e w 
d d 0 0 b 1 f 0 0 122 seeme 1sappo1nted y the pul ou t o Br1t1 s h troops. 
Yet most Tory journals d ep lored the new policy towa rd th 
Whites , chargi ng tha t it would stre ng t he n t he Bo l shevi ks. 
None of these papers, howe ver , men tione d t he ad ve r se do-
123 
mestic conseque nces. Although r ebuk ing the government's 
"half-cock policy ," the Spectator could s ugges t doing only 
"wha t we c a n" to he l p t he Whites . As if to wa sh its hands , 
it concluded : "It is f ool ish fo r ncwspa e rs to try to 
dec ide wh a t ought to be done wh e n the fac ts are not k nown 
0 0 0 f 0 d .124 to them and t he r e 1s nee ssar1ly no bas1s o r JU gemcnt . 
This comme nt r ef l ected t he Tory p re ss ' dil emma . All we r e 
di ssatisfi ed wi th t he ne w poli c y, b ut none could o ffer a 
1 21 Hoare to Sazonov, July 30 , 1 919 , I bid . 
~~~~~R~e~v~i~c~w , CX XVIII (Aug . 2 , 1 9 1 9 }, 97; 
(Augus t, 1919 }, 7 49-54 . 
123The Times , July 25 , 1 9 19, p . 13; Observer, Aug. 3, 
1919, p. 8; Daily ai l , July 29 , p . 6 , Aug . 5 , 1 1 9 , p . 4 . 
l 24 spectator, CXXI II (Aug . 2, 1919 }, 14 0 . 
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feasible alternative. Before long, the Whites ' defea t 
opened a new possiblity. 
Between August and November, 1919 the po litical 
map of Russia changed rapidly. Mos t British troops were 
withdrawn and Kolchak 's r etreat turne d into a rout as his 
tattere d forces fled eastward across Siberia. Denikin 
continued his advance until mid-October wh e n he was only 
250 miles from Moscow . Eut a d e t ermined Re d attack drove 
the Voluntee r Army back to the Crime a within five mon ths. 
On October 20 Yudenich's drive was halted in the suburbs 
of Petrograd. A massive Bolshevik counte roffensive the n 
annihil a t ed the Northwes t Army . 125 
Churchill was the only governme nt ministe r who 
retained a shred of hope . 126 By September Conse rv tive 
publica tions had become noticeably pessimist ic. The 
Saturd y Review conceded that fin a ncial difficul ti es pro-
hibited greater aid for th e Whites . The Spectator con-
sidered aba ndoning them : "The knowl edge tha t the y a r e 
thrown upon th e ir own r esources may act as the ri gh t tonic , 
12 5swe ttenh ilill , All i e d In e ion in Hu s s i a , 
66, r e vi ews these de~v~e~l~o~m-e-n~t-s-.------~-------------
. 212-
126Hemorandum by Churchill , o v. 12, 1919, CAB 24/93. 
For an op osite vi ew , see Curzon to Ba l four , 1\ug. 21, 1 919 , 
E. L. Woodw r and Roh n Butle r, eds ., Doc ume nts on Briti sh 
Foreig n Policy, 191 9 -193 9 , se r. 1, III (Lo nd on , 19 4 ) , 
pp. 519 26 . ( lle r einaft r cite d as British Doc uments .) 
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where all other medicines have failed.• 127 On September 21 
J. L. Garvin began groping for a ne w approach to Russia. 
Believing "non-intervention by itself cannot be a policy," 
and assuming the Soviets sincerely desired peace, he de-
cided that "a new channel into Russia may exist, and with 
it • may be a new and bette r o pportunity of extending 
to the Russian people • , economic help." Garvin 
seemed to sugg es t a rapprocheme nt. 128 
When Denikin and Yude nich advanced in mid -October, 
some Conservative papers attempted to recapture the en-
thusiasm of the past spring, but their fervor was s upe r-
129 
ficial. The Times did not even con~en t when Yudenich 's 
troops we re in front of Petrograd. Aft er the Soviet coun t er-
offensives , the Daily Te l eg raph and The Times questioned 
further involveme nt. The Saturday Review remarked bluntly, 
•Really th r e is not a pin to choose between Reds and 
127saturdaf Review, CXXVIII (Sept . 13, 1919), 237; 
S ectator, CXXI II Sep t . 20, 1919 ), 360 . See a l s o Daily 
Telegraph , Sept. 24 , 1919, p. 10 . Lord Beave rbrook ' s Daily 
Express , an indepe nd nt newspa er g enerally f ollowing a 
Conservative ed itoria l policy , felt similar l y ; see Ke nne th 
Young , Churchill and a ve b r ook (!< e w Yor k , 1 67), p . 54-55 . 
128For t he develo me nt of Garvi n's ideas , see 
Obs e rve r, Aug. 24, p. 8, Sept. 14, p. 10, Sept . 21, 1919 , 
p. 10. 
129Represen t ative edi t orials from the 
press at this time can be found in Coates , Ar ~--~---.~~ 
vention in Russia , p . 26 7. See also Hoa r e to Churc ~11, 
Oct. 16, 1919 , T mplewood aper , Box II, File 3. 
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Whites, both being tre acherou s barbarians." It conclude d, 
"Morally, all the Russians ar e not worth the bones of a 
British grenadier.• 130 
Several Tory backbenche rs agree d. On November 5 
a group of Opposition M.P.'s introd uce d a motion calling 
for a total withdrawal. Samue l Ho a r e r es ponded for wh at 
had become a shrinking band of die-hard Torie s. Although 
admitting that the ele ctora te was dis e ncha nte d, he fear e d 
that a pullout would re s ult in a Ge rman t a ke ove r of Rus sia. 
He conclude d with a f eeble ple a for r e cog nition of Kolchak . 
131 J. D. Rees seconded this a na lysis. Howe v e r, s e veral 
Tories criticized inte rve ntion. F. A. Macqui s t e n e x p r essed 
contemp t for all Ru ss i a ns, "I do not care from what source 
the Governme nt flow s , wh e t he r from a Czar or Sovi e t or in 
any other fo rm ." Lord Henry Ca v e ndi s h - Bcn t i nc k , a me mbe r 
of the Coalition Fore i g n Af f a irs Gr o u p , e xp l a ined t ha t he 
was not "one of t ho se who s ee r e d when t he s ub j e c t o f Russia 
is me ntioned ." In his vi ew , "The mo r e mone y we squ ande r in 
Russia the g r ea t e r does the st r e ngth of Bolshev ism become ." 
Interve nt ion had div i ded t he pub l ic , inc r e ased p ri c e s and 
taxation, a nd d rive n millions of Russ i a n s i n to t he Sovie t 
130Daily Te l egra ph , Nov. 4, 19 1 9 , p . 13; The Time s , 
Nov. 4, 19 19 , p . 1 3 ; a turd a y Re v i e w, CXXVII I ( o v. 1, 
1919), 40 5 . 
131For the speeche s b y Ho a r e and Rees , see De b a t e s , 
CXX (Nov. 5, 1919 ), c ols . 1 58 1-86, 1591-9 6 . 
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camp. Like Cecil, he concluded that Bolshevism was an idea 
immune to brute forc e . For r easons of "enlightened self-
interest," Britain should seek peace. 132 Churchill's 
spirited defense of limited assistance probab ly convinced 
~ost skeptical Conservatives to back the government. Only 
Cavendi s h-Bentinck supported the Opposition motion, which 
was defeated easily. 133 
By early November the Tories' former ly una nimous 
defense of the Whites had become unglue d. Domes tic unres t 
and fiscal problems undoubtedly helped to effect the change 
but, more importantly, it was c a used by t he White military 
failure. Few Tories, however, advocated normal relations 
with the Bolshe viks. Only J. L. Garvin, Lord Henry 
Cavendish-Be ntinck , and Lord Rober t Cecil preceivcd the 
shortcomings of a Russo-Briti sh cold war . In fact, mos t 
Tories intensified the ir opposition to anything approaching 
Prinkipo as thei r su pport for t he Hhites waned. 134 
Many Tory ne ws pa e rs and pol i ticians may have 
secretly desired an Allied invasion to root out the Bolshe -
viks afte r the Armistice . With bu t a f ew ex ceptions , the y 
132 Ibid., cols. 1607-8, 1617-20. 
133Ibid., col s . 162 5-3 7. 
134 For two s a lien t examp l e s, see George Buchanan' s 
speech and Henry Page Cro f t's article in The Ru s si 
Outlook , I (Oct. 11, 1919), 539-40 , and ( ov . 638 . 
also sensed t he i mposs i bi lity of such a v en t u r e . They 
committed themse lve s to the Wh ite c a u se in the spring 
of 1919, but t hei r enthus ias m d is s i pa t ed when the Wh i te s 
met defeat. But Tory paper s and b ackbe ncher s c e rtain ly 
limite d the gove r nmen t's o p tions on Russia . As Lloyd 
George di s cove r ed d uring t he Bullitt inc i d e nt, he c ou l d 
not attemp t to end the conflict withou t th r eaten ing his 
own pos ition. 
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The government' s incons iste nt a nd e ve n c ontrad ictor y 
policie s toward Rus sia d u r ing t h i s year c ompo und the 
difficulty of gaug ing the r esponse o f Tory minis t e rs . 
Histor ians gene ral ly hav e oversimpli fi ed t he i r opi nions 
on interve ntio n by l ab e l ling th~n as su porte r s of e i the r 
l d G Church l.' ll. 13 5 s · · t l ' k c L oy e orge or orne m1.n1. s e rs , 1. e u rzon 
and Ceci l, v acillate d be tween o l icies o f g re t e r or l esse r 
Briti sh as s i s t a nce . Too l i t tl e is k nown of t he v iews of 
Lord Birkenhe ad , the Geddes brothers , and Sir Robe rt Ho r ne 
to c a t e go r ize them . Ba l f ou r , Au s t e n Ch ambe rl a in , a nd onar 
Law appar en tly oppos e d large-sca l e inte rvention t hroughout . 
Despite t he d ivi s ions , it s eems clea tha t Church i ll fo und 
little suppo r t f r om his Tory Cabine t colleag ues . Moreov r , 
the War Secre tary was not highly r egard e d by To r y l ead e r s . 
Law e s pecia l ly d i sliked and distrusted h i m: 
13 5F . s . Northedge , The Troub l ed Gi an t : 
the Gr ea t Powe r s , 1916-19 3 ( e w York , 1 9 6 6 ) , 
good examp l e . 
during one 
Brita in ong 
p . 7 6 , l. S 
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Cabinet discussion on Russia the Tory leade r rema rked , "We 
have heard quite enough of Winston's nons ense ." 136 
Tory ministers r e garded t he Bol s he viks as a band of 
criminal usurpers who b e traye d the Allie s during a d a rk 
moment. How e ve r, t hey did not des ire a r e turn of Russ i a n 
autocracy b e cause it would h a ve r e s urr cted old fears of 
Russian exp a nsion. 137 Some histori a ns claim that Tori e s 
backed intervention to e limina t e th e Ru ss i a n threa t fore v e r 
138 by dismembe ring the c oun try. Admitted l y , the y supporte d 
independence for the Baltic sta t es , and s ome hope d to keep 
the Caucasus from Bolshev i k c o ntro1. 139 Not once , howe ve r, 
did the Cabine t con s i de r the fut u r e bound a ri e s of Russ i a . 140 
Britain's failure to e volve a cohere n t Ru s s i an pol i cy was 
costly. Whe n Lloyd Ge o r ge fin a lly a tte mp t e d to es t ab li s h 
such a policy, he me t with s t ubbor n Tory r es i s t a n c e . 
136 Robe r t Rhode J ame s , ed ., Me mo i r s o f a Con s e rva tive : 
J. C. C. Dav i d son ' s e n o ir s and Pa pe r s , 1910 -19 37 (Lo n on , 
l96 9 ), p . 53 . 
137 
A n umbe r o f Tor i es c omme nte d on t h i s ; see Law to 
Lloyd Geo r ge , M y 20 , 1919 , Bon r La w Pa e rs , 101/3/7 8 , 
and a me or a ndum b y Ba l ou r , July 1 6 , 19 18 , ci t e d by 
Konni Zil l i acus , li r ro r of t h a !l is o y of Se cr e t 
Diploma c y ( 'cw York , ':1 6) , 
13 8 . h . ' d f E.g., F~ s c e r, Russ ~a s Ro r om Peac e t o Wa r , 
p. 19. For a n o ppos i ng v~ ew , s e c Br a d l e y , A l l~ cd I n t e r -
ventio n in ussi , p . 1 3 . 
139Balfour,and es pec i a l l y Cur zon, wan t e d t he Cauca us 
kept fr om th e Sovie t s , but Cec i l o pposed t hem ; see Ullman , 
Brita i n and the Russian Ci vil Wa r, pp . 70- 86 . 
140
r b i d ., p. 22 0 . 
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C H A P T E R I V 
THE TRADE AGRE EMENT 
The Guildhal l Speech 
During a ma jor foreign policy addre ss at the annua l 
Lord Mayor's Banquet on ove mber 8 , 1919, Lloyd Ge orge em-
phasized that peace would remain illusory while the Kus s ian 
conflict continue d . Dri t ain already had repaid her "debt 
of honour" to the Whites with t 100 million of supplies and 
armaments . Troubled by the pros ect of an interminable 
guerrilla war , t he Prime Minister be lieved another Prinkipo 
1 plan might restore peace. 
Conservative papers critici zed the Prime Minister . 
The TimE' s claimed his advocacy of "ne utrality betw en right 
and wrong " would "cause th e British name to stink ." The 
Daily Mail d e nounce d his suggesti on of "s aking hands with 
murder." It printed a cartoon showing him dancing with 
Trotsky t oward a sign entitled " Dack to Prinkipo" ; the 
caption r a , "The r inkipo Prance or Foxy Trotsky . '' 
Almost alone , the Dai ly Te l eg r ph a voided ol mics . 2 
The Time s ' lobby c orres ondent r e o rted tha t many 
1observer, ov . 9 , 1919, p . 1 3. 
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Unionist M. P.'s were "uneasy and upset.• 3 In Commons Samuel 
Hoare asked if the speech signalled a change of po licy. 
Bonar Law replied that it was an expression of hope and 
concern.
4 Law's answer lacked force. In fact, the Prime 
Minister had spoken withou t first consulting t he Cabine t. 
The Daily Mail stated that several ministers would resign 
if Britain nego tia ted with t he Bolsheviks. 5 
The strong Tory r esponse appa r e ntly prompted the 
Prime Ministe r to "clarify" his statement . A numbe r of Tory 
backbcnchers who had neve r spoken on Russ ia gave adv nee 
notices of ques tions for the Novembe r 13 session. That 
morni ng Lloyd Ge orge d r e w up a general stat ment, with 
help from Law and B lfour . 6 In Commons the Prime Minister 
gave a ssurance that Oritish po licy was unch anged . However, 
he reaffirmed the governme nt ' s desi r e to bring peace to 
Rus sia because the conflict was i mpove ri shing Brita in and 
7 
the world. Many Con se rvative papers were dubiou s about 
this ambiguous s tate men t, but the Dai ly Telegraph , con-
vinced of Lloyd Ge orge's sincerity, accused t hem of 
3The Ti , s , o v. 1 2 , 1919, p . 1 4 . 
4Deba t s , CXX I ov. 10, 1919 ), col. 15. 
5 
.1 "1 Dal. y Hal. , ov . 11, 1919, p. 7. 
6
u11man, Britain and t he Russ i an Civil Wa r, p. 308. 
7Debates, CXXI (Nov. 13, 1919), cols. 471-75. 
. 8 
overreact1.ng. 
On November 17 Russia was discussed at length in 
Commons. Three distinct viewpoints expressed by Tory 
83 
speakers indicated widening differe nces of opinion. Lord 
Robert Cecil again urged Britain to work for peace because 
it would benefit her economy; and Denikin's territory 
contained a huge grain surplus which could alleviate famine 
elsewhere in Europe. Apparently to show tha t he was not 
9 
pro-Bolshevik, Cecil concluded by denouncing the ir crimes . 
Walter Guinness and Henry Page Croft claimed the Soviets 
did not want peace. "You can no more expect Bolshe vism to 
live within its bounda ries ," said Guinness, "than expect 
a man-eating tiger to live in a stall and fe ed on c arrots. " 
Although relucta ntly ace pting the expiration of aid to the 
Whites, Guinne ss ass e rted that a loan to th em would be a 
•perfectly good d e bt." Both speake r s p rophes ied Germa n 
domination of Russia if Britain pull e d out. 10 Sir Arthur 
Steel-Maitland advoc a t e d a mi dd le policy, stressing the 
need for pe ace but disavowing nego tiations ; and he sough t 
only or a l sup or for the I ites . Althoug h not wi s hing 
to antagoniz e "the Rus s ia of the futur e ," his approa ch 
8oaily Te l eg ra~h , ov . 11, 1919, p . 10. For an 
opposing vie w, see Da 1.ly Hai l, ov. 14, 1919, p. 6. 
9oebates , CXXI (Nov. 17, 1919), cols. 688-97. 
lOrbid., cols. 726-32, 751-58. 
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11 
probably would hav e guarantee d it. In this r espect, 
Lloyd Ge orge was close to Stee l-Mai tl a nd . 
Instead o f ana ly z ing his policy a s wa s expected, 
Lloyd George me r e ly r e hashed hi s Novembe r 13 sta t eme nt . 12 
Guinne ss a nd Page Croft expr essed amazeme nt at h i s avoidance 
o f the is s ue . 13 Balfour's attempt to "cla ri f y " Lloyd 
George 's s peech also obscured the g ove r nme nt's intentions . 14 
The Times c a lled the Prime Minis t e r ' s stateme nt one of the 
worst defenses of for e i g n pol i cy in dec ades . The Morning 
~ stated , "There ar e t imes whe n it is wis e r to r ef r ai n 
[from comrnent]--i n case a pe r haps na tura l emotion mi g ht 
15 
carry the pe n too f a r." 
Lloyd Geor ge may h av e i n t ended t he Guildhall speech 
t o be s i mply a n expression of c o nce r n for Russia . But it 
was probab ly a tr ia l ba lloon to t es t To r y r eac tion t o the 
idea of direc t po lit ica l negotiations with t he Bolshev iks . 
I f this was t he case , he certain ly r etr eated in the f ace o f 
Tory critic isms . Pe r haps he inte r reted the ir weakeni ng 
11 
I bid ., cols . 71 0- 15 . 
12 I bid . , col s . 71 5- 26 . 
13 Ibid . , col s . 72 6-27, 7 52 . 
14 Ibid., cols . 765-6 7. 
15The Times , Nov . 18, 1 919 , p . 14; Morning Post , 
Nov. 18, 1919 , p. 6 . See a l so Saturda y Revi e w, VIII 
(Nov . 1 5 , 1919 ), 45 4 ; 1 cv~ ew , LX IV (Decemb r , 
191 9 ) , 440- 48; a nd Dai 8 , 1 9 1 9 , p . 6. 
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endorsement of the Wh ites in the fall to mea n the y would 
tolerate a revival of Pri nkipo. With but a f e w e xce p tions , 
they had not changed. In f a ct, the Guildha ll s peech a nd 
the statements of Novembe r 13 a nd 17 l e d ma ny To ry ne ws -
papers and polit i ci a n s to espou se the White c a use throug h 
the remainde r of the y ear. Perh aps to di s credit the 
Bolsheviks furthe r, some pape rs inc r eased cove rage of t he ir 
11 d d f . 1 1 . 16 a ege exce s s es a n e ncou r ageme nt o un1ve r sa r e vo ut1 o n. 
However, two respecte d Conserva tive journa ls d i ssen ted . 
On November 22 the Specta t o r dec l a r ed t ha t t he 
Allies should promote a n armi s tice bec a use t he Re ds would 
come to ag r eeab le t erms . Aft e r a ll, the y would be ove rthrown 
anyway whe n the popu l ace c o ntrasted their an a r c h ica l rul e to 
Denikin' s p r og r e ss ive gove rning of South Russ i a . 17 The 
Obse rve r wen t e ven fu r the r. On Novembe r 1 6 Ga rv in ac-
knowl edged t he "d i s.as trous failu r e" o f i n t erv e nt ion: havi ng 
fought wi th "magn i f icent abi l i ty," t h e Bo l sheviks soon would 
oust t he Whites . Thus a t o t a l ly ne w app r oach was ne cessary . 
Trusting t ha t "an i ncreasing maj ori t y of sane Union i s m" 
woul d a ccept th is r eality , Ga rvin advoca t e d di r ect Or i ti sh-
Bolshevi k nego t iations . The Sov i e ts would acce pt "reasonab le" 
16The Times , Nov . 14, pp . 13 -14, Dec. 10, 1 9 1 9 , p . 1 5; 
Daily Mail , ·ov . 17, 1 9 19 , p . 10; D l eg raph , ov. 1 8 , 
l9l9, p . 1 0 . 
17 spectator, CXX III (Nov. 22 , 1 919 ), 6 8 3- 8 4 . 
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terms and then could be accorded diplomatic recognition. 
He predicted succ ess be c ause Soviet policies a lre a d y were 
"profoundly modi fied. "18 In this editori a l Garvin outlined 
the basic t e nets later held by all Tory "conciliators" and 
established himse lf as the leading spokesman of that 
segment of Tory opinions. Significantly, Lloyd George's 
thoughts on Russian policy evo lve d on similar line s. 
The Opening of Trade Nego tia tions 
After the Peace Conference the Allie s did not 
attempt to coordinate thei r Russian policies until the 
White s had failed. In De cembe r they termina t e d 11 
assista nce to the Whi te s but e s t abli s hed a cordo n sanita ire 
around Russia b y supplying armame nts t o contiguous states. 19 
The Cabi net endorsed the decision, with only Ch u r ch ill 
20 
objecti ng . Se ve r al weeks later , as a result of Denikin ' s 
continuing retrea t, the anti-Bolshe vik Ca ucas ian r epub lics 
18 Observe r, Nov. 16, 1919 , pp. 12-13 . 
19 s e creta ry ' s o t e s of a Confe r ence , Dec. 12, Dec. 13, 
1919, it"sh Doc ens , se r. 1, II (London , 19 B), p . 744 -
48, 76 - , ii4=78.ATt houg h Hoa r e and h is Group c o n tinued 
to pre s s strong l y f o r a t l eas t min i ma l as s is t ance t o t he 
Whites , he admitted pri v a t e ly, "We s 11 p r obab ly e u n-
succe ss ful in ou r effo r s ." S i gn if ica n t ly, he n or s d t he 
idea of a cord on sa ni t a i r e a week be fore t he All i e d mee ting ; 
see Hoa r e t o Dr. Ha r old W ~ll i arns (Bri t i s h journ li s t in 
South Russi a ), De c. 4, 1919, e mp l ewoo d P pc rs , Box II , File 3. 
20
c abinet minutes , De c . 12, 1919, cite d by Ullma n, 
Brit a in a nd the uss ian Ci vil Wa r , p. 316 . 
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of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan seemed about to be 
overrun by the Soviets. The crisis unexpec tedly dominated 
the discussion at a routine meeting of the Allied Supreme 
Council held in Paris on January 10, 1920. The Council 
quickly accepted Curzon's proposal for de facto r ecognition 
of Georgia and Azerbaij a n, but his reques t for arms shipments 
21 was tabled for furthe r study . 
To coordinate Briti sh policy Lloyd George sent for 
Law, Balfour, Churchill, Fir s t Lord of the Admiralty \~a lter 
Long , and the military chiefs . This group me t three t i me s 
between January 16 and 19 . Cur zon and Long wanted Allied 
troops s ent to t he Caucasus to protec t the British-dominate d 
oil fields in southern e rsia and to defend the a roach 
to India. Churchill thought th e r epub lics were doomed in 
any event . To r e lieve ressure in the South h sugg e ste 
that t h e Allies should i nc ite Po l and and Finland to attack 
in the orth . Lloyd George di spar aged a military t hre t t o 
Persia and India; and bee use Br i ta in could not s a r e troops , 
he would send only a ame nts. 22 Curzon and Churc ills oke 
to Allied l eade r s on J anua ry 19 , b ut t he Prime Mini s t e r' s 
23 
recomme nd tion was accep ted . 
21Hinutes of a meeting of the Council of For e i gn Minis-
ters, Jan. 10, 19 20 , Briti sh Docume nts , ser . 1, II, 7 96 - 9 7. 
22ullman, rita in and the Rus sian Civil 1'/ar , p. 331-3 6 . 
23Minutes of a meeting of t e Allied Sup r eme Council , 
Jan. 19, 19 20 , h Docur.ent , s er . 1, II , 914-25 . 
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In the meantime, Conservat ives r eac t ed strongly to 
the Bolshevik advance. The Times feared a t h rust beyond 
Transcaucasia. The Da ily Telegraph like ne d them to the 
"Mongol hordes " who had devoured everything in the ir path . 
The Saturda y Revi ew c a ll d for volunte e r armie s to cr ush 
the Soviets. Only the Obs e rve r and t he S pectator be lie ved 
the Red Army would stop voluntar ily at th e old Russian 
frontier. 24 
The governme nt fueled Tory fears. Speaking before 
a large Coalition d emon s tra tion, Winston Churchill vividly 
described the alleged threat to the Empire . 25 A Wa r Office 
stateme nt of January 1 6 warned tha t Britain would be forced 
to commit troop s to the Caucasus to sea l o f f the Bolshevik 
peril. At the s ame time , it was r e vea l ed that a mini s t e rial 
deleg a tion had bee n s ummo ne d h as tily to Paris. 26 Tory 
papers became appr hens ive . The Morni ng Pos t felt hos tili-
ties could be avoided on ly if D nikin ' s forc es we re r e -
Althoug h some assistanc e r eached the Ca ucas us, t he Re d Army 
occu i ed l\zerb i jan in April, 1920 , Ar men ia in · ove e r , 
1920, and G orgi a in March , 1 92 1. 
24The Ti mes , J 
Jan. 6, 1 920 , p . 10; 
26; Observe r, J a n 4, 
1920) 1 37 • 
25
observe r, Jan. 4, 1920, p. 14. 
26churchill l ate r d e ni ed any involveme n t in p r eparing 
or is suing t he st a t eme nt; s ee Ul lma n, ritain and the 
Russi a n Civil War, p . 32 8. 
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1 . 27 supp l.ed. As tensions peaked, the Allies announced on 
January 18 that they would negotia te a trade agreement with 
the Bolsheviks . 
This startling disclosure was almost entirely the 
work of Lloyd Georg e . Several factors influenc ed him. 
Before the war England and Russia had traded extensively. 
Britain's brief postwar boom had collapsed by late 1919, 
and Anglo- Russian trade might help to revive the economy. 28 
The Soviets often asked for commerci a l relations with the 
west. 29 And European liberals stressed r epea tedly that 
t d ld 11 - . " 1 h 'k 30 ra e wou mo l.i.}' .__ .. .: ~0 s evl. s . 
On January 6, 1920 E. F. Wise, an economic adviser 
attached to the Brit ish P a ce Delegation, had r equested 
that Britain end the blockade and resume tr ade throug 
the Russian Co-ope r ative Societies, which h a d r e ma ined free 
from Soviet domina tion. 31 Lloyd Georg e endorsed the i d ea 
but did not inform the Cabinet. Despite the p ressin 
27Horning Pos t , J a n. 16, 192 0 , p. 6 . See also ~ 
Telegraph , J a n. 17 , 19 20 , p. 10 . 
29carr, The Bo l shevi k Revolution , III, 148-55. 
30Tho s on, 
Peace, p. 357. 
ol shevi sm , and the Versaill s 
31
.r-te morandum by Wise , Jan. 6, 1920, British Doc ume nts, 
ser. 1, II, 86 7-7 0 , n . 1. 
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caucasus development, he presented his proposal to the 
Allies in Paris. On January 14 he introduced two anti-
Soviet representatives of the Co-ope rative Socie ties, who 
claimed that Russia possessed abundant exportable prod ucts 
and gave assurances that Bolshe vism would be d ea lt a 
. 1 " bl 1. f t d d 3 2 cr1pp 1ng ow ra e was reo pene . On January 18 the 
Allies decid e d to initiate trade but insisted that "these 
arrangements imply no c ha nge in the policy . . • towards 
the Soviet Government." 33 This announcement, too, was made 
without prior Cabinet approval; even the Foreig n Office was 
. . 34 
not represente d at the d1scus s 1ons. The Allies' conduct 
at Paris typified th e ir inconsistency: they mapped military 
strategy against the Bolsheviks whil e e x tend ing the hand of 
friendship. If Lloyd George was not troubled by the pa r adox, 
some Tories we re. 
Tory pre ss r eac tion to the announcement vari ed . The 
Horning Post cried th a t the roposal to trade with "th e 
devil" would ince nse decent peopl e ; besides , Russia had no 
exports. The Times characterized the move as "fraudulent" 
and de no unced Ll oyd George fo r surrendering to "advan c e d" 
32 
Minutes of a mee ting of the Head s of the De l ega tion, 
Jan. 14, 1920 , Ibid., pp . 867 -75. 
33 rbid., p. 912. 
34 · . Off . Lloyd George late r expla1ned tha t the Fore1gn 1ce 
was excluded because the matte r c ame under the s upe rvision 
of the Food Mini s try; see Ibid. , p. 911 , n. 5 . 
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Labourites. It stated--mistakenly--that the Russian Co-
operatives were controlled by the Bolsheviks. 35 The com-
36 
mercia! communi ty also was not pleased . 
Some Conservative journa ls, however, offered 
strong support. The En g li s h Revie w suggested t ha t Russia 
could save the starving millions in Europe. The Spe ctator 
called the decision "sound" e ve n though "trade with the 
Co-ope rative Societies will be trade with the Bolshevik s ." 
It urg ed Britain to "coax back Ru ss i a n life t o norma l by 
trade, and to leave Russian politics to look afte r themse lves ." 
The Obse rve r hoped trade would build a "solid p eace " with 
Russia. Even the Saturday Revi e w abandoned its earlie r 
37 hawki s h stand. 
In view of the prevailing wa r scare over t he 
Caucasus , the n umbe r of favora b l e Tory press c omments is 
surprising . In pa rt it may have bee n an emotional r e l ease 
following r e c e nt t ens i o ns . The prospect of e l imina ting the 
Bolsheviks peacefully certainly made the trade p roposal 
attractive , and t he absence of direct contac t s added appeal . 
35Morning Pos t , Jan . 17, p . 6 , Jan . 19 , 1920 , p . 6 ; 
The T imes , J a n . 1 9 , 1920 , p . 13. 
36The Ti mes , Jan. 29, 1920, p .l4. 
37English Revi e w, XXX (Feb rua ry, 1920 ), 172-7 5 ; 
Spectator, CXXIV (J a n. 24, 1920), 101 - 2; Obs e rve r, Jan . 1 8 , 
1920, p. 10; Satu r day Revi e w, CXXIX (J a n. 4, 0 ), 74. 
The Dai ly Teleg r aph , Jan . 21, 1920 , p. 1 0 , a l so d i d not 
crit1c1ze the move . 
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~llien addressing the newly conve ned session of 
parliament on February 10, Lloyd George e mphasize d that the 
exhausted Red Army no longer th reatened the West . But he 
also objected to peace negotiations until the Sovie ts r e-
placed their "methods of barbarism" with a "civilized" 
government. Russia and Europe needed eac h othe r e conomica lly. 
His reports indicated that "the corn bins of Russia are 
bulging with grain." He concluded: "Trade , in my opinion, 
will bring an end to the f erocity, the rapine , and the 
crudities of Bolshevi sm sure r t han any othe r me thod ." 38 
Tory backbe nche rs did not r espond . During the nex t 
few days most Tory s eakers dep lored the s t aggeri ng cos t of 
. 39 intervent~on . Lord Rober t Ce cil, howe ver, argued for 
direct trade r e l at i o n s if Brita in w s to have any influe nce 
in Russia. 40 The Mo rning Post cou l d no t unde r stand why 
Conservative M.P.'s a ea r ed so "complaisant . " 41 
This o bse rvation underscored a decline of To ry 
interes t in Russia , t he firs t since th e World War. The 
change was not d r amat ic . The press , for ex l e , still 
prin t ed accoun s of a l leg d Sovie t cri es . 42 And in March 
38
oeba t es , CXXV (Feb . 10, 1920), cols. 40-46. 
39 r bid ., CXXV (Feb . 12, 19 20 ), col. 333, a nd CXXV 
(Feb. 13-;-I920 ), col s . 400 , 438 . 
40
rbid., CXXV (Feb . 12 , 1920), col s . 281-8 6 . 
41Mor n ing Post , Feb . 11, 1920 , p . 6. 
42 E.g ., The Times , March 31, p . 15, Ma y 24, 1920, p . 9. 
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Th e Times l isted ove r t we n ty-five extant an t i-Bolshevik 
organ i zatio ns , some with a lluring ti tles l ike the Libe r ty 
League and the Chr i stian Counter- Bolshev ik Crusade. 43 
Howe v e r, Tory edito ria l write r s and backbe nchers began to 
ignore the Ru ssian issue . Samue l Hoa r e now c o r r esponded 
infreque ntly wi t h Hhi t e l eaders . 44 Humanitarian projects 
appear ed . Hoare , Oliver Locke r-Lampson , and o the rs we re 
take n up with the South Russ i a Re l i ef Fu nd, f o unded in 
45 Decembe r, 19 1 9 to assis t White r ef ugees . Fe w Tories we r e 
moved b y General Denikin ' s v isi t to Londo n in April , 1 920. 
Hoare a nd Guinness l e d a handfu l of M. P . 's at t ending dinne r 
in h is h o no r. 46 Churchil l wanted Denikin tre ated a s a 
government gues t, but Bon a r Law said it wa s "abso l ute ly 
f h . . 47 out o t e ques t~on . 
Chang ing d e v e l opme nts in Russia pe r haps influenced 
4 3 
Ibid ., March 1 3 , 192 0, p. 1 2 . Reports of the ir 
activities c an be fo u nd in e T i mes , J a n. 28 , p . 9 , Feb . 12 , 
p. 10, Feb . 1 4 , p . 14 , Feb . 1 8 , p. 13 , March 3, 192 0 , p . 1 2 , 
and Sa turday e vi e w, CXXIX (Feb . 14 , 1 920 ), 161-62 . 
44 
ab l " ( . d. 1 ) 21 E . g ., Hoare t o E . S ~ne Tsar~ s t ~ p oma t , May , 
1920, and Hoa r e t o Struve , July 16 , 1920 , emp l e wood Pape r s , 
Box II , F il e 4 . 
4 5 
The Time s , De c . 22 , 1919 , p . 8 . On Ma r ch 1 , 19 20 , 
p. 10, The T~mes r epor t e tha t t he Committee h ad collec t e 
over £ 40 , 000 . 
46 r bid. , April 28 , 1920 , p . 17 . 
47 Law t o Churchi ll, Apri l 16 , 192 0 , Bonar Law Pape rs , 
101/4/32 . 
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the Tories. On February 2 the Soviets signed a peace treaty 
with Estonia, the ir first postwa r agreement with a bourg e ois 
government, and negotiations soon were started with othe r 
nations . A number of domestic r eforms sof t e ne d the i mpac t 
48 
of t hei r rul e . But this hiatus did not last long : as 
was to happen so ofte n during the 1 920 ' s , new developme nts 
refocused the Tories ' atte ntion on Rus s ia. 
By the time trade negoti a tions began in l ate May, 
many Tori e s had voiced strong o ppos itio n. Two factor s 
probably exp l ain t his cha ng e from the ir initially mi ld 
response . First , the Soviets h ad , in the meanti~e , t aken 
over t he Co-ope rative Soc i et i es . Be cause of the Bo l shevik 
monopoly on for e i g n trade , it mean t t ha t the Allies would 
49 be trading direc tly with the Sovi e t gove r nme nt. Bu t 
Alli ed l eaders did no t object. 50 Tory ministers also seemed 
unperturbed . Af t e r being asked r epeated ly by Conservative 
M.P.'s about t he sta tu s o f t he Co-op ratives and t he ir 
dele g t es to t he upcoming con ference , Bona r Law finally 
answe r ed : "It is known that the co- o pera tive societies a r e 
under t he contro l of the Soviet Governme n t. It is in t he 
48oeutsche r, The Prophe t A ed , pp . 458-59. 
49 Carr , The Bolshevik Revolution , II ( ew York , 1 95 2) , 
pp. 237-4 0. 
50A pendix to Briti s h Secre t ary ' s otes of an Allied 
Con ferenc e , Feb . 23, 192 0 , Briti sh ocuments , ser . 1, VII 
(London , 1958 ) , p . 21 6 . 
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interest of this country as well as of Russia to get trade 
established." 51 Secondly, Allied po licy had devolved into 
a British enterprise after France and Italy declined to 
52 participate. In esse nce , the long-standing Tory fear of 
direct Ang lo-Soviet negotia tions seemed about to ma teri-
alize. 
Most Tory new spapers used i den tical arguments ag a inst 
the talks: the Co-o e ratives ' delegates r ea lly we r Sovie t 
agents who only wanted political r e cog nition; t he Bo l sheviks 
had strippe d Russia c omplete ly of e xportab l e goods ; and it 
was wrong for Britain to s it down with bloods tained crimi-
53 
nals. The Daily Hail , the N tiona l Re v iew , and The Times 
were outraged by the ab sence of prote ts from Tory ministers. 
The latte r paper warned t hat Conse rvatives would find it 
difficult to forgive t he ir l eaders for "soiling their 
ermine through inte rcour se wi 
54 
tJ e emissaries of Lenin ." 
51Debates , CX XVIII (April 27, 1920), cols. 1013-14. 
52
ariti sh ents , ser . l, VIII (London , 195 8 ), 
p. 280. For a s ry of Fre nch objections , see Curz on to 
Lloyd Ge orge , 1 y 28 , 1920 , Bri ti s h Doc uments , se r. l, XII 
(London , 1 96 2), p . 7 26-28 . 
53The Time s , May 28, 1 920 , 26 , 
1920, p. 6; Dady Ha il , May 2 8 , l h , 
May 31, 1920, p . 12; Satu rd y e vie w , CX'IX 
491. Only t he Obse rver and t e pee ato r c on t inued to 
support t he governmen t ; s ee especially t he t e ll1ng arg ume nt 
by the di p l om tic corres ondent for the Observe r, M y 30, 
1920, p. 13. 
54 Dail~ Mil, May 29, 1920, p. 4; Nationa l R v iew , 
LXXV (July, 920 ), 577; The Ti mes , M y 24 , 1920 , p . 9 . 
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Indeed , Conservative mi ni sters were not disturbed 
by the prospect of "shaking hands with murder.• The 
Cabine t did not dea l with the confe r ence until May 28, in 
itself a s triking indication of the ir acquiesc e nce . The 
Cabinet discussion c entered on a note by Curzon, wh o felt 
the trade talks provided a n o pportunity to s e ttle othe r 
outstanding issue s. His rea s oning was simple: 
We know from a grea t var i e ty of sources that the 
Russian Government is threate ned with c omp lete 
economic disaster, and that it i s ready to pay 
almost any price for the assistance which we mo re 
t .han any one e ls e are in a pos ition to give . We 
can hardly contemplate coming to its r escu e without 
exacting our own price for it, and it s eems to me 
that that pr ice c an f a r bet t e r be paid in a c essa -
tion of Bolshe vik hostility in parts of e wo rld 
of importance to us , t han in the o s t e ns i b le inte r-
change of c ommodities , the existence o f wh ic on 
any conside r ab l e scale in Russi a there is grave 
reason to doub t. 
Specifically, he hoped to re pa tri a te c e rtai n British pr ison-
ers still in Russia , secure a c ess tion of Bolshe vik ropa-
ganda in Persia a nd Afgha nistan, and arrange an armisti c e 
55 for the embattled Wh ites . His coll e ag ues agr e ed unani-
mously to t hese propos l s . 56 
The t wo c onfe r ence de l e g a tions we r e he ed b y 
55 Note by Curzon , Hay 27, 1920 , ritish Documen ts, 
ser. 1, XII , 723- 26 . A mon t h late r Curzon wrote t . a t the 
resumpt ion of trade al s o wou l d " l ead more quick ly than 
anything el se to t he downf 11 of t he c o= unist r e g irr.e "; see 
Curzon to Si r Auck land Ged es (ambassador t o the Un i ted 
States), June 24, 1920, British Docume nts , ser. l, XII, 74 2 . 
56
cabine t minutes, Hay 28, 1920, CAB 23/ 21. 
97 
Leonid Krassin and Tory Sir Robert Horne, President of the 
Board of Trade. At the opening s ession on May 31, Krassin 
said he was empowe r ed to discuss the Allied blockade of 
Russia, currency, commerc ia l representation, and the l ega l 
basis for trade. Lloyd George, who was to participate 
frequently, countered with Curzon's suggestions. 57 During 
a second conference on June 7, Lloyd Ge org e also asked for 
recognition of Britons ' claims for unpaid services and goods 
supplied to the Tsarist and to the Soviet gove rnments. The 
talks then adjourned unti l June 29. 58 
Fearing that Lloyd George would offer diploma tic 
recognition, many Tory papers ditorialized on t he conf e r e nce 
almost daily. Several were piqued by the government ' s 
silence. 59 In fact, the r e had been no public statemen t 
since the Prime Mini ste r's s eech of Feb ruary 10. The Time s 
predicted an in~inent Bolshe vik collapse and p rin ted many 
letters from Conservative bac kbenchers who denounced not 
only the Bo l sheviks but also Lloyd George for his al l egedly 
57 secre tary' s ~otes of a Conference , May 31, 1920, 
Briti sh Doc urnen s , ser . 1, VII I, 281-92 . 
58 
secreta ry's lotes of a Con fe r ence , June 7, 1920, 
Ibid. I pp. 292-3 06 . 
59 Representative editorial s c an be found in The Times , 
June 4, 192 0 , p . 17; Dail y Mai l, June l, 19 20 , p. 6; Mo rn1n 




devious methods. A few Tory journals continue d to suppor t 
the government. Despite occa sional attacks from other Tory 
papers, the Observe r pressed strongly for a political 
settlement. 61 Although the Spectator now conceded that 
Russia probably did not have any exports, it still desired 
trade relations. Time and Tide , a new independent Tory 
magazine for women, reasoned that the "infectious Bolshevik 
apple• would not spoil Britain. 62 
In Commons on June 7 Tory backbenchers finally 
spoke out. John Gretton hurled abuse at the Soviet dele-
gation. Reginald Hall was a ston i shed t hat Britain was 
negotiating with the governme nt wh ich had not apo log ized 
for the murder of Captain Cromie. Like othe r distraugh t 
colleague s, he explained that the Bol sheviks p l anned to 
barter gold s tolen from foreigne r s , museums , and c hurches . 
Samuel Hoare offe r ed a more r easoned ana lysis . Although 
favorin g comme rci a l ties because Europe needed peace and 




The Times, June 9 , p. 12, June 12, p . 12, Jun 18, 
p. 12, June 28, p . 15, July 20 , 1 920, p . 8 . 
61 For an attack on the Observer , see Sa t u rday Re vi ew, 
CXXIX (June 12, 1920), 534. 
62 Spectator , CXXIV (June 12, 1920) , 7 80 -81; Ti me and 
~. I (June 4, 192 0 ), 76. 
63ror these speeches , see Debates , CXXX (June 7, 1920 ), 
cols. 147-53, 154-56 , 1 59 -64. 
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In reply Lloyd Ge orge admitted t ha t Britain was now 
dealing directly with t .he Bol shevi ks , b ut he dismissed Tory 
objections. After all, Russia had a grain surplus, "The 
mere fact that Central Russia i s sta rving is not proof at 
all that the r e is not plenty in other parts." Mo r e ove r, 
Britain would violate tradi tion a l policy if she r efused to 
trade be cause of Bo l shevik excesses, "This country has 
opened up mo s t of t he c annibal trade o f t he world." He 
concluded that worl d peace was contingen t upon peace in 
Russia. 64 
65 Some Tory back be nchers we re not r eassur ed . In a 
letter to Horne two days late r, Hoare ruled out "a permanent 
Chinese Wall " against t he Bolsheviks , but he f o resaw two 
"disast r ous " r esults of Lloyd George 's policy. Britain 
gave France the i mpress i on that " perfide Albion having 
sacrificed its anti-Bo l shevik p r inciples is me re ly inter -
ested in pinching the Russian ma rket." And r ece nt t a l ks 
with r ep r senta tives of the Ba l tic Sta t es convince d him t he 
Soviets became " ore truculent and ugressive [s ic] w en 
accorded r ecogni tion ." Hoare wa s intrigued by t he oti-
vations behind e Conference : 
You and t he Pr i me Niniste r are ente ring upon these 
negotia tions with the arri re ensce that by r e -
64Ibid. , cols. 164-72. 
65 E.g., the s t atements by Arche r-Shee and Page Croft 
in I bid ., col s . 174-78, 1 82-87. 
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establi hing norma l li fe in Ru s sia you will be 
destroy ng the Bo l shev ik Gove r nme nt, whilst the 
Bolshe v k Gove r nme nt a r e fr a n kl y dec laring that 
they r egard t he r esump tion of trade relations as 
a means for Bolshevik propaganda and fo r bring ing 
ne arer t he day of wor l d r e vo lution which will 
destroy the Briti sh c ap itali s t Gove rnme nt. !low 
can any official agreeme nt b e stab le wh e n thi s is 
the mentality of t he two contrac ting p a rties? 
Like Curzon, he hoped Britain would force t he Soviets into 
a politica l settlement; but his plan would include "a free 
66 
opportuni ty for public opinion to expr es s itself in Russia." 
Most Tory journa ls were wary of the Prime Minister's 
67 
statement. Ev e n the Spectator believed that his admission 
of direct dealing s with the Sovie t s exemplified t he gove rn-
ment's unce rtain policy . It finally offe r ed reluctant 
support: "Thus, altho ugh M. Lloyd Ge orge ' s po licy for t his 
week appears, g r anting hi s f acts to be correc t, to be 
reasonable, sad expe rience prevents u s fro m assuming t ha t he 
will be of the s ame mi nd next week ." But diploma tic r e cog -
nition s hould be withhe l d "until Lenin co n f ines his siniste r 
activit i es to his coun try .• 6 8 
Meeting for the fir s t t ime since 1913, t he Confe r nee 
of t he , a ti ona l Unioni s t Association offered di ssiden t Con-
servatives a p l a tf orm to denounce t he Sovi e t s . Hore t han 
66 11oare to Horne , June 9 , 19 20, Temp l ewood Pape r s , 
Box II, File 4. 
67 E.g., Morning Post , J une 8, 19 20 , p. 6. 
68 Spec t ator , CXX IV (J une 1 2 , 1 9 20), 7 80. 
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half of the cons titue ncy a ssoc i a tion r eso l u t ions dea lt with 
Bol shevi sm a nd sociali sm . 6 9 The An nual Report of t he 
Executive Commi ttee bl a sted t he Sovi e ts for trying "to 
overthrow mode rn civilisation." 70 Party l e a de r Bona r Law 
defended t he gove r nment. Huc h of hi s p l e a e c h oe d t he 
7l Prime Mini s t e r's p ropo sal s . Ev e n these r e v e lations did 
not s a tis f y some d e l e ga t es . Lord Salisbury a nd L . J. Maxse , 
editor of the Nationa l Re vi ew, c ha r ged tha t the gove r nment 
was plann i ng to g r a nt d i p loma tic r e cog nitio n. 72 
Tory a r guments a ga inst the tra de t a lk s we r e sub -
stantiate d b y s e v e r a l r epa tri a t ed p ri s o ne r s from Russ i a . 
H. V. Keeling told a g rou p o f M. P .' s t ha t Russ i a was 
sta rving and on t he v e r ge of c o ll a pse . 73 Re v e r e nd F r ank VJ . 
North , t he Ang lica n ch ap l a in in Moscow, was r e c c i v d a t 
Buck i ng h am Pa l a c e and was f e t e d a t s e ve r a l r eceptions whe r e 
promi ne n t Cons e rvatives shared t he od i urn . 74 In p r ess 
articles Ilo rth a l so pre d i c t e d th a t t he So v ie t s would f a l l if 
69 d . . t ' Lo n o n, Cons e rva t1ve pa r ty Ar c h1ves , Co nse r v a 1ve 
Conf r enee Mi nutes , 192 0 , pp . 21, 22 , 40 ; ' he Times , June 10 , 
1920, p . 18 . 
70cons e rva tive Confe r e nce Hi nutes , 19 20 , p . 1 2 . 
71Ibid ., p. 29 . 
72 Ibid ., p. 1 6 ; The Ti es , J u ne 1 2 , 19 20 , p . 1 8 . 
7 3The Ru ss ia n Outlook , I I I (Ju ly 17, 1 920 ), 14 91. 
74The Time s , Ma y 31, p .l4, J une 14, p. 16, June 24, 
1920, p. 13. 
Br i ta i n r e f use d t o t rade . Tories often pointed to his 
statements to b u tt r ess t hei r own opposition. 75 
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Whe n negotia t i o ns rec onvened on June 29 , t he t wo 
sides we r e unable to r each agreement on Sov ie t po l icy in t he 
Midd l e East , thei r propaganda in Britain,and debts owed t o 
Britons . 7 6 Krassin seemed wi ll ing to bargain o n propaganda . 
But he cl a i med t ha t Soviet for e ign policy was outs i de his 
jurisdiction and that the Al l i ed i nterve n tion and blockade 
ha d r e lieved the Sovie t s o f r esponsibi l i ty for Tsar i s t 
debts . Moreove r, deb t r ecognition was no t needed to r e -
store Briti sh confidence , as Lloyd George had argue d , 
beca u se businessme n we re anxious t o recover past l osses . 
Krassin fin a lly offere d to sett l e outstanding diff r ences i n 
75Dai l y Mail , Ju ne 2, 1920 , p . 7; The Russian Ou tlook , 
III (J u ne 5 , 1920 ), 13 60 . 
76 sovi e t Russi a ' s tot a l ind b t edne ss to Britain ha s 
ne ver b n esta b li shed cl a rl y ; t he r e are a l so dif e ring 
f igures f or the v riou s cl sse s of debts . The following 
breakdow n is bas ed on state e n t s y A. V. Alexande r (parlia-
mentary s ec r e t a ry to the car d of Tr ade ) in Deba t es , CLXXV 
(July 7, 1 92 4), col . 17 56 , and Lord Cur zon in Lo r as De b t e s , 
LVI ( ~larch 26 , 1924), col . 10 66 . Ru s sia ' s priva t e de t s 
(exc luding intere s t) total e d ap roxi te ly ~ 255 illion: 
confi sca t ed pro e rty in Ru ss i a owned b y Briti s h na i o na l s , 
~1 80 million ; Tsaris t bod own ed by Britons , £ 40 million ; 
and miscell a neous priv a t e deb ts (inclu ing e r ona l os-
sess i o ns , er ~ona l in jury , etc . ), £ 35 millio n . Ru s sia ' s 
publ ic indeb t edne ss to Bri t ai n (inc luding interes t as of 
1924) was ap r ox i tely £ 80 7 million : p r ewar loan to 
the Tsarist gove r nmen t, £ 16 7 mil l i on ; and war l oans , 
t 64 0 million. Thus the sum t o t al o f Russia ' s ind e b t edness 
to Br i t ain was a pproxima t e ly £ 1 062 mi l lion . 
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a "complete unconditiona l and general peace" with the West. 77 
Lloyd George refused , demanding Soviet compli ance with 
78 
Britain's terms within a week. 
The Briti s h ultimatum contained an amb i g uous 
sentence: "The British Government propose wh a t is tanta -
mount to a gene ral armistice, as the condi tion of t he re-
sumption of trade r e lations , in the hope tha t this armistice 
79 
may lead ere long to a general peac e ." Soviet Foreign 
Minister Chiche rin apparen tly interpreted t his to mean the 
Allies would grant de jure r eco gnition. On July 7 he wired 
f h . . 1 . 80 h d d acceptance o t e pr~nc~p e s ~n t he note . But he a r ea 
too much into it. Curzon had wr itten previously , "The r e is 
n~ ques tion whateve r of making peace with t he Sovi e t Gove rn-
f d . h d . . ,81 ment, or o accor ~ng t em ~ jure recogn~t~on. And the 
othe r Allies , especial ly Fra nce, would not negotiate with 
77
carr, The Bolshevik Revolu ion , III, 15 8-6 2, explains 
the Soviet s t and ~n detail . 
78
s ecre t a ry's Notes of a Conference with the Russia n 
Trade Delega tion , June 29 , 1920, British Docume nts , ser . 1., 
VIII, 380-8 8. 
79Th e Time s , July 15, 1920 , p . 9 ; Michae l Glenny, 
"The Ang o- Sov~e Tra e Ag r ee e nt , March , 19 21 ," Journal of 
Contemporary History, V, .;o. 2 (1970), 70. 
80Narkominde l [Sovie t Foreign Ministry ] Stateme nt on 
Anglo- Russian Relations , July 9 , 1920 , Jane Deg ras , ed ., 
Soviet Documents on Foreign Po licy, Vo l. I: 1917-1924 
(New York , 1 95 1) , pp . 191- 9 4 . ( e reinafter r eferred to as 
Sovi e t Docum nts .) 
8lcurzon to Auckland Geddes, June 24, 1920, Briti sh 
Documents , se r. 1, XII , 742. 
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the Soviets. 82 At this point the trade talk s we re suspe nded 
because a more pressing ma tter came to a he ad. 
- The Russo-Polish l-Iar 
When the Polish army inva d e d the Ukraine on April 25, 
1920, many Conse rva tive p ape rs e xone rate d the agg r essors. 
The Time s claimed the Poles simp ly h ad a ntici pated a Sovi e t 
attack, "It has bee n a d e f e n s i v e offe nsive." Some Tory 
journals haile d the Pole s a s d e f e nde rs of Wes t e rn civili-
. 83 
zat1on. The Ob se rve r alone d isse nte d , Ga rvin r e ma rki ng 
prophe tically, "Those who counte n a nce the wild Polish 
amb . . d . k h h d oo
84 1t1ons an agg r ess 1ons now not w at t e y o. One Tory 
backbe nche r a gre e d wi th Ga rvin. Lord Robe r t Cecil, wh o had 
since b e come cha i rma n of the Ex e cutive Commit t ee of the 
League of Na ti o ns Union, as k e d the gove r nme nt to s e cure 
a Leagu e of Nations c ondemna tio n o f Po l a nd . Lo r d Curz o n 
replied tha t t he Red A.rmy h ad bee n mas s ed on t he Pol ish 
fronti e r. If t h e League inte r fe r ed , it "would c r t a inly 
be reg a r d e d a s inte rven tion in f a vour of the Bo l s h e vis t s 
82
sir Ey r e Cr owe (Permane n t Und r- Se c r e t a ry of t he 
Fore ign Offi c e ) t o t he I ta li a n c ha r ge d ' affaire s , J une 2 , 
1920, I b i d ., p. 743. 
83Th e Ti me s , ~lay 19, 192 0, p . 17; -'-S......,_....,.,.,_-- CXXIV 
(June 12, 19 20), 780; Da ily 11a i l, Na y 21, , p . 4 ; 
Daily Te l e g rap h , July 22 , 192 0 , p . 1 0 . 
84 o bserve r, Ha y 23, 1920, p. 10. 
and against o u r All i es." More ove r, the So viets d id not 
recognize the League. Howe v e r, he conceded tha t Poland 
had acted without first consulting Britain. 85 
Disturbed by Labour's claim t h at Britain had 
engineered the atta ck, Bonar Law repeat e d Cur zon's dis-
lOS 
claimer on May 20. He stre ssed Britain's ne utrality but 
admitted that she would sup ply Pol a nd with a rmaments 
promise d in the fall of 1919. 86 Se v e ral Tory b a c kbenche rs 
supporte d the gove rnment: Ha lford Ma c k ind e r asked the 
public to show "some fri e ndlines s towa r ds the Pole s in the 
very difficult pos ition in which they find th er.~se lve s ." 87 
In fact, the Pole s a d v a nce d steadily until late 
June whe n a Soviet counte rattack forc e d t hem into a cos tly 
retreat. Ma r s h a l Pilsud ski the n s e nt his Prime Mini s t e r, 
M. Gra bski, to Spa for Alli e d h e lp. Lloyd Ge orge criti-
cized the Po l es . But, f earing a Bo l she v ik victory , t he 
Allies fo r mula ted a n a rm i s ti ce and p l e dged to d e f e nd Pol a nd 
if the Sovie t s crossed t he p rovi siona l bo r d e r (the Cur z on 
line) fixe d b y the Peace Confe r e n ce o n De c embe r 8, 1 919. 
Grab ski a g r e e d t o t he t e rms , and on Jul y 11 Cur zon d i spatched 
85For e xtr a c t s a :1 = c o:runenta r y on the cor.r..es o nde nce , 
see Coa t es , Armed I nte rve n tion in Ru ssia , p p . 321- 22 , and 
The Ru ssian Outlook , I II (i!a y 22 , 1920 ) , 1 29 5 . 
86o e bates , CXXI X (May 20, 1 9 20 ), co ls . 16 96 -170 4 . 
87
rbid., col s . 1711-18 . See a l s o Wa lter Gui n ness ' 
remarks, -cors . 1 66 0- 6 4. 
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88 89 
them to Russia. Tory pape rs backe d the Allies. The 
Soviet reply vaguely cons e nted to peace talks if Poland 
made direct r e presenta tions. 90 In Commons on July 21 
Lloyd Ge orge called the Polish attack "re ckless and foolish" 
but adde d that a vanquished Poland would be a disas t e r for 
b . l . 91 b kb h h European sta 1 1ty. Tory ac e nc ers a nd t e pres s 
applauded his a nalys is: all now favored a peace ful 
. 92 
solut1on. 
In replying to the Sovie t note Curzon acce pted 
dire ct Russo-Polish negotiations b ut emph a size d the Allies ' 
desire to meet concurre ntly with a Rus sia n d e l e g a tion in 
London. In conclud ing he warned them not to cross the 
93 
Curzon line . But the Sovi e ts we r e convince d th a t Poli s h 
Communist s a nd the Re d Army could t o pp l e Pi l sudsk i. As a 
subterfuge Ru s s ia me t the Pol e s on Aug u s t l, afte r he r 
88 For t he Allie d d i scuss i ons , s ee No t s of a Me e ting , 
July 6, J u l y 9 , 19 2 0 , and Briti sh Secreta y ' s No t es o f a 
Conve r sa t ion , J u ly 10 , 19 20 , rit i sh Docun e n t s , se r . 1, 
VIII, 441- 42, 5 02 - 6 , 52 4- 30 . The Cu r zon note i s r r inte d 
in De b a t es , CXXX I (J u l y 14 , 19 20 ), col s . 2372-74. 
89 E.g., Obs e rve r, July 1 8 , 19 20 , p . 10, a nd Th e T i mes , 
July 13, 1 920 , p . 1 7 . 
90
sov i e t Docume n ts , I, 1 9 4-9 7. 
91 Deba t es , CXXX II (J uly 21, 1920 ), cols. 481-86, 
539-41. 
92 Ibid ., col s . 517 -2 1, 529 - 30; Observe r, Ju l y 25, 192 0 , 
p. 10; DailY Te l eg r aph , J u ly 20 , 1920 , p . 1 0 . 
93
curzo n to Ch iche rin, July 20, 1920 , Bri t i s h Documen ts , 
ser. 1, VII I, 649 - 50 . 
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advancing force s already had crossed t he Curzon line. 94 
They also agreed to talks in London. 95 Led by Kame ne v 
and Krassin, the Soviet Trade Delega tion (re named the Peace 
Delegation) me t with Lloyd Ge orge and othe r ministers on 
August 4 and 6. Flushed with hopes of i mminent victory, 
the Soviets demanded excessive terms. Lloyd George r e fu sed 
and demanded an armistice to b eg in on Augu s t 10. If Rus s ia 
demurred he would su pp ly Poland throug h Danzig and reimpose 
the Baltic blockade. 96 
With the Re d Army barely forty miles from Warsaw, 
the Cabinet un a nimously seconded the Pr ime Minister' s effort 
97 to keep Poland free. Only Win ston Churchill offe r ed an 
alterna tive . In the Ev en ing News on July 29 he pro ose d 
committing German troops to stem the Red tide , but The Time s 
i . . d h " . 98 1 h . cr t1c1z e ~s suggest1on. ow e xtre me y appre ens~ve , 
94 Carr, The Bo l shevi k Revol u tio n , III, 209-10 . 
95 
. . 2 1 2 . d Ch~che r~n t o Curz on , J uly 4, 9 0 , extrac t s r~nte 
in Oebate s , CXXXI I (J uly 26 , 192 0 ), eels. 97 4-7 5 . 
96 
Draft 
Aug . 6 , 19 2 0 , Si r 
Willi am ull , noted an i - ol s e v i k Tory 
par tici pa t ed in t he , ug u s t 6 ee ti ng a t t e 
old fr i e nd Kras sin ; info a tion rovided 




see Lloyd Geo rge ' s r emarks in Briti s h Secr e t a r y 's 
Notes of a Confe r e nce , J uly 27, 1 9 20 , Brit ish Doc ume n s , 
ser. 1, VIII, 652 . 
98 . The TLmes , July 29 , 1920, pp . 11, 13. 
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The Times expre s sed a view shared by many Tory papers: "It 
is a terrible truth that once more we stand upon the edge of 
a crisis fraught with possibilities only less tragic than 
those that lowered over us in this first week of Aug u s t six 
99 
years ago. " Editorials refl e cted a f ear that a communiz ed 
Poland would prompt the Russians and Germans to demand a 
fundamental revision of the Versai lles trea ty. Western 
100 
civilization was felt to hang in the balance. Despite 
such dark prophecies no Tory j ou rnal wanted to c ommit 
British troops . 'l'he Daily ~lcJil felt the arrest of the 
Soviet Peace Delegation migh t bring Russia to heel . Ev e n 
the ~orning Pos t r epudiat d wa r. These papers advocated 
inte rvention if Poland fell, bu t none p r o o sed crossing the 
101 
Russi a n fronti e r. The Observer seeme d to rule out 
British interference comp lete ly: Garvin judge d that a 
Sovie t occupation of Warsaw would not threa ten Polish in-
urg the Po l e s to go 
When the Bri ti sh ultinatum e x p ire d , Lloyd George 
99
r bid. , Aug . 6, 1920 , p . 11 . 
100Daily Teleg r aph , Aug. 5, p . 10, Aug . 9, 1920, p . 10; 
The T. e s , Aug. 7, 19 0 , p . ll. 
101Daily Hai l, Au g . 5, 1920, p . 4; Morning Pos t, Aug . 10, 
1920, p. 6. Se e also The Ti me s , Aug . 9 , 1920 , p. ll. 
102ob serve r, Aug . 8 , 1920, p. 8; Saturd (Aug. 21, 19 20 ), 14 9 . ---~....__ _ __ _ cxxx 
109 
outlined the Al lies ' preparations for parliame nt. 103 Only 
two Tory b ackbenche rs res ponded . Lord Robert Cecil again 
asked for Le ague med iation , while G. B . Hur s t sought support 
. . . 104 for the Pn.me Ml.nl.ste r. Every Labou r speaker cautioned 
the governme nt not to become involved . After nearly six 
hours of polemics Lloyd Georg e reappear ed with a n w set of 
peace proposa ls from Kame ne v. The d emand for i mmediate 
Polish demobilization r emai ned , but t he Soviets promised 
to withdraw from the Polish front and to r e duce their troop 
levels. More surpri sing ly, t hey would allow the armistice 
line to be drawn in Poland's favor. After securing Cab ine t 
approval that evening , Lloyd Ge orge asked the Poles to 
accept. 105 
Conservative papers quest ioned t he Sovie t t erms . 
The Time s c alled them amb i guous and p rinted some rumors 
purporting t hat t he Soviets d id not want peace . The Specta-
tor refused com e nt until the t erms were p r esented at the 
armistice confe r e nce , scheduled to c onvene mome ntar ily a t 
Minsk . 10 6 Such hes itations we re well-f o unded . The Minsk 
103 Debates , CXXXI II (Aug . 10, 1 920 ), cols . 253-72 . 
104
rbid., cols. 287-97, 339-42. 
cols. 351-54 ; 
106 . ll t cxxv The Tl.me s , Aug. 11, 1920, p . ; Specta or , 
(Aug. 14, 19 20 ), 1 96 . 
t 
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talks were never held because neither belligerent wanted 
peace at the moment. The crisis continued. 
After August 10 Tories turned their attention to the 
Council of Action, a body of trade union and Labour party 
leaders forme d to prevent British intervention. 107 On 
August 13 an emergency conference of the Labour movement 
unanimously endorse d the Council of Action. Labour leaders , 
including such moderate s as J. H. Thomas, advocated a 
108 
general strike. Tory publications we r e outraged by such 
proposals. The ~lorning Post labeled the Council a "London 
Soviet" taking orders directly from "the J e ws in Hoscow." 
The Spec tator decided Council leaders were creating a bog us 
war scare to enhance their political p r es tig The Daily 
Telegraph accused t hem of attacking a "bogey of their own 
. ,.109 
creat1on. 
Tory backbenchers also concentrated on the domes tic 
ramifications of the crisis. On August 16 Bona r La w, and 
then Lloyd George, reite r ated their peace ful inte ntions. 
Law exclaimed that Labour's ou tbu r s t was "in support o f 
107 . . . . 1 For the Counc1l' s a ctl.Vl.t l. es , s ec L. J. MacF a r anc , 
"Hands of f Ru s s i a : Br itis h La bou r a nd t he Russo-Poli sh War, 
1920," Past and Present , , o . 28 (1 9 67), 1 26-52. 
108carroll, Soviet Comm uni sm and Wes tern Opi nion , p . 177. 
109Morning Pos t , Aug. 13, 1920, p . 4; S c cta tor, CXXV 
(Aug. 14, 1920), 196 - 9 7. See also at ion a l Re v iew , LXXVI 
(September, 1 9 20), S-6, 14-17, and Da 1 l y Te l e graph , Aug . 16, 
1920, p. a. 
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our policy." But Lord Robert Cecil stated t hat t he 
Council's "direct action" was revolutionary . Henry Page 
Croft insisted that Labour M.P.'s resign for having erected 
a "Soviet Governme nt which is a rival of this Parliament." 
Like other Tories he opposed interv e ntion unless the 
Soviets showed they were "absolutely determined" to crush 
Poland. 111 
Unknown to Commons, the Poles had counterattacked 
that morning and almost immediately scattered the Re d Army. 
This "Miracle on the Vistul a" benefited Britain as much as 
Poland. Whe n the Soviets announced their terms for an 
armistice on August 23, one clause diffe red from their 
propos a ls of August 10. The innocuous "civil militia" to 
be organized afte r the war was altered to mean a civil 
militia of 200,000 me n drawn entirely from the working 
classes. Tory fears had been jus tified. Lloyd George and 
. . . 112 h . 1 Curzon protested Sov~et du l~c~ty. T e Sov~ets ater 
withdrew th e clause when suing for peace . In 11arch , 1921 
the bellige rent s signed the Treaty of Riga , which gave 
110 Debates , CXXXI II (Aug. 16, 1920 ), cols. 663-68 , 
683-91. 
111I bid ., cols. 677-83, 707-10. 
112 . 23 Notes of a Conversat~on lleld at Lucerne , Aug . , 
1920, Curzon to Chicher in, Aug . 24 , 1920, British Documents , 
&er. 1, VIII, 777-80, 77 9 , n. 3. 
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Poland an eastern boundary more favorable than the Curzon 
line. 
Most Conservatives probably hoped the Pole s would 
overrun Russia . But when Poland was threa tened, thei r in-
decisive reaction perhaps ind icate d their s upport was more 
vocal than substantive. The Tories clearly did not want 
a military confrontation with Russia. The Council of ~ction's 
advocacy of a ge ne ral strike probably did not influence t he 
government. It did, howeve r, widen the gulf between Labour 
and the Tories. The war also deepened the mistrust between 
Britain and Russia: the Soviets were convinced that Br itain 
had instigated hostilities, while the British we r e outraged 
by Sovie t hypocrisy. As a r esult, Ang lo-Sovie t tr ade negoti-
ations suffered a setback. 
The Conclus ion of the Agreeme nt 
The sus pended trade negotiations we re not resumed 
immediately. ~lhen the Sovie t Pea c e De l ega t ion r e turned to 
Britain in August , t hey became involved with l ef tist attempts 
to pre ven t Brita in from he l ping the Poles . The govcr . e nt 
broke the Sovi e t ciphe r code and monitor ed the ir ac tivities 
113 
closely. Hos t Cabinet ministers , includ ing such fervent 
trade supporters as Law and Horne, wanted the Soviets 
113Law to Lord Stamfordham (private secretary to the 
King), Sept . 1 5 , 1920 , Bon a r Law a e rs, 101/4/88 . 
113 
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dismissed. ~owever, the Cabine t finally allowe d them to 
remain. Bonar Law gave two reasons for the decision: the 
government would have had to admit poss e ssion of private 
Soviet telegrams , and the y belie ved propagand a could be 
. d 0 th t h 0 d 0 0 f 115 conta~ne w~ ou ~n e r~ng a resumpt~on o trade . On 
September 10 Lloyd George d e nounced the Delegation's 
machinations. 116 Kamenev left Engl a nd the next d a y, and 
Krassin took his place. On Septembe r 14 Lloyd George 
ordered the civil servant Russi a n Trade Commi ttee to r esume 
negotiations, but nothing materialized for the n ex t ten 
117 
weeks. 
The impasse resulted from i ncreasing Cab ine t 
dissension. On Se ptembe r 15 Curzon c onvinced h i s colleag ues 
to sus pend formal talks until t he Sovie ts c eased dome s ti c 
propaganda and fr eed the r emaining British pri s one rs in 
Russia. 118 During t he fall Curzon and Chiche rin e xchanged 
several recrimi na ting t e l eg r ams . The Foreig n Secretary 
criticized t he Sovi e t s for violating t he ir propaganda p l edge , 
114 0 ( 0 ) J. C . C . Dav~dson p r1vate secre t ary to Bonar Law to 
Stamfo rdh am , Se pt . 2 , 19 20 , I bid ., 101/4/85 . 
115Law to S tamfordham , Sep t. 15 , 19 20 , Ibi d ., 1 01/4/88 . 
116 Secre t a ry's o t e s of a Confere n c e wi t h t he Russ i an 
Trade Delegation, Sept . 10 , 192 0 , Brit ish Doc ument s , se r. 1, 
VIII, 7 8 3- 91. 
117 Glenny, "The Ang lo-Sovi e t Tr ade Agreeme nt," p . 73. 
118c abine t mi nutes , Sep t. 1 5 , 1920, CAB 23/22. 
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and Chiche rin countered that Britain r eally wanted to break 
119 
off the talks. Chiche rin was partially correct. Church-
ill and Walter Long now r esolutely opposed nego tiations even 
if the Soviets accepted the preliminary conditions. For two 
months they bombarde d the Cabinet with memorandums. Long 
was convinced that the Soviets really sought to destroy 
Britain. As evidence he pointed to Krassin ' s a lleged rol e 
in fome nting unrest among s a ilors and doc kworkers. Churchill 
accus ed them of collecting v aluab l e po li tical and military 
information. He f elt tha t Britons should trade with kussia 
120 
at their own ri sk. In October Au s ten Chamberlain a l so 
came out against the conference , probably in r esponse to 
. . 121 pressure from bus~ness ~nterests . 
But some ministers were u ndecided ; Curzon u nde r-
scored their d il emma . Because of steadily increas ing un-
employmen t, he "would be glad to s ee commerc ial r e l a tio ns 
estab lished." However , an agreeme nt would g ive the Soviets 
a " r enewed l ease of life " wh ich t hey wou l d use to undermine 
Britain. He finally reaf i rme d his will ing ness to sign an 
119For two of these t e l egrams , see Chi c 
Sept . 24, 1920 , 
Chicherin , Oc t. 
120 E.g., memorandums by Long , S p t . 27, Sept . 30 , 19 20 , 
CAB 24/111, 24/112, and me o rand um by Chu rchill, Sept. 21 , 
1920, CAB 24/111 . 
121Gl enny , "The Anglo- Soviet Trade Agreement," p. 74. 
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agreement if the Soviets adhered to the t e rms of the June 30 
122 
note and his September 15 memorandum . 
In mid-Novemb e r the Soviets released a group of 
British prisoners. 123 Interpreting this as a conciliatory 
ges ture, the Cabine t discussed a possible r esumption of 
negotiations . The Prime Minis t er and !!orne spoke affirmative-
ly because of rising unemp loyment. Bonar Law cite d other 
rea s ons: Soviet propagand a was only a minor irritant; 
Britain could influe nce Russia mo r e effective ly i f an agree -
ment was signed ; and it would be impolitic to v e to an accord 
when many Britons believe d in a vas t Russian marke t waiting 
to be t apped . Curzon arg ued for Soviet acceptance of 
every condition, uut the Pr i me Ministe r r ep l i e d that the ir 
propag anda could not be c onta ined comp letely . The d i s cussion 
ended witho ut a d e cision . 124 During t he mee ting C urc hill 
told his close fri e nd Birkenhead that he would r es i g n i f 
the Prime Hinister prevailec! . Tha t af t ernoon Birkenhead 
critic ized Churchill : "You wi ll find yourse l the h e ro of 
the Morning Po s t and t he l e ade r of some thirty Tories in the 
12 2 Memorand um b y Cur zon , lov. 1 4 , 19 20, CAB 24/114 . 
123Memorandum by t he Foreign Off i c e , Dec . 30, 1 920 , 
Briti sh Docu e nts , ser . 1, VIII , 866 . 
124cabine t minutes , ov . 17, 1920, CAB 23/23. Law a nd 
Hor n e al s o publ i cly urged suppor t for Lloyd Ge org e ; s e e 
Deba tes, CX XXI II (Oc t. 26 , 1920 ), col s . 1519-21, and The 
:ov. 13, 1 920 , p. 10 . 
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House of Commons, who disagree with you on ninety percent of 
all subj ects about which you f ee l really deeply. " 125 When 
the discussion resumed t he next day, Churchill told Lloyd 
George: "You are on the high road to embrace Bo l shev i sm . 
I am going to keep off t ha t and denounce them on all 
possible occasions ." Auste n Chamber l a in and Birkenhead 
reluctantly supporte d the victorious Prime Minister. 
Churchill did not resign. The decision was publicize d that 
126 
afte rnoon. 
The Tory press r esponse was cond itione d l argely by 
recent events. After the Russo-Poli sh war many papers had 
127 
wanted the Sovi e ts ex pe lled . In mid - o vember, when the 
Bolsheviks captured Sebas topol, the l ast White stronghold, 
several pape r s fe a r ed they would attack the Mi d dle Eas t, 
and even India. 128 The Da ily Tele g r a h t yp ifie d the 
genera lly critica l pre ss r e c ep tion of the Cab ine t ' s de cision: 
"Can this be usef ul, in any shape, eithe r to Russia or to 
the world? Must it not r a the r be pernicious since it will 
125 Glenny, "The Ang lo- Soviet Tr ade Ag r eement," pp . 75-76. 
12 6cabinet minutes, ov. 18, 19 20 , CAB 23/23 . 
127The Times , Sep t. 10, p . 11, Se p t. 11, p . 9, Oct. 8 , 
1920, p. ll; na il~ ~! a il, Se t . 22, 1920, p. 6 ; Da ily 
Telegraph, Aug . 2 , 1920 , p . B. 
128Morni ng Post , Nov . 14, 1920, p . 5; Daily Te l eg raph , 
Nov. 16, 1920 , p. 12; The Ti e s , Nov. 16, 19 0 , p . 13. 
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delay the ine vitab le d ownfa ll of the f rantic d espotism 
which is the c a u se of Russia 's penury?" 129 As u s u a l the 
Spe cta to r a nd the Ob serve r offe r ed support . The la t t e r 
pape r wa s ec s t a tic: •In the fir s t 12 months a f t e r r e -
opening trade , Ru s s i a would c e rta inly place in t h is country 
orde rs for mach i n e ry and manufacture to the tune of at l eas t 
f-100,000,000. • 13 0 
In early Decenbe r Ho rne a n d Kr assi n exc h a ng e d draft 
agreements , a nd d i scu ssions r esume d t o solve t hr e e r e maining 
differe nce s. First , Br i t a in i ns i ste d t ha t t h e Soviet g o-
ve rnme nt a nd their citi zens r e f r a in from • h os til e ac t ion or 
propaganda " i n Bri tain , the Empire, the Caucasus , Asia 
Minor, Pe r s i a , and Afghani s tan . Th e Sovi e t d r af t sec t ion d i d 
not me n t i o n s pecific a r eas . e x t, t he Sov ie t s wante d specia l 
l eg islation t o p r even t rit ish cre d itor s f rom con fi scat ing 
their e xpor t s . Br ita in p r o t es t e d t h a t such laws wou l d be 
ill e g al . Finally , Brita in cern nded Sovie t compensa ti on for 
un pai d s e rv i c e s or good s su . p l i e d b y Britons ; o ther cl a i ms 
we re to b e c o n s i de r e d i n ano t h e r trea ty . Russia want d a l l 
1 31 
claims d e fe rred t o a l ate r t r ea t y . 
1 29 o a ily Te l e g r a p h , n . d ., c i t ed b y Coa tes , A Hi story of 
Anglo- Sov i e t Re lat~ons , p . 46-4 7. 
130specta tor , CXXV (l lo v. 20, 1920 ), 661-62 ; Ob s er v e r , 
Nov. 21, 1 9 20 , p . 1 2 . 
131The Sov i e t a nd th e ritish d ra fts can b e fo und in 
Appendix to a For e i g n Office emo r ndum , De c . 30 , 1 9 20 , 
Bri ti sh Doc ume n s , se r . 1 , VIII , 869 -7 8 . 
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On December 21 both sides offered minor concessions, 
b t d h d b . 132 u no progress was rna e on t e e t ques t1on. The next 
day Horne publicized the government's growing irritation by 
accusing the Soviets of sta lling at the conference and even 
conceding that Russia h ad nothing to trade. To reassure 
edgy Cons e rvatives he declared that other classes of debts 
would never be abandoned. 133 
From December to March, 192 1 Tory press opponents 
of a trade agreement generally were s ilen t, apparently 
believing the deadlock wa s insurmountable. 134 Howe v e r, 
Labourites and the coterie of Conservative pre ss s u pport e r s 
. . 135 became mor e vocal, blam1ng t he governme n t for the 1mpas s e . 
The Foreign Offic e also admitted that "there h a ve be en a 
good many indications lately of a change o f mind in 
132 Draft Secr etary ' s Notes of a Confe r e nce , Dec . 21, 
1920, Ibid., pp. 87 9- 92. 
133De bates , CXXX (D c. 22, 1920) , cols . 1865- 78. 
134 For a few of t hese infreq ue nt editoria ls, s ee Da il 
Teleg r aph, De c . 15, 19 20 , p . 10; Mor ning Pos t, De c . 21 , 
l9 20 , p. 6 ; a nd Th Ti mes , Dec . 2 2 , 1920 , p . 11 . 
13 5 See Observe , e c . 1 2 , 1920 , . 13 ; 
CXXV I (Feb . 1 2 , 192 1), 1 89 ; an Sun ay Times , e c . 
Dec. 19, 1920, a pended to a memorandum by Commande r Ma x se 
(Fore i gn Of fic e civil serv nt) , J a n. 5 , 192 1, Gr ea t 
Britain , Pub lic Re c o r d Off i ce , Fo r e i g n Office iles , 
Gene ral Corresponde nce , Politica l, FO 371/68 77. (Ge ne ral 
Corresponde nce , Political, he r e inaft r r eferred t o as 
FO 371/ .) 
119 
corrunercial and industrial circles." 136 Tory backbe nche r 
J. D. Rees, a leading anti-Bol s he vik, also c h anged his 
stand. 137 
During the winte r months Curzon and Chiche rin a gain 
exchanged insulting t e legrams. Curzon had become exaspe r-
ated by Chicherin's t a ctics: 
With so colossal and f inished a li a r it is u se -
less to cope . Nor, a f t e r n~ l a st r ep l y , wh i ch I 
said would be the l as t o f t h e seri s , wo uld I pro-
pose to d o so. The fu s ilad e mi g h t go on till t h e 
dark-haired a mong us b e c ome g r ey , t he g r e y-ha ire d 
white, and the wh ite ba l d .l3 8 
In January and Feb ruary Chiche rin worked h a rd to 
improve his b a r g aining po s ition. On Februa ry 26 Ru s sia 
signed a tre a ty with Pe r s i a , which in turn de nounced a n 
Anglo-Pe rsi an trea t y negoti a t e d b y Curz o n in 19 19 . Ag r ce -
139 
ments with Afg ha ni s t a n a nd Tu r k e y f o llowed . The Sovi e t s 
thus encroached u pon Brita in' s Mi dd l e Ea s t p r e s erve a nd 
r e nde r e d s upe r f luo u s h e r ins i ste nc e o n n aming s pe c i f i c 
countries in the d r a ft tr ade ag r eement. 11o r e ove r, Russ i a 
beg an to place l a r ge indu s t ri a l o r d e r s in ~urope . In 
13 6r.lcmorand um by . Cl a rk (Fo r e i g n Offi c e c ivil s e rv a n t ) I 
Dec. 21 1 19 2 0 , FO 37 1/5 434 . 
137 De bates , CXXXVI (Dec. 20 1 192 0 ), col s . 12 59 -6 0 . 
138Memorandum by Curzon , Feb . n.d. I 192 1, FO 
For a r epresenta tive t e l g r am f ro~ Chicheri n l s e 
Docume nts , I, 230-33. 
c n t, " p . 8 0 - 81. 
53 . 
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Br i t a in it was r umo r ed tha t many Sovi e t mining and l umbe ring 
. b b d . 140 concess1ons were a out to e grante to f ore1g ners . 
On Ma rch 4 Horne i nforme d Krassi n that the gove rn-
me nt would sign a n agreeme nt af t e r the t e r ms were discussed 
in Commons. The r e on March 9 four Tory opponents r epeate d 
1 41 the mora l a nd economic a r guments. Two Conservatives 
re spo nded fa vorab l y . Al though Lord Robe r t Ce cil obj e cte d 
to Labo ur' s c on t en t ion that trade was a panacea for domestic 
prob l ems , he be l ieved th a t the agreeme nt would pro ote peace . 
Lamber t Ward be l i e v ed the La bour party had so exaggerated 
t he beneficia l res ul ts of trade that he supported an accord 
jus t t o prove them wrong : "If the re is any trade t o be done 
it wil l all be to the advantage of thi s country . If t he r e 
is no t rade t o be done , the n t he y h a v e t r i ed and it is 
t hei r fun e ral . " 14 2 I n r ep ly Rob e rt Ho rne hoped tha t trade 
would r esto r e Rus sia to t he mai n s tream of civ i lization and 
he l p t he European economy . Altho ugh r eassur ing Tory b a c k -
be nchers on the debt question , h e di smi ssed tl1 e ir mora l 
objections to "ta inted " Russian gold . 1 4 3 
14
°Fische r , The Sovie ts in Wor l d Affai r s , I , 293. 
141
oeba t es , CXXXIX (March 9, 19 21) , col s . 525-28 , 
564 -66, 572-75 , 57 6-7 7. 
14 2 I bid ., cols . 5 31 - 33 , 5 61- 6 3 . 
14 3Ibid ., cols . 535-40 . 
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On March 14 the Cab ine t r emoved Asia Mi nor, t he 
cauca sus, a nd Pe r s ia from t he ir li s t o f areas of f l imits 
to Sovi e t p ropaganda , r e t a i ning on l y Britai n, t he Empi r e , 
India, and Afghan i stan . I n r e turn Br i t ain would r ef r a in 
from dire ct or ind i rec t p r opa ganda or hos tile ac tion aga in s t 
sovie t Rus s i a a nd the areas fo rme rly wi t h in t he Russ i a n 
empire . The Cab ine t c onsen t e d to prote c t Sovi e t sh i ps , 
cargoes , a nd go ld from Br i t is h creditors . F i na lly, t he y 
agreed tha t t he future genera l treaty wo uld be a " peac e" 
tre a ty, thus o pe ning t he possibi li ty o f de j ure re l a tions . 
Howe v e r, the y ins i sted t ha t t he Sovi e t s r ecognize t he ir 
144 
liabil i t y t o c ompensate Britons fo r unpaid q ood s . Ev e n 
this wa s wa t ered down in the ac tua l t rea t y , whe r e t he Sov i e t s 
recogniz ed t he ir r es onsibi l ity on ly "in principle . " The 
deposit ion of a ll d e b t s was l ef t to the l ater peace trea t y . 
The Tr ade Ag r eement signed on March 16 al s o inc l uded an 
excha nge of trade d e l egations with d i p l oma tic i mmunity . 
And if t he propaganda c l auses we r e viol a ted , e i the r party 
1 45 
could cance l the Ag r eeme n t upon s ix- months ' notice . 
1 44 Cabine t mi nu t es , a rch 1 4, 1921 , r e printe in 
FO 371/6854 . 
145Grea t Br i tai n, Par l i ame nt , Pa rli ame nta r y Payers , 
(House o f Commons an Cornman ) , (Rus ~ no . 1 , 1 § 21 , 
Cmnd. 1 207, "Tr ade Agreemen t etwe e n !l is rit t a nic ·lajcs ty ' s 
Government an t he Government of Ru ss i a n ocia1ist 
Federa l Sovi e t Re ub l ic, " (Lon on , 192 1) . 
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The Cabinet ' s capitulation to key Soviet demands 
was induced by several factors. Russ ia's diploma tic 
succes se s in the Middle Eas t had unde rcut Britain 's rationa l e 
for excluding her in f lue nce from the area. The Cabinet also 
feared losing desperate ly needed forei g n trade : Kr a ss in 
later called this the "final reason." 14 6 Moreover , Winston 
Churchill had since l ef t the War Office to become Secre t ary 
of State for the Colonie s, and his interes t in Russia was 
reduced considerab ly. Illness had forced a nothe r h a rd 
liner, Walte r Long, to retire. 
As the governme nt rushed to conclude the Agreement, 
most Cons e rvative p pe r s we r e focu s ing on the Kronstad t 
rising . Many sp rinkled t he ir columns with dispatches from 
Helsink i and Cope nhag en pre d i c ting t he Sovie t s ' downfa ll. 
On March 5 The Tim s r e orted , "The white fl a g i s hoisted 
over t he Winter Palace and th e Kr e mlin." 147 ~ditori 1 
write r s , how ve r, f e lt t he l a ck of adeq uate inform ti o n 
14 8 
precluded a n accurate asses s me nt. After t he Ag reemen t 
was initi a led , Tory pres s o onents we r e a ngered . The 
14 6Krass in ' s c omm nt s Xeni a ud i n and 
H. H. Fi sh r , ed s ., Sovi e t \·,'es t, 1920-192 7: 
a Docume nta ry Survey~(~S~t~a~n~~~~~~T--=~_,675~.~~~~~~~-
147The Times , Ma rch 5, 1921 , p . 12. 
148
r b id., !1arch 2, p . 12, Ma r ch 5, 19 21, p . 11; Daily 
Tel e ra ~arch 1 8 , 1920 , p . 9. The ·torning Pos t , I rch 14, 
921, p . 7, d i sag r eed . 
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Time s felt Britain had be en shortchanged, especially by the 
clause prohibiting creditors from attaching Russian gold. 
The Daily Mai l and the Morning Post assailed the Prime 
Minister for bracing t he totte ring Soviets again; they 
predicted a Tory rebe llion. The Na ti onal Re vi e w denounced 
the "chicken-he arte d swa shbuckl e rs of the Carlton Club who 
149 
are as mum as mice." Ma ny financial and comme rcial 
concerns also dis sented. 150 
The numero us clause s favoring the Bol s he viks led 
Tory pre ss supporte r s to all a y the ir enthusiasm. The 
Observer f e ared Sovie t inte rfe r e nce in those Middle East 
countries not enume rated in the propag anda clause . The 
Specta tor con~ined its "ge neral" sa tisf ac tion with an 
attack on "the maddes t Gove r nment t ha t the fanatici sm of 
man eve r c o nce ive d . " Like these journ a ls Ti me a nd T i de 
cautione d a g ainst a ny i mme d i ate t rad e be ne fi ts . 151 
In Commons on Ma rch 22 Lloyd Geo r ge cl aimed t h e 
Agreeme nt would he l p pa cify Eu r ope a nd c onve rt t he Sovie ts 
into " ho ne s t, sober , d ece n t citi ze ns " t h rough a g entle -
149The Time s , Ma r ch 17 , 192 1, p. 11; Da ily Ma il, 
March 17, 19 21, p . 6 ; Morn ing Po s t , Ma rch 17 , 19 1 , p . 6 ; 
Nationa l Re vi w, LXXVI I (April , 1 2 1 ) , 165 . See a l s o 
Saturd a e v i e w, CXXX I (Ma r c h 19 , 192 1), 229 ; Ca r d i f f 
Western Ma ~l . Ma r c h 17, 19 21 p. 5; and Daily Te l eg r aph , 
Marc h 17, 192 1, p. 10. 
150 . . p For repres enta t~ve c omme nts, s ee lorn ~ng ost , 
March 18, 19 21, pp . 7- 8 . 
151 Obs e rve r, Ma r ch 20 , 192 1, p .l3; Spec t to r, CXXVI 
(March 19 , 192 1 ), 350 ; Ti me and Tide , II ( ~arch 1 8 , 19 21), 2 46 . 
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manly process of instruction." Sensing support from most 
voters and business firms, he stated tha t Tory obj e ctions 
~do not seem to have permeate d beyond the walls of this 
152 
House.ft During the debate Conservative dissen t e rs 
charge d that the Agreeme nt was signed too hastily , ac-
corded de facto recog nition to bankrupt criminals, and 
disre garded the creditors' claims . 1 53 Earlie r in the day 
Edward liood had called for its suspe ns ion on the g round 
that Soviet propagand a was continuing in Indi a and 
154 
Afghanistan. Only one Conservative defended it: 
J. D. Rees believed that the absence of trade heightened 
. 155 
the mise ry of the uss1a n pe opl e . 
By ending the three -yea r undec lared war between 
the two countri e s, t he Trade Ag r eeme nt marked an i mport an t 
turning point in their r e l a tions . But Lloyd Ge orge did not 
prevail easily. Had Tory pressure b e e n le ss intense , the 
Agreement mi ght have been signe d much earlie r, and on terms 
even more favo r able to Russ i a . Eve n s o, Lloyd Ge o r ge ' s 
successful conclus i on o f t he negoti a tions agains t strong 
opposition i s a fit t i ng e stimony to h is politica l s agaci y . 
152 Deba t es , CXXXIX (Ma rch 22, 192 1), cols . 2505-12. 
153 I bid ., cols. 24 95-2 50 5, 2514-17, 2520-22. 
15 4 I b i d . , co 1 s . 2 3 3 5-3 6 . 
155I bid ., col s. 2522-25 . 
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The different grouping s of Tory op inion towa r d 
Russia be g a n to emerge more clearly d uring t he negotia t i ons . 
The Observer, the Spe c ta t o r, Time and Tide , and Lord Robert 
Cecil b e c ame t he l ead i ng e x pone nts of t he "concilia tory" 
viewpoint. The "centris ts," a s ma ll but influe ntial group 
at this time , were willing to dea l wi th t he Sovie ts if t he y 
made only minimal concess ion s to Brita in. A s urp rising 
number of Cabine t mi ni s t e r s , l e d b y Law and Horne , chose 
this stand. Pe rh aps t hey we r e influenced by Lloyd Geor ge ' s 
charisma and by increas ing unemp l oyme nt. The "righti s t s" 
asked for more exte n s ive Russ i a n con cess ions : l e d b y 
Curzon in the Cab ine t, t hese Tor ies seem to h a v e been 
supporte d b y a ma jority of Tory newspape r s a nd backbenc he r s . 
The "ultras " d e nounced any contac t s with the Bo l shev iks . 
Although the ir r a nks were swolle n i n 19 1 9 , the de f ea t of 
the Whites r educed t heir numbe rs conside r ab l y i n the 
followi ng decade . Wa l te r Long and the Horning Pos t 
exempli f i ed t he "ultr a " v iewpoin t at t h i s time . 
Despite t hese differences of o pinion no Tories 
favored war with Russia , and all felt that Bri t a in shoul 
have extracted be tter t erms in th Tra de Agr ement . When 
Lloyd Geor ge moved to normali ze re lations with Russ i a n 
during the l as t yea r o f t he Coal ition, ma ny Tories wo rked 
hard to ins ure t ha t h e adop t ed a s t ronge r po s iti on at the 
barg a ining t able . 
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C H A P T E R V 
ATTEMPTS TO NORMALIZC RELATIO~S 
Initial Stalemate 
Between the spring and the fall of 1921 Tories paid 
little attention to the Soviets. Internal changes in Russia , 
however, attracted some interest . M1en Lenin announced a 
New Economic Po licy to revitalize the Sovie t economy, many 
1 
Tory papers were ebullient . The Times stated , "The 
fanatic who begins to doubt has los t half hi s ower.• The 
Morning Post added , "Saul has become a bourgeois ." The 
Daily Teleg r aph claimed the move was inevit ab l e becaus e 
. . 2 Bolshev~sm v1ola t ed human nature. The Sovi e t s also b eg an 
to concede th a t c apita li s t sta tes were ore r esis t an t to 
revolut ion tha n ex pect d . Without disavowing the ir ultima te 
qoal of world r e volution , they were will i ng to coex ist with 
3 
the \•lest. The Spectato r saw these declarations as a 
desperate a ttempt to stave off t he next ine vitab le Ru s sian 
revolut ion. 4 Othe r publicat i on s c a uti o ned against prem ture 
1c arr, he Bolshevik Re volution , II, 280-359 , d i s -
cusses the EP ~ n de ta1l . 
2The Times , Ma rch 15, 1921 , p . 11; Morn ing 
March 14, 1921, p . 6 ; Uai ly Teleg raph , A r il 3 , l 9 . 
3 f . For excerpts rom t wo Sov1et announcements , see 
Eudin and Fisher , ds. , Sovi e t uss i a and p . 82 -
84, 91-94. 
4 Spectator, CXXVI (A ril 1 6 , 1 921) , 4 82 - 8 3. 
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expectations. The Times , for example, accepted the pro-
nouncements at face value . Almost alone the Observe r pre-
dieted that the Soviets would become d emocratic because 
their revolutionary spirit had bee n softened by r e -eme r g ing 
5 Russian na tiona lism. 
A significant issue involving the Bolsheviks came 
to a head in Aug us t, 1 9 21 when The Times publish d a s ries 
proving the Protocols of th 6 Cl de rs of Zion was a forgery. 
This disclosure helped refute the beli e f of some Cons e r-
vatives that t he Soviets r e ally we r e part of a J e wi sn 
conspiracy to dominate t he world . British anti-Semitism 
was non-virul e nt by Continen t a l s t andard s , b ut the l arge 
numbe r of Jewish Bolshe viks had l ed to increased anti-
Semitic rhe t oric among Tories . Russia n corres onde nts for 
severa l Tory newspape rs had transmitte d anti- Semi tic r e orts 
0 7 
eve n before t he Nov mbe r Revo lut1on. 
During the fir s t two year s of Sovi e t rule , such 
righ t-wing Tory publ ications as the r~ ationa l Re view o[ n 
5Tne Ti mes , June 28 , 11 , June 30, 19 21 , . 11; 
Obs e rver , Jan. 8 , 1922, p . 12. 
6 The Times , Aug . 15 , p . 9, Aug . 16 , p . 9, Aug . 17, 
1921, p . 9 . 
7E. g ., the r eport of Ho e rt I ilton in The ' i 1c s , 
April 7, 1917, p . 5 . A c or r es o nde nt fo r t he Da1ly ·e le-
~~ph , E. Ashrnead - Bartlett, was an avowed anti -S mite . In 
mDhe r eferred t o o l shcvism as a "Jewi sh m fia mov eme nt"; 
see TheTi mc s , Jan. 26 ,1920 , . 8 . 
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included anti-Jewish slurs in the ir editorials. But the 
Saturday Review explaine d that Jews had become revolution-
S 
aries as the result of Tsarist per secution. Daily Tele-
~ editorials neve r broach e d the subject. The Tim s , 
whose policy in t his matter was typical, occasionally in-
eluded the Jewish surnames of some Bo lshe vik l eaders in 
parentheses but ne v e r went much be yond that. In late 1919 
it o pened its columns to a discuss ion of the r e l ationship 
between Bolsheviks and J ews . Readers ' ques tions we re 
answered by Britain 's J ewish l eaders , including Philip 
Magnu s , a Unioni st M. P . Like the others Magnus admitted 
th a t many Bolsheviks w re Jews, but he ma intained th a t the 
overwhelming majority of hi s co-re ligioni s ts abhorr e d 
Bolshe vism. 9 
Although a few "ul tra" backbenchers sometimes in-
jected anti- ·emitic r emarks into th e ir speec s , os t 
Tories follow ed their l eade r s in avoiding t he subjec t. 
However, t he governme nt's Wh ite Pape r of April, 1919 in-
eluded a c h r ge th a t 
. 10 
cons p~ racy . 
8 
Saturday 
olshevi sm wa s a German-Je wi sh 
LXXIV (Decemb e r, 191 9 ), 442; 
(De c. 6 , 1919), 526-27. 
9The Ti e s , Dec . 15 , 191 , p . 19 . In ovembe r and 
l e tters to t he December , 1 9 1 9 'he Time s was filled with 
editor on th e subJ e ct . 
10
"A Collection of Re ports o n Bo l shevi sm , " pp . 41-42 . 
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In J anuary , 1920 a translation of Ni lus' Protocols 
of the Elde rs of Zion had been circulated in Britain . 11 
One Tory paper swallowe d the tal e : in t he first of several 
commentaries the Morning Post proclaimed , "Le nin speaks for 
a secre t world-wide organization of wh ich he is mere ly a 
tool. " 12 In the summe r it p rinted a series on an a lleged 
Jewish-Masonic plot to e nsl ave t he world. \-/he n this was 
late r published as a book, 'l' he Cause of World Unrest , II . A . 
Gwynne, the Morning Pos t' s editor, wrote an introduction 
attacking politicized Jews. Although Gwynne disliked bei ng 
call e d an a nti-Semite, he was willing to endure the mis-
nomer as long as t he a lleged Jewish- olshevi k cliq ue 
threatened Britain . 1 3 The Time s n e ve r comm nted editori ally 
on t he Protocol s , b ut in May, 1920 a corres o nden t stated 
that Sovi e t me thods v a lida t ed t he book ' s al l ega tions . 14 
The Spectator d e fende Gwynne 's r i gh t to speak : "We hold 
that a case for inquiry has been m de ou t, and we ost 
See also Walte r Laqueu r , 
Conflict ( os t on , 1 65 ), 
11 
pp. 
war appear anc 
ny , a Ce ntury of 
196 7) , 
os t-
12Morni ng Po s t, J a n. 17, p . 6 , Dec. 15, 1921, p . 6. 
13The Ca use of rorld Unres t ('ew York , 1920) , pp . v-
xxxi i i. 
14 The T . es , lay B, 1 920 , p . 15. 
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sincerely wish that some body of the nature of a Royal 
Commission could be a ppointed to inquire into the whole 
subject." In April , 1921 the SEec t ator warne d Ru ss ian J e ws 
to reject Bolshev ism fac e it collapsed. 15 or a pogrom once 
The National Re vi e w allude d to the Protocol s r epea tedly in 
its editori a ls, and eve n the Da ily 'l'e l egraph betrayed a 
tinge of bi as when it r eferred to "Trotsky- Brons t ein" in 
August , 192o. 16 
Only a handful of Tory politicia n s , however, were 
impressed b y the Pr o t oco l s . In an artic l e title d "The 
Jewish World Problem ," Lord Sy de nham wrote that a ll Belshe-
vik l eaders we r e J e ws acting out the rotoco l s . l!e p l eaded 
with "Ge ntile " nations to ove rcome t he "powe r-loving 
Orienta l r ace ." To this e nd, British J e ws s hou ld be made 
to drop their " Saxon or o r ma n ' cover names '" and to d is-
avow their "dou b l e nationality" by s we a ri ng alleg i ance to 
17 
Britain alone . h'inston Chu r ch i ll a a r ent ly was t he only 
Cabinet ministe r to comme n t on the Protoco ls . I n t he 
:I~l~l~u~s~t~r~a~t=e~d~S~u~n~d~a~~l!~e~r~a~l~d~ he ment ioned a world -wide 
(Oct . 16 , 1920) , 489 - 9 0 , CXXVI 
16Nation 1 Review , LXXV (June , 19 20), 44 8; Da ily 
Telegraph , .ug . 19 , 1920 , p . 8 . 
17The ine t eenth Century a nd After , XC ( o vember, 1 9 21), 
888-901. 
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"sinister confederacy" of Jews who had been trying to 
"overthrow civilisation" since the eighteenth century. 
The Bolsheviks, he explained, neve r dis turbed "J e wish 
interests and J ewish places of worship." To e limi n a te these 
Rinternational" Jews he urged the creation of a Jewish 
. . 18 
national home 1n Palest1ne . 
After The Times exposed the Protocols in the swruner 
of 1921, most Tories dropped the subject . Some pape r s were 
apologetic: the Nationa l Rev i e w now exp l ained wh y some 
. . . d 1 . 19 Russ1an J ews J01ne revo ut1onary movements . The r eaf t er , 
only a few "ultra " Tory politici a ns and journa lists made 
anti-Semitic stateme nts. 
As interest in t he Protoco ls subsided , Br itain beg an 
monitoring a lleged Soviet violations of t h e Trade Agreeme nt. 
In Septembe r the Cab ine t d ire cte d Curzon to se nd a p rotest 
note. Howeve r, t hey decided not to pub li sh e note, as 
was customary , and a g r eed that it " should stop short of an 
actual threat of cance ll a tion of th e Trade Ag r eement, wh ich 
20 
should a t t h is stage be he l d in r ese rve." The dispatch 
l Billustrated Sund y Her ld , F b . 8 , 1920 , p . 5 . See 
also an e a rli r an ti- Semi ti c slur in one of h i s s e echcs on 
Bolshevism in The Russ i a n Outlook , I ( ~ay 26, 191 ) , s u p l e -
ment, p. v. 
19National Rev iew , LXXVIII (Decembe r, 1921), 490- 50 0. 
20c abine t minute s , Sept. 14, 192 1, r epr inte d in 
FO 371/68 45 . 
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handed to Chiche rin on Spetemb e r 17 d e taile d a long list of 
complaints: anti-British s peec hes b y Soviet and Cominte rn 
leaders; Soviet agents o pe rating in Afghani s tan and India; 
a propaganda school in Tashkent which traine d Indian r e vo-
lutionaries; and Sovie t s upport for an India n •anarch i s t• 
who smuggle d bomb s into Indi a from his factory in Afghan-
istan.21 
On September 20 the note wa s l e ake u some how to t he 
pre ss, but it attrac ted little a tte ntion. Those Tory 
papers which did c o mment ch a r g e d tha t the Sovie t s could not 
be restraine d by the Trade Ag re eme nt for the y we r e conte mp tu-
ous of He s tern law and g ood f ai th. But only The Time s c a lle d 
. 22 for cancell a t1on. 
The Soviet r eply claimed t he c harge s we r e forgeries 
or fabric a tions. One defe ns e wa s to be repea t ed o f t e n 
during the de c ade : 
The Russian Go ve rnme nt wi s hes to t ake t his occa ion 
to e mph as ize ... tha t the me r e f a c ts of t he Th i r d 
Interna tional h avi ng for obvious r eason s c ho sen 
21
curzon to Ch i che r i n, Se p t. 7, 1 9 21, Gr ea t Bri t a i n, 
Parli ame nt, Parli ame ntary Pa. e r s , (House of Commons an 
Comm nd ), ( uss1a no . J, 1927), C nd . 2895 , "A Se l ction 
of Pape r s De a li ng with the e l a tions be twee n Hi s Ha j esty ' s 
Gover nme nt a nd t he Sov ie t Gove r nment , 1 9 21 - 1 927 , " (Lo ndon , 
1927), pp . 4-1 2 . The date on the Br i ti s h note i s mis -
leading . (He r e i na f te r r eferr ed t o as "A Se l e ctio n o f 
Papers." l 
22The Times, Se p t. 21, p . 11, Sept. 24, 1921, p. 9; 
Mornin~ Pos t , Se pt. 21, 19 21, p . 6 ; Dai ly Te l g r aph , 
Sept. 2 , 19 21, p. 10 ; Sa turday Hevi e w, CXXXI I (Se t. 24, 
1921), 3 60. 
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Russia as the seat of its e xe cutive co~ittee • 
and of some of the members of the Russian Gove rn-
ment in their ind ividual c ap ci ty belongi ng to the 
executive committee, give no more just i fi cation for 
identifying the Th ird Inte rn a t ional with the Russ i a n 
Government than the Se c ond Internationa l, hav i ng its 
seat in Brussels or counting among t he membe r s of 
its executive M. Vande rvelde , a Be l g ian Mini s t e r, 
and Mr. Hende r son, a Briti sh Cabi ne t ~iniste r, gave 
justi f ica tion for r e nde r ing i dentical the e cond 
International with t he Belgian or Br it i sh Gove rn-
ment. Moreove r, the Execu tive Committ e of the 
Third Interna tional consis t s of t hir ty-one members , 
among whom are only f ive Russians , i nc lud ing tnree 
who do not belong to the Russian Govern~e nt.23 
Curzon ridicul ed the stateme nt: "Whe n the Ru s sian Govern-
ment desire to take some action more than u s ua lly r epugnant 
to normal internationa l l aw and comi ty, the y ordinarily 
erect some oste nsibly independent aut. o=i t y to take the 
24 
action on their behalf. ~ Correspondence ended with t his 
angry note. 
The Time s atternp t e to enlive n the i ssue by p rinting 
letters from Conse rva tive politicians who rgued th a t c on-
tinuing Bolshevik propaganda a nd the absence of r ea l economic 
25 
bene f its nega t ed the r easons fo r t he Ag r eement. Robe rt 
Horne , r~pl ac ing Chambe rl a in as Chance llor o f th xcheque r 
23Litv inov to Cur zon , Sept . 27, 192 1, Sovie t Docu -
ments, I, 257-62. 
24
curzon to Litvinov, Oct. 6, 19 21, "A Se l e ction of 
Papers," pp. 17-20. 
25The Ti me s , Sep t. 24, 1921, p . 9. See es pecially 
the l e tter from Lo r d Long of Wraxa ll (Wa lter Long ) in 
The Times , Oct . 15, 192 1, p. 6. 
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in April, admitted in October that Anglo- Russian trade was 
much lower than e ven the governme nt ' s modera te expec-
. 26 . 
tatLons. One Tory appa r ent ly was carrLed away by Curzon's 
allegations: b ackbenche r Hartin Archer-Shee a sked that 
27 imported Rus sian scrap iron be searched for hidde n bombs . 
But the Observer i mp lore d th e gove rnme nt to ex t e nd de jure 
28 
recognition to Russ i a . The general ly ind iffe r en t Tory 
respons e to th e note is puz zling . Perhaps thei r a tten tion 
was centered on a greater drama the n unfoldi ng . 
The Rus s ian Famine 
In the s umme r of 1921 the Sovie t s a nnounce d that 
25,000,000 Russ i a n s we r e starving , the v ictims of a wide-
spread f amine which h ad re s ulted from a combina i on of 
29 
human error and natural dis a s t e r. On Augu s t 5 t he Cab ine t 
rul ed out ex t ensive a id b e c a u s e of ritain's fin a ncia l 
26 
I b i d ., Oct . 14, 192 1, p. 11. Bri tish exports to 
Russia i n 1 9 21 did not r eac h £ 4 million , in c ontras t to 
the 1913 fi g ur e o [ ~ 28 millio n . Unl ess o herwi se ind icat d , 
these and all f o llowi ng trade s a t is tic s a r e t aken rom a 
det i l ed trade memo r andum by i r Philip Cun li( fe - Li s t e r 
(Pr s i d n t of t he oard of r ae ) , J an . 2 8 , 19 7 , ' B 4/ 
184. 
27 
Debates , CXLVII (Oct . 31, 1921) , col . 13 28 . 
2 8 
Obse rve r, Oct . 16, 1921 , p. 12. 
29 For a detai l e d study of t he c a use s o f the f am i e , see 
H. H. Fi sher , The Famine in Soviet Russia , 19 19 -1 9 3 : t he 
¥~27a tion s of th e . e r Lc a n Rel 1 f 1 dm 1nLst r a t1 on (t ·ew Yo r k , 
) , p . 469 506 . 
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diffic ulties . Howev e r, the ministers noted tha t " the famine 
distr i cts were t hose which had longes t r esiste d t he Bolshe-
vik s ; t ha t whe n Bol shevism disappea r ed , the Russ i an peop l e 
would r ema in, and it wou ld be a wi se po l icy to g i ve s o 
e motiona l a people l:eason f or g r atitude . " The Cabi ne t then 
agreed to e ndo r se a Bri t i s h vo l untary fund and t o e x t end a 
loan if t he necessary guara ntees were off e r e d . Dut Bri t ons 
. . . 30 
would have to adm~n ~ster both rc l~ ef programs . 
In Commons on August 16 Lloyd Geor ge al s o a nnounced 
tha t Br i t ain wou l d par t icipa te i n an inte rnationa l r e li e f 
effor t. Although d e clining to cap ita lize o n t he Sovie t s ' 
mi s f or t une , he urged t hem t o c ompensate their fo r eig n 
deb tor s . On l y in t h i s wa y would I es t e rn trade r s r ega i n 
enough con fide nce to e x port t he goods ne cessary to overcome 
the famine . 31 Tor y speake r s who follo•..,.ed Lloyd Ge o r ge out-
li ne d t he ir party ' s domin nt r es onse to t c cal amity . 
J. D. Rees r easoned that eve n a n i nternationa l ef f o r t could 
not prevent mi l l ions of Ru ss ian e san t s from starving and 
o ther millions from mig rati ng into Wes t e rn Europe in search 
of food . Unmo ved by t he Prime lini s t r ' s ap pea l , vJa l t e r 
Gu i nness ass e rted: 
The famine was a symptom of a disease which c anno t 
b e dealt with by a e r e o licy of r e lief . Drough t 
30cabinet minutes , Aug . 5 , 19 21, r p rinted in FO 
371/69 19 . 
31
oebates , CXLVI (Aug . 16 , 1921 ) , cols . 1 236- 42 . 
may have had much to do with it, but mu c h mo r e 
responsible is the Bo lsh e vi k pol i cy which has 
destroyed t he railwa ys a nd has stopped tha t 
production u pon wh ich even a simple sys tem of 
bartering should be founded . 
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He doubted if the Sovie t s would facilitate r e li e f efforts 
32 
and concluded t h at the famin e might h ave been a hoax . 
A numb e r of Tory ne wspape rs a l so blamed t he Sovie ts 
and o pposed a public grant or a conditiona l loa n, f earing 
the Soviets would strengthen the ir tyranny rathe r th n 
succor the victims . These p apers also were not enthusiastic 
b . . . 33 . . a out pr1vate contr1but1ons . The1r spec1 al correspondents 
in the famine districts mos tly s eemed interes t ed in de-
34 
nouncing the Bo l sheviks. Letter s from Tory politicians 
suppor ting these journa l s indica t ed widesp re ad ho s tili ty 
to public f am ine relief . 35 How e ver , the Observ e r and Time 
and Tide urged gov e r nme nt cred its for Ru s s i a , cou pli ng t he ir 
36 
request with p l ea for de jure recognition . Othe r Tory 
publicat ion s backed a n inte rna tiona l re l ief effort. 37 
32 . Ib1d ., col s . 124 9-51 , 1262-63. 
33 
The Ti es , Aug . 8 , p . 
1921, p . ll; ~o ning Post , Aug . 8 , 1921 , 
Aug. 11, 192 1, p. 4; Daily Telegraph , 
34 
E .g., Daily Ma il, Aug . 20, 1921 , p . 5, and The Times , 
Sept. 13, 1921, p . 11. 
35 
The Times , Sept. 8 , p. 9, Sep t. 24, 19 21, p. 9; 
Saturday e v1 w, CXXXI I ( ov . 5 , 192 1), 53 1. 
36
o bse rve r, Aug . 21, p . 8, Oct . 9, 1921, p. 12; Time 
and T i de , II (Au . 1 9 , 1 921 ), 7 8 3. 
37 Spe ctator , CXXV II (Sep t. 17, 1 92 1), 352-53; 
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Because the Soviets refuse d to allow We stern dele-
gates into the famine area, the anticipated Allied progra m 
never materialized . The International Red Cross, however, 
sponsore d a Committe e for Russian Relief which ne gotiated 
0 38 f 
an a1d agreement. A ew Tory pape rs criticized the 
Committee for allowing Soviet pa rticipation in the distri-
b u tion o f supplies. 39 In Britain the Imperial Wa r He lief 
Fund, the Save the Child r e n Fund, and the Frie nds ' .t.:me rge ncy 
and War Victims Relief Committee launche d appeals. 'l'he 
0 0 40 Labour party, too, JOln e d the effort. 
The British g ove rnment repea t ed ly r e fu sed fund s or 
d o 1 th s o , , d 41 ere 1ts un es s e ovl e ts r e cog n1z e d the1r eb ts. Th e 
September protest no t e h a r de ne d the Cabine t ' s positio n. 
I n l ate Octobe r t he Soviets offe r e d to a c k nowle dge a minor 
class of d e bts in r e turn for a loan, but Cur zo n d emanded 
recognition of all deb t s . 42 The Labour pa rty, howe ver, 
Satu rd ay Revi e w, CXXX II (Sep t. 10, 1921), 311; lla ti o na l 
Revi e w, LXX VI II (September, 1921), 26-27. 
38Fishe r, Th e Fami ne i n Sovie t Russ i a , pp. 6 2-67. 
39The Ti mes , Sept . 10 , 1921, p. 11; w, 
LXXVIII (Octobe r , 19 21), 16 5- 66 . 
40 Grauba r d , Briti sh Labour a nd t he Russian Re v o l u tion , 
pp . 226-28. 
41For an exhaustive de f e ns e of this vie w, see Sir 
Philip L1oyd - Gr arne (Sec r e t a ry to t he Ov e r se s T r ade De a rt-
ment) to Rex Leepe r (Fore i g n Off i ce civil s e rvant), Sep t. 21, 
1921, FO 371/69 23. 
42Krassin to Curzon, Oct. 30, 19 21, Cur zo n to Kr as in, 
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lobbied frequently for a public grant, and a f e w Conser-
vatives joine d t hem . On Octobe r 20 Lord Robert Cecil 
accused the gove rnme nt and many of his fellow backbe nche rs 
of aiming to destroy Bolshevism by allowing mass starvation. 
On moral, political, and e conomic grounds he r eque sted 
. . 43 
credits of i. 1 to£ 2 m1.ll1.on. 
On Novembe r 8 the gove r nment announced a grant of 
£ 100,000 in med ical stores to the Hriti sh Red Cross. 
During the deba t e Labourites charged t hat it was too little 
and too late. Lord Robe rt Ce cil added t ha t Russ i a ns needed 
. . 44 food, not med1.cal suppl1.es. Othe r 'l'ori e s r esponded 
dif fe r ent ly. Au s t e n Hopkinson was "sick of these s tale 
bleed ing heart s . They begi n to stink in our nostril s ." In 
his vi ew r e lief was "simply t hrowing mi llions into a 
bottoml ess pit ." J. D. Rees ag r eed , cl aiming tnat t ax -
paye r s we r e in no pos ition to subsidize Russ i a . J. C. 
Gould also was empha tic, "It is t he g reates t piece of 
hy pocrisy tha t we have to fac e to-day whe n pub lic me n s t and 
up and pretend to b e char itab l e by dea l ing this way with 
other people ' s mone y ." Despite thi s o p osi tion tne gove rn-
. ' 1 45 ment secured the1.r r equest eas1. y. 
Nov. 1, 1921, cited by Coate s , A History of Anglo-Sovi e t 
Rel ations , pp . 62 -64. 
43o eba t es , CXLVII (Oc t. 20, 1 92 1), col s . 324 -32 . 
44 I bid ., CXLVIII (Nov . 8, 19 21 ), cols. 305 - 9 . 
45 . Ib1. d ., col s . 313-1 8 , 327-32 , 334 -37. 
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In the following months private charities raised 
over £ 1 million, but they were hindered by the anti-Soviet 
. f 1 . 1 ' 46 v~ews o severa Tory )ourna ~sts. In November the Daily 
Express began to campaign against all reli e f efforts, on the 
premise that voluntary contributions should be spent in 
Britain. Its special corresponden t in Russia r eported that 
the Soviets had ample food supplies. Despite obj e ctions 
from relief organizations and from Lord Curzon, the Daily 
47 
Express stood firm. 
In the spring of 1922 the government decided to 
increase the ir relief efforts, probably in r esponse to two 
developments. In February Sir Benjamin Rob e rtson, a n Indian 
famine expert, published a wide ly circulated evaluation of 
the British program in Russ ia which r ai sed t he Soviets for 
their coope r a tion but criticized Britain ' s mi s e rly contri-
bution. Moreover , he found that some of t h e med ical stores 
given in Novembe r had bee n contamina ted and th a t 200 tons 
of lime juice had been included in one shipment . Rob e rtson 
proposed an outrig h t government g r ant of £ 350,000 to 
46 
For a typical editoria l, see The Ti e s , Se pt . 8 , 
1921, p. 9. 
47Lord Wearda1e (Chairman of t he Save the Child r e n 
Fund) to the edi t o r of t he Da ily x prc s s, ov . 21 , 1921, 
Curzon to 1-le a r dale , lov. 23, 192 1, · 0 371/ 69 26. See 
also Raymond Postgate , Eng land Goe s to Pr ess , 181 5-193 7 
(Indiana olis, 1937), pp . 307-11. 
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48 
British charities. An important political considera tion 
also helped modify the government's inflexibility: Lloyd 
George then was attempting to bring Russia back into the 
comity of nations; and a time ly relief grant would assist 
his efforts. 
On Harch 6 the Cabine t discussed the Prime l1inister 's 
proposal to give~ 250,000 to£ 350,000 to three British 
relief agencies. Churchill and other ministers protested 
on financial grounds. Balfour though t the funds should be 
spent in countries bordering Russia to prevent the spread 
of disease. Claiming tha t the proposal was purely huma ni-
tarian, only Curzon offere d support. The meeting ende d 
. . 49 . . . 
without a dec~s~on . Two days l ate r the Pr~me M~n~ster 
argued in v ain with his colleag u e s: the Cabinet agreed to 
50 
offer only sone additional su plies. 
On Harch 17 Commons deb t e t he plan to g ive 
tlOO,OOO in food and med icine to t he r e li e f agencies . 
Every Labour speake r pleaded for a much l arger appropriation , 
but Conservatives again were divided . Those defend ing the 
gove r ent used f amiliar arg e nts : Britain ' s economic 
48 .. h Report by Roberts on , Feb . n. d ., 192 2, Br~t~s 
Muse um , Viscoun t (Lord Rob e rt) Cecil a e rs , ox I, ( 8 ). 
For favor ab le r eactions , s e Lords Debates , XLIX (Fe . 22, 
1922) , cols . 213-27 . 
49
cabinet minute s, March 6 , 1922, CAB 23/2 9 . 
50 Ibid. , March 8, 192 2. 
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plight rul ed out a greater sum; they had no right to give 
away taxpayers' money; and Soviet mismanageme nt had caused 
the famine. 51 Three Tories spoke against the motion . 
Samuel Hoare, who had just finished serving as League of 
Nations High Commissione r for White Russian refugees , 
wanted a monetary grant because he had found t hat food s tuffs 
were difficult to distribute. Sinc e the Ame r ican Cong r ess 
already h ad voted $20 million for the famine victims , lioa r e 
belie ved Britain could afford at l east £ 350,000. Lord 
Henry Cavendish-Be ntinck c harged that British intervention 
had helped to bring on t he famine . He backed Hoare 's re-
que st both on humanitarian and on se l fish economic grounds . 
Lord Robert Ceci l be lieved that if a famine occurred in 
France the governme nt would offer assistance i mmed iate ly. 
In his vi w Bolshe vik crimes were extr aneous to th basic 
issue of mil lions of starving peo l e . He sugges t ed a g r an t 
52 
of £ 500,000. 
Austen Chamberlain cited nume r ous sta ti stics to 
show why the gove r nment could d o nothing ore . And if t hey 
did, Labou r soon would dema d countles s millions . s i des , 
the prese nt proposal was Brita in's greatest contribu tion 
ever to victims of a for e i gn d i saster . Although t he gov e rn-
51 Debates , CLI (March 17, 1922), cols. 2577-84, 
2599-260 2. 
cols. 258 5-91 , 2603-5 , 260 8-16. 
ment carried t he vote h and ily, e i gh t een Conserv a t i ves 
53 dissented. 
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The Morning Pos t de nou nced the vote as "foolish 
generosity" which me r e l y kep t the Bo l shevik s in powe r. 54 
But a f e w p ape rs urged a g r ea t e r ef f or t, and several 
Conservative M.P.'s joined t he biparti s n Russian Famine 
Parliame ntary Committee to l obby fo r a larger appropri a tion. 55 
WiU1in a f ew month s , howeve r, the f ami ne i ss ue s ubs i ded 
whe n the Sovi e t s b egan to r eap a n ade qua t e harves t. 
Cons e rva tives clea rly were d ivided on f ami ne r e lief . 
The Tories o pposing the gove r nmen t o n Ha r ch 17 were o ne of 
the larges t blo c s v o ting aga ins t t he pa r ty l e d e rsh i p o n 
any ques t i on i nvolv ing Russ i a during the 1920 ' s . Suppor t ers 
of bo th vie ws used weighty a r g en t s . Famine r e lief mi gh t 
have le ss ne Ang lo-Sov i e t t ensions , bu t Bri t a in ' s minuscu l e 
contribut i ons and Sov ie t quarrels wi t h r e l ief agenc i es on l y 
inte nsifi ed t he est r ang ement . The Sovi ets be l iev d Conser-
vative s wanted to eradica t e Bo l shevi sm through s t a rvat i on. 
Wh e the r true or no t, t he ir sus i c ions were shared by Lord 
Robert Cecil and oth e r o ries o os e t o such a policy . 
53
rbid., cols. 2616-2 6 . 
54 
Morni ng Pos t, Ma rch 23, 1922 , p . 5 . 
55 Obse rver , March 1 2 , 192 2, p . 1 2 ; English Revi e w, 
XXXIV (Harch , 19 22 }, 282 - 85 ; H rry Ba r ne s , :·!. P ., to Au s t e n 
Chambe r l a i n, ~l a rch 28 , 1 922 , i\usten C ambe r l ai n Papers , 
AC 29/1/1 6 . 
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Moreove r, the f amine controv e r s y hinder e d Lloyd Ge orge ' s 
lates t a ttemp t to come to t erms wi th Rus s ia. 
The Genoa Con fe r e n c 
On Janua ry 6, 1922 the Allied Sup r eme Co u n ci l had 
invited t he Sovie ts to p a rticipa t e i n a Eur o pe a n fina ncia l 
a.nd e conomi c confe r e nce to be h e l d a t Geno a in Ma rch . Lloyd 
Ge org e e n v is i oned t he ge ne r a l Con t ine n ta l s e ttlement tha t 
h a d e lud e d him a t Ve r sailles . And he was in f lue nce d by 
politica l c o n s ide ration s . In t he preceding t wo y ea r s h i s 
powe r had waned a s nume r o us d omestic and f o r e i g n c r i ses 
contr ad icte d the g r and ios e ex pe cta tions o f 191 8 . Rumor s of 
a g e ne r a l e l ection spre ad r apid ly as Coa l i ti on Tor i e s 
be c ame r est l e ss . They es pec ia lly r esente d t he Prime 
Mini s t e r ' s a lleged ly dicta tor i a l a nd un p r i ncip l e d me t hods . 
Some To r i es fea r ed t he dem i se of the i r p a rty i f it r emained 
5 6 
tied to h i s c oa tta ils in a no t he r e l e ctio n . If Ge no a 
succ eeded , Lloy d Geor ge i gh t r e c ap t u r e Tory a l l eg i ance and 
5 7 
di s arm Labo u r o ppone nts of his Russ i a n o l icy. 
Sovi e t l ea e r s ha t a l ked r e eate ly of a de t e n te 
5 6 d . . Keith Mi dd l e a s a nd J oh n Ba r nes , B 1 w1n: H1o-
gra hh y (Lo ndo n , 196 ) , p . ~5 - 1 ? 4 , r ev i ew tne d 1scont n t 
W1t 1n t he To r y pa rty at th 1s t1 rne . 
57 . • 1 ' . 1 For a n ev a lu a t1on of Lloy d Geo r ge s po 1 t 1 c 
motivations , see Ta ylor , Eng l ish isto ry , p . 1 89 . 
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58 
with the Wes t. The NE P r eforms s eemed to buttress t he ir 
words. Lloyd Ge orge a p pa rently anticipated a total abandon-
ment of Commun ism. He was i mpressed e s pecially when Le nin 
admitted on Hovember 1, 1921 that eve n he could not p r edict 
h f h . 1 " f . 59 ow ar t e c ap~ta ~ s t r e o rms m~ght go. 
On Dece mbe r 15 Lord Birke nhead, the Lord Ch a nce llo r, 
outlined the Prime Ministe r's goal: "It is for us to gathe r 
up the salvage of Europe , and in orde r to do tha t you mu s t 
come to a n a rr a ngeme nt with France and with German y . And 
you mus t also come to an ar. ·a ngeme nt with Ru ss i a a s we ll. • 60 
The ne xt day the Cabine t c o nsente d to Sovi e t part i ci pa tion 
if the y r e cog nized t he ir deb t s and p r ovided f acilities for 
for e i g n tr a d e r s . The Pr ime Mini s t e r al s o sugges t ed de jure 
recognition, but his colleag u e s in s i s t e d t ha t before thi s 
was done t hey s hould b e c o n su lted . In the meanti . c , t hey 
were "in no way c ommi tt e \i ns ton Church i l l ap?arent l y 
led the . . 61 o ppo:;a t~on . 
58 . d Many e xtr act s fr om Sov~ e t no t es an newsp ~e r 
edi to ri a l s can be found in 0 371/6 856 . See also Russ ia n 
In form a tion a nd Re vi ew , I (t:ov. 15 , 192 1), 74. "h~s w ek ly 
magaz~ne was t " e o icial e rg o[ t he Inf o ation rt-
ment of t he Ru ss i a n Trade Delega t ion i n London . 
59 . ( h" . d ) -'-Lord Sw~nton P ~l ~ p Ll oy -G r eame , I R me •. ~e r 
(London , 1948 ), p . 17. Lloyd Geo r ge r efe r r ed to Len~n ' s 
speech in De bate s , CLI I (April 3, 1922 ), c o l. 1900 . 
60 Coate s, A Hi story of Ang l o - Sov ie t Re l at i ons , p. 65. 
61
c ab ine t mi nutes , Dec. 16, 19 21, ex tr ac t s r epr in t ed 
in Cab ine t mi nutes , Ma r c· 28 , 192 2, Appendix I, CAB 23 / 29 ; 
Young , Churchil l and Be ver rook , p . 59 . 
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At Cannes on January 6, 1922 the Allied Supreme 
Council issued the Conference invitations. At the r equest 
of the Cabinet and the French gove r nmen t, all participants 
were asked to agree beforeha nd to guarantee the property 
rights and products of foreign investors, recogniz e all 
public and private debts, and abs tain from subversive 
propaganda abroad. If the Soviets accepte d these and other 
terms, the Allies would cons i de r de jure recognition a nd 
62 
credits. 
The Times claimed th a t Russia could not be re-
constructed until the Bolshe viks were overthrown. The 
Morning Post doubted Soviet sinceri ty. Howe ve r, the 
Spectator, the Observer , and the Saturday Revi ew f e lt tha t 
Russia should be given an opportunity to r ej oin the European 
economic community. 63 Briti sh banke r s b e lie ved t ha t the 
~ 100 million in r econst r uc tion loans ne ded by Russ ia 
64 
would h a ve to be c on troll ed closel y b y the Hes t. 
The Sovie ts accepted t he invita tion, but severa l 
developments in the three months p rior to the Confe r e nce 
62Eud in and Fisher, eds ., Sov iet Russ i a and t he Wes t, 
p. 98; Fi s che r, Russ i a ' s Road from a r, pp . 94 -
95. 
63The Times , Jan. 7, p . 7, Jan. 9, 1922, p. 11; 
Mornin} Pos t, Ja n. 7, 1922 , p . 6; Specta tor, CXXVIII (Jan. 
21, 19 2), 67; Obse rver , J an . 8, 19 2, p. 12 ; Sa tur ay 
Revi ew , CXXXIII (Jan . l4 , 1922), 27. 
64Thc Times , Jan. 4, 1922, p. 10. 
146 
dampened Lloyd George 's enthusi a s m. In Fe bruary h e agreed 
reluctantly with French Premi e r Ra ymond Poinca r e th a t 
Russian recognition would not follow automatically eve n if 
65 
the Soviets gave satisfactory guara ntee s and sa f eg u a r ds . 
As usual, unre straine d Soviet rhe toric h e i gh t e ned Alli e d 
suspicions. Soviet leade rs demanded uncondit i ona l re-
66 
cognition and credits. Despite the ir bomb a s t i c pub lic 
stateme nts, they f e are d that vle s t e rn capita li sts e ithe r 
would torpedo the Confe r e nce or wo uld attemp t to e n s lave 
. . 11 67 Russla econom~ca y. As an alte rna t e wa y of e nding the ir 
isolation, the Sovie ts opene d s e cre t negoti a tions with 
. 68 Germany in Apr~l. 
Poincar~'s o b j e ctions a nd Sovi e t p ronou nc ements 
hinde r e d Lloyd Geo r ge ' s f f ort s to wi n o v e r a n inc r usi ng 
69 
numb e r of h o s tile Tories . On Harch 14 a g r oup of Unioni s t 
backbe nchers d i s cu ssed t he poss i b il ity of withdrawing from 
65 
Coates, A Hi story of Ang l o - Sovie t Relat i ons , 
pp. 67-69. 
15 , 19 22 ), 
351-52, 
67 . . . d See Eud ~n a nd F~ she r, eds ., Sov iet Russ~a an 
the Wes t, pp . 1 00 , 127. 
68 • • I 96 F1sche r, Russ ~a s Road fr om Pea c e t o Wu r, p. -
98. 
69 E . g ., The Hi story of The Ties , IV, Purt I I, 65 5, 
and an edi t orial and t he uke of :o thumber l and ' s diat r ibe 
in Nat i on a l Review , LXXVI I I (Febr uary , 1 922 ), 752 - 62 , 
773- 86 . 
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70 
the Coalition. Lloyd George unwittingly fueled this mis-
trust whe n he explained to a correspondent for the Daily 
Chronicl e , a news paper long r egarded as his mou t hpiece , that 
the Allies would not recognize the Soviets until they 
offered guarantees. However, his real opinion a pparently 
was given in an editorial in t he same issue which stated: 
"This a ttitude [Lloyd George's statement] doe s not alter our 
own strong conviction that the sooner recognition of Russia 
can come , the better for peace , present a n d future." During 
the intervi e w Lloyd George a l so challenged Conse rvatives: 
the reporte r quoted him as saying that "he would part from 
his d earest political fr iend rathe r than abandon this g r ea t 
fund amenta l i ssue of politics ," i.e., a settlement with 
. 71 . f Russ~a. On Ma rch 20 he asked for a parl~amentary vote o 
. . 72 
confidence pr ior to his d epa rture for Italy ~n early Apr ~l. 
A few d a ys late r he told Au s t e n Chambe rlain t ha t " t he 
Cabine t mu s t choose between Winston and me ." He app arently 
. . . 73 
wanted m1ni s terial a pprova l for d e j u r e r e c og n1t1on . 
. 1 0 4. ee t h 
y t he 
p r i 1 , 1 9 2 2) , 
71
coate s , 1\ Histor y Relations , p . 70; 
Middlemas und Uarne s , =e=a=l~~~ 
72The His tory of The T i me s , IV , Part II, 655 . 
73
c h ambcrlain to Lloyd Ge orge , a rch 2 5 , 19 22, Au s ten 
Chambe rlain Pa c rs, AC 23/6/2 2 ; Fran k Owen , 'empestuous 
Journe y: Lloyd George , hi s Life a n d Time s { ew York , 195 5 ), 
pp. 611- 13 . 
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The Cabinet meeting scheduled for March 20 was 
designated as the s howdown. Uni onist l e a de r Austen Chambe r-
lain fac e d a dilemma be c a use he was c o mmitte d t o keeping t he 
party in the Coalition. li e sided with Lloyd George a nd 
oppose d Churchill o n Rus s ian r e cognit i on bu t f e a r e d it s 
implica tion s for h i s pa rty. As he exp l a ined to Curzo n: 
We Unioni s ts c ould not be ut in a mo r e di ffi c ult 
pos ition. The s ympa t h i e s of t he mass of our pa rty 
on this i ss ue would b e who lly on Wi ns ton ' s s i de . 
If we d e cided a gai ns t him a n he r e tire d , we s ho u l d 
have a new and ve r y r ea l split i n the par t y , e x-
tending , I am as s u r ed , to the Governme n t itse l f . 
Imagi n e wha t o ur o s itio n wo ul d be i f Winston re-
signe d be c a u se he wa s more Conse rv a tive th un t he 
Cons e rvative a nd Unioni s t membe r s o f t he Gov e rn -
me nt. It would be rea l l y hope l es s . 
Howe ve r, he c o nti nued , Ho rne was a ttem ti ng t o mod ify the 
Pr ime Minis t e r ' s s t a nd , and Bi r kenhead was us i ng his in-
flue nce wi t h Churchill. Ch ambe rl a i n c on s i de r e d a po s sib l e 
comp r omi s e : 
First , a firm adhe r enc e to t e c ond ition s l a i d 
d own at Can nes a s t he necessa ry p r el i mina ry o 
r e c og nition , and , second ly , a r o a ti o na r v 
in wh ic t he Ru ss i a n GovernQc nt us t s 
not on l y ve r a lly a c c e ts t he t e s , 
actua l ly r o c eed ing t o c ar ry them ou t. i s , I 
t hink , wau l be a s o u nd policy , t houg h i t waul no t 
plea s e t he x t r en i sts on e ilhe r s i e ; uut I am v ry 
doub t f u l whe the r the ri e ~ ini s te r wi ll c onse n t to 
th e p r oba tiona ry pe r i od . 74 
On Ha r ch 2 5 Chambe r l ain wrote the Pr i me Hiniste r t a t 
the Da ily Chron i c l e d ito ri a l, proba b ly wr i t t e n "unde r yo ur 
74
ch ambe r l ain t o Cu rz o n, da rch 24, 192 2, Aus t e n Chambe r -
lain Pape r s , AC 23 / 6/21 . 
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dire ct inspira tion," had bee n in terpre t ed by Chur chill a s 
an obvious c halle nge , and eve n Birk e nhe ad , a s t aunc h 
supporte r of t he Prime Mi nis t e r, had r eacted with "d i smay . " 
The crux o f t he prob l em , Ch ambe rl a i n reasone d , was t he 
timing a nd c ondi t ions of r eco gnit ion. Ev e n if t he Sovi e t s 
accep ted t he guarante es in t he Cannes p r oposa l s , "pr act i -
cally the who l e of my par ty " wo u ld d ema nd more than v e r ba l 
assurances . Chambe rlai n a c cuse d t he Prime Mi nis t e r of 
de ceiving t he Cabi net: he had assure d his ministers i n 
De c embe r, 192 1 tha t r ecognition was s ubj ec t to t he ir 
approv a l, but now he seemed to sugges t t ha t the Cannes 
propo sa l s had p l edged Brita i n to r cognition , cond it iona l 
only on v e r bal Soviet a c ceptanc o f the invi ta t ion . I n 
Chamber l a in' s v iew t he Cannes proposa l s we re 
a statemen t of conditions which would be the 
essenti a l pre limi na ri es of r cognition and without 
whi ch r ecog n ition c ould no t ve n be consi e red . 
Thi s implies t h t i f those con itions arc ac c t 
r e cogni t i o n would e considered , but it is not a 
pledge that recog nition would be g iven , and still 
l ess a p l edge tha t it would be giv e n a t onc e as 
a ma t te r of c ou r se . 
In concluding he re asoned t ha t t h Prime Minister was 
placing himse lf i n a "false position" unless he c ha nged 
his stand . 7 5 
Before the Cabine t me t, Conservat ive press o p onents 
75
chambe r l a i n to Lloyd Geo r ge , a r ch 25 , 1 922 , 
~., AC 23/6/22 . 
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of Genoa offere d nume rous ob jecti o ns: t he Bolsheviks h ad 
not abandoned Communi s m; ~he ir pub lic sta t emen ts proved 
they would not repa y the ir d eb t s ; t hey we r e c oming to Ge noa 
only to s e cure d e jure r e cogni tion a.nd loans; a nd the 
Confere nce thre atened to a l ie na t e Fra nce . Seve ral p ape r s 
denounce d Lloyd George for p lotting a pre - e l e ction coup a nd 
for planning recognition without ma t e ri a l guara ntees . The y 
asked Tori e s to de f e a t him in the vote of con f i dence deba t e 
76 
scheduled for April 3. Seve r a l Tory b a c kbenche rs 
. . th . . . 77 publ~c~z ed e ~r oppos~ t~on. Comme rcial a nd fin a nci a l 
. 1 " t.. • 78 interes ts d~d ~~ew~ se . The n umbe r of Lloyd Ge org e 's 
Tory pre ss supporte r s h ad diminished si nce J a nua ry. The 
Engli s h Re v i e w qualified its sta nd , a nd o the r journa l s 
became sile nt. Al mos t a l o ne now, the Obse rve r l abe lled 
Genoa a " shining p r omi se t o Europe . " Garv in urg e d the Prime 





P· 6 ; 
76The Ti me s , Ma rch 23 , p . 13 , Ma r ch 29 , p . 13, 
31, 192 2 , p . 13; Dai l M il , M rch 2 2 , p . 8 , Ap r i l 3, 
p . 8 ; Mo rning Post , M r c · 2 , p . 6 , M r ch 2 3, 192 2 , 
:a ion a l Re view , LXXIX ( ril , 1922 ) , 161- 6 3 . 
77 
The Ti me s , Ma r ch 21, p . 8 , Apr i l 3, 19 22, p . 8 . 
See e s pec~ al ly t he critic i sms o f Lo r d Eu s t ace e rcy in 
Nati ona l e v i ew , LXX I X (May , 19 2 ) , 4 36 . 
78The Ti me s , April 3, p. 8, Ap r il 5, 192 2, p . 1 8 . 
79 Eng li sh Re v iew, XXXIV (.a rch , 19 22), 283; 
Obs e r ve r, J p r i l 2 , 192 2, p . 1 2 . 
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Worried by this deepening Tory o pposition , Lloyd 
George met on Ma rch 27 with Austen Chambe rlain, Churchill, 
Birk.enhead, Conse rvative War Sec r e tary Laming Horthington-
Evans, and Libe ral Hinister of Health Alfred ;.tond. The 
ministers were shown a memorandum by the Pres i de nt of the 
Board of Trade, Stanle y Ba l dwi n, which painted a grim 
picture of Brita in's trade prospe cts . The primary c auses 
were said to be the r epa rations is s ue , unstab l e monetary 
exchange rate s, a nd Rus sia ' s absence from world markets . 
Lloyd George ma inta ined tha t the Soviets h ad a c cept ed t he 
Canne s conditions "imp licitly" when t hey agreed to come to 
Genoa, but the y also would have to give a "clear and 
definite acceptance of t hese princi p les ." Des iri ng 
Cabinet solidarity, h e accepted Chamberl a in's suggestion 
for a probationary period p rior to r e cogniti on . But for 
two reason s he a t l eas t wanted to di scuss r e cognition a t 
Genoa: at Ca nnes he h ad promised to d o so; and he 
believed t ha t two f a c t i o ns we r e vying for control o f Russia , 
•one entire ly Cormnuni stic , and the othe r prepa r ed to 
abandon Communi sm in dea ling Hith fo r e i g n count ri e s ." I f 
the latter g roup dominated t he Soviet de l ega tion , it would 
be fooli sh to r emain tigh t-lipped . He believe d t ha t if the 
Soviets signed the anticipa ted Eas t Europea n peace pact a t 
Genoa the y could excha nge lowe r l e vel diploma ts with the 
West. The y would r ece ive full de jure r e cog nition only 
152 
after respecting the pe ace pact and the Canne s condi tions 
for an uns pecified period. 
Churchill criticized the Prime Hiniste r for not 
upholding the Cab inet r eservation s of De c embe r 16. lie also 
charged that a prior parli amentary vote of con f ide nce for 
the Genoa policy would force the Cabinet to acce pt a ny 
Confe r e nce r e sults and p r e ve nt t hem from pass ing judgme nt 
on Soviet cond uct during the proba t i ona ry pe riod . Quoting 
from the Briti sh minutes o f r e c e nt mee ting s with Sovie t 
and French officials, he tri e d to s how tha t t ne Sovi e ts 
really ha d not accep t ed the Can nes p roposa l s , a nd t h at 
France did no t think the Al lies had a g r eed to r e c ognition 
at Cannes . Birke nhead i n t er j e cted tha t t he Pr i e Hini s t e r 
did not wan t a b l ank c heck , " It was on l y contemp l a t e d to 
grant such r e c ogn i tion as was ne c essa ry to g ive effec t to 
the r esults o f t h e Genoa Conf e r ence . " Ch u r ch ill t hen 
80 
accept ed Lloyd Ge o r ge ' s proposa l s . 
The next mo r ning Lloyd Georg e , Chamberlain , and 
Birke n.head me t wi t h Curzo n . The Fo reign Secretary wou l d 
agree to the p l an o nly i f Bri ta in ac t ed wi th Fr ance 
because unil a t e r al ac tion would be "fa t a l " to t h e ir 
alliance. Cur zon pe rh aps was conv i nced tha t Fr ance would 
80 . Conclus 1ons of a Confe r enc e o f Mini s t ers , 
March 27, 1 922 , Cabinet mi nute s , Harc h 28 , 1 92 2, Appe nd ix 
I, CAB 23/ 29. 
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not go along, but Lloyd George accepted his reservation. 
When Curzon state d that eve n qualified r e cog nition was 
tantamount to de jure status, Birkenhead r eplied that 
technically he was correct, t he only diffe r e nce being that a 
Soviet charge would not be r eceived by the King. 81 At 
this point the other ministers fil ed in for the Cabine t 
meeting which Baldwin h ad described as potentially 
"historic." 82 
In the event, t he discussion was quite unexceptional. 
Lloyd Georg e mere ly r e p ea t ed that r e cognition would increase 
trade and assist the "anti-Communi s tic elements " in Russia. 
The Cabinet ordered the British de l egation to foll ow "the 
general consens us" a t Genoa and not to of fe r limited re-
cognition unless the Russians acce ted t he Cannes r e so-
lutions. De jure recogni tion would follow a p roba tion a ry 
period. Fina lly, the Confe r ence re s ults would e subj e ct 
83 
to p ar li amentary approval . This mee ting , howe ve r, was 
significan t for othe r r easons . By c ompromising with the 
Tories in advance , Lloyd Geo r ge averte d a pos s ible Cabinet 
81
conclus ions of a Confere nce of :·liniste r s , larch 28 , 
1922, I bid ., Ap end ix II . 
82 . M1ddlemas and Barnes , 
83 . Cab1 ne t 
Baldwin , p . lO S . 
23/2 9 ; Midd l e -
19 5-9 7. 
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rebellion. But the Tories also retre ated a little: for the 
first time, Conservative ministe rs a ccep t ed explicitly 
the pos s ibility of some form of r e cog nition f or the Sovie t s . 
Addressing a packed House on April 3 t he Prime 
Minister descr ibed his policy as "cautious" and "moderate . " 
He asked skept ica l ~!. P. 's to realize tha t Russian partici -
pation was essential to a trade r e viva l. LUrope now h ad a 
unique o pportunity to recon s truct "the g rea t es t unde v e l oped 
country in the world ." To demons trate that Russia had 
abandoned Co mmunism and would endorse th e Canne s proposals, 
he quoted from Le nin's r ecen t speeches. In concluding he 
warne d that Europe migh t experi e nce anothe r holoca ust if 
84 
Ge noa failed. 
Labour spoke sman J. R. Clynes oppo s e d the govern-
me nt b e c ause their "circums c ribed " policy did not affect 
85 
the roo t c a use of Europea n unres t . Tory b a ckbe nche r s 
offered differing o p i nions . John Gr e tton , r e pr senting t h e 
right wing , attacked t he Prime Mini s te r as v e heme ntly s 
he d enounced Russia . lie calle d t he Co nfe r e nce a thinly 
disgui sed politica l subterfuge wh ich th r ea tene d to spl it t e 
West. Lord Robert Cecil, in contrast, score d the Prime 
Ministe r f or not e xte nding full r e cog nition to Russia 
86 
immediately . 
84 o e bate s , CLII (Apri l 3, 1922), cols. 1891- 19 04 . 
85 
Ibid., co l s . 1 905 -19 . 
86 . 2 Ib1d., cols . 1919- 2 8 , 1 947 -5 . 
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A majority of Cons e rvatives probab ly concurre d with 
the temperate r emarks of Samue l Hoare u.nd Bonar Lu.w. Hoare 
reasoned that the Bolshe viks would be on trial at Ge noa. 
If they had changed, "so much the b e tte r"; if not, t he ir 
incorrigibility would b e di s playe d b e fore the world . Bonar 
Law, in his first parli amenta ry speech since illne s s had 
forced his retirement the p revious year, supported t he 
Prime Ministe r be c a use the s trict ins tructions to the Brit-
ish del e gation would pre v e nt any s e cre t machina tio ns . ll e 
believed that Lloyd Ge orge wa s n o t s t ag ing the Co nfe r e nce 
for political purposes beca use Geno a was a "da r k a nd d o ub t-
ful v e nture." Although f ea ring tha t t he Bo l she,•iks h ad no t 
87 
refo rmed, Law was willing to g ive t hem a hea ring . In 
summarizing for t he g ove r nment Au s t e n Ch amberl a i n s tressed 
that tr ade with othe r Eas t European na t ions cou l d be in-
8 8 
creased e ve n if t he Russi a n a s e ct of Genoa fai l ed . 
The motion sup orting the g o ve r nment passed e asily 
by a vote o f 372 to 9 4, but 23 Cons e r v a tives r c hed into 
the Oppos ition lobby. Po l itica l undit s had estimated 
earlie r tha t 5 0 to 60 Unionists wou l d su port Churc hil l if 
89 
he opposed t he motion. Law's mas t e r f ul s pee c h e rh a s 
87 
Ibid., cols. 19 53-58, 1934-41. 
88
rbid ., cols. 19 81- 88 . 
89 Coa t es , A Hi s t o r y of Anglo- Sov i et e la t ions , p . 70. 
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cha nged s ome minds . With o ne excep t ion , t hese 23 Conser-
vative s supported the l ate r Ca rlton Club mo tio n t o abandon 
the Coalition . 90 Howe ve r, such d i ssente r s a s Lor d Robe rt 
Cecil, Os wa l d Mo sley, a nd Sir Arth ur S t ee l-Maitla nd we r e 
neithe r "ul t r as " no r " rightis t s ." 
"Ultra" Tory publ icat i ons were not conve r t ed b y t he 
vote: the Mo rni ng Post and t he Na t iona l Re v iew wonde r e d 
how Conserva tive Co a li t i on i s t s c o u l d s wa llow Lloyd Ge orge ' s 
"fa iry t a l es . " Howe ver , the Saturday l1evie w and the Cardiff 
Wes t e rn Mail we r e r eassured by t he p r oba tion a ry e r iod . The 
Daily Teleg raph now was o nly dub i o u s : "There i s abo u t as 
much like lihood o f t he Sovie t Government ever acquir ing a 
just cl a i m to r e cogn i t i o n as there is o f t he Et hiopia n 
cha ng ing hi s skin." Althoug h o f f ering "inte llectua l 
as sent" to Ge no a , th e Spe ctator f ear ed Lloyd Geor ge wou l d 
sides t ep t h e l i mitat ion s on r e cog nition if he saw a 
political advan t age ; it , t oo , was amazed that no ministe r 
91 
had s t ood u p t o t he "Autoc r at of the Cab ine t. " But othe r 
journals cong r a t ul a t ed t le Cabinet fo r f orcing Ll oyd George 
9 0 Fo r a l ist o f the voting at the Carlto n Club , s ee 
J ames , ed ., He oi r s of a Conservative , p . 12 9-33 . 
1 P • 5; 
Specta t o r, CXXVIII 
. 157 
to drop his scheme for unconditional recognition. 92 
It is difficult to prove either con t en tion. Circum-
stantial evidence, however, suggests that the Prime Mi niste r 
was bent on recogn ition, but Tory opposition , inside the 
governme nt and out, forced him to back down . Unlike his 
previous e ncounters with the Cabine t, Lloyd George no w 
submit t e d to t hei r res trictions without much strugg l e . His 
conduct mirrored a malaise that had ove rtaken the Coalition. 
The Prime Minister's conf i dants be lieved he was "losing his 
punch and grip" and intima t ed that mos t ministers had los t 
93 
conf idence in his ability to gove rn. Lloyd George 
perhaps r ealized the futility of trying to convert t he 
Cabinet to his po int of vi ew on Russ i a . 
Thirty-four nations we re r epr esen t ed whe n the Genoa 
Conf e r e nce ope ned on April 1 0 . The British delegation was 
head ed by t he Prime l·linister , Laming Wo rthington- Lvans, 
Robe rt Horne , and Philip Lloyd - Grearne . Lord Curzon had 
become ill and r ema ined in London. Chicherin and Krassin 
l ed t he Sovi e t d e l egat ion. The Conference was div i e d into 




oaily Mail, March 29, 192 2, p . 9; The Time s , March 29, 
1922, p. 12. 
93 . 1 M~dd emas , ed ., Thomas Jones : Whiteha ll Diary, I, 
197. 
94 The Ge noa Conf e r ence h s no t b een serve d we ll by 
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During the first two weeks the Allies and the 
Soviets wrang led inconclusively over such crucia l questions 
as Tsarist state and municipal debts and confiscated private 
property. Russia presented the Allies with a ~ 4 billion 
bill for damages the y allegedly had caused t hrough inter-
vention. The Allies disallowed the claim but were willing 
to scale down Tsarist state debts if the Soviets r ecognized 
the claims of foreign nationa ls. Lloyd-Greame summa rized 
95 
the mood concise ly, "We are at arm ' s l ength ." 
The gap widened on April 16 when Russia and Germany 
signed a trea ty of fri e ndship at Rapa llo. The pact had 
long been predicted but, nonethe l ess, the announcement took 
96 
the Allies by surprise . According to the te rms made 
public, the outcast Powers renounced their financial claims 
against each other. The secret clauses provided for mutual 
military assistance . 
In re sponse The Time s, the Daily ~!ail , and the 
Morning Post r esurrected the late nt Tory fear of Bolshevik 
subservi ence to German militarism. They b l amed Ll oyd G orge 
as much as the two signatories. Accord ing to t he Da ily Mail , 
"The Prime !-linister wa s wa rned tha t, if he fraternised with 
histori ans . For a g ene ral ac coun t, s ee J. Saxon Mills , The 
Genoa Conference (Lond on , 1922 ). 
95 
Lloyd-Greame to Baldwin, n. d. , cited by Swinton, I 
!!!:~~r , p. 20. 
96 
Ibid ., pp . 21-22. 
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the Bolshevik rogues and crimina ls, he must expect to have 
his pockets picked." 97 Other Conse rvative papers reacted 
less harshly. The Specta tor felt the mutual deut cancel-
lation would stimulate world trade . The Ob se rver questioned 
only the timing of the announcement. The Saturday Re vi e w 
reasoned that it would revive Russo-German trade a nd there -
by increase Britain's chances of pgetting our r eparations 
98 
paid and of doing b usiness ourse lves." Tory politiciuns 
offered the same mixed r esponse . Lord Channing, a 
"rightist," was restraine d in his remarks. Samuel Hoare 
believed it could stre ngthen t he peace, but Lord Robe rt 
Cecil called it an unfortuna te reve rsion to the pre war 
99 
alliance system . Considering Rapa llo's pote nti a lly 
disastrous cons eque nces for the Versai ll e s settleme nt, t he 
general Tory r e action was surpri s ing ly mild . 
After the Rapa llo inte rlude the Alli es presented 
their fin a l of fer to the Sov i e t s . It invited t hem to 
participate in a new international c onsortium whose 
initial c apital o f £ 20 mi lli on wa s to be used for cur o ean 
97 
The Ti es , A r i l 18 , 1922 , p . 13; 
April 19 , 1922 , p . 6; ~orn i ng Post , Apr il 8 , 
192 2, p. 8 . 
98 Spectator, CXXVIII (, pril 22, 19 22), 481, 486-8 7; 
Observer , pril 2 3 , 1 22 , p . 12; Satur e vi e·,. , CXXXII 
(Apn 1 2 2 , 19 2 2 ) , 4 0 5 . 
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The Ti es , A ril 29 , p . 11, Ma y 1, p . 10, May 2, 
1922. p. 8. 
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reconstruction and dev e lopment . Britain also would include 
Russia in the Trade Facilities Ac t, which g uaranteed advances 
of money for the carrying out of contracts by Bri ti sh firms 
abroad. To swee ten the offe r the Allies p l edged to r educe 
the total Tsarist state deb t and d ropped t hei r p r evious 
demand for extraterritorial rights for foreigners tradi ng in 
Russia. An arbitration c omm i ssion was to eva luate al l 
contested private claims against Russia; the Soviets we re 
offered on e seat on the propos e d five -member board. In 
return the Soviets were asked to r efrain from subversive 
activities and propaganda abroad; recognize Tsari s t d e bts 
and ob liga tion s to foreigners; r es tore, compe nsate, or offer 
concess ions to a ll foreign nationa ls f or c o nfi sca t e d pro-
100 
perty or goods; and aba ndon the ir counte rclaims . 
The Soviet r eply of May 11 defe nde d debt r epud i a tion 
and sidestepped the r opaganda i ssue , but the y we r e willing 
to r e cog ni ze their d e bts in r eturn for a s ubs tanti a l loan . 
'l'hey asked for a "mixe d commi s sion of e xper ts" to discu s s 
101 
claims and cr dits at a later d a t e . L loyd Georg e 
convinced the Allies to ee t with the Sovi e ts ag in a t The 
Hague in June. At the last mee ti ng of t he Co nf e rence on 
102 
19, each deleg ation s i gne d a four- month eac e pact. 
100 
M. Schanze r (I tali a n Foreig n 1ini s ter ) to Chicherin, 
3, 1922, copy in FO 371/8189 . 
101Mi lls, The Ge noa Con e r ence , pp . 401-15 . 
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Most Conservative journals criticized t he Allied 
offer of May 3. The Saturday Revi ew , a forme r Confe r e nce 
supporter, expr essed ange r: 
It is monstrous tha t we shou l d c onte mp l a te ad -
vancing money to a Gov e r nme nt whi ch has been 
conspicuous for its financia l shortcomings . We have 
no mor e ass ur a nce of its be ing put to any be tte r u se 
than the othe r finances of which Ru ss i a has had the 
disposa l. 
Other journals agre e d with the Spectator ' s earlier con-
tention that th e Sovi ets we re trying to make the proceedi ngs 
103 
as "farcical" as those a t Bre st-Litovsk. 
Some Tory politicians also were distraught. Phi lip 
Lloyd-Gre arne ' s t h r ea t e ned r esignation from the Deleg a tion 
was with dr awn onl y a fte r a hea t ed exchange with the Prime 
. . 104 . H1n1 ster . Co nv1 nced of Russian ins ince ri ty , Aus t e n 
Chambe rlain f eared that Ll oyd Ge o r ge would of fer uncon -
ditional r ecogn ition and cred its , wh ich n e ithe r the 
minist rs nor Commons would r atify . lie eve n r eminded the 
Pr ime Hini ster of the Cabinet r es trictions . 105 Whe n Curzon 
p. so. 
105 
Swinton , Sixty Yea r s of Power (London , 1 966 ). 
Chambe rlain to Curzon , lay 1 5 , 1 922 , uste n 
Chambe rlain Pa e r s , C 23/6/40 . 
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l earned of the p l an to extend negotiations , he d e nounced 
any dea l i ng s with that "who l e ras c a lly crew" unti l t he ir 
106 
machination s in I ndia ceased . 
Genoa str ained at l eas t on e friendsh i p . Lo r d 
Birke nhead was c a lled to t he Co nfe rence s ve ra l t imes , and 
after one mee t i ng wi th Lloyd Ge o r ge he publicly i mp l i e d a 
. . 107 
need fo r u ncondi tiona l recognl. tl.on . IVins ton Churchil l 
b egged h i s fri end ins tead to recomme nd British cred i ts fo r 
t he Empire a nd to upho l d the Cabinet r es trictions . If he 
did , "You may ye t extri c a t e yours e l f and wha t is more 
i mportan t t his country f r om the entang l et:~e nt into wh ich she 
10 8 h as b een l ed by the pe r sona l vie ws of one ma n . " 
Afte r r e t urning t o Britain Lloyd George r e v iewed 
the r esults o f t he Conference for Commons . Although Genoa 
106cur zon to Ch ambe rlain , May 13 , 1922 , Ibid ., AC 23 / 
6/3 3 . See a l so Curzon to Lady Curzon , May 16~ 2 , cited 
by l! a rque ss of Ze tl and , The Life of Lord Cu r zon (, ew York , 
1928 ), III , 29 7- 98 . 
107 
Mi l ls , The Ge noa Confe r ence , pp . 38-39 . 
108
churchill to Birk e nhead , ay l , 19 22 , cited 
o f Bi r enhe. d , Th Life o f Lo d Birken t 
(Lo ndon, 19 35) , p . 171-74 . 
Chambe rl ain , ~~ y 13 , 192 2 , 
AC 23 / 6/38 . It has l ong be n assumed t hat Birkenhead was 
of o ne mind with Churchill over t he ussian question 
duri ng the Co a litio n y ea rs . oweve r, e vidence ind ica cs 
that he was probab ly closer t o the rir.~e Hi ni ste r ' s vi e w. 
In 1 92 3 Birken ead wrote , "I w s never a lc t o shar e t e 
sanguineness with ~;hi ch he (Churchi ll] su rve yed each new 
atte p t to d islodge t he ovie t urd r ers"; sec Lord 
Birkenhead , Con emporary Person a lities (London , 192 4) , 
pp. 1 21- 22 . 
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helped to i mprove interna tional fin a nce , he conceded tha t 
discussions with Soviet deleg a t e s had p roduced nothing 
tangible. Russia would not b e helped until she recog nize d 
her private debts. But he was o p timistic about The 
Hague mee ting whe re, h e pred icted , Allied and Soviet 
•experts" would arrange the r storation of for i g n-owne d 
109 
property throug h Soviet concess ions . Only o ne Tory 
backbe ncher d e f e nded Ge noa . Sir Arthur Shir l e y Benn, 
preside nt of t he Association of Briti sh Ch ambe r s of 
Coll'.rnerce and an unoffici a l governme nt advi sor, though t tha t 
the Conference h a d red uce d European t e nsion s . Bu t he, too, 
110 
advis e d that Britain would ne ver accep t debt r epudiation. 
Dissident Cons e rva tives of fe r e d nu.rnerous obj ctions . 
Speak ing for a s mall band of "ultras ," R. S. Gwynne oved 
a vote of c e n s ure , arg uing t hat the olsheviks had shown 
by Ra pa llo t hei r inten t to split the Al li es . He accu s ed 
the Prime tiniste r of staging The Hague mee ting to mask 
the Ge noa failur e . Picturing Ru ss ia as Labo u 's "bee in 
the bonne t, " Ma rtin Archer- Shee denounce d t he ir p l an to 
settle debts after establishing r e l a tions : Sovie t bank -
ruptcy alone nega ted Labour's conte ntion t ha t inc r eased 
111 
trade would r e uc e domes tic unemp lo e nt. 
109 De bates, CLIV (May 25, 1922), col s . 1449-68. 
llOibid ., cols. 14 81-84. 
111
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Other Tories were more re s tra ined. After scruti-
nizing the Ru s sian prob l em Lord Ro bert Cecil announced with 
uninte ntiona l unde rsta t ement that the Alli e s and Sovie ts 
had reache d an i mpas se. He d e sired to readmit Russia to 
the European community but pred icted failure at The Ha gu e . 
Frede rick Wi se be l iev e d the Allie d overtures to Russ i a 
were prema ture : after a longe r expo s ure to the NEP policy 
the Sovie t s mi gh t be more arnenable. 112 
In rep ly f or t he gove r nme nt Worthington- Evans 
sympa thize d with the o b jections of hi s f e llow Con s e rva tive s . 
He r e ite rated t he Prime Mi n i s t e r's strong stand on t h e deb t 
prob l em , as s uring th a t t he r e would b e no gove r nment l oan s 
even i f Sovie t deb t s we r e s e ttle d . Russ i a could e~pect 
only t he be nef its o f the Tr a d e Fac i lities Ac t. S i g n i f icant l y , 
he d id not a tte p t t o defe nd The !Iag ue Co nfe r e nce . 11 3 \'li t h 
Labo u r abs t a i ni ng , Gwynne ' s motion was de f ea t e by a vote of 
235 to 26. Con s e rva tives wh o vo t ed aga i nst the g ove r nme n t 
on Ap ril 3 did s o a ga in, b ut t he v as t ma jority o f Tor i es 
rema i ned loy a l, albe it r e l uc t a n tly . I f the t a lly i s indica-
tive , Lloy d Geo r ge ' s d r atic bid t o r e j u v e n t e the Coa l ition 
had r e s ul t e d i n a s t and o ff . 
112 I b i d ., col s . 14 9 2- 1 503, 151 5-1 8 . 
113 b. 1 h . E d Ll I ~d ., col s . 55 2- 60 . Wort ~ng ton - v a ns a n oy-
, LTOYd Geor ge ' s c h i ef deputi es a t Ge noa , sca r c el y 
e l ed t hei r a v e r s i o n t o t he Sov ie t s ' conduct t he r e . 
t he ir v i ws , see Home a nd Po l it i c s , . S . o . 1 5 (1 92 2 ), 
, and The Times , J une 14, 1922 , p . 17. 
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The Times spoke for many Tory papers when it 
decreed, "Reconciliation between them [the Bolsheviks) and 
the doctrines of civilized mankind is i mpossib l e ." Most 
former press supporters of Ge noa conceded that the Bolshe -
114 
viks had not r e forme d. Only the Observ e r believed Genoa 
was the "saving event in the life of the world": ~1e Allies 
now realized they could not i gnore th e Bolsheviks . Unlike 
his fellow journalists Garvin claimed succe ss would come a t 
115 The Hague . 
The Hague Confe rence 
For a time The Hag ue Confe r e nce appeared to be 
stillborn. At Genoa France and Be lgium had di s agreed with 
Lloyd George 's p lan to allow the Soviets to compensate or 
offer concess ions to fore i gne r s in li e u of full re s titution . 
France r e vive d he r object i ons in June bu t finally consented 
to participate a t The Hague to a void an o pen split. Poincare 
116 little ho pe for success . 
The equal ly pessimistic Tory vi e w soon harde n ed 
overt hostility. In May Sovie t authorities arrested 
114 The Times , May 16, 192 2, p . 17; ~estern Ma il, May 26, 
1922, p. 6; pec t a tor, CXXVIII (llay 27, 1922 ), 642; Da ily 
Telegraph , ~lay 17, 1 92 2, p. 10. 
115 Observe r, May 21, 1922, p. 12. 
116 Coates, A History of Anglo- Sovi e t Re l a tions , 
87- BB. 
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Tikhon, Patriarch of t he Russian Orthodox Church, allegedly 
for refusing to surrende r church tre asures. Tory p ape rs 
and politicians led a vocife rous protest in Dritain. 
Although Conservative s generally had ignored Soviet re-
ligious policy, they now d e scribed the privations suffe r ed 
by all Russian b e lievers , pe rhaps with the ulterior motive 
117 
of undermining Sovi e t cre dibility at The Hague. 
Despite Lloyd Ge orge's seeming optimism ove r The 
Hague, he appointed only a smal l delegation h eaded by Lloyd-
Gre ame and Liberal Sir Edward Hilton Young, the Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury. The Sovi e ts r esponded by n ami ng 
Litvinov and Kra s sin. Be for e departing , Lloyd- Greame 
assured a heavily Cons e rvative a udience tha t the Soviets 
would not receive economic assista nce until the y provided 
118 
"confidence, securi t y , and fr eedom" for Western trade rs. 
The Conference forma lly opened on June 24 wi th 
twenty-se v e n n a tions r ep r esented . Two c omm i ss ions conduc t e d 
all b u sines s . A non-Rus s i a n commission composed of l-Ie s t e rn 
delegates was d ivided into three subcomm i ssions--private 
pro e rty , credits, and deb t s . Sovi t de l eg t es ade u p the 
117 . 
Represen ta t ~ve comme nts 
ticians can be found in The Tim 
1922, p. 17 ; Morning 
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86. 
118 
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Russian commission whi ch faced the ~llied subcommis sions . 
The two sides argued inconclusively for weeks, both 
adhering rigidly to positions taken at Genoa. 119 In early 
July the gulf wide ned whe n Lloyd-G r eame ruled out compe n-
sation for creditors throug h concessions (a pla n which the 
Soviets seemed to dis like t he leas t) a n d insisted that they 
restore property whenever pos s ible or remune rate the o wners. 
Britain probably agreed to this strong Franco- Be l g ian s tand 
to gain the ir s u pport in the deve loping Turkish crisis. 
Despite the setback Litvinov announced t hat in exchange for 
substanti a l credits the Sovie ts would agree in princi l e to 
compe nsate pro perty owne r s: p r e v ious ly, t hey had deni ed 
the lega lity of compensat ion. And instead of direct govern-
mental loans t hey would be sa tisfied wit.h gov e rnme nt-
guar an teed credit s from p riva t e 1· es tern sources . l:l ut t .he 
non- Russ i a n c o mm is s i on s coffed . Anxious t o end t he fruit-
less n egotiat i ons , Lloyd - Gr eame c a lled for a final s ess ion 
on July 20. On July 1 9 Kr ass in asked Lloy a -Gre ame to 
enumerate t.he Allies ' t erms for a r esump tion of talks . T e 
Briti s1 delegate t e n r w u 
119 
The 
state . en t whicl e fel t t he 
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Rus sian s hould ac c ept. Kr assi n ag r eed to r econunend it to 
his gove r nme nt. At the la s t s ess i o n Litv i no v r ead it aloud: 
If the othe r de l ega tions r ep r esen t ed a t The Hag ue 
agre e to r efe r t he p ropos a l at the s ame t i me t o 
the ir Gove r nme nts , the Russian De l ega tion wi ll a t 
once r e f e r t o t he Russian Gover nme nt the auestion 
whe the r t he Russ i a n Gove r nme n t is p r pa r ed , assuming 
tha t cred its to t he Russian Governme n t in ~1e sens e 
inte nded by t he Ru s s i an De l ga tion c nnot be g iv n 
(1) to a c k nowledge t he d e bts due by t he Russian 
Gove r nme nt or its predecessors to forei g n n a tiona l s ; 
and 
(2) to ag r ee to g ive effec t i v e compe nsa tion t o 
for e i gners fo r p r o e r t y pre v ious ly owned b y th em 
which has been na tionali sed by t he uss ian Govern-
ment; p rovided tha t t e rms of paymen t of t he d e bts 
and t erns o f compe ns ation , whether in th e for m of 
concess ion o f p r ope r t i es or otherwise , be lef t to 
b e ag r eed be t w n t he Russi n Govern . e nt an d the 
pe r son s c onc erned , in t he cours e of two ye r s . l20 
If the qua l ificat i on s a r e o ve rlooked mome ntari l y , the 
annou nc eme n t g r ea t ly modified the Soviet pos ition . The non-
Russ i a n c onuniss i o n f e lt it crea ted a fa vorab l e a o sphe r e 
for furthe r discussions. The Hague Confe r e nce t hen closed 
1 21 
on t h i s seemingly optimi s tic note . 
Le fti s t histori a ns h ave a rgued that the Allies 
. d. . th f 122 di s mi sse d t he Sov1et offer by a Journ1ng e Con r e nee . 
Howe ve r , Lloy - Cr eane had authore d t he Sovi e t stat e nt , 
which was me r ely a propos 1 to thei r gove r rune nt an no t an 
12 0 Swi n t on , I Remembe r , 
account of the roposal , see 
col. SOL 
. 25 . For the ve rba tim 
Debate s , CLVII {July 26, 192 2), 
121 Debates , CLVII (Ju l y 26, 1922 ), c o l s . 502- 3. 
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accep tance; and t he final session a lready had been fixed. 
The Soviet deleg a tion probably adopted Lloyd-Gre ume ' s words 
to cove r up the failure. Likewise, the Briti sh d e l ega tion 
123 
could r e turn home with something . 
In Commons on July 26 Lloyd-Greame claim d th a t the 
Sovie t state me nt offere d a "rea l hope of concre t e re s ults." 12 4 
Later in the debate Lloyd Ge orge d e livered his last s peech 
on Russia as Prime Hinister . The closing e ven t at The 
Hague , he excl a i me d , showed that conf e rence dip lomacy was 
working. The Soviets now realiz e d t h a t unless the y o e ned 
the door to "Hes t e rn b rains , t h e \-/estern trade r, and \·/e ste rn 
skill," Ru ss ia "will be r e duced t o some thing like pri e v a l 
conditions . " He also attacked t he Labour party 's Russian 
policy: "If you s e nt out the b es t 1\mbassador we posse s s , 
he would not be fo llowed by a sing l e b anke r or trade r until 
the necessa ry cond it ion s we r e e stab li shed . " l\ nd ape c e ti e 
gove r nme nt loan wa s un p r eceden t ed in Bri t i s h hi s t o ry . In 
sum, Lab uur wa s misleading t he o v i e t s . 125 Pe rha s 
hea rte ned by t h is force ful s peec h , s e v e ra l Tory b ckbenchers 
defen ed t he g ove r 12 6 e nt . But two off e r ed di f f erent 
123 . ' 25 Sw1nton , I Rem e r , p . . 
124 
Debate s , CLVII (July 26 , 1922) , cols . 491-50 4. 
12 5Ibid ., co l s . 5 44 - 55 . For t he s e ech of Labour 
lpokesma~ R. Clyne s , s ee cols. 50 4-12 . 
1 26
r b i d ., cols. 524-26 , 560 - 63 . 
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approaches . Lord Eustace Percy criticized conference 
diplomacy , sugge s ti ng instead t ha t the Britis h Trade e le-
gation in z.toscow could e ffect an Ang lo-Soviet r app roche-
me nt more easily. Lord Robert Ce ci l again ad vocate d i m-
mediate r ecognition to h e lp b re ak the Ang lo- Sovie t de ad -
lock . Hare surprising l y , he def nded the Sovie t t erms for 
an accord , cla i ming the y could not be compe lle d to abandon 
their economic s ystem . In his estima tion direct trade 
relations we re almos t i mposs i b l e be c a use of the differing 
economic and l ega l sys t ems . All he could sugg s t was 
establi sl ing comme rce with t he Ru s sia n pe o p l e , "somehow 
or other.• 127 
Con s erva tive journalists t ook little intere s t in 
The Hague. Th e few d ito ri a l s s o ke of "The ll ag ue Dead-
lock ," '' r e akdown a t The Hag ue ," o r "Linge ri ng Illus i o n s . " 
The Rus sia n p ro osa l o f J ul y 19 was virtua lly i g no r ed . 
Even t he 0 se r v e r . i n t ai ned a n un usua l silen c e . Th e Ti e s 
summarized t e s e nti e n t s of oany ape r s : 
We hope th a t the r e will b e no f u r he r nego t i a t i ons 
for t he r esent and t ha e ~u ro can row r s wi ll 
r.~aint ain a wa r d s Bol shev isn a unite f r ont . It i s 
only when t he de l usive a ntom of tr us t in Bo l s hev i s m 
finally f ad e s away t h a t it will b e oss i b l e to de a l 
con s tructive ly wi th Rus s i a . 
In less restraine d l an g uage t he Da ily a il cla · ed t he 
127 I bid ., cols. 531-33, 533 - 39 . 
Bolsheviks had demons trated t hey were "just a gang of 
common crooks. · 128 
These press stateme nts probab ly r ef l ected U1e 
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dominant Tory feeling after Ge noa and The Hague. Cons e r-
vatives be lieved the Sovie ts had been g ive n amp l e time to 
achieve an equitable se ttleme nt of the ir d iffe r e nces wiUl 
Britain. Because Conservative s would not tolera t e debt 
r epudiation , Lloyd George was forced to t ake a stronge r 
sta nd t ha n he migh t otherwise hav e taken. 
During the la s t year of t he Coalition t he Cabinet 
was blocked by Ule r es tive ness of Tory backbe nchers, an 
increasing majority of whom wanted to dissol ve t he 
Coalition. Auste n Chamberlain , Birkenhead , !orne , a nd 
other Tory mini s t rs w o sought to preserve the governmen t 
had to def r to t ' e ir backbencher ' de ands on Russian 
policy or f ace a r ebe llion. I n t he preceding yea r o ry 
leaders ha r eva iled ove r their backbenchers on the Trade 
Agreemen t. ut by 1922 Lloyd George was so feared , and e ve n 
ha ted, by most Tory •I.P . ' s and journalists that the le de r-
it n cessary to ado t a l rd line on Russ i . 




Russia at this time must be interpreted at least to some 
extent as covert attacks on the Prime Minister . The 
Spectator o ffers an extreme example . In 1920 this journal 
had become "conciliatory," but in 1922 it adopted the 
"rightist" viewpoint because of its distrust of Lloyd 
George . After the Coalition fell it resumed its earlier 
stand. 
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C H A P T E R V I 
THE CURZON TOUCH 
The Tories Take Off ice 
On October 19, 1922 a majority of the Tory membe r-
ship of Common s mee ting at t he Carlton Club voted to aba ndon 
the Coa lition. Lloyd Ge o r ge ' s Ru s s ian policy was only o ne 
of the many f a ctors i n f lue n c ing t he d e c i sio n . Althoug h mos t 
anti-Sovie t bac kbe n c he rs side d wi t h t he ma j o rity , a n umbe r 
of notab l e "ri ghti s t s , " inc lud i ng Carlyon Be ll a ir s , t a l ford 
Hack i nde r, Cl a ude Lowthe r, a nd Yl i l liam Bull, s upported t he 
1 . . l Coa 1.t1.o n. 
Rus s i a was not a c onte n ti o u s i ss ue d uri ng t he gene r a l 
ele ction he l d in De c e mbe r . Tory l e ade rs we r e r e tice nt , a nd 
the p r ess a llud ed t o Ru s s i a o n l y wh e n d e nouncing Labour ' s 
2 
alleged Bo l s he vism. The a t iona l Unionis t As s oc i a tion ' s 
lite r a ture d id li k ew i se : one t y p ica l p i e c e urged t he 
ele cto r a te t o "bang t he d o or on Bo l shevi sm b y voting 
. . , 3 . . Un1.on 1. s t . ' In r c v 1. e wi ng Ang l o-Sovi e t r e l a t1.ons the 
encyclope d i c Tory Campa i g n Gu i de c r iticize d La o ur more t ha n 
1For a l ist o f t he vo ting , s e e J ame s , ed ., Memo irs o f 
a Conse rvative , pp . 13 0 - 33 . 
2E . g ., Da ily Ma i l, Nov . 15, 1 9 22 , p . 8, a nd The Ti me s , 
Nov . 2 2 , 1 9 2 2 , p • 11. 
3
sos : Labou r a r t y ' s Ap,ca l t o Bo l s hics (Lo ndo n , 
192 2) , p ph l e t no . 21 3. See also Ru s s1.a 1 s o b jec t-Lesso n 
in Soci a li sm (Londo n , 1 9 22 ), ph l c t no . 205 4 . 
4 
the sovi e ts. 
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The Tories we r e r e tur ned with a comf ortab l e majority. 
Prime Hini s t e r Bo na r Law's Cab i ne t i ncluded on l y two 
"righti s t s ," Lords Sa li s bury and Cu r zon. Continuing as 
Fore i g n Se cre t a r y , Cur zon now e me r g e d ou t of t he s had ows 
where he had b rood e d wh ile Lloyd George domi na t e d fo r e i g n 
policy. On ass~ing hi s pos t he d e c l are d t ha t t he wo rld ' s 
ills would be cured " no t by star tl ing d r ama t i c s t r o kes , not 
by a policy of haughty iso l ation, but by c ompr omi s e , by 
5 
cooperation, a nd by goodwill." For a t ime t hese words 
seemed to a pp ly eve n t o Ru ss ia . 
In tlovembe r Cu r zon a g r eed r e lucta ntly t o l i mited 
Sovie t pa rtici pa tio n in the La u s anne Co nfere nc e , conve ne d 
by t he Allie s to a r r i v e a t a eac e s e tt l eme nt with K ma l i s t 
6 
Turkey . Cu r zon a nd Ch i c he r i n exchanged hea t e d wo r d s 
dur i ng t he s ess i ons dea l ing with the S t r ai t s , but f e w To ry 
polit ici a ns and j o urn a l s s howed mu ch inte r es t; only t he 
7 
Obs e rve r ha d a r oved full Sovi e t a r t ic i pa t ion . The 
Sovi e t s wan t ed t he S tra i t s closed to wa r s hi ps , but Cu r zon 
disag r eed . By sk ill ful ly mixing t h r eats wi t h concess i on s 
4The Campa i g n Guide , 1 92 2 (Lo ndon , 1922) , pp . 2 48- 6 7 . 
5 
The Ti s , Oct . 2 4, 1922, p . 1 8 . 
6Th i s is based on I orthcdge , 
The Tr o ub l d 
7
ob s e rve r , Oct . 22 , 19 22 , p . 12 . For a r ep r s n t ative 
dis s e nti ng v~ew , see he Tim s , ov . 28 , 1 922 , p . 13 . 
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he forced the Soviets to capitulate . Curzon called it a 
"victory," but Chicherin had ma tche d him in their verba l 
bouts. More significantly, the Sovie ts had signed their 
first international tre aty. 
The return of the Tories to powe r did not a ff e ct 
the Anglo-Sovie t stalema te. In Decembe r Unde r-S e cre t a ry 
for Fore ign Affairs Ronald ·lctlei ll echoed the Coa lition's 
policy when he explained th a t the governmen t desired in-
creased trade and Russian participation in world affa irs . 
Soviet actions, howe v e r, contrad icted their conciliatory 
word s . As a c ase in point, he note d thei r r ef usa l to 
rati fy an agreement to r e turn the prewar concessions of 
Briti sh-owned Russo-Asiatic Consolida t ed . 8 In private , 
government offi cia l s hoped to i g nore t he Sovie ts until t hey 
9 
accepted The !Iague condi tions . 
During question time in several Commons sess ions, 
some "ultra" H.P. ' s urged the gove r nme nt t o c ance l the Tr ade 
Agre eme nt. Cuthbert J ames and o he rs t houg h t it " intolerable" 
that a Con se rva tive govern en t would ma intain r e lations with 
10 
a band o f cri tinals . And yet t he is sue was not rais e 
8The · 21 Tl. es , Dec. , 
held nume r ous goldrn ining an 
Tsarist Russia . 
9 
19 22, p . 9 . This larg e firm had 
timbering concessions in 
J . D. Gregory (h ead of the o rthe rn De par tmen t at the 
Foreig n Off ice ) t o Law , Jan . 2 4, 1923 , FO 371/9 347. 
10The Ti me s , Dec . 9 , 1922 , p . 11. Ot he r Tories showed 
1 76 
during t he Annua l Conserva t ive Conference . 
A f ew Tories recommended the o p osite pol icy . 
S i r Al lan Smith, leader of t he p a r liamentary Industria l 
Group , asked Law t o faci l i t ate Russian trade fo r t he sake 
11 
o f t he unemp l oyed . Fo r a time t h gove rnmen t did not 
move in e i t he r di r e ction . The n in t he spring of 1923 
the dead lock ende d . 
The Ultima t um 
In l a te f1a r ch Cardina l Ciep l a k , the Roma n Catholic 
archbishop of Petrog r ad , and his aide , Monsig nor Dutkevich , 
were s e n t enced t o death by a Soviet court f o r treasonous 
activi t ies . The ve r d ict produce d an uproar in the \'les t . 
The 1\.rchbi shop of Ca nterbury dec ri d t h e Sovi e t c ampaig n 
to exterminate Ch ri s ti a nity . Lord Syd nh am was r epul sed 
12 
by this "most h o rri b l e c rime in a ll history . " 
Ma il b e l ieved such "hide ous" r e lig i ous per s ecution roved 
t heir d i sdai n b y introduc ing b ills to c urb "sedit i ous " 
(Cor..munist ) p ro a g nda and t eac h in , but no ne a ss e d ; 
e . g ., Debates , CLX II (: !a r ch 27 , 19 23), c o l s . 273-7 8 . 
11 
Smith t o Law , Dec . 14 , 1922 , Don a r Law Pa e r s , 
11 2/4 0/1 . 'he Ind u s tri a l Grou p was an informal, bi p rti san 
organizati o n of 1. P . ' s i n t e r es te d in industrial an c om-
mercia l questions . A numbe r of To ries were l ead ing 
member . 
12 
Lords Dcbat s , LII I ( la rch 20 , 192 3 ) , c ols . 454-58, 
459- 60 . See also ~rkcn e a ' s conde~ation in his 
Con t e mporary e r sona lit i es , p .l 22 . 
13 
the Sovie t system was "politica lly organ i sed" cr i e . 
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The Horning Post u r ged Curzon to disniss "the miss ion of 
Bolshevist spies and propagandists which now pollute our 
capital." Although Garvin a l so critici zed Soviet "folly," 
he f e lt t he trials showed the need for a d i p l oma tic l ink 
b e cause "we arc r educed to rid iculous i npotence when a 
14 
crisis a ri ses. " 
Curzon directed t he British agent in Moscow, 
Robert Hodgson , to ask for a stay of execution . Other 
gove rnme nts d i d likewise . 15 The Sovie t re p ly, r ece ived 
the ve ry next day , branded th Briti sh r eques t as a n 
intrus i o n in the ir dom stic affai r s and al s o assailed 
Britain's alleged assassination of political pr i soners in 
Ire l a nd , I ndia , and Egy t . It w s sig ned by Gregory 
Weinstein, a minor bu r eaucrat . 16 Hodgson r fused to 
accept t he note ; severa l days lat r he r eceived a similar 
13 
Dail ~l a il , Apri l 6 , 192 3, p . 7. See a l so - -~ 
Te l r a h , March 28 , 1923 , p . 8 , and The T i es , M rch 28 , 
1923 , p . 13. 
14~~~t , l\ ril 9 , 19 23, p . 6; Obse rver , l\ r il 1, 
p. 10 , Apnl ~ , p . 14 . 
15 
Hodgson to Chiche rin, Ma r ch 30 , 1923 , Great ritain , 
Parl i amen t, Parli ame ntary Pa e rs , (House of Co .ons and 
Command) , ( ussi no. 2 , 1923) , CI'\Ild . 1869 , "Corr sponde nce 
be t wee n Hi s ajes ty ' s Gover en t ar.d t he Soviet Gover ·en t 
Re s ecting t he e l a tions be twee n the 'wo Gove rn e nts , " 
(London , 1923), p . 1. 
16




one. Ci e p1a k's s e nte nce was r educed to t e n yea r s in 
pri s on, but Butkevich was sho t; a nd p r epar a tions con ti n ued 
for t he upcoming tria l of Pa t r i arch Tikhon. 
In r espo n s e Curz on c ons i de r ed ab r ogat ing t he Tr ade 
Agreement. Se ve r a l othe r developmen t s ~ l s o di sturbed h i m: 
the Sovi e ts con t i nue d t he i r p r opaganda in t he !lear l:.ast , 
and t hey had been h a r ass ing Br itish t raw l e r s with in Russ i a ' s 
self - proclaimed twe lve - mi l e i nte rn a tiona l l imi t in t he 
18 
Arctic Oc ean. Cur zon asked his s ubo rdinates for t hei r 
19 
thoughts . From Mos cow Hodgson wrote t ha t a b r eak wou l d 
increase the powe r of Sov iet ext r e i s t s , precipitate a 
return of t e r ror , exc l ude Britons f r om Russ i a ' s e c o nomic 
recove r y , and dep r i v e Bri t ain of he r l iste n ing post and a 
mode r a ting influence in s i de Russia . Hodgson, howe ver , 
would attemp t to convince Chicherin that t he threa t to 
20 
abrogat e the Tr ade Ag r eeme n t was no t an i d le one . J. D. 
Gregory, head of the No r thern De ar c n t at t he oreig n 
Office , al s o cautioned agains t ha s ty action since the 
government soon would be confronted with demands by the 
17we inste in t o Hodgson , April 4, 192 3, Ibid. , pp . 4-5 . 
18 . . . . For t he t raw l er ~ ssue , see F ~ sche r, The Sov~ets ~n 
Wo r l d Affairs , I, 4 42 - 43. 
19 Curzon t o Hodgson , Apr il 9 , 192 3, Bona r La w Papers , 
111/12/66 . 
20 Hodgson to Cur zon , Apr i l 13 , 192 3, FO 371/9365 . 
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Opposition to r e new the trade ties. Cancellation was a 
single usage weapon which should be r ese rved until it would 
damage t he Soviets , and "that momen t h as obvious ly not 
arrived . " Gregory urged a continuation of Curzon's policy, 
"The Bolshevists hate being cold-shouldered e ve n mor e tha n 
21 
b e ing o penly abused or attacke d . " Sir Cyre Crowe , the 
22 
Permane nt Under - Se cre t ary , a g r eed with Gregory. The 
23 
Department of Overs e a ~ Trade feared a r educ tion of trade . 
A junior mer:1ber of t he Fo r e i gn Office , llilliam O ' llal l ey , 
sugg e s ted an ultima tum: "The fact t ha t we h ad not act d 
precipitately but had give n t he Bo l s h e vi k s a n o portuni ty 
2 4 
to r etreat would be to ou r a d vantage . " Curzon followe d 
O'Malley ' s advice. 
Afte r the publication of Wein s tein ' s noes Tory 
pa e rs also weig he d e ri ts of a break . Some ca lle d fo r 
. 25 1 t he ous t e r of the Ru s sian Tr ade D lega t~on . Dut a n e qua 
26 
numbe r d i sag re e d . R vers ing i ts previous s t and the 
21 . M~nute by Gr egory , March 31, 1 9 23 , FO 371/9341. 
22Minute by Cr owe , Marc · 31, 192 3 , Ibid . 
23 
t-lemorandum by the Ove rseas Tr a de Depa r tme nt , 
April 17, 1 923 , FO 371/9365 . 
24Hinute by 0 ' ~1a lley , pril 11 , 19 23, Ibid . 
25The Ti mes , April 24, 192 3, p .l 5; Morning Pos t , 
19, 1 23 , p . 6; Dai l y Te l eg r aph , pnl 14 , 192 3 , p . 8; 
r.:-~t-'.'l-7a-=i-=l , A ril 13, 1 3 , p . 7. In t he Da ily Hail, 
, 19 3 , p . 5 , Lord Syde nh am a g r eed . 
26 Spectato r , CXXX ( pril 14, 1 923 ) , 615; Saturday 
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influe ntial Association of British Cre ditors of Ru s sia now 
found that the Trade Ag r eeme nt did not serve any "useful 
27 
purpose ." The Russi a n section of the Lo ndon Chambe r of 
28 
Comme rce concurre d. 
The Sovie ts scorned the a g itatio n in Britain. 
Propag andist Karl Ra dek r e call e d s ar c a stica lly how se ve ral 
English monarchs h ad Aecute d the ir Archbi s hops of Ca nte r -
bury and d e scribed t he Fore i g n Und e r-Secreta ry a s "not 
worth a farthing ." He and othe r l e a d r s c hall n ed rita in 
to abroga t e t he Trade Ag r eeme nt, claimi ng h e r pe rilou s 
econo my needed t h e Russ i a n marke t. 29 
Labourites saw a tte r s d iff r e ntly fr om a d e k. On 
March 29 sev e ral Oppos itio n backbe nche r s a c cused the gov rn-
ment of o s tra cizing Ru ss i a , noting t ha t thi s was t he f irs t 
Rev i w , CXXXV ( p ril 21, 19 23), 
p. 13; u a i l x r 0 ss , Ap r i l 10 , 
Coates , Re lig i on i n Tsa r i s t and 
p. 14. 
52 7; Obse r ve r , May 6, 1 9 23, 
19 23 , ci ted by I i lli am 
o v i e t Ru ss ia (Lond on , 19 30 ), 
27 Le sl ie Ur quh a r t (ch a i rma n ) toR . Nc e ill , Ap r i l 10, 
1923, FO 371/9 3 65 . Founded i n 192 1 to l o bby fo r t he 
credito r s , t he Associat i o n incl uded a numbe r of To r i s in 
its l ead r s ip . In 19 8 e i gh t u ack' e nc ~ r a nd on e e e r 
sat on its Ad vi sory Council, a nd Olive r Loc er - Lamps on , H. P . 
was a me e r of i ts x cu t i v e orr~i ttee ; s ee Ri c ard R. 
Twe e d (cha i rma n) t o t e For e i g n Of ice , Ma y 31, 1928 , 
FO 371/13313. Fo r a n ea rly s t a eme n t of i ts g oa l s , see 
F. C. Sa v a g e (s e cre t a r y ) to Ce cil l rmsworth , N. P ., ov. 29 , 
1921, FO 371/68 75. 
28 London Chambe r of Comme rce to He e ill, 1\pril 10, 
23, FO 371/9 3 65. 
29 Ho d g on t o Cur zon , 1\ r i l 17, 192 3, I bid .z Rus s i a n 
fo rma t i o n and r.e v i cw , II ( p r il 21 , 1 9 2 3 )~5 . 
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discussion of Russia in the new parliament. McNeill's 
heated denunciation of Soviet religious policy underscored 
30 
the governme nt's growing irritation. Such official 
comments led Labour to conclude that Tory protests were 
31 
preparing the public for a break. Labour leade r Arthur 
Henderson wrote anxiously to the Prime Minister, who 
replied that "if we should be forced to take action," 
32 Commons could pass judgment . 
On April 25 Curzon first brought the Russian 
question to the Cabinet's attention when he announced the 
seizure of a British trawler off Munmansk. His collea gues 
approved a draft protest enumerating Britain's comp laints--
trawlers, propaganda, and the lieinstein notes. If an 
acceptable r ep ly was not given shortly , "our present de 
33 
facto relations woul d be severed." 
A week later the For ign Secr e t a ry presented a 
wide-ranging ultima t um in which he quote d from intercep t ed 
Soviet diploma tic corre spondence to document such "per-
nicious" activities as Soviet arms shipmen t s and Comintern 
3
°For the speeches of E . D. More l and C. P . Treve lya n, 
and Mc•eill's reply, see Debate s , CLXII (March 29, 1923), 
cola. 822-29, 830-32, 841-4 8 . 
31E.g., the r emarks of Labouri te Charles Buxton in 
~·, CLXIII (April 26 , 1923) , col. 664. 
32
uenderson to Law, April 14, 1923, Cambridge , The 
versity Library , Stanley Baldwin Papers, vol. 114, p. 72. 
33
cabinet minutes , April 25, 1923, CAB 23/45. 
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subsidies for revolutionaries in India, Afghanistan, and 
Persia. He demanded the dismissal of Soviet diplomats in 
Kabul and Teheran, the withdrawal of Weinstein's notes, and 
guarantees against future harassment of British trawlers 
outside the three-mile limit. Fina lly, he requested 
compensation for two British subjects allegedly mistreated 
34 by the Soviets. Russia was given ten days to comply. 
The Cabinet altered just a few minor points in the draft. 35 
Only one minister's reaction is known. Lloyd-Gre ame , 
President of the Board of Trade, wrote that because recent 
attempts to settle debts had fail ed , "Firm action •.• is 
probably the only way of bringing the Russian Government to 
their senses.• Moreover, "We have obta ined little or no 
benefit from the Trade Agreement.• Its abrogation would not 
reduce Russian i mports, "If it pay s them to import into t he 
country, they will continue to do so , eithe r directly or 
36 
indirectly. • 
The Soviets rece ived th e note on May 9, and the press 
published it th e next day. The Times ' lobby correspondent 
37 
reported that most Tory M.P.'s were p l eased . Almost all 
34
ror the text of the published note, see Curzon to 
rin, Hay 2, 192 3, "Corres o ndence Respec ting the 
lations between the Two Gover en ts," pp . 5-13. 
35 Cabinet minutes, May 2, 1923, CAB 23/45. 
36 Lloyd-Gre ame to Curzon , May 1, 1923, FO 371/9365. 
37The Tim s , Ma y 10, 1923, p. 14. The maj ority of 
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Tory papers responded favorably. The Morning Pos t, The 
Times, the Daily Tel e graph, the Wes tern Ma il, a nd the 
Daily Mail applauded the forthright exposition of Britain's 
complaints. Anticipating a Soviet re j ection, they agre ed 
that cancellation of the Agreement would i p rove r e lations 
by ending the hypocrisy of dealing with the criminal 
38 
camarilla. Reversing their earlier positions the 
Spectator and the Saturda y Re view now claimed th a t continue d 
silence would be misconstrue d as acq uie s c e nce in Sovi e t 
39 intrigues. Time and Tide stradd l e d the fenc e . 
Garvin, however, accused Cur zon of having dealt an 
•irreparable blow" to the country' s economy by "cutting o f f 
our own nose to spite our face." His ultima tum me th od, the 
•worst kind of di ploma tic procedure ," i nvite d a r e j e ction: 
•unless we are ma d our ob j e ct in o ur controve r sie s with 
Moscow ••. must be s ettleme nt, no t ruptu r e ." I nde ed , 
comme rcial and indus tria l inte re s t s felt t he governme nt had 
no alte rna tive . Fo r a l ist i ng of f a vorable re sponses , see 
Foreig n Offi c e minute , May 8 , 192 3, FO 3 71 /9367 . For a 
diss en t ing v iew , see Les l ie Sco t t , 1 . P . , to Curzon, May 1 5 , 
1923, FO 371 / 9 366 . See al s o t he a prov 1 of t he Association 
of Briti sh Cr edi tors o f Russ i a i n The Times , lay 10 , 1 3 , 
p. 16. 
38 
Morni ng Pos t, May 9, 1 9 23, p . 8; The Times , Ma y 1 5 , 
1923, p. 1 5 ; Dai ly Te le~ r aph , May 10 , 1923 , p . lO ; es te rn 
Mail, May 10, 1923 , p . ; Da i ly ta il , Ma y 11, 19 23, p . B. 
39 Spe ctator, CXXX (M ay 12, 1923), 7 86; Sa turday Re v iew , 




Curzon "had never been notable for foresight.• Garvin's 
polemic was not well-received by fellow Tories: an ano-
nymous writer in the English Review denounced him and 
41 
•his Bolshevist fri ends." 
The Soviets reacted characteristically , charging 
that the note wa s a pre t ext to reimpo se the blockade or 
42 
renew military intervention. Britis h leade rs denied 
43 
the allegation. But for many r easons the Soviets feared 
a break: Le nin was incapacitated; Germany seeme d abou t to 
collaps e under the Ruh r invasion; Poland and Rumania might 
launch an invasion; and the loss of the British market 
~ight harm the NEP. In private, some Sovie t leade rs disa-
vowed the discourteous Weinstein notes and doubte d the 
legality of their unilateral t we lve-mile territorial limi t. 44 
The Soviet rep ly, receive d by Hodg son on May 13, cited 
May 13, 1923, p. 12. 
s eech by Leopold Ame ry (First Lord of 
o se rve r, la y 13, 1923 , p . 13. 
The Soviets in World Affairs , I , 444-45; 
oa from Peace to War, p . 146. 
185 
allegedly hostile British activities in Russia and Asia. 
But they agreed to withdraw the Weinstein notes, compensa te 
the two Britons, submit the seaboard dispute to an inter-
national confe r e nce, and mee t to settle the remaining 
45 
differences . Krassin flew to London the next day. 
Tory newspapers g ave the note a mixed reception. 
but the Observer offered praise . The Saturday Revie w and 
the Spe ctator did not know what to think, both awai ting a 
46 
lead from t he governme nt. 
On May 15 Labour sponsored the onl y deba t e on Russia 
during the life of thi s ar liamen t. A parade of Opposition 
leade rs condemned the note . Ramsay MacDona ld f e lt a 
confere nce would have been p ref e r ab le to the Foreign Se cre-
tary's " pompous" ap roach . I f the Trade Agre e me nt was torn 
up, Britain would lo s e needed trade a nd "a state of incipient 
47 
war will b e crea ted." Two distinct view oints can be 
45 
Litvinov to Curzon, May 11, 19 23, Great Dr itain, 
Parliament , Par li ame n t ry apers, (Uo use of Commons and 
Co mm a nd ) , (Russ i no . 3 , l923 ) , C::md . 18 74, " Rep y o f th e 
Soviet GovernMe n t t o His M jes y ' s Go ve r e nt especting 
the Relations betwe en the o Go ve r nnen t s , " (London, 1 9 2 3) , 
pp. 2-8. 
46 
Morning Post , Ma y 16 , 192 3, p . 9; Da il da il, 
May 15, 1 923, p . 8; Obse rve r , My 20 , 1923, p. 1 2 ; S tu r d a y 
Revie w, CXXXV (May 1 9 , 1 923 ) , 656; S f ctator, CXXX (~1ay 1 9 , 
192 3) • 834. 
47 
De bat s , CLXIV (Ma y 15, 1923) , col s . 281-99. For 
aimilar s e eches by Lib era ls Lloyd Georg e and II . H. Asquith , 
aee cols. 31 9 -2 6 . 
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discerned from Tory backbenche rs' speeches. Reginald Ba nks 
and Martin Archer-Shee demande d tha t the Soviets comply with 
48 
Curzon's d emands or lose t he Agreeme nt. Sir Allan Smith 
hoped to prese rve the Agreement bec a use of its comme rcial 
benefits. Like MacDonald he believed the ul timatum had 
49 
resulted in "a state of war." Under-Secretary Ronald 
McNeill r ebuke d these comme nts about a wa r but terme d the 
Soviet reply Re ntire ly unsatisfactory." Although Rwe have 
negotiated until we are sick of nego tia ting ,• he announced 
50 
that Curzon was willing to mee t with Krassin. 
51 
On May 19 Krass in s poke with Curzon a nd Me e ill. 
In a note to Curzon on May 23, Krassin r e iterate d the 
concessions listed in the Soviet r e ply of Hay 13, adding 
that compensation woul d be paid to Briti sh seamen; howeve r, 
52 he again denied viol a ting the p ropaga nda clause. Curzon 
48 
I bid ., cols. 3 26 -34, 341- 47 . 
49 
Ibid., col s . 361-65. 
50 
Ibid ., c o ls . 295-319. 
51
coates , A Hi s tory of n~ l o- Sovic t e l a tions , p . 117. 
The topics of di scuss~on are un nown . 
52 . l . h Th~s note and the s ubs eque nt d ip o . a t~c e xc a nges 
continuing unti l the fin a l Sov ie t c orrmunicat ion of June 18 
can be foun d in Gr ea t Britain, Parl i ame nt , Pa rli ame nt r 
~ers , (House of Commons and Cornman ) , ( Russ ~ no . , 9 23) 
d. 1890 , "Furthe r Cor r espondence b e twee n His ·I jes ty ' s 
Governme nt and the Soviet Governme nt," (London, 19 23), 
pp . 3-1 8 . 




On May 21 Stanley Baldwin had replaced the ailing 
Bonar Law as Prime Minister. Like his predecessor, Baldwin 
54 
gave Curzon almost a fr ee rein in foreign affairs. But 
the Prime Minister emphasized that "we must try to avoid 
. . 55 
a break w1th Russ1a." On May 30 the Cabinet decided that 
the Soviets must sign a "renewed declaration on propaganda 
in a more specific and definite formula ." Curzon should 
make matters "slightly easier" by allowing them to r e call--
instead of di smissing--their agents in Kabul and Tehe ran. 
Finally, the Soviets must r epudiate their claim that 
compensation for the two British claimants did not imply 
56 
wrongdoing . 
On June 4 Kras sin criticized Br itain's increas ed 
demands but was willing to sig n a more specific propaganda 
pledge and to withdraw the r ese rvation concerni ng the two 
British claimants . Howeve r, he refus e d to recall the 
diplomats in Afghanis tan and Persia. 
As the i mpasse dragged on, Tory pape rs divide d along 
53 
Coates, A History of Anglo-Soviet Re l ations, p. 121. 
54 
Middlemas and Ba rnes , Baldwin , p. 179. 
55 
Middlemas, ed., Thomas Jones: Whitehall Diary , I, 238. 
56
c abinet minutes , Ma y 30, 1923 CAB 23/46. 
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three lines. The Times, the Morning Post, and the Daily 
Mail wanted the boot applied to the Soviet mission. The 
National Review, the Spectator, and the Western Hail merely 
57 
urged Curzon to stand firm. Other journals requested a 
negotiated s e ttlement because Russia seemed conciliatory. 
Garvin again was most e mphatic, "To allow for eig n policy 
to be guided by detestation o f Bo l shevism . • . is the 
58 
straight way to catas trophe .• The Soviets charged tha t 
59 
"permanent Tory hostility" had caused the crisis. 
Agreement final ly was reach ed after Krassin 
announced that the Soviet charg~ at Kabu l, then in Mos cow, 
would not return to his post. On June 11 the Cabinet 
interpreted this as a c apitulation . (Krassin later a g reed 
to dismiss the agent in Teheran if he engaged in anti-
British activities.) At the end of the meeting Baldwin 
congratul ated Curzon "on the h ighly s uccessful issue of t hese 
60 
difficult negotiations." Curzon was elated , "I think I 
57 
The Times, May 24, 1923, p. 11; Morning Post , May 24, 
1923, p. 6; D ~ly Mai l, May 25, 19 23, p. 6; l a t~ona l Re v iew , 
LXXXI (J une , 19 23) , 50 5-6 ; Spe c a t o r , CXXX ( ·1a y 19 , 19 3 ) , 
838-3 9 ; Western Mail , May 24 , 1923 , p . 6. 
58 
Observer, May 27, 1923, p . 12; Time a nd Tide , IV 
(May 25, 1923) , 533; Sa turda y Re view , CXX.XV (June 2 , 192 3), 
720; Daily Express , May 24 , 1 923 , cite d by Coates , A History 
of Anglo-Sovi e t e l a t ion s , p . 121. 
59 Rus sian Information and Review, II (June 2, 1923), 
60 
Cabinet minutes , July 11, 1923, CAB 23/46. 
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may claim to have won a considerable victory over the Soviet 
Government, and I expect the m to beha ve with more circum-
61 
spection for some time to come." Virtually all Tory 
62 
papers, including the Obse rve r, hailed the settlement. 
63 
Only a handful of Tory politicia ns dissente d. 
Tranquility 
After the settleme nt Russia did not gener a te much 
interest among Conservatives until afte r Labour c ame to 
power in January, 1924. During this time several Tories 
worked for normalized commercial r e lations. Indeed, British 
trade despe r a t e ly ne ede d a boos t. In 192 2 exports and r e -
exports to Russi a had tota lle d a me re£ 4.7 million. 
Statistics for the fir s t six mon ths of 192 3 p r esaged a n 
even lowe r annua l figure . In the s e two y ears the Sovi e t s 
accumul a t ed a favorab l e tr ade bal a nce o f l 8.3 mi ll ion ; 
64 
and the y continued to d a ng l e prospect s of l a r ge ord e r s . 
61 
Curzon to Lo r d Cr e we (amb a ssador to Fr a nce ), June 13, 
1923, c i te d b y Ze tl a nd , The Life of Lord Curzon , I I I, 356 . 
62 
E.g., Observe r, J un e 17, 1923, p . 12 ; The Time s , 
June 14, 19 23, p. l S ; and Saturday Re v iew , CXXXV (June 1 6 , 
1923) 1 795 • 
63 
E.g., the rema rk s by Sir Willi am Davi s on i n 
Debates , CLXV (June 1 2 , 1923 ), c ol. 22 9 , and l etter by 
tord Syde nham in Spectator, CXXX (June 23, 192 3), 1038- 39 . 
64 Ru ss i a n Information a nd Re view, III ( ov. 24, 1923), 
324-26, con t ains a t ypical li s ting of c ommerc i a l possi-
ities. 
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On July 24 the backbenchers' Industrial Group 
implored the Prime Minister to stimulate exports throug h an 
65 
extension of the Exports Credi ts Act (or Scheme ) to Russia. 
Baldwin answered: 
The Gover nme nt are not p r epa red to extend the 
scheme to Russia until the Russian Governme nt 
accepts the obligations and creates che cond itions 
that this Gove rnment and its predecesso r have 
always insisted on as an essen ti a l pre-requisite . 
I may add that the imports f rom Russia to t his 
country we re l ast yea r of a value nearly double 
that of the expor t s from this country to Russia so 
that the Rus sian Governme nt mu s t have had at the ir 
disposal in this coun try funds sufficient for 
purchases conside rab ly in excess of t hose they 
actually made . 66 
In reply Sir Allan Smith comp lained that the cond itions for 
an extension of the Export Credits Scheme were vague . More-
over, he noted, the Soviets always h ad me t all comme rcial 
67 
obligations promptly. But his p l ea fell mostly on deaf 
ears. A few Tories of fe r ed support , but others atta cke 
65 
Sir Allan Smith (chairman) a nd Tory P. J. Hannon 
(secre tary) to Baldwin , July 24 , 1923, Dailt Telegra!h , 
July 26, 1923, p. B. See also t he p l eas o Tory Al red 
Davies in Deba t es , CLXVI I (Aug . 2 , 192 3) , eels. 1744- 45 . 
The ·xport Credits Sc erne , enacted in 1920, se t u p 
an Export Credits De ar .en t to guar~n tee t he ayr.en t of 
bills of exch ange drawn by Briti sh fi rms on for eig n buyers 
of British goods . If the forei gne rs ' ills we re not a id, 
the government guarantee we nt into effect. ussia was 
excluded from the Act by dec r ee . The Tr a de Facil i ties Act , 
in contrast , advanced guara nteed funds t o help Briti sh 
firms fulfill contracts in foreign countries. 
66 1 . . Ba dw~n to Sm~th , Aug . 3, 1 92 3, Dai l y Teleg ra ph , 
Aug. 14, 1923, clipping in FO 371/9350 . 
67




Other Tory businessmen tried to encourage trade . 
In late August a delegation from Becos Traders, Limited, 
visited Russia. Founded ten years earlier to promote the 
Russian market, Becos was associated with over eighty 
British engineering firms. Led by F. L. Baldwin, a cousin 
of the Prime Hinister, the de l ega tion confer red with 
69 
leading Soviet economic officials . Upon returning 
Baldwin issued a guarded ly optimistic state e nt: 
We were able to discu ss several in t e r esting 
proposi tion s , which will probably lead to 
satisfactory busin ss r esult s ; bu t it must be 
obvious that all such r s ults will be comparative ly 
small until a means is found of securely giving 
credits.70 
A few Tory papers hailed the visit as an i mportan t first 
step. 71 Others ri d iculed the report as illusory. 72 The 
Association of Briti sh Creditors of Russia believe d th a t 
trade would r emai n stag nant without a deb t s et tlement . 73 
68 
For a favor a ble comme nt, see Obse rver , Aug . 19, 1923, 
p. 8. In The T. e s , Aug . 16, 19 23 , p . 1 3 , Tory b a c k e che r 
John Reme r denounced Smith and otl e r "mi s guid e i d ividua ls ." 
69The Time s, Aug. 14, 1923, p . 7. 
70 . 
. Ib~d., Sept. 3, 1923, p . 3. See also the reaction 
of A. G. Marshall , one of the leading participan ts, in 
~-· Sept , 17, 1923, p. 8 . 
71 Observer , Sep t. 2, 1923, p. 10; Sa turd ay Re v i e w, 
CXXXVI (Sept . 8, 1923 ), 266. The Soviets we e st ' c ; see 
Russian In o rma ti on and Re vi ew , II I (Sept. 8, 19 23 ), 146. 
72 . 11 E.g., The T~me s , Se p t. 4, 1923, p. . 
73 I bid ., Sept. 15, 192 3, p. 15. During an earl i e r 
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The Cabinet vetoed increased tr ade by t abling discussion of 
74 
the topic. 
In the fall of 1923 Baldwin abruptly scheduled a 
general election. Although Labour's manifes to called for 
de jure recognition of Rus sia , Tories generally ignored 
75 
the issue during the campa ign. After Conservatives lost 
the election, t he first Labour gov e r nme nt began to im-
plement their solution to the Rus s ian puzzle. 
During the Tories' year in power, Conservatives 
moved toward fo rming a monolith ic o p inion of Russian policy. 
Although it cannot be doc umented , a Cabinet majority 
probably anticipated-- and migh t have we lco e d --a Sovie t 
refusal to honor the Curzon ultima t um . Whe n the un-
expectedly mild r ep ly was r ece ived, Curzon held out fo r full 
. meeting with Ronald .1c e ill, r ep r esenta tives from t he 
As s ociation h ad as se rted t hat a thr e tened cance llation of 
the Trade Agre e me nt would for ce the Soviets to settle t heir 
debts. Me ei ll de urred; see .otes r espec in an Inte rvi e w 
with a Deput tion from the Association of Briti s h Cr ditor 
of Russia, Ju ly 26, 1 923 , Gre t Bri t a in, ub lic Record Of fice , 
Foreign Office Files , Confi de ntial rints , Russ ia , FO 418/ 
60. See al so the o l emic against the " e vil" Bo l sheviks 
by tl e Associa t io ' s ha i nn<ln , ir Ch rles Hunter , in Tl e 
Nineteenth Ce ntury a fte r , XCIV ( ovembe r , 1923), 6a-=9 s. 
74cabinet minutes , Oct . 22, 1 9 23, CAB 23/4 6 . Lloyd-
Greame sugges ted ind irect ly that there wa s some minis t erial 
support for a change in trade o licy ; see Lloyd-Gre ame to 
Baldwin, Baldwi n Papers, vol. 114, pp . 80-81. 
75 For one of the f e w a pea ls to r eturn the gove rnme nt 
because of th e ir Russian olicy , see a l e tter from George 
Buchanan in The Time s , Dec . 4, 1923 , p. 8 . 
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compliance, apparently with the c ons e nt of a ll but the Tory 
•conciliators . " Most Tories really were angered by the 
Soviet religious trials and the Wei nstein notes . 
An intriguing question is why Curzon did not insist 
on a definitive solution to the deb t problem when the 
Sovie ts seemed conci l iatory. Louis Fischer believe s that 
"possibly, perhaps probably" they would have se ttled; h e 
blames Curzon' s pompous disdain of "crass questions of 
76 
money ." Similarly, a Foreign Office civil serva nt, 
J. D. Gregory , r e calls that if the matter had bee n raised, 
agreement migh t have been r e ach e d , "It was a great oppor-
77 
tunity mis s e d ." In essence, Anglo-Soviet relatio ns mig h t 
have bee n alte red at this time . 
Actual ly, the gove rnme nt had decided not to intro-
duce the d e bt is s ue . As Ronald Me ei l l explaine priva t ely, 
it "would only have prej ud ice d t he more limi ted issues " in 
the ultima tum. The gove r nment ' s i nforma tion ind ica ted t h e 
Soviets would h a ve abandone d the Trad e Agreement rathe r th a n 
settle deb ts. Compared to debt r ecog nition , the Agreement 
78 
was "of very mino r i m or tanc e " to th em . Me e ill's r eason-
76 
Fischer, Ru ss ia ' s Ro ad fr om Pe a t o Wa r , p . 148. 
77 . 1 J. D. Gregory , o n the Edge of o~rlomacy : Ramb e s 
Re fl e ctions , 1902-1 928 (Londo n, 1929 , p . 142- 43 . 
78 
Note s re s e cti ng a n Intervi e w with a Depu t a tion from 
As soc i a tio n of Briti s h Cre itors o f Russ i a , J uly 26, 
23, FO 41 8/60 . 
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ing seems valid. 
Tory foreign policy toward Russia was controversial--
even among the Torie s. rfu ether or not Britain's complaints 
should have been spe ll d out in an ultima tum is debatable . 
Curzon's "victory" was personally gratifying, but the 
satisfactory outcome of the crisis was due more to Soviet 
backpedaling than to his skill . Most important, the 
settlement did not lessen Ang lo-Soviet tensions. One 
historian states correctly that it only bared "the knife-
79 
edge upon which .•• relations were balanced." But it 
should also be remembered tha t relations h a d been tense 
since 1917. The Tory government , therefore, r e ally did not 
affect Anglo-Soviet relations , one way or the othe r. This 
perhaps was the most sig nificant result of the ir s hort 
stay in office . 
79 
P. A. Re ynold s , Briti s h Fo r e i g n Po licy in 
War Yea r s (Londo n , 195 4), . 63 . 
e Inter-
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C H A P T E R V I I 
THE ANGLO-SOVIET TREAT I ES 
The Confe rence 
Even before the Co nservative governmen t r es igned, 
Ramsay MacDon a ld had suggested e xte nding de j ure recognition 
1 
to Russia prior to negotiat ions. The Tory press r esponse 
at that time was r estr ai ne d, pe rhaps because their attention 
was centered on Labour' s assumpt i o n of powe r. The Spe ctator 
2 
and the Obse rver supported MacDonald . The Times c h i ded 
Labour for surrende ring Britain 's bargai ning position by 
granting unconditional recog nition . The Morning Po s t con-
clude d tha t it wou l d prop up t he Bolshe viks who, f ollowi ng 
3 
Lenin's r ece nt d e ath , were "hone ycombed with diss e n tion." 
1 
The Time s , Jan. 9, 1924, p. 14 . 
2 
Spectator , CX XX II (J a n . 12, 1924) , 38; Ga rvin to 
Rakovsky, J an . 18 , 192 4, c ited by Fische r, The Sovie ts in 
World Affa irs , II, 472. 
3 
The Ti mes , J a n. 26, 1924, p . 11; Horn i ng Post, 
Jan. 26, 19 24 , p . 6 . To ry press est i ma t es ot Len1n r anged 
wid e ly. Several saw h i m as a mons t e r o r omicida l ma ni c 
whose evi l life di sgrac d al l of mank i nd : s ee Morning 
~. J an . 23, 1924 , p. 6; Daily M il , J an . 23 , 1924, p . 4; 
Dai ly Te leg r aph , J an . 23 , 1924 , p . B; and ation l Re view , 
LXXX II ( ebrua ry, 192 4), 835 - 36 . The Ti mes , J a n. 24 , 19 24, 
p. 13, called h i m a ve ry r ema r kab l e m n b t a ttribu ted his 
success to world -wide c haos . The S*ectator, CXX.XII (J a n . 26, 
1924), 115, expressed ama zeme nt at 1s ab1lity t o ho l d 
Russia t ogethe r, bu t i t charac t e rized h . as a " ed i e val 
tyrant" who se p as sion f or r eac t ionary abst r act t heo ries 
blinded him to t he value of human life . Ga rvin l abe l d him 
•the outstand ing huma n o f ou r t i me , " an "e nemy of t he hum n 
race " who had r ep l aced one despotism wi th another ; see 
-
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On February 1, 1924 the Labour government formally 
recognized •the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the 
de jure rulers of thos e territories of the old Russian 
Empire which acknowledge their authority." The Soviets were 
invited to send a deleg ation to London "to draw up the pre-
liminary basis of a complete trea ty to settle all questions 
outstanding between the two countries ." The most important 
issues cited were propaganda, debts , and r estoration of 
Russian credit. Pending the appointment of an ambassador , 
Sir Robert Hodg son was designated as charg~ d'affaires 
4 
in Moscow. 
Tory pape rs reacted calml y to t he a nnouncement. 
5 Several made favorable comme nts. Othe rs did not pass 
6 
judgment. Those ne wspapers which did obj ec t avoide d 
Observer , Jan. 27, 1924, p. 10. 
Although Lenin had not been active fo r s ome t . e , 
severa l Tory pape rs and polit icians predic t e d his death 
would init ia t e an interna l crisis . As u su 1 , Brit i s h news 
reporte rs fue l ed specu l a tion with repor ts o f dome stic 
unres t; e.g ., t he -storie s from t he Ri ga cor r esponde nt for 
The Ti mes , April 22, p . 12, Ma y 12 , 1924, p . 8 . T e press 
had only a hazy unde r s t anding of the Soviet ower strugg le 
at t his ti e: on :-1ay 22, 19 24 , p . 17, Th Ti r.1e s halti g ly 
suggested t ha t Zinoviev , Kamene v, and Sta ln ru ed as a 




The Time s , Feb. 2, 1924, p. 10. 
5 Observer , Feb . 3, 1924, p . 13; Specta t or , CXXXII 
9, 1 92 4), 194; Time and Tide , V (Fe . 8 , 19 24), 122 . 
6
oaily Teleg raph, Feb. 5, 1924, p . 8; Dai ly Ma il, 
4, 1924 , p. 8 . 
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polemics: the Western Mail, the National Review, and the 
Morning Post regretted that the government did not demand 
prior guarantees. The Times predicted that unless the 
Soviets changed dramatically, "We foresee for the British 
Government a troublesome period of negotiations in the 
course of which much may happen both in Russia and in 
7 
England." 
Commercial and financial interes ts were cautious. 
Tory George Balfour, head of the Association of British 
Chambers of Commerce, hoped that recogni tion would increase 
B 
Anglo-Russian trade. The Federation of British Industries , 
the largest of the employers' organizations, told f.lacDona ld 
that the Soviets must recog nize thei r debts "without 
9 
qualifications." The Association of Briti s h Creditors of 
10 
Russia passed a similar r esolution. 
The Soviets anticipate d settling all outstanding 




Althoug h disappointed with MacDonald's asse rtion 
Feb . 9, 19 24, p. 10. 
e vi c w, 
2 , 
p . 11. 
trade organi-
28, 192 4, p . 17. 
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that "normal condit ions" would come only after the Confer-
11 
ence, Chicherin concluded , "But let u s hope for the best." 
In Corranons on February 12 l-1acDonald announced t ha t 
he hoped to revive trade by including Russia in the Trade 
Facilities Act and in the Export Credits Scheme . However, 
this was not to be done i mmediate ly: apparent ly he wanted 
to use them as bargaining points at the Conference. By 
asserting that these steps would be "quite sufficient ," t he 
Prime Minister i mp licitly ruled out a government l oan to 
12 
Russia. Tory backbenchers expr essed diffe ring reactions . 
A. M. Samuel, a member of the Advisory Committee that l ent 
credits under the Export Credits Sch eme, a dmitted that 
~15 million for export ventures we r e availab l e , but claime d 
that traders were securing funds from private b anks . 
Besides , tra d e wa s v i rtua lly at a standstill. For thos e 
Labour i tes who claimed that t he Ru ss i a n marke t would 
alleviate un employme nt , Samue l r e calle d that only £ 28 
milli on in British product s h a d b een se n t to Russia in 1913, 
and one-h a lf of that tot 1 h ad bee n r e - exports . Mo reover , 
foreign me rcha nts in Russi a we re fo r e d to endure abo minab l e 
11 
Rakovsky to Mac Donald , Fe b . 8, 1924, intervie w by 
cherin, Feb . 4, 1924 , ~~~~~~~c~n~t~s~ , I , 42 6-27, 
4-2 6. 
12 
Deb a t es , CLXIX (Feb . 12, 1 92 4), c o l. 469; Richa r d 
Lyman , Th Fir s t L bou r Gove r nme n t, 1 9 24 (Lond on , 195 7) , 
• 187-88 . 
199 
Unionist delegation, noted that Russian flax was needed in 
the languishing Irish line n industry. He wished the Prime 
13 
Minister "god-speed" in reviving trade . 
In Commons the next day Baldwin explained that his 
party desired peaceful relations and incre a s ed trade with 
Russia. The crux of the difficulty was negotiating with a 
governmen t "whose ide als are entirely oppos e d to our own." 
He questioned the timi ng of r ecognition because the present 
unrest in Russia meant "tha t before very long there ma y be 
no government with which to negotiate at all." Byes-
tablishing relations before nego tiations, Britain had given 
away "the only lever we have to obtain not only the thing s 
which we des ire but which we shall be obliged to have.• 
Any surrender on the debt ques tion invited postponement or 
even cance llation of Allied d e bts to Britain. Sovie t pro-
paganda in Asia, "one of t he gravest perils to which the 
world is subject," must be ended . Baldwin be lieved th a t 
busine ssmen would not trade until as sured of paymen t and 
justic e in Sov ie t comme rci 1 courts . The e r e presence of a 
British "Ambass ador , or Archimand rite , o r Pope " in Moscow 
would not stimulate c ommerce . As an ex amp le he no ted that 
Russo-German trade had not increased since 1922. Even the 
Trade Faciliti es Act and the Export Credits Scheme would be 
ineffectual. M cDona l d nodded approva l t o Baldwin's asser tion 
13 De b tes , CLXI X (Feb . 12, 1924), col s . 801-5 , 811-13. 
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that "there was no question of any loan to the Russian 
Government, Government to Government." The Conservative 
leader concluded: 
I fear, indeed, and I wish I could think other-
wise, that the time has not ye t c ome when it will 
be possible eithe r to en ter fully into t hat r e -
conciliation with Russia desired by all of u s or 
to stimulate a trade with a country which is 
poverty-stricken , which cannot e v e n ye t afford to 
buy for itse lf. It must be a tender g rowth of 
years •.•• 14 
Baldwin did not press MacDonald, probably for t wo 
reasons. For several months Tories delibe r ately avoide d 
15 
criticizing the government's foreign policy. And as 
Baldwin had stated r ecently, "I am not one of thos e 
who believe th a t the gre at motive force of Labour is 
16 
Bolshe vi sm ." The extent of Ba ldwin's r e s t raint become s 
clearer if his parli amentary speech is compared with a 
memorandum writte n for him by Samue l Hoa re. In places 
Baldwin r epeated Hoare's ana lys is v e rb a tim, but the o missions 
are striking. Hoa r e reasoned t ha t MacDonald had bee n 
compelled by his party to offer r ecognition. After assuming 
power the Prime ~tiniste r w s torn be t wee n t he conflicting 
demands of par ty pressure and officia l responsibi lity. The 
14
rbid., (Feb. 13, 1924), cols. 851-57. 
15 The Times, May 22, 1924, p. 11. 
16
rbid., Feb. 11, 1924, p. 9. 
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resulting "milk and water" recognition probably would not 
lessen Soviet hostility. Hoare concluded on a harsh note: 
"No change will take place in the situation until Russia 
17 
has definitely r epudia ted its Bolshevik principles." 
Before the Conference convened on April 14, most Tories 
had foresaken Baldwin's conciliatory tone for Hoare's 
abrasive analysis. 
Soviet leaders soon ridiculed both the Labour party 
and the upcoming Conference. Trotsky characterized the 
Prime Minister as a "Christian Menshevik" whose bourgeois 
18 
government was fraudu lent. Gregory Zinoviev, head of 
the Third Inte rnational, cried that Briti sh credi tors would 
receive a "thunde ring ' Ho'" to the ir "ridiculous claims .• 
Trotsky offered a striking me taphor: "The ma n condemned 
to be hanged who slips out of the noos e doe s not pay for 
19 
the rope .· Krassin and Christian Rakovsky , the head of 
the Soviet delega tion, de ma nded a loa n of £ 150-300 mi llion. 
In return the y offered increased trade and liberal concess ions 
17 Memorandum by Hoare , n.d ., Geoffrey Fry (Ba l dwin's 
private secreta ry) to Hoare, Feb. 15, 192 4, Templewood 
Papers, Box II, File 4. 
18 
The Times, Apri l 16, 1924, p. 9; Harvey Wi sh , "Ang lo-
Soviet Relat~ons Du ring Labour's First Ministry (1 924 ) ,• 
The Slavon ic e v i ew, XV II (Janua ry, 19 39 ), 392. 
19The Times, March 6, p. 14, April 16, 1924, p . 8. 
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for British firms. But they emphasized repeatedly t.hat 
Russia would not abandon her counterclaims or rescind her 
20 
nationaliza tion decrees. 
In response to this infl ammatory language, large 
numbers of Tories began to express serious doubts abou t 
Labour's policy. Several journals which h ad supported the 
21 
Conference initially now feared a disaster. Newspape rs 
22 
were filled with l e tters from irate Tory backbenchers. 
The frontb ench Opposition moratori um on foreign policy 
criticism ended on April 11 wh en Nevi lle Chambe rlain 
assailed recognition without prior guarantees for British 
23 
creditors and a c essa tion of propag anda . Lord Curzon 
also repriman ded MacDonald for his precipitous action. In 
Curzon's judgment, "A grea t disillusionment lie s before the 
24 
British Governme nt and the Bri ti sh people ." 
On the eve of the Conference a group of prominent 
English bankers announced that before Russian credit was 
20 
Leonid Krassi n, •The Fu ture of Sovie t Trade Re -
lations," Ru ss i a n In forr.1a ti on and Rev i ew , I V ( ~l arch 29, 
1924), 1 99 - 20 0 , (. pril 5 , 192 4 ) , f.! - 1 5 ; Arnold Toynbec , 
ed., Survey of Inte r na tiona l Af fa i r s , 1 9 24 (London, 1928), 
p. 236. 
21 
English Revi ew , XXXVIII (M rch, 1924), 302; Saturday 
Review, CXXXV II (:•la rch 8 , 19 2 4) , 2 21. 
22 
E.g., The T imes , Feb. 26, p. 13, Feb. 28, 1924, p. 18. 
23 
Ibid., April 12, 1924, p. 9. 
24 
Lord s Debates , LVI (Harch 26, 1924), cols. 1055-70. 
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restored, the Soviets would have to acknowledge all debts; 
provide an "equitable arrangement" for confiscated property; 
establish a new Civil Code, independent courts, and private 
contracts; guarantee private property in l aw; allow British 
traders to deal fre e ly with "private ins titutions" in 
25 
Russia; and abandon their foreign propaganda . Rakovsky 
26 
replied with a categorical, "Never." Speaking for most 
Conservative papers The Times called the manifes to "lucid 
27 
and irrefutable." 
When the Confe rence opened on April · l4, Tory papers 
adhered to differing viewpo ints. The Morning Post and the 
Daily Hai l cla i med the Soviet de leg a tion consi s t ed of 
agitators b ent on negoti a ting a loan withou t acknowledg ing 
their debts: they urge d an immediate dismissal of the 
28 
•rogues." The Daily Express, the Obs e rve r, and the 
Spectator , however, predicte d success because bo th sides 
29 
appeared concili a tory. Other Cons e rvative papers 
25 
The Times, April 14, 1924, p. 11. 
26 
Interview wi th the pre s s on A ril 26, Sovi e t 
--~~~n~t~s~, I, 449-51 . 
The Ti . e s , April 14, 192 4, p. 13. Only the Observer, 
27, 192 4, p. 13, obj ected . 
28Horning Post , Apr il 9, p. 8, April 12, 1924, p. 6; 
Mail , April 16 , p. 8, April 17, 1924, p . 8. 
-'-'-"'---'----'-
29 
Dail~ Exp ress, April 11, 1924, cited by Theodore 
, " Brit1 sh React ion to the Sovi e t Uni on, 19 24-1 9 29 : 
y of Po licy and Public Opi nion" (u n publi shed Ph . D. 
rtation, I nd i ana Unive r s i t y , 1953 ) , p . 23; Obscrv 
1 13, 1924, p. 13; Spec t a tor , CX , II ( pril 9 
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praised M.acDonald's strong defense of British interests at 
the opening sessions but feared a replay of Genoa and The 
30 
Hague. 
After a week of discussions Conference committees 
were appointed to deal with the four major issues: debts 
and restoration of Russ ian credit, a ne w treaty of c omme rce 
and navigation, Soviet territorial wate rs, and old Anglo-
Tsarist treaties. The agenda of the all-importa nt first 
committee was reserved for the plenary sessions. The 
three technical committees made progress, but negotiations 
stalled quickly on the crucial topics. Instead of re-
turning concessions to property owners, the Soviets 
offered unofficially to settle these claims of £ 180 million 
for £ 10 million. Britain de manded the large r sum. Dis-
cussion of inter-governmental pub lic debts was postponed. 
On Hay 20 the Soviets offe red token compe n sa tion for 
holders of sta t e and mu n icipa l Tsarist bonds if Britain 
guaranteed a large long -term loan. Although t he g r eatest 
part of the loan wa s to be spen t in England , t he British 
delegation r ejected it. In June Rakovsky offered bo nd-
holders' repres e ntatives (whose claims amounted to£ 40 
Ilion) one-sixth of the bonds' face value . But he 
30 
Dailf Tele~raph , April 15, 1924, p. 10; We stern 
Mail, Apri14, 19 4 , p . 7; The Ti mes , Apri l 14, p . 13, 
April 15, 1 9 24, p. 15; Sa t urda y c v~ ew, CXXXVII (April 19, 
1924), 403. 
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excluded large bondholde rs, tho s e who h a d aided the Wh i t e s, 
and those who had purchased bond s afte r March 16, 1921, 
thereby further r e ducing nis comm i tme nt from £ 6 million to 
t 3 million. Eve n thi s was continge nt u pon a gove r nment-
31 
guaranteed loan. The bondholde rs r e fu sed . 
By the end of July the re a ppe a red little chance for 
.an agreeme nt. The various committe e s recesse d for seve r a l 
weeks at a time , and the pl e na ry se s s i on had not met since 
May 27. Both side s s eemed to be p l a ying a wai ting game . 
The British publ i c was g i ve n l i ttle information on the 
proce edings . On two occas i on s the governme n t again di sa-
vowe d a guaranteed loa n; ~! a c Donald ' s d e n ia l in Co mmo ns on 
32 
.June 18 s eemed d e f i n i tive . Rakovs ky p l eaded f or a 
33 
change in British pol i cy. But in Ju ne t he Sovi e t s 
tarni s he d the ir i mage fu rthe r by o r d e ri ng the Br i ti sh -




For the proceedi ngs of t he Confe r ence during this 
period , se e F i sche r , The Sovi e t s in Wo rl d Aff airs , I I, 47 9-
85; Toynbee , d ., Surve y o f Inte rn a t 1onal ~f fa1r s , 1 92 4 , 
pp. 23 9-41; and Debates , CL. ' V (July 7 , 192 4) , cols . 820 -
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32 
The Time s , Ma y 21, 19 24, p. 14; Deba es , CLXXIV 
(June 18, 1924 ), col. 2095 . 
33 
Chri s t ian Ra kovsky , "Th Pr ese n t Posi tion o f the 
London Negotiations , " Rus s ian In f o rma t i o n and Revie w, I V 
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Host Tory pape rs now strong ly opposed t he Conference. 
In editorials with s uch title s as "The Invasion of Vampires ," 
the Morning Pos t charged that many Soviet delegates were 
secret agents worki ng t o s e t up a "headquarte rs staff of 
Red Revolution in the c ap ital of t he Briti sh Empire." The 
Daily Mail claimed Soviet delegates faced execution if the y 
returne d home without cas h to pay t he ir terrorist police; 
35 
if they conceded anything the y would suffer the same fate. 
Those papers which had been non-commi tta l now hoped that 
MacDonald realized the futility of nego tiating with the 
36 
unrepentant Bolsheviks. 
The Spectator and the Ob s erver were discouraged 
but hoped for a break . Garvin felt the need for a d e t e nte 
transce nded fina nci a l considera tio ns. He asked the govern-
ment to b a r gain "on mo r e r ealistic lines ." The editor of 
the Spectator, John St . Loe Strachey, urged Britain to offe r 
some credits to enable the Soviets to purchase Briti sh 
Labou r pres s ure succe ssfully reve r sed t he dec ision agains t 
the commercial fi 
35 
Morning Post , June 14, 
May 30, p. 8 , July 8 , 
LXXXIII (July, 1924) , 
(May, 192 4), 621-22. 
36 
Da ily Te l eg raph , July B, 19 2 4, p . 10; Saturda y 
Review, CXXXVII (June 14 , 192 4), 604-5 ; The Times , a y 22 , 
p. 17, July 19, p. 14, July 29 , 1924 , p . 13; . p ~r e e vi ew, 
XL (July, 19 24) , 4. The Soviets accused t he Tory ress of 
trying to undermine e Con fe rence ; see Ru ss i a n Informa tion 
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goods. If they did not comply with the terms, the experi-
ment could be terminated with little lost . But if, as 
Strachey expected, credits h e lped to revive trade and re-
duce unemp loyme nt, both governments would see the b e nefits 
37 
of a comprehensive settlement. Few Tory politicians , 
however, concurred with these two journals. 
In Hay several Tory l eade rs criticized the 
38 
Conference. And over government objections , the pre-
dominantly Tory Hous e of Lords passed a resolution on 
May 28 calling for a quick end to the nego tia tions. During 
the debate Curzon warne d of a Labour hoax: 
That is the real d~r.~e r, and the fear t he refore , 
is that, in orde r t o s ve t he ir own pos ition, in 
order to make out th a t they we re not such foo l s as 
they appeared to be , - ~d in orde r not to in f uri a t e 
their e xtreme su po rt~ r s , the y may b e d riv n t o 
cor. c lude s c ::-e thing w:1 ich t e y oug ht not to conclu e , 
and which we s ha l prese nt y s ee is not a ge nuine 
agre eme nt, net a on fi de se tt l e e nt , but wl a t I 
may c all a amouflaged ug =~eme nt , a n a g r eeme nt p u t 
up in orde r to de ce ive the worl i n to t h inking 
that something has b e en concluded whe n it has not 
been concluded at all. 39 
Some Tory backbenchers expre s sed shock a t the Soviets' 
37 
Observe r, June 8, 1 92 4, p . 11; Specta tor , CXXXII 
(June 21, 192 4) , 9 88 . Se ve ral wee ks l ate r "trachey but-
tressed his argume nt by r inting an a rticle f r om a "we ll-
informed corres onde nt" who be l i e ved t ha t ussia offered 
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For speeches by Cur zon and Rona ld He e ill, s e e The 
~. May 3, p. 17, Hay 15, 1 92 4, p . 16. 
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Lords Deb a t e s, LVII (Ma y 28 , 1924), cols . 71 9-26 . 




Shortly before the summer recess the gove rnment 
finally conse nted to a d e bate. Speaking for the frontb e nch 
Opposition Arthur Stee l-Maitland rid i c uled the Sovi e t pro-
posals and e mphasize d that the stalemate would continue 
41 
until the Soviets change d. Tory backbenche rs expounded 
on his reasoning. Sir Phil i p Richard s on de nie d th a t his 
fellow banke rs wanted to sabotag e the Con fe r e nce. He 
indicated that if Ru s sia r e c og nized he r deb ts she could 
expect some pos tponement of payme nt and eve n a r eduction of 
the tota l amount. E. C. Gre n fe ll, financier a nd N.P. for 
the City, d e fe n ded his own signa ture on the b anke rs' mani -
festo. He had tri ed to .trade with Ru s s ia since 1919 b ut 
was l a r ge ly unsuccessful be c ause of inte rfere nce from Sovie t 
authorities . As e xamp l es , he pointed to t he Russo-Caucas i a n 
Company and the Nos cow branch of h is own firm which had bee n 
ordered clos e d on July 1 wi t hout e xp l ana t ion. Few tra d e rs 
und e r t hese ci r cums ta nces . Sir Victo r 
Warrende r, a me rchan t who had bee n in Rus sia from 1917 t o 
s e v e ral Sovi e t civil c odes to s h ow tha t Briti sh 
ers did not r e ceive t he s ame leg al p rivilege s and 
40 Debates, CLXXIV (June 19, 1924), col. 2456. 
41 
Ibid., CLXXV (July 7, 1924), c o l s . 1813-32. 
209 
protection accorded t heir Soviet counterparts in England. 
Unless Britain could secure some new concessions, he wanted 
the Conference ended quickly: the government "are only 
going to find the.mse lves in a bigger mess than they are in 
42 
now if they continue it." 
A few Tories exploded with anti-Soviet tirades. 
Commander Oliver Locker-Lampson, leader of a British armored 
car company in Russia during the World War, demanded an 
apology and compensation for the murder of Captain Cromie. 
He then argued with a Labour M.P. who swore he had seen 
43 
Cromie fire the first shots. Guy Kinders ley, a determined 
"rightis t," protested e ve n conditional recognition of Russia. 
It was morally wrong, he cried, to negotiate with this 
•unscrupulous c ama rilla" for the •mirage of trade." In 
summation for the frontbench Opposition Ronald Me e ill again 
44 
denied that his party wanted to abort the Conference. 
This debate showed a growing split in Tory ranks. 
Most newspapers and backbenchers f e lt the Conference should 
end, while the Opposi tion l eadership seeme d unwilling to 
prod the governmen t. But these differences disappeared 
42 
Ibid., cols. 1844-47, 1852-5 6 , 1899-1905. 
43 
Ibid., cols. 1844, 1847-49. As parli ame ntary private 
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~~-t~oson apparently had not involved himself with the Russian 
Drnh l.,m . 
44 
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within a month. 
In the last week of July the Cabinet decided to 
offer Russia a conditional guarantee d loan rather than 
admit failure. Negotiations were r esumed quick ly because 
MacDonald had promis ed a parli amenta ry d i scus sion before 
an agreement was sig ne d; a nd the s umme r adjournment was to 
begin on August 7. On Augu s t 5, a fte r a twenty-hour 
bargaining ses s ion, the gove r nme nt announce d a breakdown o f 
the Confere nce. The two s ides h ad fail e d to agre e on the 
wording of a single clause regarding confi s cated property . 
But a group of l ef t-wing Labour bac kbenchers interve ned , 
and a compromise fo rmula was h amme r ed out a fte r anothe r 
45 
mara thon sess ion on Aug us t 6. 
Two treaties we re d rafted . By t he t e rms of t h e 
Treaty o f Comme rce and Nav i g a t ion both na tio ns rece i ved mo s t 
favor ed n a t ion sta t u s , a nd Brita in i n c l ud e d Russia i n t he 
46 
Export Cre dit s Sc heme. Supersed i ng t he Tr ade Ag r eeme n t 
of 1921, the Ge ne ra l Trea t y dealt i n p a rt wi th s uch mi nor 
proble ms as the sta tus o f old trea ti e s and f i shi ng r i g h t s . 
In Artic l e 6 of the cruci a l third c hap t e r the Sovie t s 
45 
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agreed to satisfy the bondholders' claims , but Britain 
conceded that Russia's perilous financial position p r ecluded 
full restitution. After a majority of the bondholders c ame 
to terms with the Soviets, the t erms themse lves we re to 
form part of a second Anglo-Soviet treaty. In Article 7 
both sides reserved for discussion "at a later date• all 
questions concerning British wa r loans and Soviet coun te r-
claims. In Article 8 the Soviets would give Britain a 
lump sum to distribute to pe r s ons who had lodged such 
•miscellaneous" claims as thos e for personal injury and 
confiscat d bank deposits. Under Article 9 a board of 
three examiners from each country was to d e cide on the 
total amount of miscellaneous claims . According to Article 
10 a joint commission was to evaluate the validity a nd 
amount of claims lodged by Britons whose businesse s or 
concessions had been confiscated . In Article ll both 
governme nts agreed to sig n a s e cond treaty incorporati ng 
the te rms , total amount, a nd methods of repaymen t agreed 
upon in Articles 6 and 8 and those not settled by Article 
10. Article 12 stated t ha t after the trea ty r eferre d to 
in Article ll was signed: 
His Britanni c M jesty 's Gove rnme nt will r ecomme nd 
Parliame nt to enab l e them to gua r antee the inte re s t 
and sinking fun d of a loa.n to b e issue d by t h e Go -
ve rnme nt of the Union of Soviet Sociali s t epub lics . 
The amounts , t erms and conditions of the sa i d l oan 
a.nd the purposes to which it shall be a pp lie d shal l 
be defined in the trea ty provided for in Article 11 , 
212 
which will not c ome into force until the necessary 
parliamentary authority for the guarantee of the 
said loan has been given . 
The other important section, Article 16, declared that both 
countries would "restr ain all persons and organisations 
under their dire ct or indirect control• from engaging in 
47 
propaganda or subversive ac tivity against each other . 
After agreement was r eached a t 3:30 P.M. on 
August 6, Under-Secretary Ponsonby rushed to have a copy 
of the Treaties typed for his u se in the House that evening . 
With barely an hour to prepare a state e nt he stumbled 
through a virtually incohe rent speech , displaying only the 
barest acquaintance with some of the te rms . Arthu r Steel-
Maitland c a lled Ponsonby a •pathe tic figure• and crit icized 
MacDonald' s absence . Ronald McNe ill echoed othe r Tory 
speakers when he thunde r ed: 
I consider the who le thi ng a n utter farc e . I 
would be perfe ctly willi ng to jo in with the r es t 
of the House in l ugh ing at wh t c e rta i ly is in 
many of its aspec t s an ex tre me c o edy, i f I did 
not think th a t in r e g a rd to one i mportan t as e ct, 
provision for or even h inting at our guara ntee ing 
of a loan, it is not a c ome dy bu t a scandal . 48 
Pon sonby also announced th t t he governmen t would 
.ave to adjourn the nex t day and sign the Treaties without 
47 
I bid. , Cmnd. 2260, " Draft of Pr oposed 
between Grea t Br i tain and torthern Ireland a n 
Soviet Socialis t Republics , '" (Londo n , 1924). 
Gene ral Treaty 
the Union of 
48 Deb a t e s , CLXXVI (Aug . 6, 1924), cols. 3056, 3028-
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further debate. 
during the f all 
Parli ament would be asked to approve them 
49 
session . Conservatives were outraged. 
The government finally consented to a debate the next day, 
appare ntly because Lloyd George calle d the Treaties a 
"fake" and concurred with the Tory demand for an i mmed iate 
discussion. 5° 
On August 6 Tory newspape rs we re not surpri s ed by 
51 
the sudden demise of the Conference . However, they 
reacted with anguished cries at the sudden vo lte -f ace . The 
Daily Te l egraph called the Treaties "the most fant as tically 
impossible doc ume nt that has ever been presente d to 
Parli ament . " The Time s was critical of the vague wording: 
•sy raising false expe ct tions wh ich c an not be fulfilled, 
it endang e rs any slight prospects there might be of i mprove d 
relations with the Soviets." The Morning Pos t be lieved 
MacDonald h ad l os t "his prese nce of mind " wh e n allowing the 
•communists among his suppor t e rs" to establish "the 
49 
I bid ., cols. 3021-31, 3040-47, 3056- 67 , 3072-73. 
50 
For Ll oyd George ' s speech , see I bid ., eel s . 30 31-
36. Northedge , e Troub l d Giant , p . 30--,--e lieves Lloy 
Georg e ' s o posit1on 1 ncomprehensib l e " in vi e w of h is 
consi stent a"vocacy of a r app rochemen t with Russia . Political 
conside rations igh t he l p to exp l ai n Lloyd Geo r ge ' s r eac tion , 
but it should be r emembered that he always had opposed a 
gover ent-gu r a nteed loa n and had wanted the successor to 
the Trade Ag r eement to be a definitive s et tleme nt . 
51The Time s , Aug . 6, 19 24, p . 11; Morning Po s t, 
Aug. 6, 19 24 , p. 6; Dai ly Teleg r aph , Aug . 6, 192 4 , p . B. 
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Bolshevik revolutionaries permanently in this country t he re 
52 
to work their will with impunity." 
Speaking for the frontbench Opposition on August 7, 
Robert Horne upheld the Prime Minister's right to initial 
the Treaties before the House approved but reasoned that 
his signature implied Britain's consent. If the Treaties 
were overturned later by parliament, the Russian people 
would feel they had been "tricked." Horne urged HacDonald 
to postpone action. Although increased trade would soften 
the impact of Soviet rule, lower European food prices, and 
assist Britain's lagging export industry, Horne believed 
that the draft Commercial Treaty did nothing to reli e ve 
the anxieties of British traders. Likewise, the General 
Treaty made no practical advance on the deb t problem; even 
in the Trade Agreement of 1921 the Soviets had r ecogn ized 
in principle their obliga tions to British creditors. As 
the Article on the loan was worde d, the Soviets wou ld not 
have to consen t t o a debt settleme nt until afte r the loa.n 
guarantee was granted by parliamen t. Horne c oncluded th a t 
the Treaties were a "fantast ic" face- s ving de v ice concocted 
at the last moment through me diation of some gover e nt 




Te l egra ph , Aug . 8, 1924, p . 8 ; The Ti mes, 
p. 13 ; ~orning Pos t, Aug . 8 , 1924 , p. 6 . 
ail , Aug . 7 , 1924 , p . 6 , and Daily I il, 
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agreement to agree in the future,• he said, but "only an 
agreement to postpone to the future all subj ec ts of 
53 
difficulty.• Aware of the opposition of Lloyd George and 
most of the Liberals, a few Tory backbenchers predicted a 
54 
stunning defeat for the government. Ponsonby's r ebuttal 
55 
was weak. 
In the House of Lords the same day Curzon ridiculed 
the governme nt for defying the ir pledge to conduct open 
diplomacy. When the Treaties we r e announced in Commons on 
August 6, the Lord Chancellor did not even know that 
agreement had been reached. Even now, Curzon continued , the 
government leade r in the House of Lords possessed only a 
typed copy and the Opposition had bee n give n a copy only 
five minutes before the session starte d : "The history of 
the last stages of thi s matter is one of the most amaz ing 
56 
in the chronicles of Parliament." 
After the Trea ties were signed on Augus t 8, 
MacDonald and mos t other politicia ns l eft London for the 
summe r holiday . Evaluat ion s of the Tr eaties filled Tory 
news papers during their absence ; no othe r subject seemed 
53 
Debates , CLXXVI (Aug . 7, 1924), cols . 3143-53. 
54 
Ibid., cols. 3157-60. 
55 
Ibid., col. 3186. 
56 
Lord s De bate s , LIX (Aug . 7, 1 924 ), cols. 511-19. 
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important. Many editorial blasts in "ultra" and "rightist" 
journals bordered on hysteria. The Daily Mail likened the 
terms of the Treaties to those dictated by a merciless 
conqueror. It denounced HacDonald and the Bolsheviks for 
conspiring to rob Britons, while never mentioning the 
conditional terms. The Morning Post was stunned by the 
sight of the Prime Mini ste r "taking his orders from a gang 
of foreign usurpers." The Na tional Review calle d the whole 
affair a "particularly dirty and discreditable eyewash." 
In scarcely more measured t erms The Time s re surrected t he 
argument about trafficking with a gang of barbar ian butchers. 
The English Re vi ew assured MacDonald he was heading for 
•catastrophe" if he rema ined "the slave of t he Moscow 
57 
111urdere rs." 
Three "conciliatory" Conservative journals, however, 
supported the Prime Min ister. T ime and Tide be lieved that 
Article 12 contained suf fici ent safeguar ds for the creditors 
and implicit assurances t hat uch of the loan would be spent 
in Britain. J. L. Ga rvi n was en t husiastic , hailing the 
Treaties as a r eturn to "rational principles" in inter -
national affairs. Because the loan was conditiona l, he 
57
oaily Mai l, Aug. 13, p. 6, Aug . 22, 1924, p. 7; 
Morning Post , Aug. 9 , p. 6, Aug . 12, 1924, p. 6; l ationa l 
lev~ew, LXXXIV (September , 1924) , 20-21; The Times , ug . 12, 
ii':'"'"TO;" Sept. 4, p. 11, Sept. 15, p. 13, Sept. 20 , 192 4, 
11; Eng lish Revi ew, XXXIX (September, 1 924 ), 320-25. See 
so Saturday ev~ew , CXXXVIII ( ug . 16, 192 4), 161. 
torials on e subjec t appea r e a ost dai ly in most 
newspape rs. 
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lashed out at its critics. The Spectator reasoned that the 
Treaties did not endanger British interests. It urg ed 
Conservatives to remembe r that the "esse ntial object~ of 
58 
the Treaties was a reduction of unemp loymen t. 
The Association of British Chambers of Commerce and 
the Federation of British Industries condemned the Treaties. 
They objected to the shelving of public debts , the partial 
recognition of private debts, and e s pecially to the 
59 guaranteed loan. Twenty-eight loca l Chambers of Comme rce 
and the Association of British Creditors of Russia con-
60 
curred. 
Conservative politici ans opposed the Treaties for 
numerous reasons. Walter Elliot and others argue d that 
they provide d a new lease of l ife for the Bol sheviks who , 
at the moment, were embroiled in an internal powe r 
struggle. To hasten t he ir fall Lad y Askwith asked Britons 
to withdraw their savings from b anks which might assist 
61 
in a loan. The "ultra" argument was stated most 
58 
Time a nd Tid e , V (Sept . 26, 1924), 926; Obse rve r, 
Aug. 10, p. 10 , Sept . 14, p . 12 , Sep t. 28 , 19 24 , p . 1 ; 
,ectator, CXXX III (Aug. 16, 1924), 2 18-20, (Sept. 27, 
1 24), 412-13 . 
59 
The Times, Se pt. 18, 1 92 4, p. 7. A fo rme r Cons e r-
Yative m1.n1.ster , Sir Eric Geddes , headed t he Federation at 
this time. 
60 
Ibid., Sept. 14, p. 15, Sept. 8, 1924, p . 11. /\. G. 
a11-or-seco s Traders was one of t he fe w bus ines sme n 
rting the Treatie s; see Ibid., Se pt. 8, 19 24 , p. 9. 
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Ibid., Sept. 27, 1924, p. 8; Da ily 1 a il , Aug . 1 2 , 
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succinctly by Lord Syden.harn: "In the eternal war of good 
against evil, light against darkness, and Christian civili-
sation against blood-stained revolution, the forces of evil 
62 
seem to have won a notable victory." Some Tories claime d 
the Treaties were illegal because the King was not me ntioned 
in the official description 63 of the British gove rnment. 
Backbencher Guy Kindersley deplored the grant of diplomatic 
immunity to members of the Soviet Trade Delegation. Lord 
Eustace Percy said that the most favored nation clause in 
the Commercial Treaty really meant that "British subjects 
[in Russia) shall not be treated wors e than any forei g ners." 64 
samue l Samuel, N.P., criticized the extension of the Export 
Credits Scheme because other countrie s offe red safe r in-
vestments. Backbencher A. M. Samue l fore saw a repudia tion 
65 
of Allied debts owed to Britain . E. C. Gren f ell's r e -
versa! of pos ition was sy ptomati c of Tory f e e li ng s . During 
the debate on July 7, he had used t e mpe rate l ang uage re-
garding tr ade , but now he r esorted to ince nd i ary r ema r k s to 
1924, p. 12. Se e a lso The Tim s , Se pt . 10, 19 24, p . 7. 
62The Times , Aug . 26 , 1924, p. 6. 
63 
Ibid., Aug . 9, p. 11, Aug. 15, p . 12, Aug. 20, 1 924, 
p. 6. In I b i d ., Sept. 26, 1924 , p. 7, Wi ns t o n Churchil l 
claimed the abse nce of the Ki ng ' s n ame was a concess i o n to 
the Soviets. 
64 Ibid., Aug. 8, p. 13, Aug. 19, 1924, p. 11. 
65 . I b 1d ., Sept. 27, 1924, p. 13; Daily ai l, Aug. 11, 
p.-7- .-
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support his conten t ion t hat the Soviets should be ostracized 
. . 66 from the world econom~c commun~ty . 
The Russian delegation was guardedly op t imis t ic 
67 
about the Treaties. The response from within Russia , how-
ever, was l ess restrained. Sovie t pape rs rejoiced at the 
capita lists ' recognition of the Revolution and the ir 
economic system. Kamenev, t hen a membe r of the ruling 
triumvirate , claimed they had r eceived a guaranteed l oan 
68 
while merely promising to continue negotiations . Rykov, 
the trade union chief, exclaimed , •This i s a unique 
69 
achievement , the greate st achi e veme nt of mode rn times . " 
Many Tories agreed comp l e t e ly with these evaluations and 
70 
used them to back their own oppos ition . 
In Septembe r Conservative l eade rs j oined in the 
attacks. Lo r d Bi rkenhe a d , Sir l'li lli am Joynson-llicks , and 
Winston Churchill (re cen tly r e turned t o the o ry fold) , 
relied heavily on the 71 o ra l argur..en t. Other l eaders 
66 
The Times , Sept. 10 , 1924 , p. 9 . 
67 
E . g., Rus s i an I n o 
1924), 115, and 0 se rve r , 
Re view , V (Aug . 23 , 
2 4 , p . 17 . 
68 
Lyman , The Firs t Labou r Gove r nme nt , pp . 19 8- 99 . 
69 
The Times , Sept . 15, 192 4 , p . 13. 
70 E.g., Daily Teleg raph , 
Aug . 18, 1924 , p . 7 ; a n 
71 The Time s , Aug . 11, p . 12, Sep t . 22 , p. 7, Sept. 26, 
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spelled out concrete obj e ctions. Lord Balfour and Neville 
Chamberlain, for example, claimed Br itain was in no position 
72 
to extend a loan . Rober t Horne believed the lo a n might 
not be s pent in Britain. Laming Worthing ton-Evans foresaw 
73 
a repetition of Genoa. Even Viscount Ceci l (forme rly 
Lord Robert Ce cil), a "conciliator," accused the gov ernment 
of d e ceit: "There is nothing worse th an holding out to 
great people like the Russians the prospect of ge tting 
74 
money whe n you don't intend t hem to get it." 
This Tory rhetoric was greatly intensified by a 
mushrooming politica l crisis. Con cerned wi~1 Libe ral 
oppos ition to the Treaties , MacDonald sta ted t ha t a 
rejection by Con~ons would be taken as a vote of c e nsure. 
On Septembe r 30 parli ame nt reconvened for a s pecia l 
session. The next da y the parliamen tary Liberal party 
sealed the government ' s doom by ap roving overwhe l mi ng ly 
75 
a motion condemning the Treaties . The Annual Conservativ e 
1924, p. 14. Appa r entl y this was on e of the f i rst t ime s 
Birkenhead spoke about Russia since t he brcaku of the 
Coalit ion . 
72 
Ibid ., Sept . 26, p . 14, Sept . 18, 1924, p . 14. See 
also Arthur Stecl- 11aitland ' s comments in t he' t ional Review , 
LXXXIV (September , 192 4) , 49 -6 2 . 
73 
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Conference was enlivened by the prospect of Labour's fall. 
The Report of the Conse rvative Council claime d the " amazing" 
Treaties were inspired b y the l e ade rs of the Third Inte r-
76 
national. A resolution against the Tre aties pas sed 
77 
unanimously. Stanle y Baldwin repeated the subs tance of 
Horne 's parliame nta ry s peech of Augus t 7 for the delegate s. 
But unlike some of his colle a gue s Ba l d win stressed that the 
Labour government and t he Bolsheviks we re linke d only by a 
78 
mutual spirit of "inte rna tion a li s m." 
The Election Camp a i g n 
When the Tory Con f ere nce ende d on Oc tobe r 4, it was 
predicted that the gove r nme nt wo uld be t opp l ed by the uss ian 
Treaties. In the e v e nt, howe v e r, they e t d e f a t in the 
79 
famous Campb e ll c a se . In late July J. Ross Campbe ll, 
Labour Gov e r nme n t, pp . 1 99 - 20 4. Mi dd l em s and Barnes , 
Baldw~ n, p . 273 , c i t e t he "3 1 s t " a s the da t e of t he Libe ra l 
meet ~ ng : Se p t embe r h as on ly t hi r t y d ay s . It i s on l y o ne of 
a numbe r o f erro r s wh ich n ar t his volume . Ea r lie r , J . L . 
Garvin h a d u r ged Mac onal to fo r ce a d is s olutio n ove r the 
Russian Tr e a t i e s ; s e e Obse r v e r , Sep t. 21 , 19 2 4 , p . 1 2 . 
76 
Report o f t he Conse rva tive Council, Conse rva t i v e 
Conference Mi nu~es , 192 4, p. 11. 
77 
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Lyman, The First L ou r Governme n t , p p . 237 -44, and Gr a ub ard , 
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editor of the Communist Workers' Weekly, had printed an 
article urging British troops not to fire on workers if 
class warfare erupted. When copies appeared in several 
army barracks the Attorney General moved to prosecute 
Campbell for inciting mutiny. A few left-wing Labour 
backbenchers charge d that the evidence was flimsy, adding 
that Campbell was an amputee and much decorated war 
veteran. In mid-August MacDonald quiet ly ordered the 
proceedings dropped . The Attorney General routinely 
defended the government's decision when parli ament met on 
September 30, but an outcry from the Opposition benches 
reflected a growing Tory belief that the government had 
bowed again to their "Communist" left wing. MacDonald 
consented to a full debate on October B. 
On Octobe r 3 Liberals announced they would ask f or 
a Select Commi ttee to investig ate the Campbe ll c ase . 'I'he 
governmen t de f e nded the Attorney General. Hith the 
Liberals committed , Conse rvatives put down a c ensure motion. 
Before the scheduled d e bate Conservative lea ers persuade d 
Baldwin to adopt the Libera l mo ti o n to preven t them f rom 
opposing the Torie s . The government then would have to 
80 
dissolve parli ament or accept a humiliating investigation. 
lowever, Baldwin really wa n t ed Labour turned out on the 
80 
Swinton, I Remember , p . 15 8; Lyman, The First Labour 
r nme nt , p. 23 9 , n. 2. 
Soviet Tre aties because Mac Donald h a d allowe d h i s "ex-
tremists" to "smash" h im .81 
223 
Speaking for the frontbe nch Oppos ition on Octobe r 8, 
Robert . Horne said the Campbe ll a rt i cle wa s a de libe rate 
attempt to undermine the Con s titution . Mac Dona ld de nied 
82 
the charge s but wa s sound ly de f eated. The Cabine t 
resigned, and an ele c t ion was schedul e u for Oc tobe r 29. 
Tory politicia n s a nd newspape r s dev e loped g e ne rally 
two line s of a ttack during the c ampaig n. One gro up e valua t e d 
the Ru s sia n Tre a tie s on t he ir me rits, while the other f use d 
the Campbe ll c ase wi th the Tre at ie s to moun t a mora l a t tack 
against Labour . The fo rme r group us ual ly avoided vituper -
ative lang uage , while the l a tte r used it fr e q ue ntly . Se veral 
journals l abe l ed t he e l e ction a s trugg l e be t ween Briti s h 
83 
civiliza t ion and Russian Bo l shevi sm . Mil i t a ry ana l ogie s 
were u sed frequen tly: the Dai l y Mai l urged vote r s t o sav e 
Britain fr om "a dange r as g r ea t a s t ha t wh ich th r ea t ene d i t 
84 
in 1914." For the se pape rs a vo t e fo r Labou r was simp l y 
81
s t arn f o r d h arn to the King , Oc t. 7, 1924 , ci t ed b y 
Middle mas and Barnes , Ba l dwin , p . 27 3 . 
82 
De b a t es , CLXVII (Oct. 8, 1924 ), col s . 581-700. 
83Mo r n ing Pos t, Oc t . 17, 19 24, p . 8 . Se e a l s o The 
times, Oct . 14 , p . 15, Oct. 24, 1924, p . 15 . Afte r having 
IUpported t he gove rnme nt' s a tte mp t to come to terms with 
lussia, the Da i ly Exp r e ss joined thes e pape r s; see Sha ne , 
8 British Reac t ion to th e Sov i e t Union , " p . 64. 
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a vote for revolution. If Labour won, Bolsheviks would 
flood the country, reducing it to the abject condition of 
Red Russia. The se journals exploited every possible appeal. 
The English Review, for example, printed an article by "His 
Imperial Highness," the late Tsar's cousin, Grand Duke 
Cyril, who warned that Russian patriots would neve r forgive 
as 
England for cavorting with the Reds. Outraged by an 
endorsement for Labour given by the Jewish Times, the 
Morning Post cautioned that traditional "tolerance" of 
a6 
English Jews would be "hard to sustain." 
A few "centrist" Tory pape rs concentrate d on the 
Treaties. The Daily Te l eg raph asked that the loan (rumo r e d 
to be £ 40 million) be u sed to deve lop the Empire. The 
Saturday Review noted that while other nations raising money 
on the London ma rket provided strict g uar antee~ t he Soviet 
loan lacked a ny security. The Obse rve r never me ntioned the 
Russian Treaties; instead , Garvin strong ly opposed Labour 's 
a7 
economic policie s. 
Some Tory l eade rs also a voided the mo r a l is sue . 
Throughout the c ampaign Ba l dwin r epeated t he criticisms fi rst 
as 
English Re view, XXXIX (Octobe r, 1924), 4a3-a4. 
a6 
Morning Pos t, Oct. 25, 1924, p. a. 
a7 
Daily Te l eg r aph, Oct. 23, 1924, p. a; Sa t urday 
.. ~~~· CXXXVIII (Oct . la, 19 24) , 3 a5 ; Observer , Oct . 12, 
• p. 12. 
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advanced at Newcastle on October 2: Russia had little to 
trade, the Treaties would not increase employment, and the 
guaranteed loan was unprecedented. He did not, however, 
object to de jure recognition o~ the Trade Agreement of 
88 
1921. Hoare, Balfour, Lloyd-Greame, Lord Derby, and other 
•centrists• also offered tempe rate rational obj e ctions to 
. 89 
the Treat~es. 
In contrast, Churchill strenuously opposed any 
entanglement with the "gang of cosmopolitan adventurers who 
settled down (on Russia) like vultures and were tearing it 
90 91 
apart." Joynson-Hicks spoke similarly. Birkenhead 
stressed the alleged affinity between Labour and the Soviets. 
In his view the Treaties we re jus t a taste of what 
MacDonald and "the assassins and cutthroats in Russia" had 
planned for Britain. 92 Lord Curzon said it was "difficult 
to talk about t he Bolsheviks and use t he me re attenua t ed 
88 For summarie s of several of Baldwin' s c ampai g n 
speeches , see The Times , Oct . 2 4, p. 9 , Oct . 27 , p. 14, 
Oct. 29, 1 924 , p. 8 , and Midd lemas and Barne s , Baldwin , 
pp. 274-75. 
89 
For r eports of thei r s peech e s , se e The Ti me s , 
Oct. 11, p . 6, Oc t. 17, p. 16, Oc t. 18, p. 8 , Oc t. 23, 
1924, p. 10. 
90 
Ibid., Oct. 20, 192 4, p. 10. See also Ibid ., 
Oct. 11,~6, Oct. 18, 1924, p. 7. 
91 
Ibid., Oct. 16, p. 9, Oct. 23, 1924, p. 9. 
92 Earl of Birken.head , A Ca ll t o Co nse rva tives (Londo n, 
24), p amph let no. 24 86 . See also he T ~mc s , Oct . 1 6 , 
• 9 , Oct. 18 , 19 2 4 , p . 7. 
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93 
adjectives of the English dictionary." Some Tory l eade rs 
employing this language had long been strongly a nti-
94 
Bolshevik. Others, however, had rarely spoken about 
95 
Russia. Even Austen Chamberlain and Viscount Cecil 
resorted to anti-Soviet barbs. Chamberlain was opposed by 
a formidab le Communist candida te, and Cecil had tired of 
96 
Soviet denunciations of t he League of Nations. 
The Conservative Central Office swamped the 
electorate with memos , handbooks, and leaflets on the 
Treaties, the Campbell case, and the alleged link b e tween 
97 
Russian Bolshevism and British socialism. Much of this 
literature was inte nded to crea te a "crisis" atmosphere. 
women were told that Communism destroyed marriage and were 
warned of Commun ist spies disguis e d as nur ses in an attempt 
to win recruits for a Red revolution. Mothers were advised 
that educa tion in Bolshevik Russia broug ht corruption , 
93 
The Time s , Oct . 22 , 1924, p. 9. 
94 
E.g., the speech of Lor d Sa lisbu ry in Ibid ., 
Oct. 23, 192 4, ~ · 10. 
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Fo r the speeches of Leopo ld Ame ry , H. P . and Sir 
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disease, and death to thousands of innoce nt children : "For 
the Children's sake put the Unionists in Office! They will 
keep the Bolshie Teachers out of Britain." One leaflet told 
farm workers that "Re d Men from Noscow" we re preparing to 
capture the country's food supply i n advance of the r e vo-
98 
lution. 
To cou.nter t hese tactics MacDonald and othe r 
Labourites spent as much t ime reaffirming their hostility to 
Bolshevism as the y did defending the Treaties. MacDonald 
ridiculed the Tories: •rf you want to frigh t e n all the old 
ladies of both sexes all you have to do is to put on a r ed 
sheet and shout ' Bols hy' and hire your l eader write rs to 
write out of the fullness of thei r ignorance about Bolshe -
99 
vism." 
Such c ampa ign r he toric provided a suitab l e backdro p 
for a bombshel l whi ch exp loded just six days be for e the 
election. On Friday , October 24 the Foreign Office pro-
tested a l etter allegedly writ te n by Gregory Zinoviev, head 
of the Third Inte rnati onal, to t he Central Commit t ee of the 
British Communist party . Da t ed Sep t ember 15 the l e tte r 
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compromising on the Treaties because unalte red ratification 
would facilitate the wcomp lete success of an armed in-
surrection." British Communist s s hould increase their 
propaganda activities among army units and munition s workers. 
By conver ting Army "specialists" they would strengthen one 
of the ir weakest links . In the event of "actual strife w 
these "future dire ctors of t he British Red Army w would be 
100 
one of the keys to s uccess . The British note called the 
letter an unwarran ted interference in he r domes tic af fai rs 
and warned the Sov i e ts not to di savow r esponsibility me rely 
101 
because it c ame from the Comin t e rn. 
On October 25 the Daily !ail anno un c e d tha t it had 
distributed a r ecently obtained c opy of t he Zinoviev l e tter 
to othe r Conserv a tive newspape rs on the prev ious morning . 
It ch a rged that t he gove r nment decided to publ i cize it that 
same af t ernoon af t er r ealizing that the pre ss had secured 
copie s . The r est of the ed itori a l de nounced the Soviets 
for preparing an i nsurre ction and c a lled for a Tory victory 
102 because t he y knew how to handle wtreason ." On the same 
day The Times sta t ed that the l e tter offe r ed c oncr ete proof 
100 
The text of t he Zi nov i e v l et t er c an be found in 
•A Selection of Papers , " pp . 28 -29. 
101 J. D. Gr egory (head of the orthern Departme n t at 
Foreig n Office ) to Rakovsky, Oct. 24, 19 24 , Ibid ., 
30-32. - -
102Daily Mai l, Oct. 25, 1924 , p. 8. 
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of the intimate connection between the Comintern and the 
Soviet government. The Western Mail demanded the arrest of 
all Communists and the formation of vigilante groups. 
J. L. Garvin regretted that his cherished hope had been 
dashed repeatedly by men like Zinoviev, wpolitical epileptics 
whom Dostoievsky would have c alled 'The Idiots'": amicable 
relations would be impossible until the ~oscow "realists" 
103 
dealt with their "Anacharsis Clootz." 
The British Communist party called the letter a 
•complete fabrication." Rakovsky's reply l abe lled it a 
•gross forg ery" because of alleged irregularities in the 
letterhead and in Zinoviev's signature. Acting Foreign 
Commissar Haxim Litvinov asked for an arbitration court to 
104 
determine its authenticity . During the last weekend of 
the campaign the Prime Minister and othe r Labour leaders 
refused comme nt. 
Tory politicians strained to find word s strong 
enough to express their fe e lings . Churchill claimed 
MacDonald was unable to stand up to Bolshe vism. Joynson-
Hicks denounced the attemp t to create "mutiny, bloodshed, 
and red ruin in our l and." Birkenhead accused MacDonald 
103The Times , Oct. 25, 1924, p . 13; Western Mail , 
Oct. 25, 1924, p. 6; Observer , Oct. 26, 19 24 , p. 12. See 
also Horning Post , Oct. 25 , l924, p. 8 , and Daily Telegraph , 
Oct. 25, 1924, p. 8. 
104 
The Time s, Oct. 27, 1924, pp . 11, 12, B. 
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105 
of concealing the letter since September. Curzon cried, 
"A more wicked, a more pernicious, and a more detestable 
document has never appeared in print." Most Cons ervative 
speakers that weekend would have agreed with Laming 
Worthington-Evans that the only e l ection issue now was 
whether the nation was to be ruled by the "Bolshies or 
106 
Britons, the Red Flag or the Union Jack." Only Baldwin 
107 
did not mention the letter. 
On Monday, October 27 the Daily Ma il and the 
Morning Post accuse d MacDona ld of withholding t he letter 
deliberately. Othe r Tory papers demanded an i mmediate 
108 
explanation. Later in the day the Prime Minister stated 
that a copy of the letter ha d reache d him on Octobe r 16, 
six days after it had been received b1 the Foreig n Office. 
While it was being verified he had ordered the Foreig n 
Office to prepare a draft prote st which , because of his 
campaign sched ule , did not re a ch him until October 23. The 
next morning h e had s e nt the slightly alte red note back to 
the Fore ign Of fice, " e x pecting it to come back to me a gai n 
105 
Ib id ., Oc t. 27, 1924, pp . 7-B. 
106 
For r eports of spee che s by Curzon, Worthington- Evans , 
Borne, Amery, and Sir Douglas Bogg, see Ibid ., p. B. 
107 Ib "d 14 __ 1._., p. • 
108 
Daily Mail , Oct. 27, 1924, p. 8; Mo r ning Pos t, 
• 27, 1 924, p . 8; The Times , Oct. 27, 1 924 , p . 13; Daily 
--~~~h , Oct. 27, 1 924 , p . 8 . 
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with proofs of authenticity, but that night it was 
publishe d.• MacDonald did not over tly criticize Foreign 
Office officials, but he s me lled a political plot because 




That night the Cen tral Office denied the cha rge. 
The next day the Daily Teleg raph called NacDonald 's ex-
planation the culmination of "the most extravagant record 
of political ineptitude and dishonesty within our recol-
lection.• The Daily Mai l and The Time s did not be lieve that 
the civil servants would have published the letter without 
f f i h . . 111 proo o ts aut e nt~c~ty. Birkenhead ques tioned "the 
judgement and insight, and almost the sanity, of the Prime 
112 
Mini s ter." According to Ba lfour, "The governme nt is 
really a tool o f forei gn crimina l conspirators." Even 
Baldwin wondered if MacDon a ld r e ally had meant to conceal 
113 
the letter . Austen Ch ambe rlain s cored MacDon a ld for not 
maintaining clo se communications with the Foreign Off ice 
109 
The Times , Oct . 28 , 192 4 , p . 8 . 
110 
Ibid. 
111 . . Daily Teleg r aph , Oct . 28, 1924, p . 6; Da ~ly H a ~1 , 
Oct. 28, 1924, p . 8 ; The T i mes , Oct. 28, 1924, p . 13. 
112 . 1 The T~es , Oct . 29, 1924, p. 7. See a so speeches 
by Churchill , 1isbury, the Duke of Devonsh ire , and Lord 
Cave in The T i me s , Oct . 28 , p . 8 , Oct . 29 , 1924, p. 8 . 
113Ibid., Oc t. 28, 1924 , pp . 14, 8 . 
114 
while touring the country. 
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On the final day of the campaign MacDonald announced 
that he had obtained informa tion indicating the letter was 
115 
a forgery concocted by his opponents. But the claim was 
lost in a welter of Tory inve ctive. The electorate r e turned 
419 Conservatives , almost seventy per c e nt of the membe rship 
of Commons. Liberals retained only 42 of their 158 seats, 
and Labour increased thei r total vote but won only 151 s ea t s , 
a loss of 40 seats. Tories were overjoyed by the ir s mashing 
victory. The Morning Post advised the party to fi ght "the 
plot to destroy the British Empire.• According to The 
~neithe r the Campbe ll case , nor the Treaties , nor eve n 
the Zinovie v lette r had tipped the scales. Instead, "It 
was the percep tion that these and othe r e xamples we re 
symptoms of Labour's system of t h oug h t a nd po licy which i s 
alien from Great Bri tain." Othe r Tory pub lications con-
116 
curred. Joynson-Hicks c a lled th e victory a "moral 
117 
upri sing" r a the r t han a poli tical triumph . Only the 
Obse rver disag r eed , Ga rvin pointing to dissatisf a c t ion 
114 




Morning Pos t, Oct . 31, 
Oct. 31, 192 4 , p . l J ; Saturday 
1924), 438; Spectator , C ' I I 
117 
The 
192 4, p . 8; The Ti s , 
Revi e w , CXXXVIII ( o v . 1, 
(Nov . 1, 1 92 4), 632- 33. 
See also at i onal 
118 
with Labour's economic pol icies. 
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It is difficult to evaluate Tory opinions of Russia 
in 1924. Many of their unusually unrestrained anti-Soviet 
remarks cannot be treated as genuine . After all, they ex-
ploited a number of issues to disc redit Labour in hopes of 
returning to office. Especially during the campaign many 
Tories aimed at crea ting a Red sca re to panic nervous 
voters. After the Zinoviev r eve lation e ven such moderate 
•centrists" as Ba l dwin and Ba lfour could not r e s ist the 
inflammatory l anguag e they had avoided previously. Only 
the opinions of the "ultras" and s ome "rightist s " cannot 
be questioned because they employe d these s ame a r g uoe nts 
against Russia throug hout t he de c ade . In sum , the Tories' 
political use of the Russian is s ue in 1924 was not ne ces-
sarily ind icative of the ir ove ra ll attitudes . 
Not all Tory opin i ons of the Tr eatie s, however , 
were contrive d. The evide nce substa ntiates the Tory claim 
that the y we re only an e mp ty fac e -saving d evi ce . In fact, 
a Tory governme nt cou ld h a ve f a s h i one d a similar trea ty 
without r e tre ating from any of t he ir d ema nds a ga inst Ru s sia. 
When MacDonald allowed his left wing to force a continuation 
of the Conference after it was clea r tha t the Soviets would 
not honor their d ebts , he exposed himse lf to l eg itimate 
Tory critici s ms. By staking his g o ve r nme nt 's future on the 
118 Obs rv r , Nov . 2, 19 24, p . 12. 
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Russian issue, he made a disastrous mistake. As usual, 
Soviet remarks did not benefit him. MacDonald should nave 
taken note of Tory prophecies made earlier in the year. 
i b 1 . d h . . 1 . 119 Tor es e ~eve t e Z~nov~ev etter was g enu~ne . 
For them it was mere ly another Soviet at t emp t--albeit 
foolhard y--to foment revolution. The letter did not swing 
the election to the Tories; Labour wa s trailing badly soon 
after the c ampaign began. As the Chairman of the Conser-
vative party at the time recalled years late r, "I have no 
doubt that we would have got in in 1924, but we would have 
. 120 had a smaller major~ty." With Conse rvatives taking 
office under these circumstances, the future of Ang lo-Soviet 
relations appeared uncertain. 
119 See Appendix I for an analysis of Tory involvement 
in the letter episod e . 
120 J ames , ed. , Memoirs o f a Conservat ive , p . 199. 
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C H A P T E R V I I I 
THE DEADLOCK 
Chamberlain's Diplomacy: Masterful Inertia 
The composition of Stanley Baldwin's new government 
was not propitious for harmonious relations with Russia. 
Three "rightists" gained i mpor tant Cabine t posts . 'l>lilliam 
Joynson-Hicks advanced to Home Secretary, Lord Oirkenhead 
returned to office as Secretary of State for India, and 
Winston Churchill became the surprise choice as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. Lords Cave, Curzon, and Salisbury, and 
Sir Douglas llogg were t he othe r "rightist" Cabinet appointees . 
Baldwin, Austen Chambe rlain, Viscount Cecil, Philip Cunliffe-
Lister (formerly Lloyd-Greame), Laming Worthington-Evans, 
Samuel Hoare, Edward IVood, and Arthur Steel-Maitland were 
•centrists." Three ministe r s had altered their opinions of 
Russia since the Coa lition era. Birkenhead c hanged from a 
•centrist" (or even a "conciliato r") to a "rightist" after 
he escaped from the influe nce of Lloyd George. Hoare had 
been a l eadi ng "righti s t" but became a "centrist" after the 
White defe a t . Soviet attacks on the League of Nations 
caused Cecil to switch from a "conciliator" to a "centrist." 
'l'he void created by Baldwin's general lack of interest in 
foreign affairs was filled by Foreign Secretary Austen 
Chamberlain, who de v e loped the governme nt's Russian policy. 
Diplomatic recognition of Russia, the Zinoviev 
letter, the Treaties, and the Trade Agreement figured 
1 
prominently in the Cabinet's earliest deliberations. 
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-Rightist" ministers had strong opinions. Joynson- Hicks 
2 
. wrote that the Treaties were "dead. " Churchill advocate d 
a diplomatic break. In a letter to the Foreign Secretary 
he reasoned that it would "b e eve rywhere accepted as a 
strong and sens ible act giving full expre ssion to the 
national mandate ." If Soviet machina tions c e a sed , re-
cognition could be extende d late r. Howe ve r, the Tra de 
Agreement should b e kept for "any material or practical 
.3 
advantage. Austen Chambe rlain replied: "Wh e n re-
cognition ha s b een accorded , you do not r es tore the old 
position by withd r awing it. Clearly it is not a matte r to 
4 
be decided without g r a ve thought. " 
At a Cabinet mee ting on Novembe r 19, Chambe rlain 
used this argume nt to salvage both the Trade Ag r eeme nt a nd 
1
see App end ix I for t he ne w gove r nme nt's de l ibe r-
ations on the Zi novie v let t e r. 
2Joynson-Hick s to Chambe rl a in, Nov. 14, 1924, Au s ten 
Chambe rlain Papers , AC 51/8 . See al s o a memo randum by 
Joynson-Hicks, Nov. 24, 1924, FO 418/62 . 
3 . . 1 1 24 Church~ll to Chambe rl a~n, Nov. 4, 9 , Austen 
Chamberlain Pa pe rs, AC 51/8 . 
4
chamberlain to Churchill, Nov. 17, 1924, Ibi d . 
See also Ch ambe rlain to Ame ry (Colon i a l Sec r e t aryr;INov. 21, 
1924, Ibid. 
5 
the diplomatic link; but the Treaties were withdrawn. 
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When Chamberlain informed the Soviets, he did not follow 
Cecil's recommendation to include a paragraph criticizing 
6 Soviet propaganda. In the address from the Throne on 
Dece.mber 9, the government hoped that "norma l intercourse" 
with Russia would not be interrupted. Ramsay MacDonald 
7 
was surprised by this seemingly friendly tone. Chambe rlain 
later clarified the statement: 
Normal relations with any Government require that 
that Governmen t should observe the no rma l r e lations 
of friend ly cond uct existing betwee n a ny two n a tions • 
• • • It is obvious tha t each side mus t r espect wha t 
I may c a ll the courtesies and conventions of inte r-
national life upon which f r iendly relations be twe e n 
Powers are b ased . I think it would be wis e for us 
to hold our hands and wait and watch before deciding 
on any fresh action in eithe r d ire ction,or of any 
kind. a 
Chamberlain, a "centrist, " indicated here that his Russian 
5
cabinet minutes , Nov. 19, 1924, CAB 23/49. Un-
fortunate l y there is on ly a ske tch y and incomp lete accoun t 
of the discussion . Churchi ll apparently advocated a b r eak 
but was outvoted . Vi s count Cecil, who sided with Chamber -
lain, noted the next day , "I did not see hm" we could b reak 
off relations wit.h t h e Sovie t s altogethe r at this mome nt, 
and I could not think of any les se r ste p s to t ake which 
would be at all effe ct ive " ; see Cecil t o Church il l, ov . 20, 
1924, Ce cil Pa pe r s , Ad d . MSS , 51097 . 
6
chamberlain to Rakovsky , Nov. 21, 1924, "A Selection 
of Papers,• p. 34; Cecil to Churchill , Nov . 20 , 1924, Cecil 
Papers, Add . HSS , 510 97. For t .he r eply , see Rakovsky to 
Chamberla in, Nov. 28, 1 92 4, Soviet Doc ume nts , I, 47 6-77. 
7Debate s , CLXX IX (Dec. 9, 1924), col s . 48, 66-67. 
8 I bid ., (Dec. 15, 1924), col. 679. 
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policy would differ from those of previous governments. At 
first glance it appeared that he wished to bury his head in 
the sand. However, in disavowing either a break or a 
detente, he made the Soviets reponsible for harmonious 
relations. Although risking the alienation of both the 
Soviets and the "righ tist• Tories for opposite reasons, he 
believed Russia would come to te rms e ventually. 
His policy was supported by the Cons ervative press, 
which now abandoned their election rhetoric. The Daily 
Telegraph called it "reasonable statesmanship ." Even the 
Morning Post was please d that the Sovie t s would be held 
accountable for thei r actions . 9 "Conciliatory" Tory papers 
readopte d their ear lier stand. The Spectator even advocated 
a resump tion of the 192 4 Confere nce: 
Unless we are to bre ak off r e l a ti on s aga in, s ome 
sort of treaty we mus t h a ve with Russ i It will 
now be extr e l y d i ff icult to ac ievc a se ttle e nt , 
but the ne ce ss ity o f s uch a s e ttleme n t a n t h e 
benefits , co~ e rc ial and politica l , w ich it can 
bring us are jus t as g reat as ever. 
Confident that t he Sovie t r eg i me would ado p t capitalism, the 
Observ e r urged the g ove r~ent to he l p he Moscow "rea l i s ts " 
overcome the "extremists" by negotiating a comprehensive 
10 
aettleme nt. Many Tory politicians pra ised the Foreign 
9Dai ly Te l e lraph , De c . 10, 1924, p . 10 ; Morning Post , 
• 10, 1924, p . 0 . See al s o Eng lish Revie w , XXXI 
(Dece mbe r, 1924), 756, and The Time s, o v. 22 , 1924, p. 13. 
10 Spe ctator, CXXXIII (tlov. 15, 1924), 731; 0 se rve r, 
• 23, p . 1 2 , Dec. 2 8 , 1 9 24 , p . 12, J a n . 25, 192 5 , p . 12. 
11 
Secretary and avoide d inflammatory remarks. 
During the first severa l months of 1925 Anglo-
239 
Soviet relations r emained tranquil, if cool. On January 6 
Rakovsky asked Chambe rla in to exte nd the Export Cred its 
Scheme. He was told th a t Russ ia fir s t must c e as e inter-
12 
fering with British interes t s a round t he world. Two 
months late r Chiche rin a nnounced tha t Ru s s ia was r eady to 
renew negot~ations, but Chambe rlain info rme d Commons tha t 
nothing would be done until the Soviets r epudia t ed Cominte rn 
propaganda. 13 On Ap r i l 1 Chamberlai n t old Rakovs ky t hat he 
posse s sed e vidence of Sovie t i ntr igue in China, Pe r s ia, a nd 
elsewhe re. Ra kovsky disagreed , bu t t he Foreig n Se cretary 
ended the "use l ess" conve r sa t i on. 14 These in i ti a l c ontac t s 
reinforce d Chamberlain's be lief in Rus s i a ' s 'tiespera t e 
See al s o Time and Ti d e , V (Dec. 5, 19 24) , 11 85 ; Sa t urday 
Revi ew , CXXXIX (Jan . 17 , 1925) , 46. 
11 E .g., t he r ema r ks of Lord Curz o n in Lord s Debates , 
LX (Dec . 16 , 192 4), col s . 125-32 , and Lord s ewton and 
Sydenham in c ols . 114-24 . Henry Page Croft in Dcb a cs , 
CLXXI X (De c . 9 , 1 924 ), cols. 104- 7 , a nd Nevi l le Cnambe r l a i n 
(Min iste r of Health) in The Ti es , Nov . 29 , 19 24, p . 1 4, 
were espe ci a l ly t e mpe ate . 
12 . Chambe rl a ~ n to Hodgson , Jan . 6 , 1925 , "A Selection 
of Papers, " pp . 35-36 . 
13 Debate s, CLXXX I (Ma r ch 4 , 1925 ), col. 40 7 . 
14 
Chambe rl a in to Hodgson , April 1, 1 9 2 5 , "A Se l e ct ion 
Pape r s , " pp . 37 - 39. 
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anxiety" for a settleme nt. Continued procrastination, he 
15 
felt, would crack their infle xibility. 
Soviet leaders did act as if a new ag re ement was 
16 
of paramount i mportance. Chichcrin was piqued uy 
Chambe rlain's evasive attitude , "We cannot make new p ro-
posals if we do not know what makes the fo rme r proposals 
17 [the Treaties ] unacceptab le." In uncommonly r estrained 
speeches the Sovie ts asserted occasiona lly that Tories 
k . b . th th . k h h . 1 . 18 were wor ~ng to r~ng em to e~r ne es t roug ~so at~on . 
Labour spoke smen concurred . 19 
The diploma tic gulf soon widened . As early as 
December, 1924 Conservative p ape r s began to concentr ate on 
an alleged escalation of Soviet in t r igue in Europe. An 
abortive Conmunist up r ising in Es t oni a t ha t month was 
viewed by so e papers as t he beginning of anothe r effort 
20 
to ove rth r ow Wes t e rn civilization . In April , 1925 a 
15 . M~nute by Chamberlain, Feb . 10, 1925, FO 41 8/6 3. 
16 
E . g. , Rakovsky ' s s e ech i n Russ ian Info at ion and 
Review, VI (Jan . 3, 1925) , 5- 6 . 
17 . Sov~e t Documents , Vol . II: 1925-19 32 ( ;e w Yo r k , 
19 52 ) 1 P • 3 9 • 
18 E.g., K enev' s s peec h in u s si a n I n fo~ation and 
Review, V (Dec. 20, 1924), 388 - 89 . 
19 
The Times , Hay 22 , 1925 , p . 12. 
20 
Ibid., Dec. 4, 1924 , p . 15; ng lish Rev iew , XL 
(January-;--T9'25 ), 12-13. 
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Communist bomb exploded in a Sofia church where Bulgarian 
leaders had gathered. This event led to a re surgenc e of 
anti-Soviet invective, some Tory newspapers charging the 
Russian s with mas t erminding the p lot. The National Revie w 
demanded protection against the "mad dogs of Hoscow." The 
Daily Mail and t he Horning Post ca lled for a severance of 
diploma tic r e lations, the latter paper reasoning , "If the 
Bolshe viks are equal to b l owing up a cathed r a l in Sofia they 
21 
are equal to blowi ng u p a cathedral in London." 
The Bulgarian incide nt coincided with a n internal 
development which seemed to substantiate these fears. In 
1923 the Briti sh Communist party had founded t he so-called 
Minority Movement to capture the Trades Union Congress for 
the Red International of Labour Unions (Profinte rn). The 
Movement r eceived wi desprea d pub licity in April , 1925 when 
the TUC , previously anti-C ommunist and wary of Russian 
intentions , me t with Soviet trade union de l e g ates to d i s cuss 
22 
internationa l l abor solidarity. Many Tories believed the 
TUC was succumbing to the Reds . The Soviets were accused 
of using the 'linority Hoveme nt to force a revolution. 
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Although only a few "ultra" and "rightist" journals called 
for a diplomatic break in retaliation, most papers were 
23 
troubled by these alleged domestic and foreign plots. 
Several Tory newspapers analyze d internal Soviet 
developments to find an explanation for t heir conduct. 
The ouster of Trotsky from the ~la r Commissariat in January, 
1925 was interpreted by mos t papers to mean the final 
triumph of the left-wing triumvi r ate of Zinoviev, Kame nev, 
and Stalin. Both "rightist" and "conciliatory" papers 
warned that Britain could expect more provocations from 
24 
these fanatics. Predicting imminent bankruptcy and 
famine in Russia, some extremist papers stressed that a 
25 
break would help to o u s t the Soviets. Howeve r, the 
"conciliatory" press claimed conditi o ns in Russia were 
26 
improving. 
Some Tory backbenche rs also seemed al arme d . On 
23 
The Ti e s , April 25, p. 13, May 2, 1925, p . 13; 
Spectator , LXXXI (April 1 8 , 192 5 ), 62 1- 22; Eng li sh Revie w , 
XLI (J uly , 192 5 ), 17- 20 . 
24 
Spec t a t or , CXXXI V (Jan . 24, 192 5), 109 -10 ; Obse rve r , 
Jan. 25, 1925 , p. 12; he Times , J a n . 20, 192 5 , p . 13; 
Daily Ma i l, J a n . 20, 192 5, p. 9 ; National Review , LXXXIV 
(Febr uary , 1925), 827-28. 
25 
Daily Mail , June l, 1925, p. 6; Eng li sh Review , XL 
(February, 1925 ), 12 6 ; The Times , J a n. 20 , 1925 , p . 13; 
B. A. Gwynne (editor of 81e Mor ni ng Pos t) to Chamberlain, 
Oct. 8, 19 25 , Austen Ch amberl a ~n ape rs , AC 52/448 . 
26 
Observer, April 26, 1925, p . 12; Sa t u rd ay Revi e w, 
lll~~III (De c . 27, 19 24) , 645 - 4 6 ; T i me a nd ~ae , VI 
a, 19 25 ), 44 5 . 
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March 3 two ne w Members , Ge offrey Peto and Sir Frank Nel s on, 
introduced a motion condemning Soviet propag anda in Bri tain 
and the Empire. After a s e ries of Tory s peake r s offere d 
t h . d . 1 27 s rong support, t e mot~on p a sse e as ~ y. In May a 
dele gation of "ultra" and "rightist" To r y b a ckbe nche rs a s ke d 
Austen Chambe rlain to s u spend r e lat i o ns un t i l propagand a in 
Britain ceas ed. The Fore i g n Se c r e tary r eplied that it would 
28 
be impolitic withou t a more s e rious jus tifica tion. 
Cabine t ministe rs i niti a lly had r e fra ined from 
discussing Russia i n p ub lic s pee ches , but on March 9 Joyn s on-
Hicks accused "the small po l i t i c a l ga ng i n Moscow" of 
work i ng to s mash t he Empire . On April 3 Bi r kenhe ad sta t e d , 
•we, at le a st, do not desi r e t o h a ve a ny c o n tact a t all 
with elements of Sovie t Russ i a . " Se ve r a l we eks l a t e r 
Joynson-l!icks p r omised a ctio n a gai nst Rus s ia with in " a f ew 
29 




Deba t e s , CLXXX I (Ma r ch 3, 1 9 25), c o l s . 35 2-98 . The 
motion was ove r turned on a t echnica l violatio n of Ho use rule s 
by its support rs . 
28 
Da ily Te l e g r aph , May 1 2 , 19 25 , ci t ed by Coa t es , A 
History o f Ang l o Sov~ct Re l tions , p . 20 4. 
29 . 
The Time s , March 10 , 1925 , p . 16; Da~ly Ma i l, April 
4, 1925, p. 4; he Times, May 1 , 19 25, p. 11. 
3
°For extracts from l a t er s pee ches by Bi rke nhead and 
Joynson-Hicks , s ee Communi sm Unm ske d (London, 19 25 ), pamphle t 
DO. 2583, pp . 6- 7 . See also a n art~cle b y Wi lfred Ash l ey 
(Transpor t Minister ) in eng li s h e vi ew , XL (May , 1925) , 
&28-30. 
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Developments in China unexpectedly supplied 
"rightist" Tories with more ammunition. An anti-foreign 
movement founded in China after the war resulted in in-
. creasing friction between native workers and their 
foreign employers. On May 30, 1925 British police fired on 
a group of striking workers demonstrating in the foreign 
settlement at Shanghai. Within weeks a general strike 
paralyzed industry, and British-owned property was 
assaulted. Chinese Na tionalists a lso directed most of the ir 
verbal attacks against Britain. With over £ 250 million 
invested in Chinese indu s tries and with thousand s of Britons 
living in China, Britain had good reason to fear a nationa l 
31 
rebellion. The Soviets played an important role in 
directing the anti-foreign move ment. Unde r the guida nce of 
their emissary, 1Hchae l Borod in, many Communi s ts had joined 
the Kuominta ng . Soviet l eade rs o pe n ly e ncou raged Chi ne se 
32 
aspirations for self-de t ermin a t i on. 
Many Tories accus ed Sovi e t a g e nts of arousing 
Chinese nationa lism to f ome nt r e vo lutio n. Even such 
31H. Owen Chapma n, The Ch i ne s e Revolut ion , 1926 -1 92 7 
(London, 1928), pp . 70- 80 ; We rne r Le v .1. , 1\ode rn Ch .1.na ' s 
Foreig n Polic y (Mi nne a polis, 195 3), pp . 1 82 - 85 . 
32 
For a comp rehensive account of Sovie t involveme nt in 
China, see Alle n S. Whiting , Sov i e t Poli c ies in Ch i n a , 19 17-
1924 (New York, 1954). For a t yp .1. c 1 xp r e ss .1. o n o ov .1. e t 
i'YiiiPathy, s ee Christ i an Rakov s ky, "The Fo r eig n Po licy of 
Soviet Russia," Fore i g n Af fa irs, IV (19 25 -26), 574- 84. 
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moderate journals as the Ob se rver and the Sa turda y Review 
charged that their activitie s threatene d Anglo-Ru s sian 
33 
relations. Some papers demanded a break. In June the 
Daily Mail printed nume rous tira des a g ainst Bo lshe vik 
intrigue in China and r eprimanded the government for not 
acting. The usual ly tempe rate Da ily Teleg raph now con-
eluded that the Soviet embassy constituted "a dange rous 
34 
menace to l aw and order ." In mid-June Birkenhead, 
35 
Joynson-Hicks , and Horne delivere d strong attacks. 
separate speeche s on June 28, Birkenhead , Horne , and 
In 
Attorney General Si r Douglas Hogg broadened their indictme nt 
by citing Sovie t subversion in Ind i a and i n Britain , as we ll 
36 
as in China. 
Duri ng a press interview on July 2, Chiche rin 
denied any Soviet involve men t in China , c a lli ng Conservative 
charges "lies fro m beg inning to end ," and asserting that 
Commun ists "would never mak e it the ir aim to s tir up in one 
people hat red ag a inst all othe r peop l e s . " Re c en t Tory 
33 The Ti mes , J u ne 15 , p . 1 5 , June 27, p . 15 , Ju l y 6, 
1925 , p. 16 ; 0 se rve r , June 28 , 19 2 5 , p . 13; Sa turd a y c vi ew , 
CXXXI X (June 20 , 192 5) , 66 3 . 
34 . . Da1ly 1a1l, Ma y 28-June 10, and June 26, 1925, p. 8; 
Daily Teleg r a p h , June 27 , 1925 , p . 10 . 
35The Times , June 22, p . 9, June 15, p . 9, June 23, 
1925, p. lB. 
36 . Ib1d ., June 29, 1925, p. 9. 
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speeches irked him, "Lord Birkenhead is seeking a rupture 
37 
of diplomatic relations with us." A week later Rakovsky 
complained to Chamberlain personally. 38 
Hoping to ease mounting tensions, the Foreign 
Secretary publicly urged "everyone" to refrain from 
language which would make relations "more dangerous t han 
39 
they are." He also told his Cabine t colleagues that thei r 
polemics really delighted the Soviets . Wha t disturbe d them 
most, he belie ved , was indifference : Britain simply should 
ignore them. Although promising to wa tch propaganda closely, 
Chamberlain concluded that a break would help the Hoscow 
"extremists" oust the "moderates . " The Cabine t agreed , but 
40 
several ministers seemed disgruntl ed . 
The tu rmoi l in China subside d in July, but r eports 
of Soviet subve rsion continued to pour into the Foreign 
Office . Chambe rlain wrote to Baldwin in desp ir, "The pro-
vocation offered a s shown by this s e cre t infonnation is 
such as I suppose we h a ve neve r tolerate d from any Govern -
ment and it become s increas ing ly difficul t to m intain the 
attitude which I have t ho g ht it righ t to recomme nd to t he 
Cabinet." But he added that a b r e ak mig h t he lp t h e Sovie ts 
37 . 
Sov~et Documents , II, 51-52 . 
38 
Chambe rla in to Hodgson , July 13, 19 25 , FO 371/11016 . 
39 
Deba t es , CLXXXV I (J u ly 6 , 19 25 ), col. 21. 
40 
Cabinet minutes , July 8 , 192 5 , CAB 23/50. 
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in China; reinforce the German oppone nts of the Locarno Pact 
who were arguing that it was a British plot to divide 
Germany and Russia; and inte nsify dome stic indu s trial 
41 
unrest. 
On July 30 a Cabinet committee decided against 
publishing documents highlighting Communist activity and 
42 
also o pposed a break. The full Cab i ne t concurred on 
43 
August 5. Some dismaye d Tories protested , but Chambe rlain 
44 
refused to b a ck down. On Augus t 7 seve ral backbe nche rs 
asked the governme nt to honor the "ma nda te" g ive n by the 
electorate the ye ar before. Under- Secretary of S t ate for 
Foreig n Affairs Ronald Me e ill conceded tha t " Russ ian 
intrigue is creati ng g r ea t difficulties a nd mak i ng much 
mischief in China," but he minimized the long -term e ffe cts. 45 
After interes t in China s lackene d , To ry papers con-
centrated on Communist infiltra tion of trade uni ons . Some 
41
ch a mbe rlain to Baldwin, July 24 , 19 25 , Austen Chambe r-
lain Pape rs, AC 52/3 5 . 
42 
Minute by hamber l ai n, Ju ly 30 , 192 5 , I bid . 
43 
Cab i net inutes , Aug . 5 , 1925 , CAB 23/50 . o ry 
backbe nchers also we re deeply conce rne d with Commun is t 
agents; see eba tes, CLX XXIV (Hay 8 , 1 25 ), c ols . 16 95 -1712. 
44 
· · 1 · . h d ( b b h ) Ch- - '-S~r Ph ~ ~p R ~c a r s o n Tory ack e nc e r to =·~e r-
lain, July 30, 1925 , Ch ambe rlain to icha r son , July 30 , 
1925, Auste n Chamberla i n Papers , AC 5 /692 . 
45 
For the speeche s and the r e p ly, s e e Deba es , CLXXXVII 
(Aug. 7, 19 25 ), col s . 1 811-18 , 18 3- 1 8 29-36 . 
248 
papers only publicized the goals of the Minority Movement. 46 
But rabidly anti-Bolshevik journals like the Daily Hai l 
exclaimed , "The governme nt should say unmis takably now to 
47 
these British and Russian brigands, 'lla nds up•:· A few 
Cabinet miuisters, including Birkenhead, Salisbury, and 
Churchil~, disrega r ded Ch ambe rlain's plea for modera te 
48 
speeches. The President of t he Board of Trade, Phi lip 
Cunliffe-Lister, summa rized their rema rks whe n he stated, 
"The trade union moveme nt is now in the hands of me n wh o do 
49 
the bidding of thei r Moscow masters." The issue also 
dominated the Octobe r mee ting of the Annual Conservative 
Conference . A. V. Davies, M.P., was chee red whe n he 
declared that "the direct cause of a ll the political and 
industrial troub l e " in Eng land wa s the Communi s t a g ita tion 
50 
"fostere d and led from loscow." 
Attention soon was foc use d on Locarno, Switzerland 
46 
The Time s, Se p t. 10, p . 13, Sept . 28, 1925 , p. 15; 
Spectator , cxx ·v (Sept. 5, 1925), 35 6- 58 . 
47 
Dail M il, Sept . 12, 1925 , p . B. See al s o Nation 1 
Revi w, L/XXv Aug ust , 1925 ), 79 7- 99 . 
48 
The Ti . es , July 20, p. 14, July 30, p. 9, Sept . 17, 
1925, p. 14. On Sep t. 17, 1925 , p . 13, The Ti e s stated 
that it wa s "high t i~e " a government min~ster ~ke Churchi ll 
let the people know that the country woul d not tolerate any 
•Bolshevik monkey b usi es s ." On Oct . 25, 1925, p . 12, t he 
Observ r asked these "r ampant" Conse rvatives to restrain 
themselves . 
49 The Times , Sept . 14 , 1925, p. 14. 
50
conservative Conference 1inu t es, 1925, pp . 7-9. 
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where European statesmen had gathered to sign a series of 
multilateral peace pacts designed to end the chronic post-
51 
war instabi lity. As the outsider looking in, Russia 
charged that Locarno was a British scheme to isolate he r by 
coaxing Germany into the Western orbit. Before the treaties 
were initialed on Octobe r 16, Chicher in we nt to Berlin in a 
vain attempt to dissuade Germany fr om sig ning. There he 
accused Br itain of orga niz ing a new Eu ropean bloc against 
52 
Russia. 
A few Tories seemed to agree with Chicherin. The 
Horning Pos t claimed Sovie t propaganda was "forcing Wes t ern 
Europe into a new unity, of which Loc arno is no doubt a 
symptom.• Willi am Ormsby-Gore , the Under-Secretary for the 
Colonies , stated that Germany was abandonin Russia to 
53 
•throw in its lot with the Western Party .• Most Tory 
papers, howeve r, d e nied t he Soviet alleg ation . Al though 
admitting that Locarno would "do no good to the Huscovite 
rulers ,• the Spectato r r etorted , "We are genuine l y intent 
upon peace." The Times stated at it was "most desirable" 
51 For the Locarno negotiations, see .orthedge, The 
Troubled Gi an t, pp. 248-72. 
52E.g., his comments during a n Octobe r 2 press 
conference in Sovi e t Doc ume n s , II, 57 - 58 , and Lord Crewe 
(ambassador to France) to C arnbe rlain , 'ov . 29 , 1925, 
Austen Chamberlain Papers, AC 52/236 . 
53Morn ing Post , Nov . 20, 1925, p . 10; The Times , 
Oct. 26, 1925, p . S. 
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for Russia to join in the pacification of Europe, but "the 
difficulty is that Bolshevism and stability are antagonistic." 
54 The Observer felt a "Locarno for Russia" could come shortly. 
Anxious to dispel Soviet fears, Chambe rlain told 
Rakovsky, "There is not an atom of foundation for these 
suspicions.· When Rakovsky mentioned the minis ters' anti-
Bolshevik speeches, Chambe rlain denied a Cabinet rift. 
Britain had "ample grounds" to justify a break, but he hoped 
to avoid it: "Sooner or later the Soviet Government would 
discover its mis t ake and become aware that it had more need 
55 
of us than we had of it." During t he deba te on the Loca rno 
Pacts Mac Dona ld cited Ormsby-Gore's speech as evidence of 
the government's anti-Soviet bias. The Under-Secre tary's 
unsatisfactory explana tion forced Chamberlain to reaffirm 
56 
his stand. Two Conserva t ive backbenchers stated that 
Russia was excluded from Locarno because of he r policy of 
undermining Western civilization. But Duff Cooper asked 
for a Locarno-type agreement with the Soviets , even though 
57 
it "may be heretica l in this party." 
54 
S~ctator , CXXXV (Oct. 10, 1925), 577, (Dec. 19, 
1925), ll~; he Ti mes , Oc t. 2, 1925, p. 13; Observer , 
Oct. 25, 1925, p. 12. 
55 Chamberlain to Peters (consul in Moscow), ov. 5, 
1925, British Documen ts, ser. la, I, (London, 1966), 
pp. 101- • 
56 For the statements of Ormsby-Gore and Ch ambe rl a in. 
aee Debates , CLXXXVIII ( ov. 18, 1925 ), cols . 438 - 40, 522-23 . 
57 
Ibid., cols. 492-93, 506-7, 462-64. 
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Chamberlain's repeated denials must be taken at 
face value. Although he explained once that a closer union 
between Germany and Russia "boded ill for the peace of 
58 
Europe," he was not terribly disturbed by their friendship. 
When the Rapallo Treaty was rene we d in April, 1926, he did 
not object because it did not violate Germany's other 
59 
obligations. Nevertheless, Soviet discomfiture ove r 
Locarno pleased t he government. Several British diplomats 
60 
predicted an i mmi ne nt cha nge in Russi a n for e i gn po licy. 
On October 23 Chamberlain alerted t he Cabinet. He was 
especially gratified by Rakovsky' s r es traint during an 
interview on Novembe r 5. That afternoon he wrote Churchill: 
•Russia is finding out, as I anticipated she should, that it 
has more need of us and Europe than we have of it." lie 
believed th a t continued "aloo fn ess " would produce even 
58 . . . Charles Petr1e , L1fe and Letters of the 1ght Ho n. 
Sir Auste n Chamberl a in (London, 19 39 -40) , II , 249 . 
59 
Chamberlain t o H. M. Rep r esentatives at Prague , 
et al., May 3 , 1 926 , British Docw e ns , se r . la , I, 70 4-7. 
~Conservative paper s rcac ed calmly to this treaty . 
The Ti e s , A ril 28 , l 9 2G , p . 17 , ex r es sed app r ehe ns ion 
over some of the te s , bu t t he Specta t o r , CX X I (A ril 24 , 
1926), 74 8 , believed "there s e ms to e less cause or 
alarm than e v e r. " he Sa u r da Re vi ew , CXLI (Ma y 1 , 1926) , 
558, agree d , ''We doubt e R sso-Germ n Trea ty would 
frighten anybody.· 
60 
Lord D'Abernon (ambassado r to Germany ) to Chamberl a in, 
Oct. 17, ov. 8, 19 25, a nd Pe ters to Chamberlain , Oc t. 23 , 




However, his policy received an apparent setback 
when twelve leading Dritish Communists were indicted in 
October under the Inciteme nt to Mutiny Act. The Home 
Secretary admitted later that he and the Attorney General 
had acted without Cabi ne t app roval. One historian has c a lled 
the trial "one of the r a r e political witch hunts in mode rn 
62 
British history." Indeed , throughout the proceedings 
it was obvious that the defendants were on trial for the ir 
political utterances. Pe rhaps with the Campbell case in 
63 
mind, Joynson-Hi cks was determined to secure a conviction . 
The twe lve were foun d gui lty in late Novembe r and s e ntenced 
to prison. Conse rv a tive journa ls ag r eed that t hey had over-
64 
stepped the bounds of free speech. The Uni oni s t Central 
Office celeb r ated by printing a pamphlet on Commun ist 
65 
sedition. Winston Churchill announced tha t t he gover e nt 
61 
Cabine t minutes , Oct . 23, 192 5 , CA B 23/51; Ch amber-
lain to Church ill, o v . 5, 1925 , Austen Chamber l ain Pa e rs, 
52/171. Se e a l s o a e morandum by Gregory , ~ov . l, 1925 , 
418/6 4. 
62 
Middl emas , ed ., Thorn s Jones : ite hal l Di a ry , II , 
Hiddl c as akes the r e mark . 
63 
For his act ivi tie s during t he tria l, se c Coates , A 
History of Anglo- Soviet Rel a tions , p . 18 . 
64 
The 
p . 8; 
(Dec . 
65 
Time s , ov . 26 , 1925, p . 17; Daily ·I il, ov . 26 , 
Da ~ ly Te l e g r aph , ov . 26 , 1925 , p . l O; Sp c t t o r , 
5 ' 1925 )' 1011 -13 . 
The Communist (London , 1925), amph let 
2617-.~,s~~ r~~D~o~u~g~l~a~s~~~~~~~- tion of the govern~c nt ' s 
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now was preparing to defend the country ag ain s t the "band 
of cosmopolitan conspirators ga t hered from the und e rworlds 
66 
of the great cities of Europe and America ." On Decembe r 1 
Labour introduce d a censure motion . A freewhee ling exchange 
of wild accusations highlig hted the debate . Although 
suppor t ed by many Libe r a ls, the mo tion was defea ted 
67 
handily. 
After the Communi s t trial Conservatives generally 
turned from the Russian i ssue. For the next five months 
an unea sy calm was broken only by a few anti - Sovie t 
68 
speeches . Disg runtled Tory backbenchers once forc ed a 
debate ove r all eged vio l at i ons of the Tr a d e Agreement. 
Paradoxically, the Home Secretary tri ed to sobe r them b y 
insis ting that he would not be a party to a Red scare 
. 69 
campa1 g n . In t he Tory press, t oo , intere s t in pro ganda 
wa ned . The Ti mes dedu ced , " Russ i ' s r evo lutionary effort 
case wa s r e p ri nte d by t h e f a r-r i g ht Anti- Soc iali s t and Anti-
Communi s t Un ion; s ee Vi s c oun t lla il s h arn , he Commu n i s t Con-
spi rac y (Lo ndon , 19 25 ). 
66 
The Ti. e s , o v. 30 , 19 25 , p . 7. 
67 . Fo r t he speeches of J o y n son-H1 c k s a nd othe r Cons e r-
vatives , s e e De ba t e s , CLXXX'II I ( Dec. 1, 192 5 ), cols. 
2087-21 0 3, 21 25 - 35 , 2145-53, 2157-64 , 2171- 8 4. 
68A speech by Joyn s on - llicks on rch 16, 19 26 wa s re-
printed by the An ti-Soc i li s t a nd nti-Communi s t Union ; ee , 
Willi am Joynson- Hicks, Soci a l i sm a nd Communi sm (London , 1926) . 
69 Debates, CXC I V (April 21, 1926 ), cols. 1301-50 . 
all over t he world is we ake ning as a r e sult of its 
70 
constant failure . " 
Throughout thi s pe riod dip l o 1atic r e l a tion s we re 
strained . In p riva t e i n t e rviews with Fo r e i g n Of fi c e 
officials in Decembe r, 1 925 , Sovi e t dip l oma t s we r e t o ld 
again that tal ks would not be re sume d unt i l t he y stopped 
71 
propaganda and recog nized all Briti s h cl a i ms. In 
February, 192 6 Chambe rlai n r e viewe d his poli c y with 
satisfac t ion , a g a in r e ason ing t ha t "th e wi s e r membe r s of 
the Soviet Gove r nme nt s ee the neces s i ty f o r a ch a ng of 
254 
policy ." He cl a i med t h a t Brita in' s " a t ience " already had 
been r e wa r ded by a dimi nu t ion of Sovie t r opaga nd a i n t h e 
72 
Far East. 
Howe ve r, Chambe rlain h a d to tread wa rily as t he 
Sovie t s dee ned the ir i nvo l veme nt i n r i t a in' s mus hroom i ng 
ind u s tr ia l crisi The Cabine t wa s a rt icu l ar l y ups t whe n 
the Profin t e r n at t e p ed to tr a nsfe r a l a r ge s um o f mone y 
to t he TUC S trik e Committee . The Home Sec r e t ry i nvoked 
70 
The T i .e s , A ril 22 , 1926 , . 1 5 . Se e a l so 
Tide , VII (H rch 12 , 1 926 ) , 242 . 
71 
Mi nute by Mr. Mousney (head of t he o r the rn De r t -
ment) , Dec . 10 , 19 25 , a nd e cord by .'i r . '-lousney of a 
Conversat ion wi th t he Sovie t c a r ge , De c . 1 7 , 1 9 25 , r itish 
Documen ts , s e r . la , I , 24 6- 48 , 261-6 2. 
72Memor and um b y Chambe rla in, Feb . 16 , 1 926 , FO 371/ 
11789. See a l s o Chambe r! i n to H. M. Represe n i ve s i n 
Moscow , e a l ., A ril 12 , 1926 , Br i t ish Doc e ns , se r . l a , 
I, 601-3-.--
2 55 
e mergency powers to preve nt the move , but the TUC refuse d 
the money anyway . Severa l ministers were convinced tha t 
the Soviet e mbassy served as an intermediary betwee n the 
73 
Comi n tern and the extremists in the Labour movement . 
Tory b ackbenche rs questioned these activities , but Chambe r -
la i n tr ied to minimize their impac t. On Febru ry 26 , for 
ex amp l e , h e stated that Brita in did not offe r a "fav ourable 
74 
f ie l d for Soviet activity." 
In private he followe d the same course . On April 1 3 
The Time s ' Riga corr sponde nt r eported that t he Comintern 
was p l anning g reate r support for Brit i sh miners , who we re 
the n negotiating with mine owne rs . At a Cab ine t mee ti ng the 
next day some ministe r s asked for a protest note b a sed on 
the r eport , but Chambe rlain r ep lied th a t t he Soviets always 
75 
had declined res ponsibility for Comi ntern activiti s . 
Foreign Office offici a l s also advi sed a note , but Chambe r-
lain again r esisted . Although "it is not so easy to 
stomach this stu ff , " he be lie ved that a protest would " l eav e 
. . f. d . . "76 an und ~gn ~ 1 pos1t1on . l-lhen 
73 J ame s , ed., 
ienry Taylor, ~J~i~x~,~~~~~~~~~~~ 
19 4- 95. 
74 
e King 's private 
pp . 227-28; 
193 3) , 
Deb tes, CXCI I (Feb . 24 , 192 6 ), cols . 492 -93 . See 
CXCIV ( ~ ril 21, 1926 ) , col. 1183 . 
75 . Cab 1ne t i nutes , April 14 , 1 926 , extracts r eprinte d 
371/11794 . 
76
Hinute by Chambe rlain , April 14, 1926, I bid . 
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secretary inq uired about the ar ticle , Chambe rla i n a nswe r ed 
77 
that Rig a was "a r egul a r factory o f lies ." 
The Fore ign Secr etary a l so r efused to involve 
Britain in ant i - Bolshevi k p lo ts d r e amed u p in far- r igh t 
circles on the Contine nt. One such s c heme c ame to hi s 
attention in Ap r i l. Re tired Ge rma n Ge ne ra l 1-lax Hof fman n 
hope d to o rgan ize a Europe a n army fo r an inv asion of 
Rus s ia. Hoffma nn' s intermediary , Si r Henry De terdi ng , the 
fanatic a lly anti-Sovi e t head o f Ro ya l Dutch Pe tro l eum , 
app r oached J oyn son - liicks t o sou nd the gove r nmen t's r eaction . 
Chambe rlai n r e f used t o see Hoffma nn if he c ame t o Br i ta i n . 
De t e r ding and Hoffma nn did tr ave l sec r e tly to London , 
where t hey a ppa r e ntl y me t wi th Ol i ver Lo cl<er - Lamp s o n, a 
7 8 
leading " r i gh ti s t " bac kb e nche r . Anothe r of llof fm nn ' s 
emi s s a ries urged Br ita in t o crea t e a n an t i - Sovi e t b loc in 
the Ba lt ic area . Ch ambe r l a in d ismiss ed t he s ugges t ion with 
77
charnbe rl a i n t o S t am f o r dham , April 14, 1 926 , Aus ten 
Chamber l a in Pa e r s , AC 53/ 28 5 . 
78 . . . 29 The affa~r c aused a om n ary s t~r ~n 19 w en 
was a ll ged--mist<Ue nly--th a t !ioffr.an n l d vi si e 
Godf r y Locke r- Lam son , n wl y a oin ed Unde r-Secretary 
of Sta t e f o r Fore i g n Affai rs and b r a t e r of Oliv r. For 
the Hoffman n ep i sode , see Sir Will iam Ty rre ll ( e ne nt 
Under- Se c r e t a ry ) to Lo r D' Abe rnon , .pri l 1 , 1 92 6, FO 371/ 
11788; H. Sco t t (!lome Of fi ce civil se rv a nt) to C . 1-l . Or d 
(Foreign Off i ce civil s e rvant) , F b . 1 5 , 1929 , and ot r 
materi a ls inFO 371/ 14 029 . For De t erding ' s a cti v i t i es 
in the 19 20 's , see Lou i s Fi s c he r , Oi l I mpe r ia li sm ( , ew 
York, 192 6 ). 
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79 
contempt, "We won't touch it with a barge pole." The 
Foreign Secretary occasionally went to great lengths to 
dispel Soviet fears. In January, 1926, through his inter-
cession, the Cabine t permitted a British armament firm to 
supply Russia with coastal defens e ve sse ls and submarine 
mines. Previously the governme nt had refused to sanction 
·so 
a similar contract. Chambe rlain believed his diploma t ic 
policy would weake n Soviet intransige nce. He followed 
basically the s ame approach in trade relations. 
Trade Relations 
Through the s p ring of 1 925 t he gove r nme nt a id 
little attention to An g lo- Sovi e t c o mme rce. Labour urged 
an extension of trade facilitie s , but the Financial 
Se cre tary to t he Treasury , \Va lte r Gui nness , would not hear 
of it until the Sovi e ts "established such conditions in the 
treatme nt of deb ts or c ompe n s a tion f o r confisca t ed p r ope rty 
81 
as will re s tor e con f i dence a nd comma nd cred it.• Howeve r, 
the Cab i ne t did a llow Briti s h creditors t o ne goti a te 
8 2 
private ly with t he Sovie t s . A de l e ga t ion from the 
79 Memor andum by I. Pa l ariet (civil servan t at the 
Foreig n Office ) , July 28, 1926 , minute by Chambe rla in , 
July 29, 1926 , FO 371/11802 . 
80 . . Cab1net m1nutes , Jan. 29, 1926, CAB 23/52. 
81
oebates , CLX.XXII I (May 12, 19 25 ), col. 16 31. 
82 
Cabinet minutes , Apr il 8 , 1925 , CAD 23/49 . 
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Association of British Creditors of Ru s sia mee ting with 
83 
Under-Secreta ry Ronald McNeill applauded Britis h policy. 
Statistics supported t he gove r nment's contention 
that trade never would app roach Labour's p r e dictions . 
British exports and re-exports to Ru ss ia in 1923 h ad totaled 
£4.3 million, one-seventh of the figure for 1913. Due 
mainly to an increa se in re-exports, it had j umpe d to 
£ 11.1 million in 1924. Exports that ye a r had totaled a 
mere £ 3.9 million, less th a n o ne-four th of t he amount in 
1913. Moreover, British i mports from Russia had tota l ed 
~19.8 million, giving the Sovi e ts a f a vor ab l e trade 
balance of £ 8.8 million. 
But in the first six months of 192 5 Briti sh e xpo r ts 
and re-exports incre a sed to 9.4 mi llio n, ne a rly eGua l to 
the total for 1 924. Althoug h still s ma ll it w s a ttained 
despite stra ine d politica l r e l a t ions ; and ex o r t s t o othe r 
84 
countries continue d to lag . The Sovie ts u s e d t he s e 
latest statistics to bolste r t he ir r eques t f o r t r a e cred its . 
In July Rakov sky t emp t e d Brit i s h firms with a n o ff e r to 
15 million of achine ry i f Russia r e ce ived 
He c omp l aine d to Ch amb e rlai n t ha t Briti s h po licy 
83The Times, March 14, 1925, p. 17. 
84 Coates , A Hi sto ry of An g lo-Sovie t Re l a ion s , p . 21 5 . 
85see his state me nt in the Obse rve r, Nov . 8 , 1925 , 
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was causing some industrial firms and banks to hesitate in 
dealing with Russia. Chamberlain denied interfering with 
private business ventures, stressing, "The more trade there 
was between the two countries , the better I should be 
86 pleased. • But he offered no h e l p . In August a Soviet 
trade delegation placed only six small orders with 
Lancashire firms . The disgruntled Soviets charged that 
bankers had hinde red negotiations by refusing to gran t 
needed credits. 87 
The Labour party also wa s dis ppointed. In June a 
TUC delegation asked Baldwin, Ch anbe rlain, and Cunliffe-
Lister for credi ts to r educe unem lo . en t. Baldwin r ep li d 
that Russia had never been i m ortan t co . erc ially , and 
Cunli ffe-Lister explained th t cr d its woul d not necess rily 
88 
increase tr ade . Seve r a l L bour de l egations recently 
returned from Russ ia r e orted t hat the Soviets we r e 
89 
desperate for forei g n economic ss i s t a nce. In Septembe r 
90 
J. R. Clynes ridicul d British o licy . In r esponse some 
Tory backbenchcrs ch a r ged at ovie t d u p licity was the 
86 
Chamberlain to Hodgson , July 13, 1925 , FO 371/11 016 . 
87 
The Time s, Aug . 22, p . 10, Se pt. 5, p. 7, Se pt. 12, 
p . 14. 
88 
Ibid., June 24, 1925, p . 10. 
89 
Ibid., July 6, p. 9, Oct. 1 9 , 192 5 , p. 14. 
90 
I bid. , Se pt . 3, 1925, p . 15. 
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chief obstacle to increased trade . 91 Others said credits 
would follow a debt settlement , and a f e w agreed with Lord 
Sdnh ' 1 b. . d 92 y e am s mora o Ject1ons to tra e. The Obse rve r was 
the only Tory news pape r to reco mme nd credits : mos t a g r eed 
with the Saturd ay R vie w tha t the Sovie ts' r e c en t trade 
agitation was "clums y bri bc ry. " 93 The busin s s community 
and the Association of British Creditors of Russ i a con-
curred.94 Under-Se cre tary Ronald Mc Ne ill emphas ized t h t 
the gove rnme n t was "anxious " to increase trade, but t he 
Soviets ' foreign trade monopo ly, p rop aganda , and debt 
95 
repudiation were s t umbling blocks . Howev r, the fin a l 
statistic s for 1925 stre ngthened Labour ' s case . Brita in 
imported £ 25 million of good s fr om Rus sia and expo rte d 
f-19 million, almos t doub l ing t he export fi gu r e for the 
previous year . 
On February 22, 19 26 t he gove rnmen p r oposed mino r 
changes in th Trade Facilit i s c t . Du ring the debate some 
91
r b id. , Au g . 25, p . 11, Aug . 2 8 , 1925, p. 13. 
92 . 8 Ib1 d ., Se p t. 1, p . 3, Sep t. 9 , p. 8, Sept . 11, p . , 
21-;-1925 , p . 8. 
93
observe r, Aug . 16 , CXL 
(July 18, 1925 ), 61; he --.-x-....--'-~ Morni ng Post , J a n . 5, 
94 The i mes , July 22 , p . 10, Sep t . 4, 1925, p . 12. 
95 Deba t es , CLXXXVI I (A ug . 7, 192 5 ) , c o l s . 1829- 35. 
See a l s o Chambe rl a in to Chu r chi ll, lov . 5, 1925 , Aus t n 
Chambe rlain a pers , C 52/171 . 
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Opposition M.P .'s c harged that all Russo-Bri tish contrac ts 
had been exc luded from the Ac t by decree. Ronald He e ill 
conceded that the Trade Facilitie s Commi ttee had rejected , 
~on the ground of security," every app lication involving 
96 
Russia. Other Opposition speakers the n criticized t he 
well-known omis s ion of Russia from the Expor t Cr di ts Scheme . 
Appa rently unprepare d for the ir argume nts , the Secretar y to 
the Overseas Trade Department , A. M. Samue l, offe r ed a weak 
defense , claiming that the Soviets h ad bought non-British 
97 
goods with their annua l trade balance. 
On March 1 the trade issue was debated in detail 
when the governmen t a sked for a supp l e mentary sum for the 
Export Credits Scheme . In moving a r educti o n Labour speakers 
noted that the Sov i ets , who had prompt ly et e very bill s ince 
1917, woul d r ebuild the ir country e v n without foreig n 
assi stance. In sum , their exclusion fr om t he Scheme was 
indefensib le. Walte r Runc i ma n , a Libera l M. P . and l e ading 
banke r , explained that five of the l arges t b nks were 
eei ng con r acts e we en Bri ish traders and t he Sov ie t 
98 
Trade Commis sariat . A. M. Samue l again o osed government 
for Russian contracts . Joyn s on-Hicks added that 
96 o e tes , CXCII (Feb. 22, 1926), col . 235 . 
97 Ibid., cols. 240-45 . 
98For t hese s eech s , see Ibid ., CXCII (Ma r ch 1, 
1926) 1 COlS • 1105-6 1 1109 -101 11n-:-
traders could seek private credi ts until the Soviets 
99 
altered t heir economic and l ega l systems . 
Two Tory b ackbenche rs suppo rted the government. 
However, six d issented . 6a rold M cmillan and Oliver 
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100 
Stanley , young prog r ess ives specia lizing in economic affairs , 
charged that Samuel' s fall ac ious argume nts were political ly 
motivated. T . J. O'Connor said t ha t it wa s "disastrous" 
for Conservatives, "the party of exped i ency , " to r e ject 
101 
Soviet applic tions without first cons idering t he ir me rits. 
Representing Scot ti s h consti tue nci es whose economy had been 
weakened by the postwa r decline of her ring expor ts to 
Russia, Rober t Boo t hby and W. P . Temple t on beli e ved t ha t 
unemployme nt in Sco tl a.nd would b r educed if Russ ia could 
102 
purchas e he rrings on cred it. P . J. !lannon, a ssoc i ated 
of manufac turers who had extended credits t o 
pleaded for a modifi ca ti on of t he government ' s 
103 
•cast-i ron a tti t ude . " The government probab l y was mos t 
m mber of the Ex or t Cr dits 
' s Ad vi s ory Comm i t ee , Sir hilip Pi l ditch , s t ted 
99 I bid ., c o l s . 1 099-1104 , 1111- 13, 11 20-22. 
100 
Ibid., col s . 111 6-1 8 , 1137-4 0 . 
101 . Ib1.d ., cols. 1110 - 11, 1123, 1118. 
102 
Ibid ., co1s. 11 06 , 1127-29 . 
103 I bid ., c o l s . 1132- 34 . 
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that his group would beg in to cons j dc r credits i nvolvi ng 
Russia. Howe v e r, Samue l inte rj ected t ha t he would i n voke 
. 104 
the Russian exclusio n cl a u se t o ove rrule t he Comm1 ttee . 
The Labour ame ndment was de f ea t ed by a vo te o f 19 7 to 109 ; 
only 5 Conse rva tives , including 3 who h ad no t spok n, sided 
lOS 
with the Oppo si tion. 
Soon afte r t he debate t he Horning Pos t accused the 
Bolshe vik s of using t he ir £ 15 mi ll ion t rade bal a nce f r om 
the pre vious t wo y ears to finance r evolut ion s , "It i s like 
dynamite in the h ands o f a n anarchis t. " The Time s no t ed 
that the deba t e "re veal ed a good dea l o f mi sapprehension 
that is un fortuna t ely no t confined t o o ne s i de o f t he 
A sho rt t ime l ate r it began printing s t ories of 
106 
c r i sis in Ru ssia . The Sovi e t s c harged t hat 
journ als we re trying to undermine thei r 
107 
standing i n ritain . 
On Ha r ch 24 Wins t on Chu r chil l seemed to soften the 
vovernme nt' s positi o n whe n he r emarked tha t if the Soviets 
104 . I b 1d ., c o l s . 1106-8 . 
lOS 
Ibid. , c o l s . 11 55-58. S caking about Russia for 
firstt'Ime in years , Lord Hen ry Cavendish-Bentinck 
r a d voca t ed credits for Ru s sia ; s e I b id ., CXCII 
8, 1926) , col. 1898 . 
106Morn ing Post , Ma r ch 3, 1926 , p . 10; The Times , 
5, p. 15 , !-larch 24 , p . 15 , Apri l 1 2 , 1926 , p . 13. 
107 
Soviet Union Monthly , This 
ine wa s t he successor to 
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raised that debt question, "We should not treat Russia with 
lOB less consideration than we have treated other debtors." 
Describing the remark as "unexpe cted and welcome," J. L. 
Garvin foresaw a quick settlement of debts and increased 
109 
trade. But the government r es tated their standing trade 
110 
policy almost immediately. 
Despite signs of Tory dissa tisfaction ~1e government 
refused to modify thei r position. The tradition of party 
unity perhaps preve nted other backbenchers from joining the 
small group of "conciliators" who, nonetheless, attracted 
considerable attention. In Hay four Tory H.P.'s returned 
from Russia with a r eport advocating , among other things, 
an extension of trade credits. Chamberlain pe rsu aded them 
to modify their r eport, but e ven it s r evised recommendations 
111 
cheered by the Opposition. 
Until 1925 there neve r had been a l e ngthy period of 
relative tranqu ility betwee n Br itain and Soviet Russia . 
during the first eighteen months of Baldwin's second 
lOB 
Debates, CXCIII (M rch 24, 192 6 ), co l. 12 51 . 
109 
Obse rver , ~larch 28 , p . 14, April lB, 1926 , p . 14. 
110 
Laure nce Collier (civ il servant at the Fore i g n 
ice) to the London Chambe r of o mce rce, A ril 6 , 19 26 , 
losed in Chamberlain to lodg son, April 12, 19 26 , riti s h 
~--~n~t~s~ . ser. la, I, 599-601 . 
111 
See Appe nd ix II for t he de t ails of their vi s it to 
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government, the two Powers did not become embroiled in a 
serious crisis. In part this was due to Austen Chamberlain's 
policy of ignoring Soviet pinpricks. Although he believ d 
that the Soviets were beginning to see the advantages of a 
comprehensive settlement, they seem d to be as inflexible 
as ever. Actually, the Ntranquility" a t this time was 
deceptive because two potentially explosive issues began to 
at this time--turmoil in China a nd domestic industrial 
By supporting the Chinese Na tionalists and the 
~inority Movement, the Soviets showed they had not 
their revolutionary goa ls. Chamberlain did not--
not--defuse either issue . Both developments 
After the Tories took office in 19 24 , t h e four 
s of the ir opinions of Russia e merged clearly once 
The "centrist" views of Chamberlain prevailed 
hout this period , bu t he was pressured by both 
and "rightists" for diffe ring reasons. 
o i n i ons ga ine d ground at th i s time among 
t he government, probably because Briti s 
continued to lag. After the fa ll of the Coalition 
and economic aspec ts of Anglo-Soviet 
been ostly s epa rated. Thus some Tories 
become Nconciliators " mo r e comfortably . Although 
266 
their numbers increased, they were not influential enough 
to soften the government's trade policy toward Russia . 
On diplomatic policy Chamberlain faced a po-
tentially greater th re a t from his party . The strong Tory 
reaction to the events in China and to the Hinority 
Movemen t was significant. The de , and by some "rightists" 
for a severance of diplomatic relations over these two 
issues was not especially alarming . Dut the sincere 
warnings given Russia by many "centri s t s " and "conciliators" 
that further Sovi e t involve me nt in these two 
areas could not be disn issed lightly. 
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C H A P T E R I X 
I NCREASI NG TORY PRESSURE FOR A SEVERANCE OF RELAT I O S 
The General Strike 
Br i tain' s seething industrial unres t boiled over 
3 when the TUC voted to support the coal miners who 
begun a national strike . For t he ne xt nine d a ys 
strike closed d own the e c o nomi c li f e of the 
The British public expe rie nce d t he ir fi rs t ta s te 
ma ny believe d wa s incipie nt r e volution. Tor i e s 
Ba l dwin spo ke for hi s pa rty 
noted t ha t t he coun try s tood "ne are r to civi l war 
1 
ha v e been f o r c e n t urie s p s t ." The s trike s eemed 
in a d r ama tic w y the asse r t ion of Tory 
"ultras " t hat Russ i a was wo r k i ng t o d s t r oy 
The Sovi e t s h i l ed t he s tri ke a s a fr on t a l 
2 
lt on the b a s ti o n of capita l ism . Russ i a n trade 
al l eged l y su p or t c d t he ir s triki ng c o ade s ; t he 
Stri k e : a Histo ri c a l 
i n Eud i n and Fishe r, eds ., 
p . 368 - 69 . Howe ve r , i n 
i a wag e d i s pute and no t a 
I bid ., p . 13 6 . 
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All-Rus s ian Central Counci l of Tr ade Unions forwarded 
drafts for over~ 2 25 , 000 to the TUC Genera l Council. The 
Home Se cretary moved t o bar the funds , and o n Ma y 8 t he 
3 
TUC r e fused t he o ffe r. On May 13 t he ge ne ral str ike 
collapsed , but t he mine r s held out . Be t wee n t he end o f 
May and early June the Mi ne r s ' Fede r ation a ccep t ed ove r 
£380,0 00, supposedly given voluntar i l y by Russ i a n mine r s 
and othe r trade unionists . German mine r s sent ove r 
£20,000, and t he Uni ted Mine Wor ke r s o f Ame rica 
4 
contrib u ted £ 10, 000 . 
On June 3 the Cabinet de cided tha t the offe r to the 
v i ola t ed the r opaganda clause of t he Tr ade Agreeme nt 
since the ge ne r a l st r ike w s ill eg 1. Chambe rl ain was 
directed to send a protest note . Howev e r, t he ministe r s 
were unde c ided about the contrib utions t o the miners fo r 
judged 1 al . Bi r kenhead , Churchill , and 
arently asked ei r c o l leag ue s to prohi b it 
con tri b utions and to t e inate di lomat i c relations 
5 
Ru s s ia . 
3The Ti . es , M y 10 , 1926 , p . 3. 
4 Ib id. , June 11, 1926 , p . 16 . 
2 3/53 ; Bi r k e n ead 
3, 1926, cited 
II , 276; Cecil 
vol. 11 5 , p . 130 . 
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To avoid an argument over the status of Soviet trade 
unions as voluntary associations distinct from the state, 
Chamberlain and Sir William Tyr r ell, the Pe rmane nt Under-
Secretary, based the protest on a t echnicality wh ich proved 
official Sovie t complicity : in early May the Commiss a ri a t 
of Finance had wa ived a l aw prohibiting t he export of mo r e 
than 100 rubles. A shor t note handed to the Soviets on 
12 stated that the o ffe r to the TUC contrad icted the ir 
6 
professed desire for a d e tente. The Soviets de nounced the 
note in public as an unwarranted interference in thei r 
domestic affairs , but the o ff icial r ep ly was composed , if 
7 
unrepentant. 
The excha nge of t empe rate no tes indica t ed that 
and Chich rin w nte to avoid a dip l oma tic 
In f ac t, Chamberlain conside r ed sof t eni ng his 
time . In Ma y the Briti sh c ha r ge 
urged him to c hange his " neg ative " poli c y towa r d 
6 The note was enclose d in Ty rr e ll t o Hodgson , June 7, 
ish Doc ume n t s , ser . l a , II , (Londo n, 1968 ), pp . 
June 2 6 , 19 26, 
Russia because peace was endangered by her continued 
exclusion from Europe. Be lieving the Soviets finally 
desired a settlement, Hodgson advocated a resumption of 
9 
negotiations and an extension of export credits. The 
Foreign Secretary read the note with "great inte r es t." 
On May 24 he ordered the Fore ign Office to prepare "a 
270 
dispatch for consideration setting forth wherein the draft 
1924 treaty must be modified as a basis for any renewed 
10 
negotiations." However, the study was never made as a 
new wave of anti-Bolshevik Tory invective soon appeared . 
In May the Soviet contribu t ions to the strikers 
ignored in public by mos t Tories. The Dai ly ·\ai l 
was l a rgely responsib l e for tur ning the matter into a 
9 
Be ginning on May 27 and continuing e very 
two weeks , it printed editorials accusing 
try ing to de stroy the country by sending 
the miners . In increas ing ly abusive language it 
governme nt that ind ustri a l peace would r e turn only 
11 
Bo lshevi k p l o tt r s were e x e lled . 
Hodgson to Chamber lain, May 6, 192 6 , I bid. , ser. la, 
724-30. 
10 Minute b y Ch amb er l ain , May 24, 1 926 , FO 371/117 86 . 
11oaily Ma il, May 27-June 9, 19 26. See also National 
, LXXXVII (June, 1926) , 508 . This c ampaign perhaps 
to bring t he atte r to the Cabine t' s atte ntion 
3. 
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Until June 9 other Conservative newspape rs and 
politicians said little. But t h at evening Lord Birkenhead 
charged that the funds were compulsory levies s e nt "to 
12 
foment revolution in this country." When Joynson-Hicks 
was asked about Russia's role in the strike during a 
tumultuous session of Commons the next d a y, he r e plie d that 
the investigation was not complete . But when pressed by 
MacDonald he blurted out : "His Maj e sty's Gove r nment are 
satisfied--that mone y has b een sent from Russia, including 
some money from the Ru ss ian Governme nt, for the pu r pose s 
13 
of the general strike." Foreig n Unde r-Secre t a r y God fr e y 
exp l a i ned la te r to Chambe rlai n tha t he was 
to outline the Sovie ts' role for Joy ns o n- ll icks whe n, 
midst of the tu rmoil, he "we nt a little beyond what 
14 
tried to t e ll him. " 
The stateme nts by Bi r ke nhe ad and J oyns on - Hi cks 
t h e Torie s. The Da ily Mai l a dop t ed a new line of 
"So mewhe r e t he r e is so e in f l ue n ce holding back 
Briti sh governme nt , inspiring it with a t ende rness fo r 
and their i n t e r es t s ." Chambe rlain was t hough t 
12 
Morning Pos , J une 10 , 1926 , p. 12. 
13 
Debate s , CXCVI (June 10, 1926), col. 1 676 . 
14 Godfrey Locker-Lamps o n to Ch ambe rl a in, J une 1 3 , 
, Briti sh Docume nts , s e r. la , I I, 96 , n. 3 . 
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b th 1 . 15 to e e cu prlt. For several weeks the Daily Mail 
printed numerous lette rs in full leng th doub le columns. A 
note from Tory backbenche r Guy Kinde rsley was typical: 
•The criminal camarilla called the Soviet Government • 
is tapping the roots which nourish and control the Communist 
conspiracy which is destroying our industry, corrupting our 
16 
youth, and working for r evolution." On June 14 a de l e -
qation of •leading" Tory backbenche rs req uested an 
immediate interview with the Prime Mi nister to urge a 
17 
break. llowe ve r, most Conse rvative papers awaited a l ead 
. . d 1 . lB from the government before pass1ng JU gme nt on re at1ons. 
On June 16 the Cabinet r e viewed t he Soviet reply 
and statements from TUC offici a ls who den i ed receiving 
Joynson-Hicks presented a memorandum ask ing 
deci sions on diploma tic relations and on Soviet fund s 
In a second pa er he cited examples 
infiltration of the trade union movement. No 
15 . . . Da11 a1l , June 15, 1926, p. B. See also Dally 
, June 10-Junc 14, 1926. 
16 
Ibid., June 24, 1926 , . B. See a lso the letters 
bacxoenchers Charle s Foxcroft, Ph i1i Ric a r dson , lan 
e, Alfred Knox, Victor Caza l e t, and H nry Burton in 
., June 9-June 16, 1926 . 
June 14, 1926 , p. 9 . 
lB, 192 6 , p . 15; Western I il , June 
~~--~~,e_v~i .. e~w~ , CXLI (June 1 , 1926 ) , 735 . 
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agreement had been reached when the mee ting was adjourned . 19 
Later that evening the Cabinet was given a Foreign Office 
memorandum which revie wed t he intima te ties linking the 
Soviet government with the Profintern and the Comi ntern. 
It charged tha t much of t he £ 380,000 sen t to t he mine rs 
probably came from the gove r nmen t si nce Russian workers 
could not have donated such a large sum . Howe ve r, t he 
Foreign Office believed a break would disrupt trade and 
intens ify Soviet p ropaganda . Moreover , the Soviets would 
be oblivious to t he political a nd e c onomic consequences: 
•The Bolshevik mind does not attach t he s ame d eg ree of 
19 
material con s idera tions as we do ourse lves." 
would be delighted to see British l e ade rs 
20 
panic. The memorandum appare ntly impressed 
Each ministe r stated that a break would be a 
r e tali ation for the Soviets ' "malig nan t 
But, t aking into c onsidera tion the any d i s urbing 
factors in Europe a t t he p r esen t i me ; t he credit 
comm ibments of Brit ish i s t o Russ ia on c strength 
Cabinet minutes , 11:30 A. M., Jun e 16, 192 6 , CAB 23/ 
Memo r a ndums by Joyns on - ll icks , June 11, June 15 , 1926 , 
24/1 80. 
20Memorand um by the Foreign Of fice , Ju ne 16, 19 26 , CAB 
The Assistan t Secretary , J . D. Gr egory , had p r e-
ly reasoned in much t c same v e in b ut added , "If t he re 
r eason to be l ie ve tha the present r egi e wou l d fa ll 
resul t of a r upture o f r elations , there mi g t be some 
in such action" ; s e c emorandum y Gregory, June 11 , 
, Brit "sh Docume nts , se r. la , II , 98 . 
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of t he r ecent Government as s urances tha t no ear ly 
change i n policy was like l y; the incre ase in trade 
with Russ i a; t he bearing of a ruptu re on une mp loy -
me nt and on the miners ' strike; and t he difficulty 
of r e - establi s hing r elations when o nce b roke n off; 
a large majo r ity of t h e Cabinet f e lt that t he mome nt 
wa s not opportune for a r up ture o f dip l omatic 
relations , and t ha t , on a long view of the si tua tion , 
any imme dia t e political advantag es to be ob tai ne d 
the r eby would soon be outweighed by practic 1 dis-
advantages . 
The Cabine t a l so de cide d not to prohibit Rus s ian funds for 
the miners , "since such ac t ion could as i l y be misrep-
re sen t ed . " Perhaps t o molli f y the mi no rity t he y r eso lv d 
"to e nl ighte n t he pub lic as to t he mena c ing charac t e r of 
2 1 
Sovie t Gove r nmen t ' s policy towa rds this country ." 
Cecil probab l y hit o n the essen ti a l reas on for the outcome , 
22 
•sy a l l means let us avoid be ing rushed . " Austen 
won t he b ttle but f e ared los ing t he wa r . lle 
i n private: 
It has bee n dif ficul t t o ur sue t h i s ol i cy of 
patience a nd for bearance in fac of t he i r con tant 
provoc tion , and I c a nno t say that wha t as e e n 
difficu l t i n t he pas t may no t e ade i mpos sib l e 
by the Sovie t Gover ~cnt which r e cognises none of 
t he obliga ions o f in r nationa l society as if it 
were an o r d inary mc~e r of t he c omi y o n~tio n s . 
The re is am l e justification for reaking of re -
l ation s : t he on l y question i s , and will r emai n , 
whethe r i t is worth our while to do so . For t he 
21cabine t mi nutes , 6 :0 0 P.M ., June 16 , 1926 , 
23/53. 
22cec il to Ba l dwi n , June 16 , 1926, llaldwin Papers , 
115, p. 130 . 
; s e e Fe i 1 in g , _T.c..h:...:e=--L=i-=f-=e'---'o::...::.f---'--=---=-=-=-=---'----'-'------
moment, I th ink it is no t, but I c anno t s peak 
with conf i dence as t o the f u ture . 23 
In announ c i ng the Cab i ne t's de c ision on June 17, 
Balfour envisioned "no substan tial a d v a n tages " from the 
275 
rup ture d e sired by " so many of my friends .· Host i mpor tan t, 
it would be " the he i gh t o f rashness" to d i s t urb i nte r nationa l 
rela tions any fur the r. He c o ncl uded: 
The r efore , un t i l it can be shown t hat some c l ea r 
adva ntage is obtained by an alt ration of our 
fo rma l r elations with Russia, I am in fa vour of 
lea v i ng t hing s as the y a re , having quite xp licitly 
explained to anybod y w o c r e s to li s t n to our 
explana tions t hat we are not du pe s of Rus s i a n 
pol i c y , hav ing ad i t e r fect l y cl e ar tha t we know 
what the y desi r e , why t hey desi re it , how they 
inte nd t o aim a t it , by what me am: they inten to 
attai n it. 4 
The Da ily ~ il a ppare ntly was the only ne wspaper 
25 
to disag r ee with the gover .e n t. But <• t l east t wo 
~ini sters expresse ei r displeasure in public . Churchill 
accused Soviet " miscreants" and t heir "featherhe aded 
hire l i ngs" o f work ing to reduce ri t ain to the dim nsions 
t he ir own "ig nor a nt slave state .• Amid g r ea t chee ring 
c ont inued : 
23c harnberlain to Lord Emmo tt (Libe ral leade r) , June 22 , 
Auste n Ch ambe rlain e rs, AC 53/262 . 
24 Lords Debate s , LXIV (June 17 , 1926 ) , c o ls . 4 65-74. 
25 Daily \ il, June 8 . Fo r a trpical 
r ab l e comme nt , s ee ~~~~~~~~~ · June 1 8 , 9 6 , 
10. 
I am sure it would give a great d e al of satis-
faction if they we r e t h r own ou t. Pe r sonal ly , 
I hope I shall live to see t he day whe n e i ther 
there will be a civilized Go vernment in Ru ss ia 
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or that we shall have ended the p r e s e nt pre tence 
of friendly relations with me n who are s ee~ing our 
overthrow . 
He also warned British traders not to e xpect the Treasury 
to interve ne in their behalf for uncollected bills if 
diplomatic or comme rcial ti e s were s e vered. On the same 
evening Birkeru1e ad claime d that the gove r nme nt would be 
26 
forced to retaliate if the Bolshe viks d id not change . 
The two speeche s produced a spee dy reaction. The 
Daily Exp r es s b e lie v e d Churchill ' s lang uage "was such as 
would draw a prote st fr om a n y other Gove r nme nt in the 
world." In his weekly col umn in the Spectator, "N ew Membe r" 
(probab ly Robe rt Boothby , M.P.) was s hocked t o he ar two 
di sag r ee i ng with of f ici a l po li c y: "M r . Glads tone 
de sho rt work of them .• The write r b e lie v e d 
pe r s onalities e xpl a ined their successful 
Althoug h Birkenhe ad admit ted t hat se ve r a l 
coll ag ue s o po s ed his vitupe r a tiv e l ang u gc , he 
that it was a ne c es s a ry part of h is c ampaig n to 
the "Hoscow d i s ci p le," A. J. Cook, l e ftist lead er 
both spe eches , see The Times , June 21, 1926, p. 8 . 
21, 1926, cited b y Fi sche r, 
~~--~~--~--~~rr--~~~v_l_a_r, pp . 165 - 66 ; Spec t a t or , 
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of the Miners' Federation. 28 
The Cabinet's exposition of the Soviet threat also 
received a harsh response in some qua rters. On June 23 
the government published a Blue Book ct;tntaining more than 
fifty documents confiscated the previous Octobe r during the 
29 
raid on British Commun ist party headquarters. Some of 
the evidence purportedly established a link with the Soviet 
Trade Delegation, but many doc ume nts we re concerned with the 
party's perilous financial state . Others attacked the 
Labour party. Labourite Arthur Ponsonby described the 
collection as "a monume nt of official i mbecility." Lloyd 
George agreed tha t Briti s h Communists sought assis tance 
from Russia; but instead of ask ing for poison gas or 
30 
machine guns, they req ue s ted "one poo r typ i s t." Tory 
politici a ns and some ne ws pape rs appare ntly did not defend 
publica tio n of t he documents , but the lo rning Pos t and 
Time s beli e ved the reve l a t ions unde rscored the subor-
31 
o f domes tic Commun is ts to Moscow . 
28 
Birkenhead to Irwin , June 24 , 1926 , cited b y 
Birkenhead , Lord irke nhe ad by His Son , II, 27 8 . 
29 . . l " l " p Great Br 1 ta1n, Par l ame nt, Par 1amc nta ry a pe rs , 
(House of Commons and Co and ), (llomc Ofhcc ) , Cnnd . 268 2, 
•co~unist Papers: Documents Se l e cted f r om Thos e 0 tai ned 
the Ar r es t o f the Communis t Le ade rs on the 14 th and the 
October, 1 925 ," (London, 1926 ). 
30Debates, CXCVII (June 25, 192 6 ), co1s . 711, 725-27. 
31Morning Pos t, Ju ne 26, 1926, p. 10; The T" es , June 
, 1926, p . I s . Se e also Daily ai l, June 25 , 1926 , p . 8 . 
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The promised Commons debate on Russia was postponed 
from June 17 to June 25, apparently to allow tempers to 
cool. But in t.he meantime, eighteen backbenchers, probab ly 
encouraged by the speeches of t.he two ministers and by the 
publication of the Communist pape rs, put down a motion 
calling for a break with Russia. Oliver Locker-Lampson 
started the debate on June 25 criticizing the government's 
decision to table the motion. Bes i des r e hashing wa rtime 
examples of Bolshe vik tre ache ry, he pointed toward t he 
gallery to a man "whom the s e mons t e r s d e prived of s i ght." 
The governme nt's c a llo u s d i s r egard of t he ele ction manda t e , 
he continued , had led to a c o ntinuing influx of Sovi e t 
propaganda and stole n gold. 
How mu c h longe r are we going to c udd le up t o 
the se co rmor nts , and t ake ou r ma rching orders from 
Moscow? The time has come t o withd r aw t his mon s trou s 
monopoly and t o cease ma king f r ee - born Lnglis hme n 
t.he h e lots of a s l ave-state . 32 
Knox charac t e r ized t.he Trade Ag r eeme nt as " t.he mos t 
32 
Eng li sh his t o r y : "Un t il we ge t rid of t h i s 
. we sha ll have c on ti nua l i ndu s trial s tr ife 
country.• 33 Oth e r Conse rva t i v e speake r s q uoted 
a nd Pr a vda to p rove t.he Sovi e ts' r e volutiona ry 
Debates , CXCVI I (Ju ne 25 , 1926 ), c o l s . 699-708. 
33
rb i d., cols . 71 5-20. 
34
r b i d ., c o l s . 741-43, 7 57-6 3. 
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Two Conservatives supported t he gove rnment. 
E. Hilton Young, a forme r Libe ral, pred icted tha t a bre ak 
merely would drive Communist propa gand a unde rground. Sir 
Frank Nelson, a recent visitor to Russ i a , a d ded tha t other 
nations the n would be nefit from t he anticipa ted increase 
in trade with Russia. 35 Labour spe ake rs r eques t ed new 
' ' . th h . 36 negot1at1ons w1 t e Sov1ets. 
Chamberlain charg e d that Russia n funds wer 
intended to incite revolution, but he sta t e d tha t a bre a k 
would intensify dome stic and fore i g n unre st. He concluded 
that relations would not e ve n be "co rre ct" until Russ ia 
f . . 37 con ormed to 1nternat1o na l c onduc t. The deba t e was 
interrup ted frequently a s speake r s f r om bo th benches hurled 
wild accus a tions. After Chambe rl in sa t down, t he Deputy-
Speake r ad journed the p r oceedings whe n a n umbe r o f o ries 
and Labourites crossed t he fl oor t o exchange b lows . 
Hany Tory pape rs a p l a uded t he Fore i g n Secr e t a ry' s 
r easo ning , bu t the y a l s o suggested th a t his Tory 
itics had presented fo i d ble a r gume nts . 38 Some 
35rbid ., col s . 727 - 32, 752 -57. 
36E.g., MacDona l d 's s eech in c o ls. 7 63- 69 . 
37 rbid., c o ls. 76 9-77. 
38The Ti mes , June 26 , 1926 , p . 15 ; Daily Te l egraph , 
26, 1926 , p . 10; vie w, CXLI (June 6 , 1 926 ), 
S ectator , CXXXVI ~I~~u~~~~~rr) , 4 - 5; English Re v iew , 
I Ju y , 1926) , 18- 22. 
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"rightist" and "ultra" journals were di smaye d by Charnbe r-
39 lain's policy. Several Cabine t members , including Iloare , 
Amery, and Cunlif fe-Lis t e r, defended him. 40 Even Joynson-
Hicks a sked his constituents to be patie nt for a few 
41 
months. 
Pravda attacked the "Churchills, Birke nhcads , and 
Locker-Lamps ons" and boasted that a break would be 
disastrous for Britai n. Howeve r, Hodgson r eported th a t the 
42 Soviets hoped to r epair the d ip l oma tic d amage . On July 13 
Chamberlain told M. Ros e ngo lz, t he inte rim Soviet charg ~, 
that new negotiations would be "u se less ." He again denied 
a Cabinet rift and concluded the in t ervi ew b y saying tha t 
he wanted to avoid a bre a k "if possible , " e ve n though 
43 Britain had neve r t olerated s uch abuse . His choice of 
words indica t e d a serious dete rio r t ion o f r e lations as a 
result of the genera l strike. 
39oaily 
LXXXVI I (July, 
p. 10. 
ai l , J une 26, 1926 , p . 
1 926 ), 64 1-4 5 ; ·lorning 
40The Times , June 24, p . 1 8 , June 28 , p . 8 , Ju ly 1 2 , 
1926, p . 9 . 
41 Ibid., June 29, 1 926 , p . 1 8 . 
42 
Ib id ., June 30, 192 6 , p. 15; Hodgson to Chamberl a in, 
2, 9 6 , British Doc . e nts , ser . l a , II , 133 -3 5 . 
43
charnbe rlain to Hodgson , Ju ly 13, 192 6 , "A Se lection 
of Pape rs," p . 42-45. The ne xt day Ch ambe rlai n t old t he 
Cabinet how much the Soviets dis rusted r itain's intentions ; 
lee Cabinet minut s , Ju l y 14 , 19 6 , ~\B 23/ 53 . 
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After previous Ang lo-Sovie t crise s, "ultra" and 
"rightist" Torie s did not sus t a in pub lic interes t in the 
Soviet question. But now the y we re de t ermine d to keep it 
in the press he a dline s . I n late June a group of these 
backbenche rs se t up a committee to moni tor viola tions of 
the Trade Ag r eement. The members included such promin e nt 
anti-Bol s he vik s a s Olive r Locke r- Larnpson, Richa r d Ba rne tt, 
Philip Rich a r dson, Al f r e d Knox, and Joh n Gre tton. According 
to one r eport a majority of the ir colle ag u e s we r e s ympa-
44 
thetic. Using an appro priate title, t he "Clear Out the 
Reds Campa i g n," the backbenchers s t aged a ma s s mee ting a t 
the Royal Al be rt lla ll on July 1 5 . The a udi e nce of 7, 000 
included ove r 80 M.P.' s , many pee r s , a nd r eprese n t a t ives 
from Conse rvative - domina t ed p t r iot ic o r ga ni zations . In h i s 
welcoming r ema r ks J oh n Gre tto n e mphasized t ha t a n expulsion 
of the Bolshevik s would e stab l is h a wor l d -wi de p r eceden t. 
Back.benche r s Hama r Greenwood , 1i t che l l Bank s , a nd Ol iver 
Locker-Lampson followed wi th a nti- Do lshevik ti rade s . 
According t o he lat ter : 
We permi t t he scum o f ou r own gut e r and the out-
pouring o f e very foreig n sink to collect week ly in 
our parks a nd t o a ssa il all that we l ove mos t with -
out l e t or hi ndrance .... I am tire d of hearing 
the Sovie ts r efer r ed t o by His lajesty ' s ini s ters 
as a f r iendly state , and sick t o dea th of t e 
diplo ma tic slobbe r wi th w ich we fawn u o n t hose 
fiends. 
Ju ne 28 , 19 26 , p. 8; Specta tor , CXXXVI I 
282 
The audience r esponded with wild c heering . A young woman 
who obj ec t ed to Locker-Lampson 's invective was ejected 
45 
amid roars of approval. 
The same "rightist" and "ultra" zealots held an 
outdoor meeting in Sep t ember whe re Lock e r-Lampson pred icted 
another general strike unles s the Reds were "driven into 
the sea"; the first one h ad resulte d fr om "our toadying 
46 
to Moscow." A month l a t er the y returne d to the Royal 
47 
Albert Hall. Occasionally they spoke before smaller 
48 
gatheri ngs. Several pointed to trade statistics to 
bolste r their argume nts. Alfred Knox contras ted Britain' s 
postwar Russian trade de ficit,£ 22 mi llion, with t he 
£28 mi ll ion balance h e ld by t he United States , r eason ing 
the similar fi gures proved that Britain's purch ases 
Russia fin a nced Soviet trade with the United States. 
the Unit d S t a tes had no a g r e e me n ts with Russ ia, he 
45Th Times , July 16 , 1926, p . 6 ; Oa il~ Te l e g r aph, 
16, 1926 , p . 10. A copy of the re solut~o n s e nt to the 
Mini s t e r c an be found in FO 37 1/117 87. For a 
l e edi tori a l comme nt , see os , J u l y 16, 
p. 10. 
46The Time s , Se p t . 17, 1926 , p . 14. The wo r 
lots" r efers to t hose To r ies who advocated a break with 
ia in 19 26 and 19 27. aturally mos t were "ultras" and 
47 
Ib id ., Oct. 16, 192 6 , p. 9. 
Lamps on's s pee c h , see Coa t es, 
Relations , pp . 245-46 . 
For extra cts fr om 
A Hi s tory of Ang lo-
48 For Henry Page Croft's speech to a Conservative 
, s ee The Time s , Oct . 14, 1926 , p . 12. 
concluded that Britain should cance l h e rs in orde r to 
49 
corner a larger share of the Russian market. 
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The Annual Conse rva tive Confe r e nce held in early 
October gave the zealots a c hance to t es t party s e nt iment. 
Guy Kindersley asked the de l e gate s to back the governme nt 
•in any steps they may t ake to end this menace to our 
freed om and sta bility." William Bull re s olve d that the 
government should t ermina te a ll tie s with Rus sia. Both 
motions were c a rried unanimo u s ly. Locker-Lampson cried , 
•England is gagge d a nd bound wh ile the e nemy spits in he r 
face and stab s he r in the b a c k ." The d e l ega t es rose t o 
50 
their f ee t wa v i ng their agenda pape rs. 
Gradua lly the zea l ots r eceived suppor t f rom pro-
minent Tory l eade rs . In a wide ly p ub licized l e tte r t o his 
constitue n ts , J oynson- llic ks wa r ned tha t Russia wa s p lanning 
51 
anothe r gene r a l s trike . He proh i b i ted some mee t i ngs of 
49 
The Tim s , July 1 9 , 1 926 , p . 13. Se e a l s o a l e tte r 
from Guy Kl nd er s ley i n Ibi d ., July l, 1926 , p . 12 , and 
National Re view , LXXXV Ir-\Aug u s t , 192 6 ), 82 6-28 . The 
a l ac1 e 1n t he se argume nts we re clea r to the gove r nme n t; 
as a c ivi l se rvan t note d , "I t i s o ne t h i ng to trade with a 
country wi wh o s e gov e r nme nt you hav e ha d no r e lations 
and qui t e anothe r t o carr y o n b u s i ness with a Powe r wi t h 
whom you ha ve j us t h ad a r ow"; s e e minute by Alve r y 
Gascoigne , July 22, 1 926 , FO 37 1/11777. 
50 
Conse rvative Con fe r ence Mi nute s, 1926, pp . 23,25. 
1926, p . 7. The lette r was r e -
Centr al Off ice unde r t he ti t l e , 
1926 ), See 
--~--l_· m_e __ s , Nov. 18, 1926 , 
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leftist groups and the Communist party on the gro und that 
public peace was endangered. In November Labour ~.P.'s 
denounced his action as an illega l suppression of free 
speech, but the Ilome Sec r e t ary r ep lied by citing the 
52 
alleged Commun ist plot to de stroy the na tion. His move 
showed clearly that Britain still was gripped by a 
revolutionary situation. On November 3 Lord Birkenhead 
repudiated Cabinet policy in public whe n he calle d Russia 
•a foreign Power of whom I do dispute and have d isputed 
the right under exi s ting conditions to be recog nized in 
53 
this country.• Se veral ministers spread alarmist views 
about Russia's mi lita ry p l ans . At a Committee of I mperi a l 
Defence me eting on July 22, Churchill sugges te d a confe rence 
betwee n the milita ry c h iefs and the Fore i g n Office to deal 




t o l d the I mpe r ial Con f e rence tha t Rus sia 
to attack I nd ia. 54 Since Brita in had discounted 
Debate s , CXC IX ( ov. 18, 1 926 ), col s . 205 5 -210 8 . 
'l'he T' . cs , ov . 4, 1 926 , p . 16 . 
~emorandum by Tyrrell, July 
Cabinet memoran dum , CAB 
Life of F . E. Sei th 
pp . At 
inte rna l powe r strugg l e in Russi a , a nd not on Sov i e t 
ion. Zinovi e v's expulsion fro m the Pol i tbu ro and f r om 
presidency of e Cominte rn, and the s u de n death of 
ix Dzerzhinsky , head of the secret pol ice , left S tali n as 
ispu t ed ruler. From Moscow Hodgson interp r eted these de-
·•~gpmen t s to e an "a quickening in t he e volutionary p rocess 
should i mpe l the Sovie t gove r nment in the direction of 
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any Soviet military threat after 1921, these sudden 
allegations probably were made in support of the "Clear 
out the Reds Campaig n." 
The Daily Hai l, the Horning Pos t, and the Na ti onal 
55 Review lined up behind the zealots . Many papers agreed 
with Chamberlain, but even such a "conciliatory" journal as 
the Spec tator evinced a profound mis tru s t of Soviet in-
tentions. Only t he Observe r now advoca t ed r e ne we d nego-
56 
tiations. 
The anti-Bolshevik crusade strained diploma tic 
becoming more of a Russian gove rnmen t and less of an inter-
national conspira cy"; s ee Hodgson t o Chambe rlain , July 29 , 
1926, FO 371/1177 9 . Late r he cautioned aga inst any pre -
mature hopes that t h e powe r s trugg l e would t hreate n Sovie t 
stability ; see Hodgso n to Chambe r lai n, Oc t. 12, 1926 , 
British Doc ume nts , se r. l a , II , 4 34 -3 5 . Ch a.mbe r lain based 
1s an a ys 1s on Hodgso n's reports; see his s t ateme nt to t he 
Imperial Conference in Octobe r, Briti sh Documen t s , se r. la , 
II, 945-47. Although mos t To ry a e rs e li e ved Russ ia wa s 
embroile d in a cri sis , t hey could not ag r ee on it s s i gni-
ficance . The Ti es , Aug . 26 , 1 9 26, p . 11, p r edic t ed that 
Stalin would abando n the EP and suppress his op one nts 
because Comm un i st party disc i pline h d been des troyed by 
the "corruption of abso lute ower . " Tie and Tide , VII 
(Aug. 13, 1926 ), 73 2-33 , and the Observe r , July 11 , p . 14, 
Oct. 17, 1926 , p . 17, prophes i ed a total abandonment of 
Communis t rincip l e s . The turd y Re view , CXLII (Oc t . 23 , 
1926), 459 , and the s. ecta tor , ex. II (Oc t. 30 , 19 6) , 729 , 
felt contrad ictory r eports f r om Russ ia jus ti f i ed the ir r e -
fusal to play t he r ole of prophe t. 
55 . Morn1.ng Post , 
1926, p. 8; Nationa l 
ov. 9, 19 26 , p. 10; Da ily Mail , Nov . 3, 
eview , LXXXVIII {Oc t o e r, 1926 ), 190 . 
56 Spectator, CX.XXVII {Oct. 30, 1926), 728-29; 
Observe r, Nov. 28 , 1 926 , p . 17. 
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relations even further, the Soviet pre s s charging that the 
57 Tory government supported the zealots. In Octobe r the 
newly appointed Soviet charg~, Leonid Krassin , complained 
about the resolutions at the Conse rvative Conference. 
Chamberlain replied th a t Britain ' s foreign policy was 
enunciated only "from the lips of His Majes ty's inisters." 
But later in the interview he practically begged Krassin to 
offer strict guarantees against propaganda because "public 
opinion" was so aroused. Again he denied l eading an anti-
58 
soviet bloc. After the intervie w Chambe rlai n wrote that 
the Soviets still we re unrepentant . As he sus pec t ed , 
Krassin h ad been sent only to secure tr ade ere its in the 
City; but he was rebuf f e d by bankers demand ing pr ior deb t 
. . 59 
recogn1.t1.on. 
Some government officials were troubled by the a nti-
c ampaign . Lord I rw in, t he Viceroy of In ia , pl ad ed 
Viscount Cecil: 
For Heaven 's sake stop Winsto n and F. E. Birke n -
head f r om playing into the h nds o the ol sheviks 
by attributing to t h m t he i mportance wh i ch I ' m 
quite s ure t hey don ' t o ss e ss . I i r..ag i e tha t 
every t i me t he y make s e eches , t he o1s e vi ks in 
Moscow rub their hands with d e lig ht an cong ratu -
late the mselves upon the g r eat sta te of al a into 
57 
sovi e t Union lonthly, I (August , 192 6) , 147-4 8 . 
58
chamberlain to Hodgson , Oct . 11, 1926 , FO 371/11787. 
59Minute by Ch mbe rlain , Oct . 25 , 1926, attache d to a 
by Gregory, Oc t. 24, 19 26 , Ibi . 
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which they have thrown the Br itish Cabine t, wholly 
disproportiona te to the money they have spent on 
the purpose. 60 
Although agreeing with the zealots' accusations , Rober t 
Hodgson, t he charg~ in Hoscow, criticized their outbursts . 
Like Irwin he claimed that the Soviets interpre t ed the 
campaign to mean that their propaga nda was causing deep 
concern. The zealots a l s o added crede nce to the Soviets ' 
belief that Britain was conspiring to form an ant i-Soviet 
bloc. Mos t important, he noted, the Soviets believed the 
Conservative party and t he Conservative government we re 
indistinguishable . Since they assumed t ha t the zea lots 
spoke with official sanction, they concluded that the 
Cabinet s ponso r ed t he c ampa i gn . Finally, t he crusade was 
61 hurt ing t rad e . 
After receiving this report on ovembe r 1, Chambe r-
lai n wrote to the Pri e ~iniste r: 
There is food for r eflection in th is d spa tch and 
I t hink you o ug t to see it, b ut I do no t like to 
ci rcula e it to the Cab ine t withou t k nowing t ha t 
you wou ld wish t h do ne . ? he r e are word s o r 
phra ses here a nd t he re wh ich mig h t provo e o p po -
sit ion and e n r ese n tnent . I doubt w ethe r it 
woul d be hel fu l t o circ ul ate it exactly as it stan s . 
r e plied that it should not be circulated in any 
60 rrwin to Cecil, July 14, 1926, Cecil Pap rs, Ad d . 
51 084 . 
to Ch amber l ai n, Oct . 21 , 1926, FO 371/ 
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62 
form. This exchange showed t ha t the anti- Red c ampa i gn 
continued, at l east in par t, because the Prime Ministe r was 
unwilling--or unab le--to discipli ne those ministe r s who 
supported it. 
Baldwin's de sire to a void a conf ronta t ion with t he 
zealots ind icated tha t t hey we r e not mere ly a n insignifican t 
band of "righti s t s " a nd "ultras." Although it is difficult 
to assess the i mpact of the "Clea r out the Reds Campa i g n" 
within the Tory party at thi s time , the proceedi ng s at the 
1926 Conservative Co nfere nce sugge s t considerable sup port 
for their objective . The ir successe s , and e ven t hei r 
formation, mu s t be attributed to the wi des p read f ear of 
revoluti on which t he gene r al strike p r o duce d in Brita in . 
This fe a r l e d na t urally to incre a s ed fear of Sovi e t Russ ia. 
Under t hese c onditions few To ry "conci liators" could be 
heard. The " c e ntri st " position also was ha rme d by Sovie t 
in the strike: Auste n Chamberla in c l ear ly was 
the d e f e nsiv e . Be fo r e the genera l strike he h a d 
mo s t Cab ine t embe r s th a t his oli cy of a loofne ss 
would l ead to a s e ttl e e nt . Afterward s h e h a d to work 1ard 
to p r ese r ve what had become a f r agi le d i p l om tic 
As a lways he was at t he e r cy of e ve nts : anothe r 
pro vo cation mi g ht l ead to a s e ve r a nce o f all ties 
Ru ss ia. 
62
chamberl a i n to Ba l dwi n , n. d ., Da l dw i n to Ch ambe rlain , 
6, 1 926 , a ttached to I bid . -
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China Again 
In the s ummer of 19 26 Chiang Kai-shek 's armies 
launched the f amous No rthe rn Ex ped ition against t he morib und 
governme nt in Pe king. The advancing Nationalists stirred 
anti-imperiali s t feelings to a fever pitch . Their ef-
fective propaganda offe nsive was directed b y Sovi et 
advisors, includ ing Michae l Borodin. As in 1925 Britain 
bore the brunt of these ve rbal and physical attacks . 
Massive strikes by Chinese wo rke rs in Briti sh-own e d 
factor ies resulted in a prec ipitous dec line of Ang lo-Ch inese 
63 
These developmen ts prod uced in many Br itish ci rcles 
panicky r eaction bordering on hyste ria. Alfred Knox 
the z ea l ots ' belief , "The Canton gov e r nme nt [the 
control of Soviet 
. b . . ,64 The k e y to t he Ch1ne s e pro lem 1 s 1n Mos cow. 
week of December Olive r Locker- Lamps on p r essed 
Whi ps for a discussion of Ang lo- oviet 
Baldwin , howe v e r , r easone th a t a debate mi g t 
. . . . h " 65 
alread y p r e ca r1ous os1t1on 1n C 1 na . 
63 
For a detailed accoun t of Soviet involveme nt with the 
o rth and Xe nia Eud in , M. . Ro 5 's 
e Communi s t- Kuo~ in t n l Lt o f I 27 
64The Time s , Dec . 24, 1 926 , p. 11. 
65 Ty rre ll t o Chambe rlain, De c . 6, 1926 , Austen Ch amb e r-
Paper s , AC 53/5 66 . 
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The zealots then collected the signatures of over 200 Tory 
backbenche rs on a memorial demand ing t he suspension of 
relations until Soviet propaganda c eased. Mee ting with the 
Prime Hinister on December 14, spokesmen for the petitioners 
described the intense feelings within the party. Baldwin 
offered a few sympathetic r emarks but asked them to r espec t 
66 
the watchful wait ing policy. The next evening Locker-
Lampson expressed pleasure with the progress of t he anti-Red 
67 
campaign. Indeed , more than half of the Tory M.P .'s had 
signed the petition, and many local Conservative associa tions 
68 
sent similar r eso lutions to the Foreign Office. 
In addition to the Chinese developme nt, ten s ion 
within t he Tory party probab ly contributed to the zealots' 
success . Many Tories be lieved the gove r nment should have 
taken strong measures agains t trade union extre mists after 
gene r al strike, while Ba ldwin r emained concili tory . In 
fall of 1926 he was pressured to curb trade union power 
69 
adaman tly refused . Party Treasurer Lord Younge r feared 
66 Daily .!ail, Dec . 11, 19 26 , p . 9; The Time s , Dec. 15, 
p. 16 . 
67Daily Mai l, Dec. 16, 1926, p . 9. 
68
ror these r esolutions, see FO 371/117 87. ven 
dwin's wife apparently sup orted the zealots: in the 
se of one speech , she said , "Our work i s to kee p out 
Bolsheviks"; see George Bi1ainkin , I isky: en Ye a rs 
ssador (London, 1944), p . 60. 
69 Kermit McKenzie , Comintern Revo lution, 
28-1943 (New York, 1 96 4), 
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another die-hard group ag ain mi ght threaten to split the 
70 
party. For at least some Conservative s t he gove r nment's 
permissive ness wa s e piton ized by t he ir unwilling ne ss to 
sever relations with Ru ss ia. 
The governne nt watched t he a nti-Sovie t movement 
with increasing app r e he ns ion. rfu ile Chamberla in wa s in 
Geneva in early De c embe r, Unde r-Secre t a ry God fr e y Locker-
Lampson, d eeply concerned with t he Tory memoria l, wrote 
71 
that the zealots could not be conta i n d muc h longer. 
However, the Assista nt Secre t a ry, J. D. Gregory, defended 
Chamberlain's "temporizing makesh i f t policy which will jus t, 
72 
if possible , k eep t hem [the Sov ie t s ] wi t hi n b o un d s." 
Predicting in s te ad th a t Sovi e t p r opaganda wo uld i n t e nsify, 
Permanent Unde r- Se cre t a ry Sir Willi am Tyrre ll be lie ve d t ha t 
vi o l a tion o f t he T r ade Agreen~nt wo u l d allow 
d i s mi s s t h e Soviets with " a os t u nive rs a l 
Two days l a ter h i s emorandum was app rov e d by 
70 Youn g e r to J . C . C . Dav i dso n , De c . 27, 19 26 , ci t ed 
Hiddle mas and Barnes , a l dw in , p . 44 7 . 
71God frey Lo c ke r-Lampson t o Tyrre ll, De c. 8 , 19 2 6 , 
371/117 87. G. Lo c kc r-Lamp son c l a i ned t ha t t he p r o mote r s 
the emor ial p r es e nte d it a t t h a t ti e because of C' ambe r -
72 Memorandum by Grego r y , Dec. 3, 192 6, Br i t ish 
~~~!t~s, s e r. la, II, 559- 60. 
73 Memorand um b y Ty rre ll, De c . 4, 1926 , Ibid ., pp . 56 3-
minute b y Tyr r e ll, De c . 6 , 1 92 6 , I b i d ., p~4 . 
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At Godfrey Locker-Lampson's reque st, Gregory out-
lined diplomatic arguments for and against a break . Al-
though cancellation might damage Soviet prestige, it would 
increase uneasiness on the Continent, damage trade, cut off 
sources of information in ~loscow , and forfeit personal 
contacts with the Bo lsheviks . Such a "leap in the dark" 
would satisfy ma ny Tories, but it hardly would be "useful 
diplomacy." Howe ver, a "peculiarly outrageous" ac tion 
74 
would necessitate a break. Gregory's memorand um was 
distributed whe n the Cabinet discussed Ru ssia on De cember 15. 
What transpired is unclear , but they agreed to continue 
75 deliberations after the holiday rece s s. 
The deepening Chinese crisis rapidly forced re-
to the breaking poi nt. After the t<ationalists took 
Bankow in January, 1927, Chinese mo b s ove rwhelmed th e 
74 
Ku omintang a rm i e s marched ne xt on 
interna tiona l settleme nt wa s de f e nded b y 
brigades. The sold i e rs fir e d on Ch inese 
but t h is only inte nsified the ir fury. Briti sh 
7 6 
and inves t me nts we r e s e rious ly end nge r e d . 
Memorandum by Gregory, De c. 10, 1926, FO 371/117 87. 
75
cabinet minutes, Dec . 1 5 , 1926, CA B 23/53. 
76 Robert T. Poll a rd, Chi n a ' s Fo r e i g n 19 17 -
(New York, 1933), p . ~2~9~7~-~9n9~;~C~a~~--~~~~~~----
ution, p p . 32-35; or th and Eud i n, 
--'-==' p . 46. 
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Soviet leaders exhorted the Kuomintang to crush Eng lish 
imperialism. When questioned about such statements, Maxim 
Litvinov answered that his government desired a libera ted 
China, but he denied official involveme nt with either the 
77 
Kuomintang or the anti-British c ampa i g n. 
Conservative papers , however, cha r ged that Sovie t 
agents directed the 'ationa lists; and mos t feared a sovi-
78 
etized China. ut a few mode rate journals portrayed the 
Nationalists as staunch anti-Communists who were using the 
Soviets; the Spectator predicted the Kuomintang soon would 
79 dismiss them. Even the Obse rve r agreed that Russia had 
seriously violated the Tr ade Ag r e ement. Since 1919 Garvin 
believe d that her prop ag and a wou l d s ub s i de once she was 
admitted to the world community. But t he incre asing t hrea t 
to British life and rope rty l e d him to c onclude t ha t uss ia 
e mba r ked on an "u np roclai rned w r" agains t Britain . He 
perce ived that Sovi e t activitie s during t he genera l 
b h . BO e en t e open~ng r oun . 
77 Eudi n and Fi s c r , eds . , Sovie t Ru s s i a a nd t h e \ 'es t , 
364; The Time s , Feb . 5 , 192 7 , 11 . 
78 . b Morn~ng Pos t, Fe . 3 , 1 9 27, 
LXXXVIII (Janua ry, l92 7), 659 - 61; 
p. 8; The Ti e s , J an . 4, 19 27 , p . 
5 , 1927), 176, ( la rch 5, 
(Uec. 1 0 , 19 6) , 1130 , ~ 
J a n . 30 , 1927, p. 14. See also G rvin to 
31 , 1927 , Au ten Chambe rlain ape rs, AC 38/ 
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Un ab l e to de t ermi ne who was using wh om in Chin a , 
Auste n Ch ambe r l ain cr i t icized t hos e of his colleag ue s who 
81 
ins i sted tha t t he Bols heviks we r e domina n t. Joynso n -
Hick s , f o r ex ample , wrote , ''I be l ieve t ha t the Chine s e 
leader s are Bo l sh ie in he a rt and t h a t un l ess we are ve ry 
careful we may fin d t he Bolshie Ca ntonese [Kuomintang ) in 
82 
comma nd o f t he who le o f Ch i na ." Othe r Tory mini s ters a nd 
h . 83 backbe nc e r s a l s o d e no unce d Ru ss la . 
The Pro t e st Note 
At t his t i me Chambe rl ain r eque ste d a d r a ft prote s t 
84 
sol e ly on Sovi e t stateme nts a nd writ i ng s . The d raft 
p r e pa r ed by Grego ry and a me nded by Charnb rl ai n before it 
d is tr i b t ed among Cabi ne t min i s t e r s on J a nuary 1 9 . It 
fourteen a lleged vi o l ations of t he Tr ade Ag r e e nt 
81Chambe rl ain to Ty r rel l , De c. 9 , 1926 , Ib id . , AC 53/ 
569. See also Ty rr e ll t o Ch er l ai n , Dec . 6 , 19 6 , ~- · 
53/56 6 . 
82 
Joyn son- Hicks t o Ch arnbe r l i n , J an . 7, 1927 , Grea t 
t a i n , lie Re c o rd Off i c , Foreig n Off ice Fil e s , erson 1 
r s , FO G00 / 26 0 . ( e rson a l Pap rs l c r ei f t e r rc c r r~d 
a s FO 800/ . ) Fo r irkenhead ' s e e n t , sec 
Ti es , De c . 11, 1926 , p . 14 . 
by At to r ne y Genera l Sir Doug l as I!ogg 
e Ti e s , J a n . 8 , p . 7 , J an . 21, 1 9 27 , 
y K1ng s l ey Woo and Olive r Locker -
J a n . 1 9 , 192 7, p . 16 , and 0 serve r , 
84
c abinet inutes , J an . 17 , 1927 , CAB 23/5 4. 
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since May, 1926: editorials from I zves tia and doc ume nts 
from the Comintern on the gene ral strike; speeches about 
China; an Izvestia allegation of a British plot to murde r 
the Shah of Persia; speeches b y Ch icherin and othe rs on 
English impe rialism; and a "me nd acious" Izve s tia cartoon 
depicting a caricature of Chambe rlain app laud ing the 
execution of Lithua nian Conmunists. The note concluded th t 
if such vio l a tions c eas ed , the Sovi e t s wo uld be tak ing a 
i . . 1 . 85 f rst step toward 1mprov1ng re a t1ons. Ch mbe r l ain 
concentrated on public s t a t eme nts for good re s ons; in 
Septembe r, 1921 and in Ma y, 1923 Ru s sia h a d di spu t ed 
Curzon's claims of clande stine activities . 
85 
The Foreign e cre t a ry autho ri zed t he d raft without 
Deve l opme nts in China undoubted ly 
but as he exp l a ined to B !fo ur , a pro t es t 
s a ti s fac t ion t o the ore r es tle s s o f o r 
Chambe rl a in wa n t e the Cab inet to decide if 
i p r s s u pon wo rld o inio n the gravi ty o f 
c omp la i nts. 87 lie s till fi ly o po sed a di l o -
On Janu ry 2 4 he d i s tribu ted to e Cab i ne t 
The type d draf t with Chambe r lain ' s ame nda tions a n 
final c o py a.s printed for t he Cab in e t c a n b e fo un in 
371/12 589 . 
86 . Chamberla1n to Ba lfour , Jan . 22, 192 7, Ba lfour 
, Add . MSS , 49 7 36 . 
87 
Ibid., Ch ambe rla i n to S ee l-Ha i tland ( ~1 i n i s te r of 
), J an . 26 , 192 7, us t e n C ambe r l a i n a e r s , AC 54 / 
--------~~~~------------------------ ­.. 
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Gregory's emorandum of December 9 and one of his own. In 
it he explained tha t a break might promp t Marshal Pilsudski 
to attack the Soviet Union and probably would throw one or 
two of t he Baltic States into Russia 's arms. Turkey might 
become ala rmed enough to abandon her r ecent ivestern 
orientation . A break would stimulate an ti- British 
activitie s in Persia. Hos t i mportant, Germa n Chancellor 
Gustav Stresemann ' s policy of r econci liation with the Wes t 
would be "gravely embar r assed ." German ~a tionalists would 
be encouras ed to seek Soviet aid in ch a llengi ng the 
Versailles settlement in eastern Europe . Unlike Gregory, 
Chambe rlain also spe lled out th e adverse domes t ic r ami fi-
cations: Soviet propaganda a nd funds would continue to 
reach Brita in, trade would suffer, and Libera ls an 
Labourite s would unite. Finally , "i ts ultimate conseque nce s 
. on the industria l position and 
n a tion ." As he explained , Labour and trade 
extre · sts had bee n eclipse af t e r t he gene ral strike, 
o uld force mode rate s to r e i t e with them and 
88 
l e a to a r e new 1 of their do mina tion . 
88
.\eco randum by Chamber l ain , 
a more de t iled ex l a nation of 
Ch e rlain to Cun1iffe - Li s t r 
) , J an . 1 9 , 1927, Auste n Ch 
Jan. 24, 1927, CAB 24/184 . 
t~e r am i f i c ati o ns on trade , 
( r esi e nt of the Board of 
e rl a in a e rs , AC 54/145 . 
a br ief r vi ew of r el a tions 
tes and o1and a t th a t time , 
R s s i a and the We t , p . 
e t wee n Ru s s i a a nd the B ltic 
s ee Lud in and Fishe r, eds ., 
3<16-47. 
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Before the Cabinet discussion of Russia r esume d in 
mid-Februa ry, a n ti-Sovie t ag itation had i nte nsi fied gre a tly. 
The Daily Ma il r epea t ed ly a s ked Torie s how long the y would 
tolerate their l e ade rs' neg l e ct o f p rincip l e s. It cha r ged 
that Britain's pres t ige on the Continen t was plumme ting 
because of her in ab ility to d e al with Soviet provocations. 
And a break would st re ng t he n Sovie t "mode r a t es " b y showi ng 
. . 89 
that fore ign 1ntrig ue was se lf-defea t1ng . Eve n the 
Obse rve r st a t ed tha t if t he "undec l ared " war in Chin a did 
90 
not stop, the Sovie t s sho uld be s e nt packing . Prote sts 
from Tory-dominated orga ni za tions poured into the Fore i g n 
Office. 91 
When parli ame nt r e c o nve ned in Feb ruary, s e v e r a l 
Tory backbenche r s who ne v e r had spoken o n Russia urged a 
92 
break . On Feb r ua ry 1 8 a de ba t e on a p r i v a t e Hembe r' s bi ll 
to prohibit f o r e i gn contribu t i ons fo r s trikers cen t e r d o n 
Russia. Ironically t he !lome Sec r e ta ry s oke again s t the 
90 
J an . 29 - Feb . 17, 1927. Fo r s i milar 
, Feb. 3 , 1927 , p . 8 , and 
~~~~~~(=eb ru ry , 192 7) , 80 1- 4 . 
Obse rver , Feb . 6 , p . 16 , Feb . 13, p. 14, Feb . 20 , 
27, p. 14. However , the Eng li sh nevi w, XLIV (January , 
7), 16-17, and the Satu r da y R v1 e w, XLI (Dec. 1 8 , 1926 ), 
, urged the gove r nment to stay t he i r hand . 
91 The Times , Fe b. 4, p. 11, Feb . 1 8 , 1927, p . 11. 
92 For the s pee c he s of F. G. Pe nny, H. O' Ne ill, and 
rt Cayze r, s e De bates , CCII (Feb . 8 , 192 7), co l s . 59-
, 183-86, 23 8-41. 
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bill because Baldwin felt it was unnecessarily repressive, 
but he betrayed sympathy for the sponsors . Few Conservative 
speakers agreed with the governrr.e nt. The vote was a good 
measure of their sentime nts on Russia . Most Tory backbenchers 
abstained, 77 supported the bi ll, a nd only 10 joined t he 
qovernment in oppos ition. With Libera l and Labour suppor t 
d . d h . . 1 . f 93 it was en~e a t 1rd read1ng by a p ural~ty o 100 votes. 
Four moderate backbenche rs wrote an o pen letter which 
reflected the changing mood of g rass-roots sentiment . They 
that previously a rupture would have been fool-
the Sovie ts had moved from v erbal hostili ty 
in China. Afte r samp ling the ir const i tuents ' 
they concluded that a break would be "almost 
94 
supported." 
The leade rs o f the "Clear out t he Red s Campaign" 
According to Alfred Knox , "The Sec r e t a ry of 
Foreig n Aff ai rs, by his obstinate ly o s trich-lik e 
this matter, has beco e a danger to his a rty a nd, 
mo e nt , a dange r to the vital interes ts 
Oliver Locker- Lampson cried , "It is not 
to exaggerate the depth of disgus t in Bri ti s h 
93For the entire proceedings, see Ibid ., CCII (Feb . 18, 
), cols. 1275-1362. 
94 
The Times, Feb. 23, 1927, p. B. 
95 b . I ~d., Feb. 17, 1927, p . 10. 
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96 
hearts over this long drawn-o u t v a cilla t ion. " In 
separate speeche s on Fe brua ry 4, Leo pol d Ame r y , Church ill, 
97 
and Joynson-Hicks de nounced Sovie t ac t ivities i n China . 
A week l a ter Church i ll exclaimed t ha t a b r eak "would g i ve 
an i mmense amount of s a ti s f a ctio n fr om one end of t he l and 
98 
to the other.• 
The Soviets we r e d eep ly a l arme d , I z ve stia poi nting to 
the Obse rve r's edi t o ri a l c h a nge as p r oof o f a powe rfu l 
anti-Sovie t plot. Litvinov sa i d t ha t this " th r ea t t o 
peace" wa s intende d to mask Brita in' s se r i ous domes tic and 
99 
foreig n p rob l e ms . From Moscow Hodg s o n wrote t ha t a l-
thoug h the Sovie t s prev i o us ly h a d c on ju r ed up bog u s wa r 
scare s for politi c a l r e ason s , he now be l i e ve d t hey ge nuine ly 
feared wa r. Since Britain wa s t he g r e atest bourgeoi s power , 
they assume d s he was "co - o r di na t i ng a nd di r ec ting " the 
100 
"impe r ia l i s ts " f or a n a l l- out a ttack . 
9 6
oail 1 il , Fe b . 19, 1927, p . 9 . Fo r simi l a r state -
Bl.laink in, \a i sky , p . 61- 62 . 
97Th T i mes , Fe b . 5, p . 12 , F b . 7 , 1927 , p . 16 . See 
a s pe ecl by lli lliam Br i dgema n (F i r s t Lo r of e Ad -
Dai ly Mai l , Feb . 7 , 19 7 , p . 8 . 
98The Ti es , Fe b . 17, 192 7, p . 10 . 
99 Ob s e rve r, Fe b . 6 , 1927, p . 20; for Li t v i nov ' s state -
to t he Cen tra l Exe cu ti ve Comm i tt e of e Sov ie t , s ee 
t Docum n ts , II , 1 56-58 . 
100 Hodg s on t o Ch ambe rla in , J a n. 28 , 19 27, Bri ti s h Docu-
s, ser . l a , I I , 776 - 7 8 . Fo r a t y p i c al Sov l e c acc usa t 1o n 
a i t i s h-ins pired il i ta r y t h r ea t , see he Ti~e s , Jan . 
1 192 7 , p . 11. 
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Against this backdrop each Cab inet min i ste r con-
sidered the feasibility of sending Chambe rla i n' s protest. 
Their notations p rovide t he fulle s t accoun t of t he Cabinet's 
differing vi ews on Russian po licy during Ba l dwin ' s second 
governme nt. Dirlcenhead and Churchill, both "rightists," 
thought the conclusion was too feeble in light of the 
evidence preceding it. Bi rk enhead wanted to end the note 
with a d ec l a ration tha t relations would be broken unless 
the anti-British c ampaign a t home and ab roa d ce~~ed "forth-
with." Churchill be lieved the loss of Bri ti s h li fe in 
101 
China should be the primary reason. 
Thei r comments were ci rcul a t ed to othe r ministe r s . 
Balfour, Stee l -Maitland , and Cecil , al l "centrists ," wa nted 
a protes t, bu t they agre e d t hat Birke nhe ad ' s conclusion 
would, in Cecil's word s , " shoot t he bolt ." Stee l-Ha itland 
feared a situation "worse th an a t p r esen t" if t he gover ent 
note withou t f irst being prepa r ed to break . one 
mini s er s desired a b r e k . B lfour believed it 
international t ensions . Stee l- it l and 
t he note should end wit h a "stern neg tive to 
of closer r elations ." Cecil simp ly wa n t ed to 
th t pub l ic opinion could not be re s trained much 
by Dirkenhcad on the Foreig n Of fice draf t 
1927, c ,B 24/1 84; memo r a ndum by Chu r chill , 
CAB 24/1 85 . 
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102 longe r. Cunl iffe - Lis t e r cautioned tha t i f a r upture 
occurred , the Sovie t s probably would stop purchasing in 
Britain and defaul t on t he ir c on trac t s , there b y "very 
103 
seriously" damaging t he economy . The Prime ~l i ni s te r 
did not want to d i s turb in t erna t iona l af fa i r s or unite 
104 
Labour mode r a t es a nd ex tremists . Godfrey Locker - L pson 
sugges t e d r esc inding the Tr ade Agreemen t : if t he So vie t s 
the n b roke r e l ations , t he onus would r est with them . 10 5 
Foreig n Offi ce c i v il s e r v ants fi ly oppos e d a 
protes t. J. D. Gr egor y r easoned that e ve n a "mi l d bomb -
shell " could i ncre a se t he powe r of German !ational i ts n 
would f ue l Pi lsudsk i ' s " g r owing truculence . " Sir Willi am 
106 Tyrr e ll conc ur r ed . Robert ~odgson a r g ued t h t los cow 
102 lf . f Ba ou r t o Ch ambe rl a 1n , J a n. 26 , 1927 , Ba l ou r 
Pape r s , Add . ~IS , 49 736 ; emorandum y S t ee l- I i t1 and , F b . 
8, 1927 , CA 24 / 1 84; Cec i l t o Chambe rla i n , Feb . 17 , 1 27, 
Austen Ch ~er1 in a pe r , AC 54/97 . 
1 03
r1e mo randum b y Cunli f f e -Li s t e r, Jan . 28 , 192 7, 
CAB 24/1 84 . He a e nde d a e t il e , twe nty-s e ve n age 
analysi s of An 1o-Soviet tra e . 
10 4
ch amb e r l ain t o a 1f o ur , J an . 22 , 1927 , FO S00 /260 . 
l OS Godf r ey Locke r-Lamps on to 'y rre1 1 , Feb . 1 5 , 1 927 , 
800/227 0 
106 1inute by Greg o ry , Jan . 24, 19 27 , and minu t e b y 
r e ll, J a n . 25, 19 7 , b o th atta ched to a me ora nd y 
r 1 a in , Jan . 24 , 1 92 7, FO 371/12 58 9 . Labo urites o f ten 
t h a t Fore i g n 0 ice civil se rva n t s s oug h t t o seve r 
i ons with R ss ia ny time s d uri ng the deca e ; e . g . , 
n, The ir s t La bour Gove r e nt , pp . 260 - 61. A1thoug 
ory and t l e o t h e r s we r u s taun c l an ti-Do l shevi k , t r e 
us Fo r e i g n Of fice e mo r anda uri ng ese mon t s 
stra t e t hei r tre me c a u tio . 
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would interp r e t a protes t eithe r as a confes s ion of weak ne s s 
or as a prelude to a r up t ure. A controve r s y over t he no t e ' s 
contents would negate t h e orig inal inte nt. Mo r ove r, it 
would reinforce t he ir b e lie f in Briti s h hos tility b ut wo uld 
not cha nge the ir poli c y. 1-iod g s on sugge s t ed t ha t Chambe r l a in 
merely should t e ll the Sovie t s that ~~y s houl d not be 
surprised at interna tion a l r e vul s ion agains t th e ir propa-
107 
ganda o f f e ns ive . Othe r Britisn diploma t s r eported U1a t 
a break would be vi e •,.e d unfavor ab ly on the Contine nt. The 
dispatch of Sir Ronald Linds y , t he ambass a do r in Be rlin, 
was espe cially inci s ive . lie wa nte d t he gove r nme nt to 
realize tha t t he y we r e engaged in "a ne w k i nd o f wa r, • an 
ideolog ical conflict f o ug h t with wo r ds . By forci ng a b r eak 
Brita in mi ght conve rt "the present peculia r strugg l e into 
an a rmed c onfl ic t of t he old f a s h i one d s o r t ." Ins t e ad of 
risking t h i s , t he go v r e n t should r e t a l i a te witn a n 
economi c boyco tt, c o un t e r p ro ag anda , and dip l om t ic p r essu r e 
on neutral na tio ns . 1 08 In s um , the a r g ume n t s aga ins t a 
break s eeme d t o o utwe i gh t he advantag s . 
On Feb rua ry 1 6 nd 17 t he Cab i ne t c on s i de r e d the 
107 Hodg s on to Chambe r l ai n , Feb . 4, 19 2 7, FO 371/1 25 89 . 
108Lindsay to Gregory , Fe b . 3, 19 27, Si r Robe rt Gr aham 
(ambass ado r to I t aly ) t o Gregory , Feb . 4, 1927 , S i r Geo r ge 
Clerk (mi ni s t e r t o Turkey) t o Grego r y , Feb . 2, 1 92 7, Er ic 
(mi n i s t e r to F r anc e ) to Gr go ry , Ja n . 26, 192 7, I b i d . 
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effects of a break on inte rnationa l a nd d o me s tic affair s . 
According to Birkenhead the d iscussion was long a nd 
acr imonious, but he be lieved the o pponen t s of a break wo uld 
. 1 b " . . "109 " . preva1 y a narrow ma JOrl ty . Af t e r a nothe r cons1-
derable discuss ion" on Februa ry 1 8 , the Cabine t "ge ne rally" 
decid ed to continue relat i ons beca u se of European "unres t" 
and the absence of a nyth i ng like t he Zino viev lette r to 
justify a sudde n rup ture . But if p r op a gand a continue d, 
public ind ignation woul d make a break "within a f e w months 
almost inev i t ab le." Fina lly , t hey decided to toug he n the 
110 
conclus ion of t he draf t p rotes t. l:eville Chambe rl a in 
sugge s ted , "A con tinuance of suc h a cts as a r e he re c om-
plaine d of mu s t soo ne r or later r end e r i nevitab l e the 
severance o f o r d i nary r e lations .• At the r eque st of Lord 
Eustace Pe rcy , t he note a l so sta t ed tha t the Tr ade Ag r eeme nt 
111 
would be abroga t ed . On Feb rua r y 23 e Cab ine t orde r ed 
109 Cabinet inutes , Feb . 1 6 , Feb . 17, 19 27, CAB 23/54 ; 
nhead to I rwin , eb . 17, 1927, ci t ed by irkenhead , 
, p . 53 7. Before the s econd eet ing Ch ar.lbe rl ain .e t 
a t l eas t o ne b a kbe nch To ry l eace r to ex lain h is 
iti n to e~ : Si r Warden C lcot t e n b ri efed 
e ti ng of I . P . ' s fr o Liverpoo and t he o rth Count r y on 
ruary 1 6 and r e orted t o e Fo r eig n Sec reta ry t ha t t hey 
t ed his r easo n ing "a t t h is rno~en t " ; s e e Ch i lcot t to 
erlain, Feb . 1 7 , 1927 , Austen Ch a-lber l ai n Papers , AC 5 4/ 
I f Chambe r lain also t a l ked t o o e rs and fou nd s i i l a r 
mi g ht ave mentioned i t a t e f ol low i ng Cabine t 
o l s t e r his case . 
110 
ab" . 23/54 C 1ne t m1nutes , Feb . 1 8 , 19 27, CAB • 
111 . Felling , The Life of e vill e Ch~~berl a in , p. 154; 
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, 112 
the revised protest sent immediately to the Soviet charge. 
A few newspapers backed the note unequivocally. The 
Daily Telegraph called it a clear exposition. The Times 
praised the documentation of Soviet aims but wondered if 
they would comply. The ;.:estern Mai l was doubtful because 
their leaders "know nothing of decency and fair play." 
J. L. Garvin agreed that if t heir "mad dog" tactics con-
tinued, Britain had no choice but to sever r e l a tions and 
113 
organize counterpropaganda . Some "conciliatory" journals, 
however, questioned the government's wi sdom . The Spectato r 
and the Saturday Review feared greater unrest on the 
Continent. The Dai ly Express and Time and Tide clai ed th a t 
it pushed the two coun tries toward the break t hey both 
firmly o pposed; they added that the Soviets also could 
114 
complain of intemperate rema r k s by certain Conservatives . 
Percy to Austen Chamberlain , Feb . 21, 19 27, Ch ambe rlain to 
Percy, Feb . 22, 1927, Auste n Chambe rlain Pape rs, AC 54/ 
415, AC 54/417. 
112
cabinet inute s , Feb. 23, 192 7, CAH 23/54. For t.he 
note, see Ch ambe rl a in to Great 
Britain, Par l i a ment , 
and Command ), ( Rus s ia no . 1, 1 7 ), C 
lis Maje sty ' s Gove r nmen t to t he Gover e nt of t.he Un ion of 
Soviet Socia l ist Re publics Res ecting the e l a tions Existing 
tween t he T\.Jo Gove r nments nd ote in Rep ly," (London , 
27), pp. 2-20. 
113
oaily Te l egra h , Feb. 24, 192 7, p. 10; The T. es , 
• 24, 1927 , p . 15 ; We stern Hail , Feb . 25 , 1 927 , p . 6 ; 
rver, Feb . 27, 1 927, p. 1 6 . 
114 Specta tor , CX.XXVIII (Feb . 26, 1927), 309; Sa turdav 
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The Daily Mai l attacked the note for the o pposi te reason: 
As a display of feeblenes s and 'funk,' Sir Austen 
Chamberlain' s longhe ralded note of protest to the 
Soviet r epresentative in Londo n will make the blood 
of every self-respecting Briton ting le in his 
veins •••• We have hea r d a ore fo rmi dab le 
scolding given by an elde rly lady to her Pekinese 
in Hyde Park.ll5 
In a rare disagreemen t with the Da ily ~1ail, the Morning Post 
welcomed the note , hoping the governme nt henceforth would 
work for •European unanimity• on the Russian problem. It 
concluded, •If the Soviet means war on Chri stendom it is 
h . 1 1 . ,. 116 for C r~stendom as a who e to buck e lts armour. 
Tory zealots were not pleased . Guy Kinde rsley 
believed the note differed little from its unsuccessiul 
Alfred Knox wanted a •little more of th e 
Cr()l;!We ll touch." For Oliver Locke r- Lamp s on it was "a 
proclama tion to the world tha t we will take almo s t any 
117 
humiliation lying down." Even Tories defending it u sed 
. 118 lang uag e against the Sov~ets . Lord Birkenhe ad 
~~-""' CXLIII (Feb . 26 , 1927), 291; 
cited by Dila inkin , I aisky , p . 
4, 1927 ) 1 201. 
115oaily Ma il, F eb . 24 , p. 8 , Feb. 25, 192 7, p. 8. See 
Nat~o n al Rev~ew, LX XX IX (March, 1927), 30- 32 . 
116 . 10 Morn~ng Post, Feb . 24, 1927, p. . 
117
oaily Mai l, Feb. 25, 1927, p. 9. 
118 For s peeches Robe rt Horne , and 
y lvood , see T 
, and Bi lainkin~,~~~~~ 
p. 10, lla rch 1, 1927 , 
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was relieved, for the problem soon would b e solved "one way 
119 
or the other." 
Izvestia called the note a farce, and the Sovie ts 
organized mass d emons trations in protes t. The interim 
British charg~ in Hoscow, William Pe ters, reporte d th a t 
~great nervousne ss is being di sp l a yed in Soviet circles." 120 
In the official r e ply Litvinov contended t ha t Britain wa nted 
to squelch fre e s peech. He cited a n wnb e r of anti-Sovi e t 
statements by Tory newspape rs, mini s t ers , a nd ba c kbe nch e r s 
to demonstrate tha t Britain "de libe r a t e ly d e parts from 
generally accep t ed interna tio n a l s t anda r ds and cus t o ms and 
even elementa ry dece ncies ." Instead of is s uing s e lf-
ultima t ums, Ch ambe rlai n should conce n t r a t e on 
1 . f h . 1 f . 121 r e at~o ns o r t e 1 r mu tu a be ne 1 t. 
Chambe rl a in told Chu r ch ill t ha t he was especia lly 
ne d wi th t he z ea l o t s ' r es o nse . Al ong with t h e Dail y 
t he y confron t ed him wi t h a " fo r mi d ab l e comb ina tio n ." 
am a f ore i g n minister . I ha ve t o 
t he c o ns eque nces a n t o l ook f a r be yond t he l i mi ts 
119
airkenhe ad to Irwi n, Feb . 24, 1927, cited by Bi rken-
' ~· p. 537. 
120The T i me s , March 1, p . 14, Feb . 26 , 192 7 , p . 19 ; 
to Ch . e rl ain , Ha r ch 11, 19 27 , r iti sh Doc ume nts , 
(Londo n, 19 70 ), pp . 86 - 88 . 
121Litvi nov to Pete rs , Feb . 26 , 192 7, So v i e t Doc ume n t s , 
159-63. 
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of their horizon." Since the zealots did not u nderstand the 
complexities of foreign policy , he anticipated their hostile 
122 
reception of the note. 
Likewise, Chamber l ain was not su rprised by t .i1e 
res ponse of o thers . British diplomats re ported grea t 
excitement in Europe. If a break did come , Chambe rlain 
believed that t .he Continent now would absorb the shoc k more 
easily than if it had come unexpected ly. The Soviet r ep ly 
was, as usu a l, "offensive and i mpe rtine nt," but the 
Foreign Secretary still ho ped they would be s obered by 
. 123 
the warn1ng. 
On 11arch 3 Commons discussed Russia . The Op osition 
t he gove r nme nt with equ a l re sponsi b ility for the 
troub l es . According to MacDonald , "Take ou r 
Excheque r, put a beard on him, make him 
talk Russian instea d of Eng l i s h , a nd beho ld, you have 
124 linovief f." Lloyd Georg e ag r eed , addi ng t hat other 
statesme n never abuse t he Sovi ts in publ ic. 125 
to C urch ill , Feb . 22 , 192 7, Aus t e n 
AC 35/1/19 . 
to Lindsay , ~arch 1, 1927, I b id. , AC 54/ 
See also Chambe rlain to Cr we ( ambassador~France ), 
• 24, 1927 , Briti s h Docume nts , s e r . la , III, 49 . 
124 h . . b ( h 3 For 1 s ent1re spee ch , s ee De a t es , CCIII 1arc , 
), cols. 616-26. 
125
rbi d ., col s . 635-43. 
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But the apparent conversion of two promine nt Tory 
backbenchers to the zealots ' vi ewpoint indica ted waning 
confidence in the gove r nmen t. Robe rt Horne confessed that 
his long- s t anding belief abou t the Sovie t s was wrong ; the y 
really were more interes t ed in fo stering r e volution t han 
trade. There wa s no d if feren ce be tween the Third Inter-
national and the Sovie t gove rnme nt: "The Russian Gove r nme nt 
has just done in this matter wh a t s o many croo k s have done 
in business in this count ry , when the y inco r porate a c om-
pany to do t he ir dirty work for them . " Soviet activities 
in China convinced !!orne t hey we r e ob livious to prote s t 
note s . In his view a break would r e invigorate Drita in ' s 
126 
authority a nd aid Eu r o ea n peace a nd reconstruction . 
The second backbench conve rt to t he h a r d line was 
Doothby , parli e nta ry riva te s ec r e t a ry t o t he 
Chancellor of the ex c heque r a nd previous ly a staunch 
•concili a tor." A member of t he To ry d e l egation wh ic h had 
visite d Russia in April , 19 26 , h i s o licy s ugge s t i ons h a d 
f h . . 127 f . . to t hose o t e Oppos lt on . A t e r r e vlewlng 
s t and , Bo o hby all eged t a t Soviet activit ie s 
t he g e ne ral s trike and in China d emo ns tra t e d t he ir 
re to des troy t h e Brit i s Emp ire : " It may be t he g r e t 
le of t he twentieth centu r y an . . we shall have to 
12 6 Ib id., c o ls. 608-17 . 
127 . f h . See A p nd lx II o r t e t rl . 
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res is t it by every me ans in our powe r," In the event of 
another outrage , public p r essu r e would forc e a rupture . 
Even the t ermination of the Trade Agreemen t would not hurt 
Britain, "I do not th ink we should lose much , because we 
have not much ." Surprised b y Boothby ' s about-face , 
Labourite Philip Snowden attributed it to Churchill ' s 
•mesme ric influence" and sugges te that if Boothby "con-
tinues to crawl along the hedge bottoms he will be a n 
. 128 
Unde r-Secretary before very l ong . " 
At t he end of the debate Austen Chambe rlain 
e mphasized the futility of nego ti a ting a new accord when 
Rus si a continued to violate the Tr ade Agreeme nt . The go-
vernmen t did not s e v e r r e l ations on ly because it would 
react against British inte r ests in troub l ed e astern Europe . 
note a llowe d t e Con tinen t to adjus t to a 
ach and offe red the Soviets one o r e chance t o 
Labourites f o r ced a divis ion , bu t no Tories 
them; t he z ea lots p robab l y w re s atisf i ed th a t 
prot s t was in e ff ect a n ult ima t um . 
lost Tory pa e rs , i eluding 
wi th Ch ambe rl a in ' s intimation t h at e Soviets had 
l 2 8oe a te s , CCIII ( 1 re i 3 , 1 9 27) , co ls . 6 56 -64. Se e 
Olive r Locker-Lampson ' s ty p i ca l outburs t, cols . 643-
129 I bid ., cols. 626-34. 
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i d f . 1 i 130 rece ve a ~na wa rn ng. But the Spectator urg ed the 
governmen t not to be stampeded into a move t .hey might r egret . 
The Saturday Revie w asserted that Chambe rl ain was pressured 
into writing the note "against the dictate~ of his own 
commo n sense." 
It is time that some of his colleag ues in the 
Cabine t--thos e N. Litvi noff me ntions in his Note, 
for example--realized t hat th e y are enacing 
European stability , lowe ri ng Briti sh prestige and 
prevent ing t he r ap i d re cove ry of Bri tish ind ustry 
by speeches which win easy app l ause from ill-
educa t ed audiences , but which show a l amentable 
lack of th a t deepe r pat r iotism wh ich demands steady 
and unse nsational efforts to bring prosperity and 
peace to Great Britain . lJl 
The appeal went unheeded . Joynson-Hicks and Birkenhead 
continued to de nou nce t he Sovi e t s . 132 Other Cabine t 
colleagues joined t hem . 133 Horne , Alfred Mond, Auckland 
Geddes , and other p rominent Tories soon demanded the ex-
of the Soviets . 1 34 
1 30 oa il y Ha il, Ha rch 4, 19 27, p . 10; Observe r, March 6 , 
1927, p . l6; The i me s , Ma rch 4, 19 27, p . 15 . 
131
spe ctator , CXXXVIII (Ma rch 5, 192 7), 353; Sa tu rday 
Revi e•..; , C LIII (Ma rch 5 , 1927), 341-4 2 . 
1 32 . 
For a speech b y Joynson - !! ~cks , see 
1927, p. 18. Birkenhead ' s s e eches can 
s, March 8 , p . 1 8 , Ma rc h 17, p . 16 , Hay 
he Time s , Ma rch 
b e found in The 
7, 1 92 7, p . 7"': 
133 E . g ., spee ches by Hoare and Hogg in Ibid. , Ma rch 10, 
8, Marc h 12, 1927 , p. 7. 
134
r bid ., March 26, p. 7, April 8, p . 9, April 11, 
27, p. - 9-.-
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These attacks continued eve n afte r Chiang Kai-shek 
purged Sovie t advisors and sympathizers from the Na tionalist 
. . 135 
moveme nt ~n Aprll. The l eaders of the "Clear out t he 
Reds Campaign " secur ed the prohibi tion of t he Red flag from 
the Stratford-on-Avon c e r emon ies ma r k ing Shakespeare 's birth 
136 date. A month l ater t hey t eamed with the Dai l y -!a i l to 
boycott Russian Oi l Products , Limi t ed , a Soviet ma r ke ting 
agency in Britain which they claimed sold oil sto l e n from 
prewar Brit ish concessions . They were especiall y piqued 
by its a dve rti semen t in t he London t e le phone d ire ctory . On 
May 3 the Pos t Office ag ree d t o p rohib it it in t he future . 137 
Sovie t anxi e ties peaked . Rykov , t he premier , 
t he Briti sh note was the signal fo r another Wes t ern 
of Russia . As proof he cited a r e cen t Italian 
which recog nized Rum nia ' s o ccu ation of Be s s arabia , 
Russ i a in 1918. lle accused ory poli ticians and 
138 
of working to annihilate or isolate Russia . 
135 d ' 1 For t he e ta~ s , s ee orth and Eudi n, M. N. Roy ' s 
i on to Chin a , pas sim. 
136 Coates , A History of Ang lo-Soviet Re l a ti o ns , pp . 238-
137 
Ibid ., p. 266; Bi l a inkin, Ma i sky, p . 65. 
138 
Eudin and Fisher , eds. , So vie t Russ i a and the West , 
371-74. This the e was r e ea t ed c on tan tly ; s ee a n 
Pravda and the ~1 y Day manifesto issued b y the 
The Tl.11le s , 1-1arch 8 , p. 16 , 1-lay 2 , 1927 , p. 14. 
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The allegation was not entirely unfounded. On 
March 3 the Morning Post stated: 
What would be of service, if it could be attained, 
would be a European understa nding directed to the end 
of disinfecti ng the worl d from Bol s hevi sm , and , in 
particular, confining it to its chief plague - spot in 
Russia. If the Gover nme nt we re to induce the r es t of 
Europe to combine with th m in such a policy , the n we 
might re a lly ge t to the busine s s . • • • It would be 
a great crus ade; a t hing worth doing , and it would 
have a bene f icial r e sult of bring ing Europe toge t her 
for the common safety.l39 
Oliver Locker-Lampson had exp ressed a similar thought during 
his parliamentary spe ech on March 3; 
If you want pe ace you mu s t fi gh t for it ...• Do 
we mea n a peace which entitle s e v e ry outcast of 
the underwo rl d to wipe his boots u pon the Union 
Jack? This is not the so r t of pe a ce we wa nt . he 
olive branch m y be an admirab l e we apo n for 
communities wh ich are civil ized , but for the 
anthropoid a pe s of the l s he vik jung le g ive me 
the big stick, ye s , and t he bigge r boot .l 40 
But aside from these iso late d e x amp les, Torie s did not 
demand milit a ry a c tio n. Some zealots a nd ne ws p ape r s e x-
plicitly r ejected t he i dea. 141 On Harch 8 Austen Chambe rlain 
"lve have never tried to d o it and ne ver shall. "142 
es pecially upse t with those Tories who s e remarks 
139 . h 1 7 10 Morn1ng Post, Marc 3, 92 , p. . 
140oebates , CCIII (March 3, 1927 ), col. 650 . 
Daviso n in The Ti mes, 
12, 1927 )' 
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reinforced Soviet fears. In late February he was informed 
that Henry Page Croft had told a group of German Nation-
alists that European Conservatives should unite to resist 
Bolshevism. Page Croft, whom Chambe rlain describe d as "a 
good fellow, but a politician of the Mo rning Post type--
more zeal and patriotism th an judgeme nt,• received a stern 
lecture. 143 On May 8 the Foreign Secretary confes sed 
failure in private, "Nothing that I or others say •. 
appears in any way to loosen the obses sion which h a s taken 
hold • of the Soviet Governrnent.• 144 
In his public speeches during the spring , Chambe r-
lain stressed tha t the deci s ion to mai ntain r e lat ions would 
be vindicated. 145 But on April 27 he wrote that Sovi e t 
143Lindsay to Chambe rl ain, Feb . 26 , 1927, Chambe rlain 
to Lindsay, Narch 1, 192 7, Austen Chambe rlain Papers , AC 54/ 
334, AC 54/33 5 . 
144
chambe rlain to Sir Ge orge Gr aharne (ambassador to 
Belgium), May 8, 1 27 , I id. , AC 54 / 33 . Ch ambe rlai n 
apparently di s r eg a r d e d Hodgso n's adv i ce on how to answe r 
the Soviet alle ga t i ons . I ns t ead of . ere ly denying them , the 
British c harges ggested that the Foreign Secre t a ry slou l d 
atate in positive t erms t hat hi s a t enp ts to i p rove r e -
lation s had been neg t ed by t he ovi ts ' e r s i stent obsti-
nacy. Their t a ctic s alone l ed to t e c r eat ion of a " c om-
ity o f i nt rest in the countries r e atened or a ssailed ." 
t ook th is s tand because "I f ee l st r ong ly the 
s i ty of showing u p the Soviet Gove r e nt and it s Party , 
being a peri l to Europea n civili sation , bu t as be ing 
d nuisance t o everybody and a rn i ss ibl e to r e l a tions 
1 interna tiona l comity only whe n it abandons its 
ling propens iti es" ; see Hodgson to Gr egory , Ma rch 2, 
The l e tte r probab ly w s circul a t ed within the gove rn-
because a copy i s in the aldwin Pape r s , val . 115 , 
• 234-37 . 
145The T ime s , April 8 , 19 27 , p . 9. 
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propaganda had not subsided. Although still f earing the 
consequences of a break, he admitted: "It may at any mome nt 
become impossible any longe r to maintain the semblance of 
di 1 . . ,.146 p omat~c relat~ons. 
Chamberlain's r ema rk verified the success of the 
Tory zealots. The turmoi l in China, coming so soon after 
the general ·strike, l ed a number of "centrists" and some 
•conciliators" to change the ir views on Russia . The strong 
reactions of J. L. Garvin and Robe rt Boo thby to t he events 
in China are telling indicators of a fundamenta l s ift of 
Tory s entime nts. Chamberlain's ultimatum i s anothe r. As 
usual, ne ither t he Pr ime lin iste r nor Chamberlain appar ntly 
tried to stop the anti-Soviet s e che s of certain Cab inet 
Of al l Tory l eaders , only Lord Irwin in I ndia 
cone rn ove r this shift. 147 Unde r the zealots' 
fir e , Chamberlain ' s g r asp on Russian o licy s eeme 
weakening r ap i d ly . 
14 6 1 . . . . 1 ( . . t Chambe r a ~n to s~ r F ranc~s L~ n e y ~n ~s e r to 
y), A ril 27 , 1927 , h u s t e n Charrbe rl a i n Pa crs , AC 54/ 
See also Chamber l ain to s c ll owar (ambassado r to 
Unite States ), A ril 25 , 192 7, Au s t en Ch e rlain 
s, AC 54 / 264 . 
147Irwi n to Cecil , pri l 6 , 1927 , Ceci l Papers , Add . 
, 510 84. Th is lette r a lso conta i ned a n umbe r of o bj e c t ions 
rupture. All ud in o its effec s , h st te : "If you 
suffic i ently far a wa y from a sing l e hor s e h e can g ive 
very e fecti ve k ick ; but if you are among a d oz e n 
sin a r ailway-truck , they c annot hur l you ." 
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C H A P T E R X 
THE BREAl< 
The Arcos Raid 
On May 12, 1927 150 Londo n police invaded Soviet 
House, the headquarte rs of the Russ ian T rade Delegation and 
Arcos, a Soviet trading company incor ora t ed unde r nritish 
1 
laws. Each floor wa s searched me t hodica lly. Po lice 
used pneuma tic d rills to ope n r e inforced doors and safes , 
carting away truckloads of docume nts du ring t he five-day 
search . Scotland Yard and the gove r nme nt at fir s t r ema ined 
silent . On May 16 Joynson- Hi cks revea l ed t hat an "o ffici a l 
docume nt" was or had been in the hands of an Arcos e p l oyee . 
He clai e d to h a ve obt a ined a search wa rrant after consult-
ing with the Prime Ministe r a nd t he For ign Sec r e t ary . 
t he pape r had not bee n found ye t , the au t ho r itie s 
2 
were exanining the con fi sca t ed materials . 
Soviet charg ~ Ro s e ngolz d e nounce d t he r aid as a 
flagrant viol a tion of t he Trade Agree e nt , which g ranted 
diploma tic i mm unity and exem ted s e aled courier bags from 
He also c o 1 ined t hat t e searc wa rrant had not 
presen ted i mmediate ly and t ha t police had fri sked 
t he r a i d , see Coa t es , A 
p . 26 7- 69 . 
915, 916 . 
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3 
female employees . On Ma y 17 Litvinov charged that this 
"reckless" action had been i nspired by the "hate " Russ ia 
campaig n, "which was meeting with g r owing encouragement 
4 
from membe rs of the Briti sh Gove r nmen t." British papers 
5 
reported gre a t p rotest demo nstr a tion s in the Soviet Union. 
Even before the detai l s of t he raid were known , a 
few extremis t Co nse rva tive journals a pp l auded and asked for 
6 
a diploma tic break . The Dai ly Te l e g raph , the Weste r n Mai l, 
and the Observer we re less e nthusiastic . Almost alone , t he 
Satu r day Review protes t ed: "If we do not ours e lves strictly 
observe the terms of our Ag r e me n t with Russia , we hope l ess -
ly weake n our c ase when we protes t a ga in s t he r v iolations of 
i "7 t. 
Some of the confi scated doc umen t s i mp l icat d t he 
De l ega t ion in espionag e . On May 18 Joynson-Hic ks 
circul ated the evi e nce to his colleag ue s . The next day the 
appointed a commit t ee to fo rmu l ate a state e nt; t he 
included Cave , irkenhe a d , Ce ci l, J oy nson-llicks , 
3 The Times , May 14 , 1917, p . 12 . 
4Litvinov to eters , May 17, 19 27 , Sov iet Doc ume nts , 
, 375-77. 
5The Time s , May 14, 192 7 , p . 14. 
6Morning Post , lay 14, 1927, p . 10; Daily ai l, 
13, 1927 , p . 10 . 
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8 
Austen Chamberlain, Worthington-Evans, and Hogg . At their 
first meeting Chamberlain charged that the Home Secretary's 
draft was "so weak in form as to amount practically to a 
confession of failure." The Fore i g n Secretary propose d a 
"justification indeed so complete ... that it must almost 
certainly involve the dismissal of the Scviet mission." 
Ironically the Home Secretary protested that Chamberlain's 
draft was "spattered over with 'D a ily Mai l' adjective s which 
made it re ad like one of Que x' s Spy novels." When dis-
cussion resumed on r•!ay 20 the committee a ppointed Lord Cave 
to draw up a compromi se stateme nt which wa s acc ep t e d that 
9 
afternoon. Cave did not me ntion a seve rance of relations . 
Several Cabine t mi niste r s opposed a break . Ba l fou r 
to ask the Soviets for sugges tions on r epl a cing 
dip l omacy , wh ich h d de volved i nto a "sinis t er 
of l eg itimate tr a de with il l eg i tina t e ropa anda . " 
Eustace Percy r easone d t ha t altho ug h t he r aid proved t he 
Delegat ion , it did "not necessarily" 
Sovi e t policy . The u s u a l p r ac tice in such 
noted , was to expe l t he gui lty but not to seve r 
8
cabinet minutes, May 1 9 , 1 92 7, CAB 23/55. 
9 
Chamberlain t o Ba l d,,.rin , ;1ay 1 9 , 19 27 , Aus t en Chamber-
Papers , l\C 38/3/2; Joynson-! iick s to a l dwin , r1a y 20, 
, Ba l dwin Pape r s , vol. 11 5 , p . 23 8 . The committee d id 
kee p minutes , and t e d r afts by Joynso n-Hicks and 
rl ain appa r ent l y have bee n l os t. 
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relations, because this always was interpre t ed as "an intra-
duction to a state of war.~ He conceded tha t a "comp lete 
breach may, and probably must, follow, but if it does follow 
it will come from Moscow and not from us.~ Viscount Cecil 
later questioned the evidenc e from the raid, adding that he 
10 
would not have touched Arcos for econon ic re asons . 
On May 23 the Cabinet accep t ed Cave 's draft and by 
•general agreemen t" ap roved the cance llation of t he Trade 
Agreeme nt and the t ermi n a tion of dip l omat ic relations. 
Chamberlain acq uiesced after the Cabinet agreed to publish 
11 
the incriminating e vidence . Tha t afternoon he added t he 
decision to tl e d ra f t and asked Ba l dwin to make the 
12 
announceme nt t he next day . 
Addressing a packed lio us e the Prime Hinister stated 
the authoritie s had bee n inves t i g a ting a group of 
secret a gen ts who were trying to obtain clas s ified military 
Russia . Ea rly in the y ea r a civilia n employ e 
of the military was convi c t ed of assi ng s e cret pape r s to 
Soviet Trade Delegation whic~ sent t hem to Russ i a . 
10
aal four to Ch ambe rl a in, I ay 20 , 1927, Balfour Pape r s , 
NSS , 49736 ; e rcy to Chamberlai n, :-lay 19, 1927, Austen 
rlain C 54/41 8 ; i scou n t Cecil, A Grea t 
men t: an A (: e w York , 19 41), p . 1 8 3. 
11
cabinet minutes , May 23, 192 7, CAB 23/55. 
12
chamber l ai n to Baldwin , May 23, 1927, Baldwin Papers , 
• 115, pp. 239-40. 
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Recently, he continued, an "official and highly confidential" 
paper was discovered missing and "documentary evidence" 
proved it had been given to the Trade Delegation. Although 
it was not recove r e d in the raid, othe r seized ma terials 
revealed tha t both Arcos and the Trad e De lega tion ~ere 
engaged in military espionage and subversive activities 
"throughout the British Empi r e a nd North and Sou th 1\me rica." 
As proof he cited a Soviet dispatch showing t h t a Trade 
Delegation member had been assigned to Br itain specifically 
for espionage. Nume rous letters to ·~ell-known Communist 
individuals and organiza tions" in Brita in and overseas 
contained directive s from the Profintern . One docume nt 
described how to subve rt the crews of Briti sh sh ips , a nd 
another included a list of s e cret cove r addresses of 
Communist partie s in Ame rica and t he Emp ire. The g ove r nme nt 
also secured from other uns ecified sources a Fore i gn 
dispatch demonstrating t ha t Mi chae l Borod in 
received his o r de r s from Mos cow, and a teleg r am f rom 
domes tic d i st ribu tion of an ti-
British stateme nts b y Chinese ationa li s t s . The Prime 
concluded : 
Diploma tic r e lations when thus de libe r ate ly and 
systematically abuse are t emselves a dange r t o 
peace and His Hajesty ' s Gover en t have e r e o r e 
decided that unless t he ~ouse exp r ess s its 
disapproval on Thu r sday , they will t e r mi nate the 
Trade Ag r ee e n t, r equire the withd r awa l o t he 
Trade De l egation an Sov i et :·lis sion f r om London 
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and recall the British Mission from Moscow . The 
legitimate use of
3
Arcos is unaffected by these 
decisions. 
Labour M.P.'s put down a mo tion for a select 
committee to determine if Russia was guilty. Two Tory 
motions were submitted. One "applauded" the government' s 
decision, the othe r " approved" it. The sponsors of the 
former motion, including Gervais Rentoul , Harold Macmillan, 
Arthur Hope, and Frederick Hall,seemed elated. E . Hilton 
Young, Edward Cadogan, Anthony Eden , Ralph Glyn , and Oliver 
Stanley, the authors of the latter, apparently fe lt the 
governme nt had no c hoice . 14 The views of Hilton Young and 
"concili a tors," perhaps reflected the 
of other backbenche rs who previously had urged 
on the gove r nme nt. 
In introducing the Labour motion on May 26, J. R. 
s stated tha t t he raid epitomized the Tories ' hatred 
He warned that the break would increase inter-
al tensions, r educe trade , and intensify Sovie t 
The Blue Book on the seized doc ume nts was a 
15 
t dive rting , c omi c pub lication ." 
13 Deba tes, CCVI (~l a y 24, 1927), eels . 1842-49 . The 
doc ents on China a y have come into Bri t i s h hands a s a 
t of an April raid on t he Soviets ' Peking emb assy by 
Chinese governmen t; see · e s , Hay 6, 1 92 7, 
14The Times , Hay 25, 1927, p. 16. 
CCVI ( ~1 ay 26, 19 27 ), cols. 2195-2204 . 
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Believing that Soviet guilt was establishe d beyond 
any doubt, Chamberlain would not accept a select co ittee. 
He also cited othe r incr iminating documents: "We have 
pushed patience to the point at which furthe r persistence in 
it would b e weakness or acquiescence in dupery ." Continue d 
diplomatic t ies al so would be a "continual source of 
irritation and d a nger " to the world. He use d the examp le 
of the United Sta t es to show that trade with Russ ia was not 
dependent upon a c omme rcial ag r eeme n t or diploma tic r e cog-
16 
nition. In e ssence he now adop t e d the zealots ' arguments . 
Lloyd Ge orge belie ve d tha t Ch ambe rlain 's hand ha 
forced by " ho t headed " Joynson- Hicks . Ch ambe rlain's 
justifica tion for t he Ar cos r aid was "feeb l e" because every 
government engaged in espionage . Had Ll oyd Ge or e been 
would have withdrawn the s e c i 1 
privileges o f the Trade Agreeme nt a nd deported o::. e found 
lty, but he ne ve r would have broke n re l a t io s , "one of 
riskiest and mos t h aza r dous decision s ever t aken y a 
Britain , Parli ame nt , Pa rl iam n a r~ Pa pe rs , (House of 
sand Comma nd ), ( u s s~ a o . 2 , 19 7) , C ::.nd . 2 874 , 
nts I llustr a i n e Host i le Ac iv iti e s of e Soviet 
nt and Thir Internationa l a g ai nst Gr e at Br it in, " 
192 7). The two documen t s on Chin al s o we re 
eels. 22 0 4-1 8 . 
col s . 221 8-3 4. 
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Several Tory backbenchers elaborated on the Foreign 
18 
Secretary's defense . The Home Secretary tried to d e -
monstrate that his personal feelings were irreleva nt. After 
the War Secretary had informed him of the missing document 
on May 11, he consulte d with the Prime Hinister who 
authorized the searc h . lle the n saw Ch ambe rlain who asked 
if he would r eac t as strongly if the document was thought to 
be in a London business house not connected with Russ ia. 
When Joynson-llicks replied affirmatively , Ch ambe rlain said , 
•very well then, raid it. " 19 
Pleased by a Labourite's asserti o n that he and other 
zealots we r e responsible for the break , Oliver Locke r-L pson 
congratulated the gove r nme nt for "making a most effective 
spring cleaning and in get ting ri d of much r ubbish ." The 
olicy o f mode ration had been d ngerous in th e face 
a "fully armed" enemy who understood only brute force . 
casting out the "manure of toscow" Brit a in would deal 
20 
a mo r ta l blow. Eve n Thomas Moo r e , a fo e r 
•conciliato r," belie ve tha t the rcos r e ve l a tions l ef t the 
Co un i sm now shou l d e treated 
"infectious disease ." However , Moore asked for 
18 b ' d !.__2:_. , cols. 2234-40, 2240-4 3, 2284-91. 
19 b ' d !.__2:_. , cols. 2298-2310. 
20 b ' d !.__2:_ • I cols. 2253-56. 
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a retention of the Trade Agreement stripped of the diplo-
matic privilege s: by cutting the trade link Britain would 
21 
add to Europe's economic problems. His plea was ignored. 
Commons endorsed the motion "appl a uding" the gover nment's 
decision by an ove rwhelming vote of 346 to 98. No Tories 
voted with the Opposition , but 26 b ackbe nche rs were paired 
or abstained. 22 
Tory p ape rs offered a v aried res ponse. The Time s 
conceded th a t Eu ropean stability mi gh t s uffe r a nd nee de d 
trade forf e ited , but the "cause of civili sa tion" would be 
harmed by maintaining a "pa l pable fraud." The Da ily Te l e -
~ agre ed that the trade loss was no thing c o par ed to 
the cost of do es t i c unres t fome nted b y "insicious Cornmu-
nistic poison." The Wes t e rn Mai l cried , "Communism mus t 
crime he re." Howe ve r, these pape r s expla i ned that 
23 
co uld be r esumed if t he Sovie ts r epented . 
ne wspapers we re ove rj oye d . The 
its r eade r s with helping the n a tion r es t o r e "it s 
21
rbid ., cols . 2 72 - 79 . 
22The Times , May 28 , 1 92 7, p. 12 . For f avo r ab l e 
nts fro m a numbe r of Tory b ck e nche r s , s e e ~e ste rn 
, Hay 25 , 1 92 7, 9 . Bac enche r Fr ank e lson was 
of those wh o a bsta ined . 
lay 26 , 1927, p . 17; 
12; ~es tern Mail , 
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honour and its freedom." The Morning Post r e gretted t h at 
24 
the move was not taken in conce rt with othe r nations. 
The editor of the Eng li sh ·Re vie w , Erne st Remnant, perhaps 
stated the hopes of "righ ti s t" Torie s whe n he expl a i ned 
that Soviet pre st ige would suffe r a " se rious blow." More-
over, if Britain l e d an economic boycott of Rus sia "the 
25 
Soviet scorpion would sting it5e l f to dea th." 
"Concili a t o ry" jou rn a ls e x p r essed r eg r e t s . Despite 
the irre futabl e c ase aga i ns t Russ i a , t he Spec t a tor f e l t 
Chamberlain's o ft -repea t ed a r gume nts a ga in s t a b r eak re-
mained valid. T ime a nd Tid e cl aime d the "missing docu e ntw 
was a ruse conjured u p b y anti-Bol shevi k ministe r s. The 
Saturday Re v i e w c ha r ged that t he g ove rnme nt was f orced t o 
justify t he ir a uthoriz a tion of the r a i d . In its v iew t he 
only a dvan t ages we r e t ha t the Home Secre t ary a nd the 
26 
the Da i ly M i l wou ld slee p e as i e r. Af t e r 
h a d turned a g ai n s t t he Commu nis t s in Apri l, 
his a d vocacy o f a de t ente . He r e cal l e d t hat 
not s e v e red r e l at ions wi t h Fr a nce or Tu r ke y at 
of t he cen t u ry despite t he i r a nt i-Br i ti sh i ntrigues. 
~~~~M~a~i~l, Ma y 25 , p . 10, Ma y 27, 1927, p. 10; 
H y 26 , 192 7, p . 12. 
25Engli s h Re v i e w , XLIV (J une , 19 27), 647- 50. 
26 
Specta tor , CXXXVIII ( M~y 2 8 , 192 7), 932; Time a nd 
, VII I (Ma y 27 , 19 27 ), 4 81 ; Saturda y Review , CXLII 
28, 192 7), 812-13. 
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In his view, •parliamentary conside rations" forced a break 
27 
at a time when a "constructive solution" was in sight. 
28 Several ministers defended the goverrune n t' s action. 
Alleging that international confidence and security h ad 
improved over the past yea r, Ba lfour predicted no "dele-
29 
terious consequences whateve r." In a surprisingly re-
strained speech Birkenhead explained that Britain's inter-
national prestige would increase . Moreove r, t he Soviets 
would continue to trade because it helped sus tain their 
30 
currency . But in private Birkenhead was l ess guarded: 
Personally I am deli g h t e d , though I th ink we 
ought to have done so the mome nt t he Gene ral 
Election was ove r; a nd I have bee n trying to pro-
cure such a decision e ver since . I am satisfie d 
that we are absolu tel y ri gh t and s hal l sus tain no 
injury o f any kind in c onsequence of this s t ep .. 
We have got r id of t he hypocrisy of p r etending t o 
have fri end ly r e l ations with this gang o f murde r e rs, 
revolutionaries , and t hieves . I breathe quite 
diffe r en tly now U1 a t we have purged our capita l o 
these unclean and t r eache rous el ents . 31 
Even Lord Irwin, a long t i me opponen t of a break, did no t 
Bilainkin, Ma isky , p . 68 , a nd The Time s , 
p. 14. 
Deba t es , LXVII (May 31, 1927), cols. 688-94. 
30 Ibid., cols. 702-6. 
31Birkenhead to Irwin, May 26, 1927, ci ted by Birke n-
, F. E ., pp . 538-39. 
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32 
object. Sir Alfred Mond perhaps stated the dominant Tory 
33 
reaction most succinctly, "Thank God they are going." 
The events of May, 1927 were a landmark in Anglo-
Soviet relations, but many of the details still are unknown. 
As in the Zinoviev letter case, the missing docume nt was not 
found. The i mplicated employees of the Soviet Trade Dele-
gation were not broug.h t to trial, and the governme nt did not 
reveal the link between the 'l'rade Delegation and the alleged 
spy ring. There is no available evidence to prove if the 
raid was a ruse. 
Joynson-Hicks certainly realizec tha t another major 
provocation would mean a break , and s e v e ral Arcos-type r aids 
34 
elsewhere had produced incriminating documents . Governme nt 
officials were aware of the activities at Soviet House . On 
8, 1926 the Foreign Under-Secre t a ry h a d suggested 
32 Irwin to Cecil, July 16, 1927, Cec il Papers , Add . 
51084. 
33 
The Times, June 3, 1927, p . 14. eview , 
IX (July , l927) , 685-92 , 
lots ' r ea ction, s ress ing 
stige and the el imina tion o 
34
on May 4, 192~ German pol ice had invaded the offices 
the Soviet Trade Delega t i on in e rlin. Al ough a Russo -
break did not fo llow , the c aptured doc e nts sugges t ed 
the Sovi ts had been pro o ting mo re tha n trade; see The 
, May 5, 1924, p. 14. And just a month be for e the 
sh r aid , t he o rthern Chinese gove r e nt r aided the 
t embassy in ekin and unearthed evidence doc en ting 
utiona ry activity there. The r aid was g iven wid es r ead 
e in the To ry press; see Obse rve r , May 1, 1927 , p . 16, 
Ti es a y 6, 1927, p. 1 5 . he a tion a l Re view , nn.~~r.7~~-; 927), 318-19 , urged Joyns o. -H1cks t o follow s uit . 
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that if an excuse to sever relations was needed, •I think 
that the Soviet Mission acting as t he transmi tter of c e rtain 
telegrams would of itself justify us.• 35 If Joynson-Hicks 
believed this, a commercial development may have prompted 
him to move quickly. Just a few days before the raid, 
Soviet trade representatives obtained from the London 
Midland Bank i 10 mi llion in long-term credits for industrial 
machinery orde rs. But the contract was not signed yet when 
the police moved . The Home Secretary may have felt that the 
agreement would strengthen the supporters of a detente. 36 
However, by stating that the missing doc ument first was 
brough t to his attention by the War Secre tary, Joynson- Hicks 
seemingly cleared h ' self . Moreover , Baldwin and Chamberlain 
apparently were convinced by his testi o ny. In any event , 
Joynson- Hicks w s r e sponsible for mak i ng the 1\rcos raid a 
eve nt. 
The i mmediate reactions of the Prime linister and t he 
Secretary are also unclear. Baldwin ' s biog r a he rs 
and Ch ambe rlain we re "re luctant" to endors e 
. . 'd 37 ra1d, but g1 ve no e v1 e nce . Sinc e Ba l dw in and 
35 Godfrey Locker-Larnpson to Tyrre ll, Dec . 8, 19 26, 
371/117 87 . 
37Mi dd l ema s and Barnes , B ldwi n, p . 4 58 . 
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Chambe rlain knew the February 23 note was a final warning, 
they mus t have fore see n the r esults of t he ir a pproval . 
The governme nt was confronte d with a dilemma when 
the missing doc ume nt wa s no t foun d . The confi s cate d rna -
terials really were no more infl amma tory tha n Sovi e t pres s 
statements . If t he Cabine t a dmitted failure , the Trade 
Agreement violati on c ould not h a v e bee n jus tifi e d. Exactly 
why the Cabinet broke relations is unk nown; it probab ly wa s 
deemed necessary once the raid occ urre d. Eve n be for e re-
ceiving a full r e port on the r a id , Chamberlai n told t he 
French Premier t ha t he "d oub t e d" i f r e l at i ons woul d c o n-
38 
tinue . To justi f y abandon i ng hi s ea rli e r polic y , C ambe r -
lain had to stre ng the n Britai n ' s c ase . • 0 doub t, he was 
res onsi b l e f o r inc ludi ng t he t wo doc ument s on C1 i na w i ch 
Baldwi n r efe rre d to in Commons . And t hese we r e i m o r t n t. 
o us To ry M. P . no t ed i n t he Spec t tor: "It was 
a nd Roscngo lz r e v e l at i ons wh ich c ame home to t he 
e ff e ct , r a t he r t h n t he e l od r ama ti c 
39 
con nec t ed wi t h t he Ar c os r a i d ." 
3 8Re co rd o f a Conversation be t wee n Aust n Ch ambe r l a i n 
M. Bri and , Ma y 1 8 , 19 27, riti sh Documents , s e r . l a , 
1 309. 
39 Stecta t o r , CXXXVIII (1-lay 28 , 192 7), 9 35. For a 
lar s te e nt , see Observer , My 9 , 1 92 7, p . 16. In 
later exp l a nat i o n s to ore ~g n sta t esme n , Chambe rlain 
mphas i zed these t wo documents mo r e st rong ly t han the 
mate r ial s ; e . g ., o te by Mr. S lby (Fo r eign Office 
s ervant ) , enc l o sed in Chambe r l a i n to Tyrrel l, June 1 6 , 
, Briti sh Document s , se r . l a , I II , 37 3 . 
329 
The most intriguing ques t ion cen t e r s on the moti-
vations be hind Chambe rlai n's about-fa ce . Pe r haps he simply 
tired of the f igh t to ma intain r e lat ions against a n in-
creasingly powe r fu l opposi ti on . And the ultima tum of 
F.ebruary 23 h ad sha r p ly limi t ed his o p t ions . Howe ve r, othe r 
Cabinet o ppo ne n ts of a break apparent ly p ut up a s trong rea r 
quard d e f ense , for the minu t es of May 23 sta t ed t ha t the r e 
was only "gene r 1 agreeme n t" f o r a b r e aK. I n Feb ruary t he 
Cabine t "ge neral l y " h ad agreed t o con t inue r e lati ons . These 
words sugges t t ha t by May o n l y a f e w ministe r s had changed 
their views . Perhaps Chambe r l ain ' s s wi t ch was the key to 
the outcome o n Ma y 23 . 
The r ea l vic tors , of course , we r e t he Tory zea l ots . 
As J. L. Garvi n wrote , "A r cos wa s t he i r cake , and the y ha ve 
40 
it ." By fai l ing t o d i scip l i ne his col l eagues , 
t he g r oundwork. One cor r esponde n t 
, "The stre ngth of t hos e membe rs of the Cab ine t who 
a break with Russ ia i s the accompli she d f ac t of the 
40 Ob se rve r , May 29 , 1 92 7, p . 1 6 . 
41 I bid ., May 22, 1 927 , pp . 17-18 . I n hi s a utobiog r aphy , 
Memorr,es (Londo n , 1958 ) , p . 142 , n . 2 , Lord Eu s t ace ercy 
raid wa s simply the sort of blund e r which a 
....,..,r,.m.,nt 1 Home Secreta ry i s a l ways li able to comm i t on 
~•~au~ug informat i o n , and which it is d i f fic ult fo r the 
Secretary or the Pr i e Minister e ithe r o v e to in 
or t o r e fu s e t o support a f t e rwards . lihe the r such a 
Secretary would not be we l l -advised t o purge his mistake 
resignation , i s a matte r of o pi nio n." 
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On the political side, the rupture helped to quiet 
unrest within the Tory party. The Nationa l Re view applauded 
the Cabine t' s decision to disavow "defeatism . " One back-
bencher wa s convinced tha t it gave the government a "new 
42 
lease of life. " This latter stateme nt perhaps was over-
stated, but the t hought might have influenced the Cabine t. 
Converse ly, one ministe r feared that the break would 
43 
alienate the left wing of the party. Bu t this did not 
happen. Du ring the final two ye rs o f Ba l dw i n ' s rule 
Russia never was more than a minor i ssue in British 
politics. 
The Aftermath 
In the week s foll owing t he bre ak the governmen t 
repeated ly denied any ulterior mo tives. 44 The Soviets 
1eemingly were un convinced , Litvino v clai in it was a 
45 
pretext for r ene wed interve ntion. Tensions ounted whe n 
ambassadr c to Poland was assassi nated in Wars aw 
The S· 1ie ts i e diately linked e mu r de r to 
42 National Re vi e w , LX XXIX (June , 192 7), 503-6; 
rn . I 1.l , Hay 25 , l92 7, p. 9 . 
43
cecil 
, 510 84 . 
to Irwin, June 7, 1927, Cecil Papers, Add. 
44 E.g., the speeche s by Ba l dwin and Birkenhead in The 
, May 28 , p . 7, Ju ne 6, 1927 , p. 12. 
45 . Sov1.e t Doc umen t s , II, 209-12. 
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46 
to a British plot. Throughout the s ummer they cultivated 
the war scare theme. Se ve ral citizens accused of spying for 
47 
Britain were exe cuted . 
A few Tories provided a slig ht b asis for the Sovie t 
allegations. For s e ve ral wee ks in June the Morning Post 
asked Britain to preve n t o ther na t i ons f rom dealing 'o.-ith the 
48 Soviets. The Englis h Rev i e w advoca t e d a n economic boycott. 
However, the s e pape rs d i d not eve n allude to a military 
crusade. Most Tory pape r s anticipa t ed r e ne we d r e lati ons if 
th S . d d . . . h 49 e ov~ets repente , an the y de n~ed a ny Br~t~ s plot. 
46 Fischer, The Sov i e ts in Wo r ld Affa ir s , II, 740 . 
47
spect a tor, CXXXV II I (June 18, 192 7), 1056; The Time s, 
11, 1927 , p . 12. There were se ve r a l mo t ivations for the 
In part it stemoed from a n erosion of Sovie t con-
fidence in Ge rmany ; he r friendship was regarded as the key t o 
Moscow' s secu rity . In the summe r the Soviets a ppa r e ntly be-
lieved t ha t S t re semann was e stablis ing too c lose a relatio n -
ship with the We s t ; see Ha r vey Dyck , "Ge rm n- Soviet elations 
and the Anglo-Sovie t re ak , 1927 , " Sl a v i c Revi ew,. XV (!-la rcn , 
1966), 79. 11ore i mpo r tant , t he war scare w s t~e to the 
'interna l powe r strugg le e n nea r ing a clima x . Al t ough 
Stalin h ad reduced the ower of t he rotsky - Zinoviev o ppo-
sition a yea r earlier , t hey r ema ined a formi ab le t r eat ; he 
emphasi zed t he war sc r e to force Tro t sky to abando n his 
stand in e fac e of a foreign threa t or to ex o se him as an 
intrigue r w o s e activiti e s were ha ing th e st a t e at a 
tica l t ime . Litvinov a Chic e rin admi tte riv tely 
no Western gover ~nt was p r eparing a n attack . oreove r, 
ade no attemo t t o bolster the ir armed forces; 
Fi s c he r, Rus s ia ' s Roa· from Peace to \·lar , pp . 1 72 - 7 , 
Robe rt Wesson , ov ~ e t Foreig n Po1 ~ cy in Perspec t i ve 
lllllllmii'•WC1i0 Cl 1 Ill. 1 196 9 J 1 p . 10 4-6 . 
4 B . . Morn~ng Pos t, J une 13 , 1927, p. 10 ; E ngl ~ sh Revi ew , 
(June , 192 7 ) , 6 47- 50 . 
49 
E.g., The Times , June 11, 192 7, p . 13; Observer , J une 
1927, p . 1 6 ; n Spectator , CXXXVIII (June 18 , 19 27) , 1056 . 
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Even Churchill and Joynson-Hick s said only that the Soviets 
50 
were not fit to deal with civilized nations. In public 
51 
and in private Chamberlain r epudiated the Soviet charges. 
The war scare subsided after Trotsky was expel l ed 
from the Communis t party in November . After this time To ry 
interest in Russia was greatly r educed. In parli ament there 
were no debates and few questions until after th e Tory go-
vern.ment left office in June, 1929. Editoria l comments 
appeared infrequently. "Conciliatory" journals rare ly asked 
52 
for a rapprochement with Russia . Tory zealots also said 
little after the y celebrated thei r victory with a rally on 
53 
July 15, 1927. The Conservative Confe r ence held in 
50 
Emrys Hughe s, Bol shevi k Boge ~ in Britain (Glasgow, 
1943), p. 40; The Times , July 1, 192 , p . 9 . 
Lon on , , p. 
papers had r equested an 
28 , 1927), co l s . 1527-28; 
J an . 5 , 1928 , FO 371/13270. 
53The Time s, July 16, 19 27 , p . 7. The Daily ~ai l 
continued 1ts boycot t c ' paign agains t Sovi e t o1 l p r oduc ts 
It cla imed vic tory on ov . 27, 192 7, p . 10, but only a 
amall percentag e of Briti s h oil c o nsume rs had p l edg d 
Support. In the s umme r of 1928 the D ily Ma il quie tly 
dropped the crusade , and the folloNing sp r1 ng Russian Oi l 
Products, Limited , signed an adv ntageous agreeme nt with 
large British-owned oil c ombi nes ; sec h Tine s , Ma rch 4, 
1929, p. 1 6, a nd Coates, A Hi story o Ang lo- Sovie t Relations , 
pp. 291- 94. he Assoc i at ion o f Brit 'sh Creditors of Russ 1 
~&eked the Daily Mil ; s e e The T . . es , July 28 , 1927 , p . 17. 
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October, 1927 did not act on a resolution a pproving the 
government's efforts to resist Soviet subve r s ion; a yea r 
54 
later Russia did not even a ppe ar on the agenda . In a 
speech at the Lord Mayor's Ba nq ue t in Novembe r, 1927 Bal dwin 
touched briefly on Rus s ia. At the Guild h a ll the foll owing 
year, his major for e i g n policy a ddr ess i g nored Russ ia 
55 
completely. In October, 1928 t .h e ne w Tory attitude was 
epitomize d by the Prime Minis t e r's r eques t f or a one -page 
. 56 
Foreign Office memo r a ndum on Rus s ia to r efre s h h1 s memory. 
Chamberlain me t with the Sovi e ts o nly o nc e afte r Arco s . At 
their r equ e st h e t a l k ed br ie fly wi t h Litv inov i n Geneva on 
December 5, 1927. Th e joint communique s t ated t ha t "i t wa s 
57 
not found pos s ible to r each any basis of ag r eemen t." 
This lack of intere st in Russ ia was caused by a 
of factor s . Mo s t i mpo r t a n t, the severance of r e -
el iminated t he grea t est ir r i t a n t for most Tor i e s . 
the Labour pa rty c ooled conside rab l y t oward Russia . 58 
54
conserva tive Confe r e nce linu t es , 1927 , p . 36 . 
55The T i mes , Nov. 10 , 1 92 7, p. 1 5 , o v . 1 0 , 1928 , p . 8 . 
56 
Unsig ned memo r andum , Oc t. 26 , 1928 , Baldwin Pape rs , 
113, p . 106 . See a l s o G. M. Young , S anl e y Baldwi n , 
n, 19 5 2), p . 61. 
6, 1927, p . 16; George S l ocombe , T e 
(London , 1926 ), p . 284 - 93 . Chambe r -
the Cab inet t hat he wan t ed t o avoid 
he felt it would b e r ude to r e fuse; s e e 
o v. 30 , 1 927 , CAB 23/55 . 
The Sov iets in World ff a irs , II , 696-97 . 
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In the absence of Labour pressure for a rapprocheme nt, Tories 
easily could ignore the issue. Membership in the British 
Communist party also declined precipitously. Industrial 
strife lessened as trade unions became more cautious. In 
September, 1927 the TUC broke off negotiations with Sovi e t 
trade unions, thus greatly reducing Tory f ears of Soviet 
subversion in Britain. 59 Some Tories had a r eady ex-
planation for the industri a l tranquility. In February, 1929 
Winston Churchill cl aimed this "best pe riod of peace in 
industry for a whole generation" had resulted from the diplo-
60 
matic break. When the execution of the two defendants in 
the famous Sacco-Vanzetti case led to riots on the Continent , 
the Da ily Hai l poin t ed to the ous t e r of t he Bolsheviks as 
61 
the rea son why Britain had rema ined calm. 
Moreover, there we re no incidents like the Zinoviev 
to infl ame Conservatives . The Soviets we re i mp licated 
only one insignificant domes tic issue during this pe riod. 
the summer of 1928 two Russian trade banks in London we re 
See al so Robert oothby ' s rema r ks in De t e s , CCVIII (July 11, 
7), cols . 824-25. 
60 The Times , Feb. 13, 1929, p. 16. 
61Daily Mail , Nov . 28, 1927, p. 10. 
335 
62 
accused of sending funds to t he British Communist party. 
Three Soviet employees were expelled, but the Tories re-
63 
mained virtually silen t. The Soviets' waning revolution-
ary spirit and decreas ing interes t in foreign affairs also 
helped to calm the Conservatives. During t hese two years 
Soviet attention was focused on the dest ruction of the 
Trotsky o pposition and on Stalin's reconstruction of the 
64 
state. 
After the Arcos raid comme rce provided the only li nk 
between Britain a nd Russia . Hith a mi ll ion Dritons unemployed , 
governme nt l eaders r epeatedly welcome d Rus s ian trade. 65 
However, the Midl a nd Bank ag r e eme nt was cance lled , and 
Soviet purchases d e cline d . Or de rs place d in Br i t a in during 
the six months prior to t he break had a v e r aged ove r JS1.6 
aillion per month . Within four months a fter Arcos the 
figure d r opped to£ 200, 000. Thi s res ulted in part from t he 
of doing busines s in Brita in: b a nk s demand e 
and the pri c e for discoun ting ussian 
62
oebates , CCXVIII (June 11, 192 8) , col s . 63 5-43. 
63 
For a typically placid r esponse , see The Time s , 
12, 1928, p . 17. 
65 E . g ., Joyn s on-Hicks ' r ema rks in The Times , July 14, 
, p. 9. 
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bills s oared . Bu t the Soviets also may have r educed their 
orders to demonst rate the need for r enewing diplomatic 
66 
relations. 
•concilia t ory" journals felt the loss of trade was 
too high a pric e to pay for try ing to t each Russ ia a l e~son . 67 
68 Some comme rcia l and industria l inte r ests agreed . The 
gove r nmen t, howe ver, blamed the Sovie ts for the trade de -
69 
cline . 
In 1928 Br i ti ~h exports to Russia total led on ly 
£4.8 mi ll ion, d ow n from £ 11.3 million t he year before . 
This decli ne c ame at a time whe n Russia's i po rts were in-
creas ing r apidly a s a r esult of the Five-Year Plan . The 
Soviets also began to offer lucrative industrial conces sions 
to forei gn companies , but Bri t ain obtained none . In fact , 
only two of the six concessions granted t o Brit ish firms 
. 70 
since 1 917 r ema ined o erat~ve . Some "concili a tory" 
The Soviet s in World Aff irs , II, 694-95 . 
sinessne n, see Co tes , 
Should e Res tore d , 
of Joynso n- Hicks and Birke nhcad in 
p . 6 , larch 29 , 1928 , p. 18; and 
the Board of Trade , March n . d ., 
70
o ates , CCXXII ( ov . 20 , 192 8) , cols . 15 65-66 . 
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journals and politicians used these statistics when re-
11 questing a resumption of trade relations. But the govern-
ment would not even consider extending the Export Credits 
72 
Scheme . 
In the spring of 1929 a de legation of British 
businessmen, including a numbe r of Tories, visited Russia 
73 in the hope of expanding trade . But the trip was fruit-
less. The Soviets emphasized tha t trade would increase 
only whe n relations were restored and Britain ex tende d a 
loan. 74 Chambe rl a in emphatica lly v e toed both s ugges tions. 75 
A short time later the Torie s we re turned out of office. 
During t .he ele ction c pa ign t he Sovie t q ue st ion was 
virtually i gnored . 
The Labour party ofte n c ha r ge d tha t t he government 
to isolate t he Soviets in the two ye a rs f ollowing t he 
diplomatic break . Most Tories r eplied that Russ ia's in-
71E.g. , S ec t a tor , CXLI (Dec. 22, 1928), 944; Ti me a nd 
IX (Dec. 2 , 8 ), 1242; Sa turday Re view , CXLVI 
5, 1 929 ), 2-3; a nd a l e tte r f rom y in he 
s, Dec. 1 5 , 192 8 , p . 12. 
72 De bates , CCXXIII ( ov. 26 , 1928), col s . 60-61. 
73
ror a c onci se s umoary of the tri p , see Coate s, A 
o f lo-Sovi et .e lations , p . 316 - 20 . Many items 
memo r an urn , Jan. 6, 1 929 , 
pp . 134-4 0 , give background 
74The Time s, April 8, 1929, p. 12 ; Dai ly Te l egraph , 
8, 192 9 , p . 10. 
75 Deb a t s , CCXXV II (April 22, 1929 ), cols . 622-23. 
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flexibility c a u sed the stalemate . Actua lly, Brita in's 
policy probab ly was motiva t ed by a r e aliz a t i on t hat fo rma l 
ties with Ru s sia we r e not essenti a l. Chambe rlain, along 
with most Tories , be lie ved t he di sadvantage s o f r e -
establishing r e l a t ion s clearly outwe ighed the acl -., a ntages. 
Likewise, the Sovie t s we r e not a ff e cte d a d v e r :;e ly b y t h e 
break. As long a s the European d iploma tic equilib r ium r e-
mained c ons t a nt, the t wo n a tions s imp ly did not need each 
other. In the abse nce of any pressing need , ne ithe r s i de 
was willing to sof te n t he ir c o nd iti on s for a r app rocheme nt. 
This attitude k ep t t hem as far apa rt at t h e end of t he 
decad e a s t hey had bee n a t t he beg i nni ng . 
From 19 29 un t i l World Wa r I I Ru ss i a r emained a 
76 
f or mos t To r ies . Howe v e r, o ne import an t 
during t he 1930 ' s supposed ly r es u l ted l arge l y 
from t he Tories ' pre v ious opi n ions o f Soviet Russia . Some 
cla i m that the Con se rvatives ' a ~ ~eged anti - Soviet 
key i ngred ient in the formulation of Britain ' s 
77 
azi Germany . The fo l lowing 
of l eading To r ies , along with t heir views of Br i tish 
the 1 92 0's and t owa r d Germa n y in 
76oonald Lamme rs , " Bri t ish Fo r eig n Poli cy, 1929 - 193 ~: 
Prob l em o f Sov i et Russia , " (u npub lished P .D . cissertation , 
ford Unive rsity , 1 960) , adequately describ s ory r eactions 
in t he c o n tex t of his dip1o atic s tudy. 
77 . "1b . h E. g ., Ma rt~ n G ~ e rt and Rlcha rd Gott, T e Appease rs 
, 19 6 3) , pp . 7- 8 . 
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the 1930's shows, on the contrary, that there is no simple 
correlation between attitudes toward Russia and positions 
78 
on appeasement. 
Nancy Astor, M.P., "conciliator" --pro-appeasement 
J. L. Garvin, "conciliator" -- pro-appeasement 
Thomas Moore, H. P., "conciliator"-- pro-appeaseme nt 
Oliver Stanley, M.P., "conciliator" --pro-appeasement 
Robert Boothby, "conci!iator" anti-appeasement 
Viscount Cecil, "conciliator" anti-appeasement 
Duff Cooper, M.P., "conciliator"-- anti-appeasement 
Harold Macmil lan, "conciliator" -- anti-appeasement 
Winston Churchil l, "righ ti s t" -- anti-appeaseme nt 
Samuel Hoare, "rightist" pro-appeasement 
Douglas Hogg, "rightist" pro-appeasemen t 
Wilfred Ashley, M. P ., "rightist" --pro-appeasement 
Leopold Amery , "centrist" -- anti-appeasement 
Anthony Eden , M.P ., "centrist" anti-appeasement 
Austen Chamberlain , "ce ntrist" anti-appeasement 
Stanley Ba ldwin, "centrist " pro- a peasement 
Lord Halifax, "centrist" -- pro-appeasement 
?ST · · t b f d i Ib . d ory op~n~ons on appeaseme n can e oun n ___ ~_ ., 
, and Lamme rs, Explaini ng Munich , pp. 52-53 . 
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CONCLUSION 
The Tories clearly did not sha r e a monolithic view 
of Soviet Russia. Since the "ultra s " saw the Sovie ts as 
the mortal enemy of mankind , the y wa n ted no contact with 
them under any circums tance . The "ultra s" be lie ve d the 
Soviets were being d e v i o us eve n whe n t h e y a cted wi th 
restraint. The "rightists" we r e not so qu i c k to o s tr a c ize 
Russia from the world commun i ty. If the Sov i ets paid the ir 
de.bts, elimina ted inte r na tiona l intr igue , a n d prov i ded 
facilities for for e ign traders, the s e Tories wou l d no t ha ve 
objected to d ip l omati c r e l a t i o ns . On the o t he r ha nd , the 
•centrists" accorde d Rus s ia the s ame diplomat i c t r eatment 
given othe r unfr i e nd ly countr i es . Mo s t i mpo rta n t, the y we r e 
willing to c ompromi se . I f t he Soviet s honored only ce r tain 
clas ses of debts a nd di savowed prop aganda , the "ce n tri s ts" 
welcomed a r a pproche me nt , e spec ially be c a u se of 
its comme rc ia l be nef i t s . Bu t , much to t he c hag rin of the 
of "conci l iators ,· the " c e n t r is t s " d id n o t f a vo r 
t a lk s fo r a de t en t e un ti l t he Sov i ets f irst 
thei r t e rms . The "conci l iato r s " consiste ntly 
Brita i n to t ake an uncond itiona l fi r s t s tep t owa r d 
ilia tion, usually by e xte ndi ng t he Export Cred its 
or by gran ting f ull c eremonia l r ecognition . 
What promp t e d individua l To r i es to a dop t a parti c ul a r 
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viewpoint? For the •ultras,• •rightists,• and •centrists,• 
there is no definite answer be cause they never really 
examined the question clearly and directly. The leading 
•ultras• included L. J. Maxse, editor of the Nationa l Revie w, 
H. A. Gwynne, editor of the Ho rning Po s t, and a hand ful of 
backbenchers like John Gretton and Henry Pag e Croft. Their 
extremist views probably were shaped by the old romantic 
Tory concept of a pre-capitalist organic society. The 
leading figure s within the larger group of "righti s ts• 
included such prominent party lea ders as Curzon, Birkenhead , 
Joynson-Hicks, and Churchill; i mportant backbc nch e rs like 
Guy Kindersley, Oliver Lo c ker-Lampson, and Alfred Kno x ; a nd 
the editor of the Da ily 11a il, Thomas Marlowe . This diverse 
group apparently was only pa rtially influence d by t he Tory 
ethos. More i mport a nt, t hey prob ably be lieved t he Sovi e ts 
presente d a s er i ou s th r ea t to Briti s h inte r e sts . The 
•centrists," the larg e s t g roup , consi s t ed of an a p p a rent 
majority of the Tory b a c kbenchers and mi nister s , includi ng 
Auste n Ch amber l a in, Bona r Law, Lord Ba lfour, Robe rt Ho r ne , 
Stanley Ba l dwin, and Lord Eustac e Pe rcy. Be c au s e the y 
analyzed diplomat ic d e v e l op e nts without strong i deolog i ca l 
overtone s, this grou p re f lecte d the pragma tic tradi t ion within 
the Tory party. They usually saw the Sovie ts a s mo r e of a 
nuisance th a n a t.hrea t. 
342 
Perhaps because the vi ews of the "conciliators" we r e 
unorthodox in the Tory pa rty, t hey did e xp l a in their po s ition. 
Significantly, their mo tivations dif fered. Ba c kbe nchers 
Allan Smith, P. J. Ha nnon, and Thoma s Moo r e sought to r e -
vive the British economy with an Ang lo-Sov ie t r approche me nt. 
Backbenchers Robert Boo t hby a nd W. P. Ten1p l e t o n h a d a 
particular inte r e st in s aving t he he rring tr ade in the ir 
constituencie s. J oh n St. Loe Strachey , the ed i t or of t he 
Specta tor, J. L. Ga rvin, editor of the Observer , a nd back-
bencher Duff Coope r we r e conce r ned primaril y with stre ng th-
ening world peace . Lo r d Robe rt Ce ci l hoped to bo l s t e r the 
League of Na tio ns . 
Tories from similar b ackg rounds often ha d di f f erent 
outlooks. Both Thomas Moore a nd Al f r ed Knox had served 
with the Whites , but Moore bec ame a "con c i l iator" and Knox 
The Duke of o r thumberl and was a n " u ltra " 
his bro t h e r, Lord Eus t ace Pe rcy , a "ce ntr is t." At leas t 
b a c kbenche r s had lost property i n Russ i a : J. D. Rees 
a "righ t i s t " and Victor a rrend e r a "c e ntrist ." Al thoug h 
had suffe red the s ame fat e , he 
a "concil i a t o r." Such ex le s a re c onuno n. 
Tory estima te s of Bol she v ism a lso differed c o nsider-
In fact, afte r 1919 mos t Tor i es seeme d t o i g no r e the 
iets' i deolog ica l t e ne t s . Ka rl Marx wa s rare l y me n t i oned 
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1 
by politicians in the 1920's. Conservative journals 
occasionally printed articl e s on the Communist "fa ith " by 
intellectuals or journalists , but mos t e d itoria l writers 
2 
avoided the s ub ject. The Conse rva tive Ce ntral Offi c e 
printe d only two pamphle t s on Communism , and b o t h we re brie f 
3 
and superficial. The "ce ntrists" appa r e ntly ne ve r 
analyzed Bol s he vi sm . The ir pragma ti sm pe rha p s l ed them 
to belie ve tha t it wa s irre l e v an t in inte rn a t i on a l 
relations. But Garvin, Stra c hey, a nd Boothby, a ll 
•conciliators ,• s eemed to think it wa s only a t e mpo r a ry 
expediency th a t would e vo lve into a mild fo rm of s ocialism 
or eve n cap itali sm. 
Only a few "ultras " and "rig ht is ts" wro t e abo u t 
Thoug h showing mi no r v a riat i o ns , t he a naly s e s 
of North umbe rl a nd a nd Lord Syd e nh am ref l e c t t he 
•ultra" inte rpre t a ti o n . orthumbe rl a nd c l a i med t ha t 
1This cha nged somewha t in the f o llowi ng de c ade . In 
1933 Robert Bowe r, M. P ., o ffe r ed wha t was perhaps one of 
first comme n t a r ies by a To r y olit i cian o n such essen t ia l 
'e n t s o f ~arxism as t he Hege l ian dia l ectic , historica l 
r i a li sm , and t he l abo r the ory of value ; see tion 1 
CI (Sep t embe r , 19 33) , 34 7- 51 . Se e also t he a llowing 
Tory b ackbenche r s : Joh n de Ve re Lode r , o l shevi sm 
c ive (London , 1931), and I r k Pa trick, Hamme r and 
~~--~~~-o~n , 1933 ). 
2 ' ' For a s amp l~ ng o f these few ana lys e s , s ee Hor n ~n 
Feb. 4- Feb . 9, 19 24, and Na tion 1 Revie w, L~ 
r, 19 21 ) , 194-2 08 . 
~fua t i t is and Wh t it Wants (Lo ndon , 
), p p et no . 23 40 ; Co~unism Unm sked (Londo n , 19 24), 
st Work r s ' Handbooks , no . 7 . 
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Bolshevism was only the late st in a series of revolutionary 
movements founde d on t he errone ous be lief that primitive 
man had lived in a "gold e n era" of perfect happiness. 4 
In reality, med i e va l society h ad allowe d man the greatest 
freedom and stab ility. But the Albige nsian s , the philosophe s, 
the French r evolutionaries , and o the r subve r s ive s had under-
mined the med ieval synthes i s . In the twentieth c e ntury 
"modern" Bolshe vik s hoped to comple t e the des truction of 
civilizati on through unab as he d cl a s s wa rfare. The y were 
ably assiste d by Freema s ons , inte rna tional J e ws, Labourite s, 
and Inte rna tio n a l Worke r s of t he Wo rld, to n ame just a f e w. 
This world-wide p l ot pres e n t e d a g r a v e th r ea t to the Wes t. 
Lord Syd e nh am , an o l d Tory I mpe ria list, consi s t e n tly 
viewed Bol shevi sm as evi l vy i ng with good for control of 
. 5 individua ls an e ven e ntire n a t 1ons . Ha ving succumbed to 
4 
This s umm ry of No rthumbe r l and ' s vie ws is b a s e d on 
of his a r ticl e s i n the ' t iona l Re vie w, LXXVI I (July, 
1921), 617- 33, LXXX II I ( a y , 1924 ) , 365 - 85 . Be s i de s 
writing abou t t he Bo l she vik threa t, he spoke f r eq uen tly to 
Tory org a ni z i ons a nd deba t e d wi t h Labo ur M. P .' s; s e e The 
Time s , Ju ne 1 9 , p . 13 , J uly 8 , 1 92 0 , p . 16 , a nd o rninq Pos t , 
MarCl1 2, 1921 , p . 5 . Occ a s iona lly h is fe r vo r w s c o s y : 
The Ti me s , ov . 1 8 , 1 9 21 , p . 5, r e orte t ha t t he Duke l os t 
a l1be l suit to a Lo nd o n Labo u r l e ade r who c la i me d t ha t the 
Duke l abe l ed him a Do l she vi k a nd a t r ai ler . Fo r L. J. 
Kaxse's f avo r ab l e c o mme nts a ou t No rthumbe rl and ' s a na ly s i s , 
aee Nationa l Re v i e w, LXXV I (Octobe r, 1 9 20 ), 147-4 9 . 
5
sydenham 's a na l ysi s was p r es e n ted in his S t ud i es of 
ri a l is t (Londo n , 19 28 ) , pp . 336 -4 0 ; a n a r ticle 1 n he 
~~~~~~==~ · II ( la r c 27, 1 920 ), 1107; l et t e rs to t he 
i me s , Sep t . 9 , 1 92 2 , p . 6 , J u l y 1 2 , p. 8, ~~~p~.~lJ; a nd spee c he s i n Lo r ds De b a t e , XXX II I 
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this wickedness, the Russian people were forced to endure 
a most despicable barbarism. Because Bolshevism was really 
the external manifestation of the evil latent in every man, 
the fight against it had to be waged on a spiritual pla.ne. 
Britain, therefore, needed desperately to revive her past 
Christian ideals. 
"Rightist" views of Bolshevism ranged widely, but 
those expressed by Birkenhead and Churchill were typical. 
Birkenhead saw the Soviets as a b and of fanatical extremists 
who had succumbed to the pressures of modern society.
6 
Instead of dealing reali s tically with social problems 
resulting from industrializa tion, they foolishly adopted a 
cure infinitely wors e than the original illness. Immorality, 
servility, and cynicism clouded their reason. But an 
educated populace need not fear their machinations . When 
the Russian people r evolted against their oppressors, 
Bolshevism would disappear forever. 
Churchill often compared Bolshe vism to a disease 
descending on an unsuspecting nation, throwing t he viet ' s 
7 
anarchy. The mor tality rate was 
(Feb. 25, 1919), cols. 302-7, LI (July 5, 1922), cols. 258-63. 
6Birkenhead detail ed his v iews in three of his works: 
Life a nd Le tte rs (London, 1927), II, 298-313; Tu r n ing 
ndon , 1 929) , pp . 199-211; and La s t 
30). pp. 140- 6 0. 
sampling of Churchill's diverse views, 
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high, but the pestilence soon dissipated, leaving a shattered 
populace to recover the use of reason. Nations with a long 
history of social injustice were most susceptible because 
Bolshevism appealed to the worst elements in a backward 
and suppressed citizenry. The carriers of the disease, 
for whom Churchill reserved his greatest contempt, we re 
driving men into a barbarism far worse than tha t of the 
Stone Age. But these ~iscreants could not endure, th e ir 
concepts of liberty , progress , and Utopia being anti-
thetical to human nature. 
From this swruna ry it is evident that the Tories as 
a whole never r ea lly touched on the essence of Bolshevism. 
While an irrationa l f ear of the Bolshevik creed was 
probably the we llspring of the "ultra" attitude tow a rd 
Soviet Russia, wha t f ac tors molde d the opinions of the vast 
majority of Tories? Sovie t actions and words were c e rtainly 
important. The Bolsheviks r epe ated ly c a lled for the 
of Britain and the Empire. Their assistance to 
revolutionary a nd nationalist movements around t he world 
convinced many Tori e s of t he ir d a nger . "Ultras"and 
•rightists" took Soviet uttP.rances mos t seriously . 
a th, p p . 60-77; The Russ ian Out look , I (July 
26, ~1~9,1~9n)~.~s~u~~p~17ern·ent , iv-viii; Deba t e s , CXVI ( I y 29, 1919), 
1526-28; The T es , Jan.5, 1 920 , p . 7 ; and his Gr ea t 
(Londo n , 1937), pp . 167-74 (this section-was 
ng the 1 920 's). 
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But most Tories' views were influence d primarily by 
a aeries of spectacular--and sometimes periphe ral--events 
beginning in 1917 and ending with the Arcos raid in 1927. 
In the first place mos t Torie s neve r forgave the Bolshe viks 
for withdrawing from the war. Then in 1919 ephemeral 
White military successes helped to forge a virule nt anti-
Bolshevism. During the last years of the Coalition many 
Tory opinions of Russia were r ea lly defensive r eac tions to 
Lloyd-George 's political conduct. Mos t Tories be lieved he 
would sign a dishonorable settlement with Russia, and the y 
regretted his decision to act unilaterally despite French 
and Italian criticisms . Lloyd George exploited the Rus sian 
question in part for domes tic purposes , and many Torie s 
retaliated by using t he same i ssue to help force hi s down -
fall. Russia was a partisan po lit ica l issue especially 
during the election c ampaig n of 1924. At tha t time Tories 
skillfully utili zed the t wo Treaties and t he Zinoviev l ette r 
to great advantage . From 192 5 to 1927 the genera l stri ke and 
the Chinese revolution grea tly affected Tory opinions of 
Russia. 
Some peripheral factors c ontinually in f l uenced Tory 
in the 1920's. The depressed British economy , for 
wa s certainly an impo rtan t consideration for the 
And ftri gh tists" usually were concerned with 
domestic industrial unres t whe n they spoke abou t Russia . 
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Finally, most Tories probably kept an anxious eye on 
Labour's increasing powe r whe n the y stated their views of 
Soviet Russia. 
These deve lopmen ts during the decade help to ex-
plain why many Tories' views of Russia shifted. Some changes 
were almost dramatic. Captivate d by his admiration for 
Lloyd George, Birkenhead advocated a detente with Ru ssia 
during the Coalition era. After the gene ral strike and the 
turmoil in China, "conciliators" Robert Boothby and J. L. 
Garvin moved sharply to the right for a time . Converse ly, 
Samuel Hoare changed from a "rightist" to a "centrist" whe n 
he assumed office . In early 1923 Lord Curzon depa rted fr om 
his consisten tly hostile attitude t oward Ru ss ia by urging a 
large grant for fam i ne r elief . Under t he shadow of azi 
Germany in the following decade , eve n Winston Churchill 
worked hard fo r an alli a nce with Russia . In fact, only t he 
inte rpret a tion of Russia neve r wavere d dur i ng the 
By exe rting constant pressu r e on British policy-
the Tories d e f initely i nf l uenced Anglo-Sovie t re-
Early in the 1920's Lloyd Gorge might have 
ore l e ni en t t erms for a rapprochement 
he not f eared Tory opposition. The Labour Treaties in 
were ineffective because MacDonald could not sof ten the 
s' strong sta nd on d eb ts without threa t e ning the fal l 
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of his government. Tory gover e nt l eaders were in a 
similar position. Th roughout this period Tory policy-
makers were "centrists" and not "extremists ," as has often 
been maintained. However, t he l eaders we r e unde r grea t 
pressure from the "rig htists," who mobilized much more mass 
support than did the "conciliators." According ly, the 
leaders probab ly adopted a toughe r attitude toward the 
Soviets than they would othe rwi se h a ve done . While it 
cannot be stated c ategorically that "r igh tists" like 
Churchill and Birkenhead forc ed Austen Chambe rlain to 
adopt certain policies, they certa inly blocked t he diplo-
matic avenues ope n to him. The events su rrounding the 
Anglo-Sovi e t break in 1927 sugge s t that Chambe rl a in and 
other "ce ntri sts" finally succumbe d to pressure from the 
right. Had thi s pressure been l es s intense , the Foreig n 
Secreta ry might have bee n mo re patient with the Rus s ians. 
Soviet intransige nce obvious ly aided the "rightis t s ." If 
more coopera tive , Chambe rlain might 
found it e as ier and more rofitable politically to 
out longe r. 
The Tories alone were not r es onsib l e for the gulf 
Soviet Russia and Britain in t he 192 0' s . Even had 
inf lue ntial in e period or h d they been 
conc iliatory , it would have b een difficult for t he 
Powe rs to estab lish no rma l r elations . The Russ i a ns we re 
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often inflexible and some times provocati ve. The Tories were 
often hostile ~o~ard Soviet Russia , and always wary. The 
inevitable re s ult was a series of diplomatic failures. 
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A P P E N 0 I X I 
THE ZINOVIEV LETTER 
To some extent the mystery surrounding the Zinoviev 
letter remains unsolve d. Labourite s maintain that it was a 
forgery which lost the elec tion for them . Tories have in-
sisted on its au then ticity. Seve ral years a go three Sunday 
Times re porters wro te a n account indicating not only that 
the letter was a for ge ry but also tha t some Tories we re in-
. . l 
volved 1n the ep1sode . 
The reporter s be lie ve the letter wa s written in the 
summe r of 19 24 by a group of Russ ian ~mig r~s in Be rlin. 
Polish intelligence agen ts, anxious to prevent a rapproche-
ment between Russia and the West , perhaps as t ermi nded t he 
2 
scheme . Ano t her write r, Robin Lockhart , sug ges ts t he 
culprit was Sidne y Rei ll y , a British secre t service a g nt. 
3 
e spy who nev e r made a mistake,• Rei lly had been 
in anti-Soviet plo ts since 191 8 when h e had tri ed 
1
unless othe rwi s e ind icated , this s umma ry of the 
letter ' s histo y t hro ug :ove~ e r, 1 9 is ase on Lewis 
Cheste r, Stephen Fay, a nd Hu go Young , The Zinovi e v Lette r 
(Philadelphia , 196 8 ) , pp . 1-143. 
2Addi tional su pport fo r t h is thesis c an be f ound in 
ie Grant, "The Zi noviev Letter Case," Soviet Studies , 
(October , 1967) , 264 -77. 
3Robin Bruce Lockhar t, Ace of Sp i es (London, 1966), 
• 119-2 9 . 
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4 
to assassinate Lenin. According to Lockhart, Reilly 
ordered the forgery to revitalize the anti-Bolshevik 
movement, which had suffered a serious blow when a well-
known member, Boris Savinkov, defected to Russia in the 
summer of 1924. 
Late in the summer Polish intellige nce agents 
probably delivered the forgery to Reilly who was the n in 
Paris. The conspira tors must h ave discussed way s of 
convincing the Labour government of its authenticity. 
~nowing of Reilly's reputation, they probably decided to 
rewrite it in his hand. He could explain convincingly 
that he had to return it to Soviet c ha nnels before it was 
5 
missed. Reilly apparently was the person who turned the 
document ove r to the Foreign Office on October 10. Because 
4For Reilly's autobiography, l a ter edited b y his 
wife, s ee The Adve nture s of Sidney Re illy (Londo n , 1931) . 
See also Lockha rt, Briti sh Ag e nt , p . 320 - 21 . 
5This is not really considered in The Zinoyiey 
Lette r. It is based on a startli ng discovery m de only in 
1970. An archivist at the Ha rvard University La w Library 
found a glass p l a te negative of the Zinoviev letter in 
Russi an script which wa s vi r t ua ll y ide ntic a l to the Eng lish 
translation published by t he Fo r eign f ice on Octo be r 24 , 
1924; see William Butler I "Co rresponde nce , n Sovie t udie s I 
lXI (J anuary, 1970), 39 5- 400. A Briti s h han wr~t~ng expe rt 
compared it to a facsimile of Sidney Reilly 's last known 
in 1925 and concluded the y were writ e n by the same 
see Sunday Times , Feb . 8, Feb . 15, 1970. The Harvard 
orig ~nally was ~n the possession of an Ame rican c onsul 
aris who had received it from an unknown a ge nt . Re illy's 
cla ims he was in Paris in July and Augus t, 1924 , en-
in "a very important political transaction" ; see 
_.~~~T~im~e~s~, Feb. 15, 1970. 
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it WAS in his handwriting, he presumably revealed his 
identity. Circumstantial evidence supports this. When 
shown the letter, Permanent Under-Secretary Sir Eyre Crowe 
earmarked it for special attention. The Foreign Office 
received A continual flow of allegedly genuine Soviet 
documents, and it often took months to check t he 
authenticity of each one. Because the contents of the 
Zinoviev letter were not extra ordinary, Crowe probably knew 
it came from Reilly. Moreover, the intelligence branches of 
the Home Office, the Admiralty, and the War Office apparently 
6 
did not ques tion it. 
The plotters must have been anxious to see the letter 
made public. Two days before it was received by the Foreign 
Office, someone met with Conrad Donald iro Thurn, a wartime 
intellige nce agent who was a director of a com-
f . . / . / 1rm run by Russlan e m1gres . Th is " someone" has not 
identified, but he was probably a Polish a gent working 
Im Thurn might have known h im from warti e 
The visitor claimed tha t Zinoviev h ad sent secret 
6For an explana tion of the circulation of the letter 
the Foreign Office by one of the participants , see 
Strang, Home and Abroad (London, 1956), pp . 156-58. 
7In Baldwin, p. 307, Middlemas and Barnes claim that 
person was Re illy and that iro Thurn was a German . As a 
nee, they cite The Zino viev Le tte r. he authors of 
book, however, po1n t out t h t th1s unn amed person must 
been a Polish intelligence agent; see p . 1 88-89 . And 
l eng s to s how t ha t i m hu rn was Briti sh 
n ame ; s ee pp . 71-72. It is highly unlikely 
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instructions to British Commun ists. As a former intelligence 
agent, im Thurn's curiosity was aroused. Moreover, he was a 
staunch anti-Bolshevik whose company apparently would have 
suffered if Labour's treaties with Russia were approved by 
8 
parliament. When they met a ga in on October 13, the informer 
divulged the letter's contents, claiming tha t it had r e ached 
England on Septembe r 25 and that Russian charge;- Rakovsky, 
Labour backbenche r Jame s Maxton, and HacDona ld knew abou t it. 
Outraged by the intimation th a t the governme nt was concealing 
it deliberately, im Thurn told his old fri end Guy Kindersley, 
an anti-Soviet Tory backbencher, who arranged a mee ting with 
Lord Younger, t he Treasurer of the Tory party, and F . S . 
Jackson, the Chai rman . An tic ipating a pre-election bombshe ll, 
they agreed to give i m Thurn£ 7, 500 if he produced a copy , 
which the y would publish in The Times at an opportune momen t. 
that Reilly himself was i m Thurn 's mys terious info rme r. 
As a secre t agent he would have put his career in jeopardy 
if irn Thu rn told others. 
But it shou l d be noted th t the authors of The 
Zinoviev L t c r do not off e r conclusive proof for namin a 
Pol~s h a ge nt; it is one of hei r weakest links . In vi e w of 
the i m ortanc of t his info .c r , a gre t c r e ffor t shou . d 
have been ade t o iden tify him. For ex amp l e , since i~ 
mysterious informe r r eappeared brie fly in 1928 , t he thors 
lhould have d iscounted e illy e c ause he had returne to 
Russi a in 1 925 and was neve r heard from again . A. a r e ntly 
he was lured back by Soviet cou nte rinte lligence agents and 
promptly shot ; see Lockhar t, Ace of Spies , pa ss i m. 
8
rm Thurn later cha racterized the Sovie ts as 
•murderers , t hieves , and moral perver ts"; see hi s article 
in the a tiona l evie w , XCII (January , 1929) , 76 8- 71 . 
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Im Thurn d emanded the mone y as a guar an t ee a g a i n s t loss for 
his appare ntly still u nnamed in f o rmant . 
After an investigation a ssi s ted by fri ends wi t h in 
the intellige nce service s, i m Thurn dis c ov e r ed o n Octobe r 18 
that Naval intelligence h a d s ee n the l e tter. Three days 
later the head of an inte lligenc e b r a nch i n f o rmed h im by 
telephone tha t t he Foreig n Offi c e soon would r e l ease it . 
On October 22 im Thurn told a Times corres pondent t hat t he 
government wa s withho l ding t he l e tte r. Wi t hou t eve r r e -
ceiving it, or his money, im Thurn n ow dropped out of t he 
picture . 
On Octobe r 23 Admiral Si r Reg ina l d Ha ll confided to 
his fri e nd Th omas Marl owe , e d itor of t he Da ily Mai l, tha t 
the governmen t was c oncealing t he l ette r for po l itica l 
reasons . A f o r mer To ry backbe ncher and wa rtime inte lligence 
dire ctor , Ha l l probably had been tol d of the l etter by a 
fri end in intellige nce . Ma r lowe e n me t with Sir Hugh 
Sinclai r, head o f overseas e spionage , who pledged t o de l ive r 
a copy the nex t d ay . Anothe r r e tired inte lligence officer , 
Fr e derick Brown i ng , vi s ited 1a rlowe a nd a lso pro-
copy. Marlowe , Ha ll, Brown ing , and Sinc l a ir had be e n 
a ssoc i a t ed s ince s e rvi ng t ogethe r during t he wa r. 
lone apparen t l y were awa r e o f the l etter ' s origin or o f t he 
son who had de l ive red i t t o the Foreig n Office . They 
st l y be l i eve d MacDo n a ld was c once a l ing an authen t ic 
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document. On Friday morning , October 24, Marlowe distri-
buted his copies to othe r London Tory dailies for si.mul-
taneous publication the following d ay . Only The Time s 
already knew about it. Unk nown to Marlowe and h is friends, 
the Foreign Office p ubli shed the l etter and sent 
MacDonald's corrected draf t pro test to Rakovsky on Friday 
afternoon. On the previous evening the editors of t he 
Daily Ma il and The Times had told the Foreign Office the y 
would soon publish the l e tte r. Eyre Crowe, who also be-
lieved it was authe ntic, appa r ently decided on quick action 
to protect the r eputa t ion of the Fo reig n Off i ce. 
After the e l ection the lame- duck Labour government 
secretly inves tigated the l e tte r's orig in . Thei r efforts 
were hampered , howe v e r, b y HacDo na l d ' s r efus 1 to al low a 
paralle l investiga tion into the roles of t he civil servants 
and the inte ll igence branches . lie apparently did so to 
an y unnecessary exposure of t hei r operations and 
he was convinced tha t Fo r eig n Office of ficia l s had 
in b ad f aith . The c o mmittee was unab l e to decide 
9 
was a fo rge ry. 
The new Conservative Cabi net a l s o appoi nted a 
10 b ut the de t ails of t hei r pro o a r e no t known . 
9Hiddlemas, ed., Thomas J one s : Whiteha ll Di ry , I, 
10
rf a writte n r ecord of hei r inquiry was ke p t, it 
ably was pilfered late r or des troye in tentionall y . 
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In announcing the results on Decembe r 15, Chamberlain stated, 
~It left not a shade of a shadow of a doubt as to the authen-
ticity of the document." The commi ttee we nt beyond the 
records of the Foreig n Office: "We saw every witne ss that 
we thought necessary; we had before us whatever docume nts 
and information we required ." The secre t service also gave 
unspecified assi stance. His explanation s e emed convincing. 
The letter was fir s t receive d by the Gove r nmen t 
from one source. We know its whole cours e from its 
origin until it r e che d our h nds . The ne xt thing 
that h appe ned was that informa t i o n was r e c e ived by 
the Gover nmen t of the exi s t e n c e o f th i s lette r from 
another source wholly independe nt of , a nd wholly un-
conne cted with, t he fir s t s ou rce , a nd which di no t 
know that we had ha d a ny prior i nd i ca t ion that t he re 
was such a l et t r a t a ll . The nex t was t h t f r om a 
third source, independent of both t he othe rs, not 
knowing e ithe r of the othe r s and unk nown to t hem , we 
got fur the r evidence conf i rm to r y of t he a u t he ntic ity 
of the document; and the l as t stage wa s tha t fr om a 
fourth s ou r ce , i ndepend e nt of the f ir s t three, we 
got fur th e r confirmatory evide nce . 
These source s were "known to us a nd whose tru s tworthiness 
we have be e n in a posit ion to prove over a space of time 
longer or shorte r in the diffe r e nt ca s es ." Ch ambe rlain 
expa nd on thi s for "it is of the essence of a 
. b .11 ~ t must e secret. A f ew d a ys 
1966 the Labour gover e nt announced t ha t ma ny of t he files 
the Zinovi e v l e tte r we r e "mi ss i ng . " The o nly r ea l c lue un-
d at t he P . R. O. wa s an i ndex cita t i on t o a Novembe r 11 
r andum on e letter b y Au s t e n Ch ambe rlai n . Unfortuna t e ly, 
doc ument h as ee n "withhe ld '" by ord e r of the Fo r e i g n 
ce; s e e CA B 24/1 68 . Chambe rlain g ve a n ora l r e po r t on 
ir fi nd i ng s a t the Cab ine t meeting of o vembe r 10 , 192 4, 
23/4 9 . 
11 De b a s , CLXXIX (Dec . 1 5 , 192 4) , c ols . 671-7 5 . 
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earlier Joynson-Hicks had explained , "It would be impossible 
for reasons of safety to individual life, that the n ames of 
12 the people who produced this evidence should be given. 
Tories considered the c ase closed . 
For the next three years Labourites continued to 
probe informally. Their suspicions centered increasingly 
on J. D. Gregory, the head of the Northern Depar tment at the 
Foreign Office who had signed the protest note. They be-
lieved that Gr egory, a known anti-Bolshevik, had been in-
volved in fabricating the letter and had leaked it to the 
13 press. Early in 1928 the Zinoviev letter issue suddenly 
reappea red after Greg ory and two other civil servants were 
14 
accused of currency specula tion. During a routine in-
vestigation of the charges , ~acDonald and J. H. Thomas 
announced that at the end of 1924 a servant of a woman 
friend of Gregory had t estified that in October she over-
heard he r employe r and Gregory discus s ing a plot against 
the Labou r governoe nt. Hoping to obtain a new inquiry into 
the Zinovie v lette r , M c Donald obtaine d Baldwin 's approva l 
12Ibid., (De c . 10, 1924), col. 311. For eville 
Chamber~s r~arks , s ee T .e Ti me s , Nov . 29, 1924, p . 14. 
Sov ie t stat ents can be f o d ~n oviet Docume nts, II, 
417-82. 
13 For Gre gory 's est ima te of the Bolsheviks, see his 
The Edge of Diplo~ cy , pp . 130-69. 
14 Chester, Fay, anc Young , The Zinovie v Letter, 
• 144-58 , contains the de t ai ls . 
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!or a debate on March 19, 1928. 15 
On March 4, 1928 the Observer printed a letter from 
Thomas Marlowe, the former editor of the Daily Mail, who 
stated that he had received separate copies of the Zinoviev 
letter from two trusted friends on October 24, 1924; he 
suggested none too subtly that they were civil servants. 
Marlowe claimed tha t he publi shed the letter for patriotic 
16 
reasons a.nd denied communica ting with Gregory. Several 
Tory journals felt this revelation vindica t ed Labour's 
17 
demand for a full investigation. 
Some politicians also were upset. Shortly before the 
debate Guy Kinders l ey went to the Conservative Central Office 
on routine business. The party's newly-appointed Publicity 
Director, Major Joseph Ball, mentioned that the governmen t 
was concerned with the forthcoming debate. Kindersley 
apparently had not b ee n involved with Ma rlowe in 1924, but he 
realized that no one in the Cen tral Office knew of the 
Conservatives ' role in the affair. He offered to produce the 
. ld . 18 h who could en l1gh t e n everyone, Dona 1.m Thurn. On t · e 
15For the Cab inet 's decision , see Cabine t minutes, 
28, 1928, CAB 23/57. 
16 Obse rver , March 4, 1928, p. 17. 
17 E.g., Spectator, CXL (March 10, 1928), 349. For other 
press comme nts favorable to an inquiry, see Coates, A 
of A lo-Sovie t Re l ations, p. 192. 
informa tion is based on a private account written 
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morning of March 19 Kindarsley broug ht im Thurn to a 
luncheon at the home of party Chairman J. C . C. Davidson. 
The other guests included Ball, Hogg, and Ba ldwin. The 
Prime Minister was shocked when Kindersley told him what 
had happened. It was decided that Baldwin should read to 
the House that afternoon a statement prepared in advance 
by im Thurn. 19 
In opening the debate MacDonald now base d his 
request for an inquiry on Marlowe's l etter , cha rging that 
civil servants from either the Wa r Office, the Home Office, 
or the Admiralty had leaked the l etter to influence the 
20 
election. In reply Da ldwin first c a st furthe r light on 
the Conse rvative investigation of 1924: "Ac cording to the 
information wh ich we have," Zinovi e v had admitted in private 
that he wrote t he l e tte r. In Novembe r, 19 24, Ba ldwin 
continued, Chiche rin had told his c olleagues t hat Al bert 
Inkpin of t he British Communist party h ad d es troyed the 
original. As a dd itional proof the Prime 1i n iste r claimed 
Soviets had shot a Ru s sian accus ed of stea ling the 
by Kind e r sley in 195 6; see Che ste r, Fay, and Young , The 
Zinov i e v L tter , pp . 163-6 4. The Cab ine t vetoed a new 
inquiry on t e ground th t th ey would be ques tioni n g t h e 
judgment of t heir c ommittee of ovember, 19 24; see Cabine t 
ainutes, Feb. 28, 1928, CAB 23/57. 
19 James, ed., Memoirs of a Conservative , p . 204. 
20 Debates , CCXV (March 19, 19 28), eels. 47-59. 
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Baldwin asserted that his next piece of evidence 
disproved any conspiracy and vindicated the Daily Mai l. 
He vouched for im Thurn's ch a racter and claimed to have 
verified the manifesto as far as possible. Having been 
released only recently from a pledge of secrecy given to his 
informant, im Thurn stated th a t he was coming forward to 
clear the civil servants and the press. On October 8, 1924 
he had met with a busines sman in close touch with British 
Communists. After a routine business dis c ussi on he was told 
of the arrival of the Zinovie v l e tter at Communist party head-
quarters. When his friend supplied a copy the next morning, 
he became "very indig n a nt" at t he Soviets ' attempt to foment 
revolution while the y we re trying to obtain a loan of "good 
British mone y." Im Thurn decided to inform the Fore ign Office 
and the country after his in formant settled his affairs and 
found a pl a ce of safety , for "his life wou ld be in da nger . " 
After this h a d been done , Thurn asked a "trus t ed City 
friend," in "close touch" with t he Daily Mai l, to arrang e 
for publica tion. He concluded by denying t ha t any govern-
ment depar tmen t had he l pe him . 
Before introducing i m Thurn 's statement , Ba ldwin 
tried to syncronize it with Marlowe ' s . In particular he 
the fo rme r editor ' s claim tha t he h ad received two 
the l et ter from civil s ervan t s . He also noted that 
Marlowe was r e calling events which h ad occurred three and a 
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half years before and that he had written his letter to the 
Observer while in France, "away from all his works of 
21 
reference.• Labourites were unprepared for im Thurn's 
disclosure. Although subsequent spe akers also demande d an 
inquiry, none challenged the discre pa ncies between the 
stories of Marlowe and im Thurn. Labour was defeated 
soundly in the vote, 326 to 132. 
The Labour pre s~ agreed with Chicherin that 
22 Baldwin's speech was fille~ with "barefaced lies." But 
Tory papers bel ieve d that im Tt.urn' s stateme nt fina lly 
settled the 23 case . Both sides apparent ly had grown weary 
of the controversy , for one inter.~s ting statement passed 
unnoticed. On March 26 Chambe~lain told a Primros e League 
meeting that the Foreig n Office's cop y had not c ome from 
im Thurn or from hi s informant but from other trustworthy 
24 
source s. 
After i m Thurn's b rief momen t of prominence, he r e -
treated into obscurity, but not b e fore he co lle cte d part of 
the ~7,500 p r omised in 1924. The Tories had neve r paid his 
•frie nd," probab ly ecause i m Turn di not pro uce a copy . 
21 For Baldwin's speech, s ee Ibid., cols. 59- 72. 
22 
The Time s, March 23, 19 28 , p. 14. 
23 r bid ., March 20, 1928, p . 14. See al s o Coates , A 
History or--ng l o-Soviet Re l ations , p . 195. 
24The T imes , March 27, 1928, p . 18. 
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His testimony in 1928 apparently prompted them to pay up. 
Moreover, im Thurn told Major Ball he had received a cable 
from Warsaw saying that his fri end was anxious for a 
settlemen t. On April 2 Davids on gave a personal c heck for 
£ 5,000 to Major Ball, who in turn paid im Thurn. In 
acknowledging payme nt i m Thurn note d that his informe r was 
about to depart for Arge ntina unde r an assumed n ame and 
would never be heard fr om again. Be cause the Torie s had 
shortchanged him, im Thurn though t that he and Kindersley 
should be knighted. The Tories refused . When i m Thurn 
died in 1930, Kinders ley asked Baldwin to offe r c ondolence s 
to his widow. The Cons e rvative le ade r wrote , "He was a 
man who was always re11d y to give himse lf to t he services of 
25 his country." In 1956 Kinders ley wrote a dra f t history 
of his role in t he affair which he in tended to s ubmi t to the 
Daily Mai l, an a ppropri ate choice. He asked Lord Da vidson 
(formerly J. C. C. Da vidson ) a nd Sir Joseph Ba ll for t he ir 
commen t s . Se vera l mo nths late r t he t wo me n pe r s uaded 
26 
Kinde rsley no t to ublish his storJ . 
No doub t, the Zinoviev l e tte r wil l con ti nue to 
attract attention. Despite the r evelations of the Sunday 
re po rters, a n umbe r of substantive ques tions r emain 
25For the above , see Che ste r, Fay, and Young, The 
Zinovie v Le t e r, pp. 17 8-82. 
26 J ames , ed., temoirs of a Co nservative , pp . 203-4 . 
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unanswered. Such issues as the exact origin of the letter 
and the method of transmission to Britain a r e not ge rma ne to 
this pape r. However, these and other questions must be 
answe red before a final judgment can be r e ndered on the 
extent of Tory involvemen t. One of the mos t intriguing 
problems which the r eporters failed to touch on concerns 
im Thurn's stateme nt in 1928. It conflicted in ma ny ways 
with his di a ry of the eve nts of 1924, which they u 5e d 
extensively. Most important, the diary did not mention a 
businessman close to the Lommunist pa rty, and it also 
indicated tha t im Thurn never saw the l etter. Thus he could 
not have given copies to the Foreign Offi ce a nd to a 
•trusted" friend. Kindersle y mus t have known tha t im Thurn 
was lying in 192 8 because he h ad been in close contact with 
him in 1924. This leads to an i mportant que stion. Did 
Kinde r s ley tell Bal dwi n wha t they r e a l ly knew 
The Prime Mini s ter saw t he 
discrepancies betwe en the stateme n ts of Ma rlowe and i m Thurn, 
and he mus t h ave ask e d ques t ions . He c l a i med t o have c hecke d 
st a t e me nt, but c o uld no t have done so v e ry 
for Marlowe a ctually h ad told the truth. Whethe r 
Baldwin k nowing ly r e ad a lie to Co mmo ns on March 19 
b e answered . 
This, in turn, rais e s the c en tral question . Did he 
the letter was genuine? If not, his s tateme nt was 
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merely another attempt to suppress the truth. However, the 
minutes of the Cabinet me eting of February 28, 1928 imply 
that the ministers still believed it was authentic: they 
feared a new inquiry would endange r "the positio n of the 
27 informants abroa d as to the Zinovi e ff letter." Baldwin's 
biographers claim he "remaine d convinced of the letter's 
authenticity to his dying day." The editor of Lord 
Davidson's papers ma intains tha t the former party Chairman 
was persuade d similarly until the r e v e lation by the Sunda y 
Times reporte rs. 28 Moreover, in his statement on March 19 
Baldwin offere d to let MacDonald examine the government's 
29 
evidence on the lette r. It is doubtful he would have 
done this knowing it was a fr a ud. Thus Baldwin coul d have 
seized upon im Thurn 's sta tement, even knowing that it was 
false, to avoid a new inqui ry which might have e x po sed 
British inte lligence around t he world. The key to s olving 
this mystery pe r haps lies bur ied in the investiga tion 
conducte d by the Tories in 1 92 4. Auste n Chamberlain state d 
the government r ece ived ve rification o f t he l ette r from 
source s. If Sid ne y Re illy and Po lish inte lligence we re 
of the informe r s , who were the othe rs? The list of such 
27
cabinet minutes, Feb. 28, 1928, CAB 23/57. 
28Middlemas an d Barnes , Ba l dwin, p . 302; J ames, ed., 
Memoirs of a Conse rva t i ve , p. l 99 . 
29 oeba t es , CCXV (March 17, 1928), col. 62. 
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vexing questions is long, and the complete story is still 
unknown. 
Cor._ ervatives often h a ve been accused of engaging 
in a plot. The a~thors of The Zinovie v Le tter entitled one 
chapter with a typically incriminating phras e, "The Tories 
Enter the Conspiracy.• These allegations are unfounde d. 
At present all evidence indicate s that the Tories had be en 
led to believe that the Labour gove r nment was withholding 
an authentic docume nt for political reasons. The Tory 
offer of£ 7,500 to im Thurn's informe r certainly under-
scored their intention to u s e the lette r for p a rti s an 
purposes, but it did :'Ot mean the y cons pire d to p e r pe tra t e 
a fraud. A juni or membe r of the Tory Ce ntral Office in the 
1920's concurs, "As far as I am aware there was no actu a l 
. ,.30 'collus~on. 
30 Letter from Percy Cohe n, London, Se p t. 19, 1 9 69. 
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A P P E N D I X I I 
TORY POLITICIANS VISIT RUSSIA 
During the 1920's an increasing number of Britons 
journeyed to Russia to see how the Bolshevik "experiment" 
was working. Tories and Labourites disagreed on the meri ts 
of these trips. The controversy centered on the visitors' 
objectivity. Despite pretensions to openmindedness , all 
visitors to Russia c ame with their own prior estimates of 
Bolshevism . As one Briton rema rked, "Or.e of the most 
striking things about the trip was the way in which 
people who had be en to exactly the same places and seen 
exactly the same t hings had di ametrically opposite im-
1 
pressions of those things." 
The Labour p a rty or its affiliates spons ored a 
number of widely publici zed trips. Most Tori e s be lie ved 
these pilgrimages were useless . The report of the first 
Labour del ega t ion to Russia , published in the s umme r of 
1920, contained mixed praise and condemn ation. But the 
Daily ~1 a il and The Ti e s de nounced the d e l eg ate s as 
Bolshevik dupes. 2 The Conservative Ce ntral Office took 
1Archibald Lyall, Rus s i n Round abo u t: a Non-Political 
Pilgr i mage (Lon o n, 1933), p . 1 8 
2 Daily 'iail, June 11, 1920, p. 4; The Times, June 6, 
p. 11. 
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quotations from the report out of context for use against 
Labour candidates; The Time s opened its columns to those 
3 
delegates who disliked Russia. 
In February, 1925 a favorable report on Russia by a 
TUC delegation met with the usual critical response from 
4 
most Tory papers. J. L. Garvin disagreed: •rt may help by 
its example of reasonable tone to abate the r a vings of those 
belated fanatics on the o pposite side who suffer s e riously 
from Bolshevism on the brain.· 5 Robert Horne said the 
report . contradicted what he had read by "independent 
observers.• In a typical diatribe Birkenhead accused the 
delegates of transmitting t he "poisonous doctrines of 
6 
Moscow• to produce anarchy and despair at home . 
Despite these conde ations few Conse rvativ e 
politicians journeyed to Russia to corr c t Labour's 
7 
allegedly di s torted portrait. The Soviet government did not 
4 
Morn ing Post , Feb . 28 , 1 9 25, p . 13; Daily Ma il , 
Feb. 28, 19 25 , p. 6; The Ti me s , Feb . 28 , 1 92 5 , p . 3 ; 
Spectator, CXXXIV (M rch 7 , 19 25) , 353 . 
5 Observer , March 1, 1925, p. 12. 
6 
The Times, March 25, p. 16, June 29, 1925, p. 9. 
7 A few Tory 
during t he 1920's. 
of everyday life . 
partis an s vi sited Russia occ asion lly 
Mrs . Ce cil Hanbury painted a g r im picture 
She told a meeting of the Anti - oci li s t 
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. . 8 discourage poten tial bourgeo i s v~s~ tors. The r eason 
perhaps can be found in Conse rvative press estimate s of 
Labour visits. The press a rgued tha t it wa s impos s ible to 
discover t he •truth" duri ng a f e w weeks ' rushed tour. 
Soviet autho r i tie s a lleged l y hinde red inquisi t ive v i s i t ors , 
especially by a llowi ng t hem t o see o n ly c e r tai n thi ngs . The 
language prob l e m, too, p r e ven t ed t he cur iou s from as c e rtaining 
9 
the opinions of ord inary Russians . In f ac t, some To ries 
stayed away f rom Rus sia de libe r ately, apparen tly f ee l ing tha t 
distance promo t e d ob jectivi ty, not i gnora nce as Labour i t es 
charge d. Ma ny probab ly wou l d h ave agreed wi t h a Tory 
publisher, Er nes t Benn, who wrote t ha t "by r e fu s ing t o 
visit Ru ss ia, f a r from disqualifying myse l f a s a n authori t y 
on the sub ject, I have fitted my se lf mo r e spec ia lly a s a 
10 
fa i r judge .• 
and An t i - Comm nis t Union that she had see n b ands of homeles s 
orphan s roaming t he stree ts , starving worke rs , d ru nke n 
peasants , and prisons f i l l e to c apacity ; s e Th Tine s , 
Dec. 11, 1925 , p . 13 . A. T . Cook was appa l led by w a t the 
Sovie t "bloodsucke r s " had done ; see I bid . , Oct . 9 , 1926 , 
p. 7. However , T. H. Ai l ken and Ce l~irr.pson r e corded 
favorab l e i mp ress i ons o c ond i tions in lloscow; see S§ec a t o r , 
CXXX'V (Dec. 26 , 192 5), 117 6 , CXL (June 30 , 19 8) , 96 . 
H. Smallwood v isited Ru s sia f o ur time s du ri ng t he de c ade , 
depart ing each time wit.h a ixed r e c tion; s ee Ash r i dgc 
Journa l, no . 3 (August, 1930 ), 46-5 1. 
10 Er nes t Benn , 
The 
en t of 
o u t Rus Gia (Londo n , 1930 ), p . 7. 
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Backbenche r Martin Conway a ppar en tly was the fir s t 
Tory politicia n to s ee Russia in the 1920' s . A noted art 
expert, he s pen t six weeks touri ng the coun t ry in the summer 
of 1924 to dete rmine if t he Bo l sheviks h ad d estroyed or s old 
innumerable art treasures , as was r eported frequentl y in 
Conservative and Russ i an ~igr~ papers . Upon r eturning he 
state d tha t th.e t reasures we r e intac t a nd praised t he 
11 
Soviets for t heir ef forts to p r eserve them . A s hort t ime 
later Colone l As she t on Pown a l l, M.P., spen t a week eac h i n 
Moscow and Le ning rad a nd i ssued a b l e ak desc r iption o f 
conditio ns unde r -th i s mos t a p ! ling t y r anny ." He 
addressed a nurr~er o f Tory audie nces , and t he Conse r va t ive 
. . 12 Centra l Off~ce r ep r 1nted one of his speeches . I n Ju l y , 
1925 Lord Newton , a pro ine nt an ti - Sovie t peer, st yed i n 
Lening r a d fo r s e vera l weeks. His fe w remarks indica t e d 
displ easur e , if no t disgu s t , wi th wha t he had s een . 13 
In Apr i l, 192 6 f our backbenche rs unde rtook the mos t 
publicized journe y to Russia b y a Tory group du r ing 
The Times , June 4 , 1 9 
tiol shev ik; s ee We s t e rn 
Union Revi ew was t he s 
Review . 
VI (J a n . 17, 1925 ), 59- 60; 
14 . Conway wa s an anti -
The Soviet 
a t ion and 
12The Ti e s , Sept. 25 , p . 7, Oc t. 11, p . 11, Nov . 19, 
p. 11. Ass heton Pownall, The Pl a in Truth About Ru ss ia 
(London , 1924 ), p am let no. 2497 . 
13 E.g., Spectato r, CXXXVI (J an . 2, 192 6 ), 13. 
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the decade. The idea originated with Sir Frank Ne lson on 
March 5, 1926 as he l istene d to Labourite Fred Bromley 
during a Commons debate on for eign trade . Nelson realized 
that no Cons e rvative could say , as Bromley had, that he had 
gone to Russia r ecentl y to study developme nts t here which 
ff d d . h . . 14 a ecte tra e w~t Br~t a ~n. 
Nelson quickly r e cruited three o the r Tory M.P.'s to 
accompany him, Robert Boothby, Rober t Bourne, and Thomas 
Hoore. All of the m were intere s t e d in Russia. A prominent 
exchange broke r, Ne lson had desc r ibed Bolshe vi s m as a "blood-
thirsty" evil and in his maide n speech had s e cond ed a motion 
15 protesting Co mmuni s t p r opag anda . Moore had become a 
staunch anti- Bolsh e vik afte r s ee ing Soviet exce s ses during 
his two years with All i ed armie s in South Russ ia. Hi s 
fluency in Russ i an was pa rticular ly v al uable. Howe v e r, he 
was associate d with a firm wh ich ma rkete d Sovie t o i l in 
England; he ex p laine d that he wa nted to he lp reduce un-
. ' . d 16 
employmen t by ~ncr a s~ng Ru ss ~ an tra e . Bourne had 
14 Fo r Broml e y ' s s p e c h , s e Debate s , CXC II ( r ch 5, 
1926), col s . 11 40-44 . Fo r e l son ' s l ate r e xp l ana ti ons , s e e 
Morning Pos t, April 17, 19 26 , p. 14. 
15 . 1 The T ume s, Se p t. 15, 19 24 , p. 4; Deb t e s, CLXXXI 
(March 3, 19 5) , cols. 359 - 65 . Short biog r ap ica l s ke tche s 
of the four M.P.'s c a n e fou nd i n Dod ' s Pa rl i ame n t a ry 
Compani on f o r t he Yea r 19 26 (Lond o n , 1926) . 
16Moore's anti-Sovie t vi ews can be found in The Time s , 
Aug. 10 , 19 2 6 , p. 17 , Ma y 9 , 19 2 7 , p. 12. 
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argued that Russia's exclusion from European affairs was 
17 damaging the pea ce. In May, 1925 Boothby h ad intended to 
visit Russia to lobby for the herring industry, but for 
. d 18 some reason the tr~p never was rna e. 
Under-Secretary Godfrey Locker-Lampson told Nelson 
that British diplomatic agents in Russia would offer 
assistance. An interview was arranged between the M.P.'s 
19 
and the Northern Departmen t of the Foreign Office. After 
spending seve ral more week s securing Soviet approval and 
arranging their itinerary, the group prepared to leave 
London on April 17. 
Shortly before departing they spe lled out the 
obj ec tives of their proposed five - we ek trip. Moore hoped 
that "our visit may r esul t in a better relationship between 
Russia and this count ry because Russia has far more 
to gain by cultiva ting r e l a tions ith Bri tain than with any 
20 
other country. • Echoing the same sentiments , Boothby 
17For Bourne 's speech, see Deba tes , CLXXXI (M a rch 5, 
1925), cols. 772-74. 
18Boothby to Ch amberlai n, May 1, 19 25, Chamberlain to 
Boothby, May 5, 1925, Austen Chamberlain Pape r s , AC 52/107 , 
AC 52/108. 
19Nelson to Chambe rl ain, March 12, March 15, 1926, 
Godfrey Locker-Lampson to elson, March 15, 1926 , Chambe r-
lain to Ne lson, Ma rch 17, 1926, FO 371/117 88 . 
2
°Financi a l 'ews , April 19, 1926, cited by Coates, A 
Bistory of Anglo - Sovi e t Re l a tions , pp . 226-27. 
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stressed: 
We are quite independent and we are going with 
an absolutely open mind and we should not have gone 
unless we had r ea l assurances from the authorities 
in Moscow that not only should we be given every 
facility for making a thoroug h investigation of the 
social, political and economic problems but that 
they would be very glad to see us.21 
With one exception, the Conservative press did not 
comment editorially. Some papers may have feared the M.P.'s 
would be as objective as they professed to be. The Observer 
h d th . i ld i 1 . 1 . 22 ope e v1s t wou mprove Ang o-Russ1an re at1ons. 
But "rightist" backbenche r Alfred Knox asked Chamberlain if 
it was "in any sense an official delegation." His dis-
claimer apparently satisfied a pp rehensive Tory zealots. 23 
The Soviets welc0med the visit, the Soviet Union Monthly 
noting that "nothing can be more welcome than an i mpa rtial 
inquiry and an unbias sed re port by members of the Co nser-
vative Party.• 24 
On April 24 the group arrived in Moscow where they 
were fully occupied for the next eleven days . They were 
received cordially at the Kremlin, interviewing Litv inov, 
Radek, and other Sovie t notables . The M.P.'s talked 
21observer , April 18, 1926, p. 8; Morning Post , April 
1926, p. 14. 
22
observer, April 18, 1926, p. 15. 
23
oebates , CXCIV (April 21, 1926), col. 1184. 
24
soviet Un:!.on Monthly , I (May, 1926), 75. 
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at length with Soviet bureaucrats who discussed all aspects 
of Anglo-Russian relations with apparent candor. For 
several days they inspected factories, workers' clubs, 
schools, and public health facilities. With Moore serving 
as interpre ter, they spoke to workers, peasants,and 
soldiers. 
After just five days in Moscow Ne l son believed he 
had discovered the crux of Anglo-Sovi e t difficulties . In an 
interview published in Izvestia on April 29, he reasoned 
that increased contacts would reduce each country's "pro-
found" ignorance of the other. He t .ried to alleviate Soviet 
fears by pleading tha t the Conservative government was not 
trying to overthrow them. Pravda retorted that Nelson must 
not have been a party to Chamberlain 's endless plots. 25 
On April 29 Bourne became ill and went to Berlin for 
treatmen t. The British general strike began on May 1. 
Three days later r eports reaching Moscow convinced the three 
remaining M.P.'s to return home . Their planned trips to 
Leningrad, the Saratov grain districts, and the Baku oil 
fields were cance lled . They l e ft Moscow on May 5, barely 
halfway through their journey. 
After arriving in Berlin on May 7, they were reunited 
Bou rne who had since recovered. For the ne xt two days 
remained in Berlin to draw up a r eport of their 
25Hodgson to Chambe rlain, Ma y 8, 1926, FO 371/11788. 
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impressions. Running to nearly thirty typewritten pages, 
the draft contained an a dmixture of p e rce ptive judgments 
and naive impressions which in some ways resenQ led earlier 
Labour delegations' reports. The most salient points 
26 
merit full discussion. 
In the introduction the M.P.'s stated that the ir 
recommendations would not h a ve differed e ve n if the y had 
completed the ir itinerary. They we re able to go whe r e ve r 
they desired without Soviet interfe r e nce. 27 In discu s sing 
politics they empha s ized the r e volutionary n a ture of the 
Soviet governme nt. Because of Marxi s m, the inevitab le 
changes in Soviet policy wou ld be "cautious and slow ." 28 
Although Len i n's d eath had created a powe r vacu um , the 
fall of the So vie t governmen t was "highly improbab l e " and 
29 
•undesirable" b e c ause c omple t e c haos would re sult. The 
report noted tha t t he a dm i ni s trativ e ab ility of Sovie t 
"wil l stand f a vo r ab l e c ompa ri s o n with any othe r 
o f mode r n times .• 30 
The visitor saw a "con s ide r ab l e easu r e of 
r eport was appended to a minute by Lock e r-
FO 37 1/1179 8 . (He re i naf t e r r e f e rred 
27
oraft report, pp. 1-2. 
28
rbid. I P· 3. 
29 Ibid., p. 4. 
30 Ibid., p. 5. 
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democracy" in legislative and admini s trative affairs, but 
they were disconcerted by two practi r.e s: non-Cor.munists did 
no t receive legal justice, and the activities of the State 
Po litical Administration (GPU) were unjustifi ed in view of 
d omes t ic tranquility. However , the GPU's methods "are by no 
"31 
means approved in some of the most authoritative quarters . 
Although the Red Army was in excellent condition, it 
32 
did not threaten the Wes t. The NEP was we ll-suited to 
Russia. In the fin ancial sector the government was far from 
being bankrupt, as was often reported in England . In fact, 
t he Soviets were pursuing an austere fiscal policy. The 
noticeable currency d e preci a tion would be allevi a ted by 
g reater for e i gn currency re s erve s c om ing fro m an inevitable 
0 0 33 
upsurge 1n Rus s 1an exports. On the who l e the delegation 
f elt the government was changing slowly from a tyranny to a 
democracy. Toleration given al l fo s of r elig ion e x mp li i e d 
34 
this t rend. 
Regarding social conditions , the M. P . 's be lieved t .he 
pe o p l e had be ne fite d f r om the Revolutio n , "not in 
eithe r of express ion or action, but to a very ama zing 
0 0 i "35 1 e ducation, culture, and soc1a l e n1 t es . On y 
31 Ibid . I pp . 5 -7. 
32 Ibid . , pp. 25-27. 
33 
Ibid. I 71 11-14. pp. 
34 
Ib id . I p . 7. 
35 I b i d . I p . 8 , 91 11. 
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. 36 
the Tsarist survivors re aped a "very b1.tter reward." 
Trade unions we re ne cess ary because workers we re "prone to 
mista.ke what is good eithe r for themse lves or the State. • 37 
Only a top-heavy burea ucracy prevented the educational 
system from realizing its full potential. Of Sovie t 
achievements in public health, sanitation, and artistic 
and cultural developme nt, "it is difficult to s e ak too 
highly.· 38 
In view of the pre vailing Tory fear of Sovie t 
propagand a , the most startling obs e rvations d ea lt with the 
Third Interna tional. The vi s itors saw a s eparation betwe e n 
the Third Interna tion a l a.nd the Sovi e t government , compa r ab le 
to that betwee n the Second Internation 1 and the late Labour 
government. As proof the y noted th t only one Soviet 
minister was on the Execu tive Committe e of the Comintern. 
Believing tha t Comintern propaganda ad shifte r c e n tly to 
the defensive, the y sta t e d , " We are not di s posed to inves t 
the activities of e Th ird Inte rnation 1 with one ten of 
the i orta nce attach ed t o t hem .• In f ac t, since 192 2 "the 
idea of a worl d re e lution has be en practical l y abandoned in 
comm nistic circles and the concep tion of a sing le 
36 Ibid., p. 10. 
37 Ibid ., p. 18-21. 
38 Ib id ., p . 21 -2 4. 
39 Socialist state accepted ." 
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Intersperse d throughout the t ext were a number of 
oblique refere nces warning that Britain would make a 
serious mistake by not settling with the "new" Russia, 
These intimations became bold proposals in the conclusions 
and recommendations . As t he embodime nt of the report's 
40 
optimis tic t one , the y s hould be s ummarized i n full. 
Conclu s ions 
1. The Soviet exper iment is be coming successful. 
2. The Sov iet go ve r nme nt is he re t o sta y . 
3. It is the best form of a dministration for 
Russia. 
4. It is o ppor t une for Brita in to establish 
closer politica l and comme rcia l tie s with 
Russia . 
5. The main obstacles to ~ n accord a re e a ch 
country's ig no r ance of t he othe r, and 
especia lly t he mo tio na l spee c hes and 
articles by "we ll-kn own p ub lic me n" and 
"ill-informe d " ne wspa pe rs in Britain. 
Recomme ndatio ns 
l. The Expor t Cred its Sc h eme shou l d be extended 
to Ru ss ia. 
2. Britain s ho l d r esume negot ia tions to se ttl e 
all outs t and i ng probl e s . 
3. Britain s hou l d cons i d e r e xte ndi ng a gove r e nt -
guaranteed loan , an p r ewa r deb ts s hould be 
settled in a pure y bu s iness li k f as hion . 
4. Britain should pron o t e more accu a te k now-
l edg e of Ru s s i a and shou ld d iscou r age i n -
accurate spe e ches and p r ess r eports wh ich 
only serve to eigh ten Sov i e t c o nvictio n of 
an anti-Sovi e t pol icy in Br itain . 
final parag raph t he r epor t stated that the adop tion of 
39
r bid ., p. 17. 
40 Ibid., 27 30 pp . - • 
379 
the recommendations •will have an early and happy effect 
both on the peace a nd stability of Europe, and th.e 
H prosperity a.nd happiness of our own people. 
This was a bold and daring report by Tory 
politicians. In fact, it could have passed as a work of 
Communist fellow travelers. A loan to Rus sia was anathema 
in most Conservative circles. The sta t ements on the Third 
International woul d h a ve outraged most of their colleagues . 
Few Tories wou ld have agreed th a t the Soviets had abandoned 
revolution. The oblique r eferences to anti-Soviet diatribes 
by such p a rty no tabl e s as Birkenhead, Chu rchi ll, and 
Joynson-Hick s were made a t considerable r isk , because the 
four men h ad jus t begun their pol i tic a l c a r eers . 
The ir rosy d escrip tion of t he Sovie t economy was too 
simpli s t ic . Al so it is difficult to explain t heir facile 
acceptance of the fi ctional distinction betwee n the Sov ie t 
governmen t and the Comi nte rn. Mo s t i mportant, the ir 
recomme nd tions c ontained no ~ew suggestions on s e ttli ng such 
ro~ e s as private debts . As the Labour party 
bad discove r ed in 1924 , some thing mo re than good intentions 
ne ede d to resolve the Anglo- Sov ie t impas se. 
An intrig uing, thoug h i nsoluble , question concerns 
writers' objectivity. Desp ite their stre nuous a sse rt ions 
41Although Bourne endorsed t he spi r i t of the re-
COmmendations , he felt un ab le to sign the r eport . 
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to the contrary, it seems possible that they, like other 
visitors, looked at Russia through rose-colored glasses. 
Because of their well-known d~sire to affect a detente with 
Russia, they perhaps went there only to bolster their 
convictions. They certainly weakened their credibility by 
asserting that nothing to be seen outside Moscow could 
alter their impressions. 
On May 9 separate copies of the draft intended for 
publication were sent from Ber lin to Ba ldwin, Chambe rlain, 
and Godfrey Locker-Lampson, apparently as a gesture of 
courtesy for their assistance . The M.P.'s then returned to 
London. Unknown to them , the report had provoked a whirl-
wind of government activity bordering on panic . 
Baldwin's secreta ry asked t hem not to publish the 
42 
report until the Prime Minister had studied it. Locker-
Lampson's initial comme n t sugges ted the coming reaction, 
•A fortnight's tour is a very shor t t ime in which to acquire 
. d . . . 43 
a grasp of so compl1cate a s1 t uat1on . Sensing the 
repercussions to the governme nt 's Russian policy , Locke r-
Lampson met with Chamberlain on May 12. To avoid any charge 
pressuring the delegation, the Foreign Secretary re fused 
42Patrick Gower to 
Papers, vol. 113, p. 42. 
the Baldwin Papers. 
Nelson , May 14, 1926, Baldwin 
A copy of the draft r epor t is in 
43Minute by Locker-Larnpson , May 11, 1926, FO 371/11798. 
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to see them. Instead he felt that F. S. Jackson, Chairman 
of the Conservative party, should "interview" them. Jackson 
went quickly to the Foreign Office with Commander Bolton 
Eyres-Monsell, the Chief Tory Whip . When informed of the 
report, Jackson feared that the Labour party would make 
full use of it. They suggested t hat Chamberlain should see 
44 
the M.P.'s. 
The next morning, May 13, Locke r-Lampson showed the 
report to Sir Willi am Tyrrell, the Perma.nent Unde r-Secretary 
of the Foreign Office, wh o tho ught Baldwin s hould force the 
M.P.'s to withhold it. Afte r meeting with Eyres-Monse ll 
and other Conservative Wh i ps , Locker-L ampson decided that 
the Prime Minister was too o c c upied with the dome stic 
crisis. Chambe rlain the n a g r eed to me et with the M.P.'s 
45 
that s ame a f t e rnoon . 
Nelson was no t in Londo n, but e oth er three 
atte nded. Ch ambe r la in ade it c le r t ha t he wa s speaki ng 
as the Prime Mi niste r's de u ty, and ~ot as Fore i g n Secreta ry. 
Stressi ng t he t e nse ness caused by t he gene r a l str ike , h e 
that p ubli c a tion of the r eport "mi g h t add ossibly 
[the gove r~en t 's) trouble.• Any division of 
opinion within the ruling party on an i mpo rtant issue mi ght 
44Memorandum by Locker-Lamp son, Ma y 17, 1926, Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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be used by revolutionary forces. Besides, in several 
instances the report was incorrect. He asked t hat they 
postpone publication at least until the domestic crisis 
subsided, and that they publish nothing without Foreign 
Office approval. In response Robert Bourne noted that he 
disagreed with much of the report signed by his colleagues, 
but Moore and Boothby staunchly defended its contents. One 
of them--probably Boothby--stated th a t h e would leave the 
party rather than repudiate the r eport. But not wanting to 
emba.rrass t he government, they agreed to acquiesce with 
46 
Chamberlain if Nelson concurred. On May 17 Chamberlain 
met again with tlelson , Moo r e , and Boothby . Nelson announced 
a •drastic• revision, and the Foreign Secretary approved 
47 
publication. 
In contrast to the original , the revis ed r e port was 
we ak , apologetic, and almos t t._:. ~ally lacking in bold re-
commendat i on s an . 48 conclus~ons . Though still claiming 
impartiality, they now admit ted, •A fortnigh t in Mos c ow can 
in no sense be considered sufficient foun dation upon which 
49 
to base dogma tic opinions ." Previously optimistic 
46 Ibid. 
47Minute by Locker-Lamp son, May 18, 1926, FO 371/11798. 
48The revised report was attached t o a minute by 
Locker-Lampson , May 18, 1926, Ibid. (Hereinafter refer r ed to 
as revised repor t.) 
49 . d 1 Rev~se report, p. • 
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descriptions of Russian politics and social conditions were 
diluted. Instead of evolving toward democracy, the govern-
ment was "an autocracy pure and simple." All internal 
successes were attributed to an efficient dictatorship, not 
to any beneficial results of Communism. Instead of the 
judiciary improving on its own initiative, it would now do 
so only if the government consented. The sentence about 
religious tolerance was expanded to include examples of 
50 blasphemies which "filled us with abhorrence." The 
distinction between the Comintern and the Soviet governme nt 
was blurred, and Bolshe vik propaganda no longe r wa s l abe led 
harmless. 5 1 
The conclusions were eliminated: in s tead, Britain 
was a sked not to fore g o any favor ab le opportunity to se ttle 
with Russia. In place of t he r e comme ndations, Br itain was 
urged to stop an ti-Bol shevik propag anda and to obta in a 
settlement of private debts on te rms favoring Britons . 
However, the revi sion asked for increased Ang lo-Soviet trade 
sake of the unemployed . 52 
Even these dras tic changes did not s a tisfy the 
Office. Locker-Lampso n felt t he r eport sti ll 
certai n "inopportune" sentences "which might be 
50 
Ibid., pp. 2, 4, 6. 
51 Ibid., p. 15. 
52Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
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53 
misused by ill-intentioned persons.• He then bracketed 
the objectionable sections, mostly i mp lied or polite 
criticisms of Britain's policy of aloofness toward Russia. 
Other suggested eliminations dealt wit.h the report's 
advocacy of long-term trade credits for Russia, the two 
Powers' ignorance of each other, t.he revised estimate of 
the relationship between the Comintern and the Soviet 
government, and the Soviets' allegedly peaceful intentions . 54 
55 Nelson agreed to every deletion without objection. 
Baldwin approved the emasculated version the next day. 56 
Both Locker-Larnpson and Chambe rlain expressed satisfac tion. 
The Foreign Secretary instructed his Under-Secretary to 
thank the group "for the friendly way in which they r e -
57 
ceived and treated my friendly suggestions ." 
Why did the M.P.'s r evise their draft so hastily? 
Lord Boothby provides a possible answer when he r ecalls that 
they were i mpressed by Chamberlain's fears of intensified 
domestic unrest. But more important , t hey did so upo n 
realiz i ng the extent of Foreig n Of fice opposition. The 
53Minute by Locker-L amp s on , May 18, 1926, F0 371/11798. 
54 . k I Rev~sed report, pp. 10, 14-1 5 . Loc . er -Lampson s 
deletions were penciled into the Foreign Office copy of the 
revised r eport. 
55Minute by Locker-Lamp son, May 18, 1926, FO 371/11798. 
56 Locker-Lampson t o Tyrrell, May 19, 19 26, FO 800/227. 
57Minute by Locke r-Lampson , May 18, 1 926 , FO 371/11798. 
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M.P.'s did not want to incur their enmity because any 
future activities would require Foreign Office approval 
58 
or, at least, neutrality. The M.P.'s were not overjoyed . 
Boothby's desire to terminate "this accursed thing" 
59 
suggested frustration. 
Chamberlain's avowed reasons for interfering were 
valid. However, F. S. Jackson's reference to Labour u sage 
of the draft repor t was perhaps anothe r factor. Locker-
Lampson's deletions add weight to this speculat ion; several 
of these hardly could have jeopardi zed n ational interests, 
e.g., "For the diploma tic relations between the two 
countries leaves , in our opinion, a great deal to be 
60 
desired." Tories had been saying that for years . 
Chamberlain also might have feared that publica tion of the 
draft would have undermined his pol icy of keepi ng the 
Sovie ts at arm's length . Any sign of growing opposition 
from within his own party would have reinforced the Soviets' 
belief that Britain eventually would modify he r t erms for a 
settlement . The aftermath of the gene r a l strike an the 
continuing coal strike clouded wha t otherwise would h a ve 
been a clear case of governmen tal pol i tica l pre ssu re. That 
partisan politics played at least some r ole seems certain. 
58Lord Robert Boothby, interview in London, July 29, 
59 Boothby to Geoffrey Fry (Baldwin 's privat e s ec r e -
tary), Ma y 20 , 1926, Ba l dwin Pape rs , vol . 113, p. 44 . 
60 Revise d r eport , p. 16 . 
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Chamberlain tried to undercut anticipa ted 
Opposition critici sm of hi s role in the affair. The M.P.'s 
promised to say that the governmen t had not forced them to 
61 
change or omit anything from the re port. Chamberlain also 
told Arthur Willert, Publicity Director at the Foreign 
Office, what to s a y to press reporters. If asked whether 
or not Chamber l a in h a d urged the M.P.'s to alter the report, 
Willert was to re s ond : 
How can I say? I was not present at t he inter-
view; but, if you a sk me what I think, I expec t 
that the Secretary of Sta te di s cussed it wi th 
them and I should not be s urpri sed if t hey t hem-
selves fe lt t hat in the ligh t of th a t di s c uss i o n 
some passage s in the report ne e ded reconsideration.62 
The report was p rin ted privately and circulate d at 
the end of May. Boothby predicted corre ct ly tha t even t he 
63 
revision would be r e ceived cold l y y ma ny Torie s . The 
virulent ant i - Soviet pres s i gnored it comple t e ly. Several 
Tory zealots criticized t he mo de r ate as s es s;ne nt of conditions 
64 
in Ru ssia . The Daily Te l e g r a ph c onc e ded t h t t he obser-
vations we r e sound but felt tha t no thing wou l d happen un til 
61Minute b y Locke r-Lampson , y 18, 192 6 , FO 371 / 117 9 8 . 
62Hinute by Chambe rlain , May 20, 192 6 , I b "d . 
63 Boothby to Fry, May 20 , 1926 , Ba ldwin Pa pe rs , vol . 
113, p. 44, 
64 For t he r ema rks o f Olive r Lo ckc r-Lampson 
Knox, s e e De a es , CXCV II (June 25 , 1926), col s . 
See al s o Kno x' s de ta ile d r ejo in e r in the 
LXXXVII (Augu s t , 19 26 ), 857 - 66 . 
an Alfred 
707 , 715 . 
1 Re vi ew , 
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Moscow changed. The Saturday Revie w l abe led the recommen-
dations as weak and differing little from previously un-
successful policies. Only the Specta tor of fered unstinted 
praise, •It is absurd not to trade with a man because you do 
65 
not like him personally." The Foreign Office realized that 
66 
the business community would not be i mp r e ssed. 
The Liberal Mancheste r Guardian welcomed the r eport . 
The Labour Daily Herald r efused to publi s h it, allegedly 
67 
because the M.P.'s had asked for money. Howeve r, Labour 
68 party leaders comme nted favorably . Izvestia hoped that 
•the more sober eleme nts" in the Tory governme nt would 
. 69 implemen t the r eport ' s sugges tlons. 
66 
Minute by Gascoigne , June 12, 1926 , FO 371/117 88 . 
67Minu te by Gregory, June 1, 1926, I bid . The M.P .'s 
met all ex penses out o f thei r own pockets-. --- e l son was 
especially piqued by in ti t ~ons t h a t t he y h ad been gues ts 
of the Sovie t gover e nt . Since publ ication ex cnses al s o 
fell on the ir shoulde rs , a pa r e nt l y f e~ copies were pr in t ed ; 
Nel s on provided t he Fore i g n Off ice wi h just t hree . The 
Cen tral ews Service , which ublicize it , did send a c e ck 
to the ; see Ne l son t o Sir Geoffrey B tl e r (pa rli arne n:ary 
private secretary to Si r Samuel Hoare) , June 9 , 19 6 , FO 371/ 
117 98. The articles writte n l ater by the M. P .' s (and re-
ferred to below) probab ly he l pe defr a y the expenses . 
68 For t he c omments of Pon s onby ad MacDonald , se e 
Debates , CXCVII (June 26, 1926), eels . 715, 763-64. 
69 Izvestia , June 4, 192 6 , cited by Hodgson in a dispat c h 
Chamberla1n , June 12, 19 26, FO 371/117 88 . 
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The report might ha ve r e c e ived a warmer rece pti on 
from Conservative s h ad it not coincided with the g e ne ral 
strike. Soviet f i na ncial contributi ons to the strike rs 
resulte d i n a rising tide of anti-Soviet hostil i ty wi th in 
70 
the party. At the time Chamberlain wa s h a rd pres s ed to 
secure Cabine t app rova l jus t for cont i nuing r e l a tions . 
The M.P.'s defended their views. Nel s on told 
Commons t ha t 
if three membe r s of a l arge po litica l party with 
some des ire t o see some t hing of a p r oble m fo r t hem-
s e lves are me t on the i r r etu rn wi t h critici sm , not 
all of it ill-natured , but some of it very il l -
natu r ed , it i s not bes t c a l culated to induce othe r 
people to unde r take simil a r p ~l g rimage s which afte r 
all, when a ll t his h ea t h as died down , may prov e t o 
be in the bes t interests o f any l a rge pol itic a l 
party.71 
The group al s o addressed t he Tory b ack.be nc he r s ' 1922 
Commi ttee . 72 Seve r a l t ook. up t he i r p ens . In a three-pa rt 
ser ies in the Daily Teleg r a ph , Thomas Moore assessed Rus s ian 
conditions mor e f avorably than the p ub l ished r epor t, but he 
stopped sho r t of t he or igina l conc l usions a nd r ecommendat i ons . 
He wrote tha t grow ing uss ian nationa l i sm wou l d l ead to a 
70The Soviets claime d t his c ampa ig n of i nvective was a 
direct r esponse t o the r eport , which the y mis take nly be l ieved 
had bee n given wi de coverage in Bri t a i n; s ee Sovie t Union 
Monthly , I (Ju l y, 19 26 ), 1 24 . 
71oebate s, CXCV II (June 26 , 192 6 ), col. 752. 
72Lord Robert Boothby, i nterv i ew i n London, July 29, 
1969. 
389 
democratic government. Britain should reopen negotiations 
b th S . t d ' d f . d . . 7 ) I th soon ecause e ov1e s es1re r1en sn1p. n e 
Spectator Boothby echoed Moore's sent iments but more force-
fully called on the government to provide better trade 
facilities. Greater commercial contacts would help to 
dispel mutual ignorance. 74 
Writing appropriately in the anti-Sovie t English 
Review, Robert Bourne explaine d his d isag r eement with the 
draft report. He felt that the NEP was a failure becaus e 
state-run enterprise s were operating at a loss. Combined 
with peasant distru s t of p aper currency, this me a n t that 
Russia lacked sufficie nt f unds to p rovide adequa te s ec r i ty 
for a foreign loan. Without e ntre pre neu rs or a loan Ru s sia 
could never fulfill her e normous pote nt ia l. Because of the 
British public r e action to Sovie t fu nd s for the mine rs, 
Bourne conc l uded t hat a r a ppr oche me nt had b e e n de l ayed 
75 
•indefinitely." Sig nifican tly, Nel s on, Moore, a nd Boothby 
arrived at the s ame c o nclusion. The y be lieve d the Russian 
miners' "volunta ry" c o ntributions we re really c o pu l s ory 
73oaily Tele g r a ph , June 4, p. 10, J u ne 5, p. 12, 
Ju.ne 7, 1926, p. 1 0 . 
74 spectator, CXXXVII (J u ly 3, 1926), 5-6, (July 10, 
1926), 42-43, (Ju ly 17, 1 926 ), 8 3- 8 4. o o thby r e p r i nte d 
extracts from his article i n h is autob i og r a hy , I Figh t to 
Live (London, 1947), pp. 74- 8 6. 




Bourne apparently lost interest in Russia for he 
never again spoke on the subject in Commons. Nelson opposed 
a break in Ju;1e, 1926 but apparently remained silent there-
after. Moore occasionally wrote in favor of closer 
77 
relations. During the debate on the dipl0ma tic rupture 
in May, 1927, he was the only Tory to ask for "rete n tion of 
the Trade Agreement. Boothby was quiet for a time after 
becoming Churchill's p a rli amentary private secretary in the 
summer of 1926. Early in 1927 he advocated a break with 
Russia but then f a vored a r enewal after the Arcos raid. 
The visit a p paren tly had no positive ef fec t on 
1 . 1 . 78 Ang o-Sov~et re at~ons. It may have had a ne~a tive 
impact: only one Tory politician again vi s ited Russ ia 
until after the May , 1929 election. An incide nt barely one 
month after the M.P.'s vis i t i ndicated t h t the Tory govern-
ment discouraged such t rips . Lord Inverfor th, a noted 
industriali s t, r equested Baldwin's permiss ion to trave l to 
76Minute by But ler , June lO,FO 371/11786. 
77
see The Times , Au g . 10, 1 926 , p. 17, and ~lo r ning 
Post, July 29, 1926 , clipping inFO 371/117 98. 
78 
Only the American a nd t he Latvian gover en ts r e -
quested copie s of the r eport . In both instances the Fo reign 
Office under scored Chambe rlain's insistence tha t the r epor t 
did not have his approva l or d i sapproval; s ee me ora n urn by 
the Overseas Trade Depa r tmen t, July 12, 1 926 , a nd Latvian 
Minister to Chamberlain , Oct . 8, 192 6, FO 371/11 798 . 
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Moscow for trade discus s ions. The visit, he stresse d, would 
not touch on politics . In a typica lly l aconi c r e ply, 
Baldwin seemed !lnnoye d, " It is i mpos s ib l e to pay a non-
79 
political visit to Moscow.• Inverfo r t h made the trip , but 
he travelled unde r an as sumed name a nd it wa s ne ver ma de 
80 public. A numbe r of Tory b a ckbe nche r s , howe ver , did 
journey to Rus s ia afte r Ba ldwin l e ft o f fi ce . 81 
79 . . 
. M1.nute by Ba l dw 1. n , June 12, 1926 , Ba l dwi n Pa pe r s , 
vol. 115, p . 127. Se e al so Sir Ge orge A s trong (Bri ti s h 
journalist) to Ey r es-Monse ll, June 9 , 1926 , Ba l dwin Papers, 
vol. 115, p. 127. 
8
°Fische r, The Sovie t s i n Wo r ld Aff irs , I I , 48 2. 
Lord Be ave r b r ook pa i d a short vis1.t to Moscow in the sp r ing 
of 19 28 , b u t accordi ng t o one histo ri an he spe nt mos t o f hi s 
t ime in a ho t e l r oom r e ading his Daily Exp r ess ; A. J . P . 
Taylor, inte rv iew i n London, J u ly 7 , 1 69 . See a l so Ke nne th 
You.ng , Chur ch ill an caverb r ook , pp . 1 01 - 2. 
81John d e Vere Lode r, de f ea t e d in the , a y , 19 29 
election , v isited Russ ia i n t he au t umn o f 92 9 and aga in in 
19 30; see h i s o l shcvi sm in e r spe c tive , pp . 5- 164 . Lady 
Astor a c co pan 1. e d Geo r ge Bern r d Sha on h ~ ~ tou r i n 
Septe mber , 19 31 ; see Maurice Col l is , ancy Asto r ( e w Yo r k , 
1960), pp . 160- 74. In Septembe r , 1932 a p r ty of f o u r back-
benchers went the re , and in t he same month Ha rold a illan 
also made the t r i p ; see his l~inds o f Chang e , 1 914 - 19 39 
(New Yo r k , 1966), pp . 295 -3 25 . Cap t 1.n C n1. g h - Re 1.d paid 
a visit in the s umme r of 19 33 ; seeR . J . Ell i s , He walks 
Alone : t he Pub lic a nd Pr iva t e Life o f Cao t ai n Cunn1.n h am-
Rel.d Londo n , 1945 , pp . 95-96 . oothby r e tur ned 1.n the 
BPring o f 1 9 34 b ut wa s mu ch mo re cri tic 1 o f the Sov i e ts 
tha.n he had bee n earlie r ; see his I Figh t t o Live , pp . 86 - 87 . 
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A P P E N D I X I I I 
GUIDE TO MAJOR CONSERVATIVES IN THE TEXT* 
AMERY, Leopold : M. P .; Under-Secre t ary of Sta t e for the 
Colonies , 19 19 - 21 ; Financ i a l Secre t a ry to the 
Admiralty, 19 21-2 2 ; F irs t Lord of the Admi r a lty , 
1922-24; Sec r e ta ry of St ate for the Colonies , 1924-
29. •centrist. • 
ARCHER-S HEE , Martin: M.P., -1923 . •Righti s t. " 
ASHLEY, Wil f r ed : M.P.; Pa rli amen t a ry p riva t e s e c r e t a ry to 
the Minister o f Tr ansport , 1922-23 ; Under - Se creta ry 
of Sta te for Wa r, 19 23 -24 ; Hin is t er o f Tr anspor t, 
1924-2 9 . •Righti s t. " 
BALDWI N, Sta nle y: M.P.; Fina nci a l Secre t a ry to the Tr easury, 
1917-21; President o f t he Boar d o f Tr ade , 192 1- 22; 
Chance llor of the Excheque r, 1922 - 23; Prime Minister, 
1923-24, 19 2 4- 29 ; Leader o f the Cons e rvative Party , 
1923-. ·ce n tris t. " 
BALFOUR, Ar thu r J ame s Balfour, Firs t Ear l: M.P., -1922; 
Secre t ary o f Sta te for Foreig n Affairs , - 19 19; Lord 
Pres i den t o f the Council , 1919 - 22 , 1925 - 29 . 
•centrist . • 
BI RKEN!~D , Fr eder i ck Edwi n Smith, First E rl : M. P ., -1 922; 
Atto r ey Gener 1 , - 1 19 ; Lord Chancel lor, 1 919 - 22 ; 
Secret ry of St te for India , 192 4- 28 . "Rig tist" 
afte r the Coalition e r a . 
BOOTHBY, Robert : M. P . , 1924-; Parliament ary priva te sec re -
t ary to the Chance llor of the Excheque r , 19 6-29 . 
Lead i ng "conc i lia o r . " 
BOURNE , Robe r t: M.P. , 19 24-. "Conci l iator . " 
BUC HANAN , George: Ambassado r t o Rus sia , - 1918; Ambassador 
to Italy , 1919 - 21 . Initial ly a "concili ato r , " he 
be c ame a •righti s t" in 1919 . 
*This list inc l ude s only t he name s an i orta nt 
of fices held by these i n ividua l s betwee n 1917 an 1929 . 
Unl es s o erw i s i ndica t ed , the M. P .' s in t he list served 
throughout t h is e riod . 
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BULL, Willi am: M.P. "Rightist," but remained a personal 
friend of Leonid Krassin. 
CAVE, George Cave, First Viscount: M.P., -1918 ; Home 
Secretary, -191 9; Lord Chancellor, 1922- 24 , 
1924-28. "Rightist ." 
CAVENDISH-BE THICK , Lord Henry : M.P., -1929. Articulate 
"concili a tor" in i mmed iate postwa r years. 
CECIL of Chelwood , Edga r Algernon Robert Cecil , First 
Viscount: M. P ., -1 92 3; Minister of Blocka de , 
-1918; Under - Secre t ary of Sta t e fo r Fore i g n Affairs, 
-1918; Lord Privy Seal, 1 923 - 24; Chance llor of t he 
Duchy of La nc a s t e r , 1924-27. E rly "conciliator , " 
later a "centr i t." 
CHAMBERLAI N, Aus ten: M.P.; Chancellor o f t he Excheque r, 
1919-21; Lord Privy Se a l, 192 1-22; Leade r of t he 
Conservative pa rty, 1921 - 22 ; Se c r etury of State fo r 
Forei gn Affairs , 192 4- 29 . "Centri s t . " 
Cr~BERLAIN, e vi lle: M. P., 19 1 8-; Pos a s ter Ge ne r a l, 
1922-23 ; tHni s te r of Heal th, 1923 , 1 92 4- 9 ; 
Chance llor of t he Excheque r, 192 3-24. "Ri gh ti st . " 
CHURCHIL L, Winston: M.P ., -1922, 19 24-; Secreta ry o f State 
for Wa r, 19 19-21; Se cretary of Sta te for the 
Colonies , 1921-22; Ch a ncellor o f t h xche que r , 
1924-29. " Righti s t . " 
COOPER, A. Duff: M. P ., 192 4- 29; Fin ncial Se c r e t ry to the 
War Office, 1 928-2 9 . "C o ncilia t o r. " 
CROFT , He nry Page : M. P. Le ading "ultra . " 
CU NL IFFE-LI STER , Phili p (Lloyd-Gr eame ): M. P ., 1918-; 
?arliame n ary ~ce re aPJ to he Boa rd of Tr ade , 
19 20-21; Se cre t a ry t o t he Over sea s r adc Uepa r .en , 
19 21-22; Pr es i d e n t of t c Boar of Tra e , 1 9 22-2 1, 
1924-29. "Centrist . " 
CURZON of Ked l es ton, George Nathan i e l Curz o n , Fir s I rque ss : 
L0rd Preside nt of the Counci l , -1919 ; Se cre t a r y of 
State for Fore i g n Af fa irs , 1 91 - 24; Lor Pr e s1de n t 
of the Counci l, 192 4-25. "Rightist. " 
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DAVI DSON , J. C. C.: M.P., 192 0-23, 19 24-; Pa rli ame nta r y 
private s ecretary t o Bona r Law, 1922 -23; Chan c e llo r 
of t he Duchy of La ncaster, 1923-2 4; Chai rma n o f t he 
Conserva t i ve p a rty, 1927-30. 
DAVIDSON , J. H.: M. P., 191 8-. "Righ tist. " 
ELLIOT, Wa lte r: M. P., 19 18 - 2 3, 1924- ; Under-Secr e t a ry of 
State for Scot l a nd , 1926 - 29 . "Righ t ist . " 
GARVI N, J. L.: I:dito r o f the Obse rver . Leading "c o nc i l iator." 
GOFF, Pa r k: M. P., 19 18-23, 192 4- 29 ; Pa rl i ame ntary p riva t e 
secretary t o t he Fir s t Lord of the Admi r alty , 19 19 . 
"Ultra. " 
GRENFELL , E . C. : M.P., 19 22-. "Righ t is t." 
GRETTON , John : M.P. Leading "u ltra." 
GUI NN ESS , Wa l t e ::-: M. P ., Under - S::":..: r e t a ry of Sta te fo r h'a r, 
1922- 23; Fi n ancial Secretary to t he Tr easury , 1923 -
24, 1924 - 25; Mi niste r of Ag riculture , 1925-29 . 
"Rightist." 
GWY NNE , H. A. : Ed i t o r o f t he Mo r ning Post. "Ultra." 
HAILSHAH , Doug l as Hogg , Fir s t Vi scoun t: M. P ., 1922 - 28; 
Attorne y Ge neral, 192 2- 24 , 192 4- 28 ; Lord Chance l lor, 
19 28 - 29 , " Right ~s t . " 
rU\NNON, P. J.: M. P ., 1921-; Secretary of the Ind us tri a l 
Grou p in Commo ns , 1921 - 29 . "Conciliator . " 
HARR ISON, Aus te n : Editor of the Engl i sh Re view , -192 3. 
"Cent r is t. " 
HOARE , Samue l: M. P .; Secretnry of St te for Air , 1922 - 4 , 
19 24- 29 . Changed from a "rightist" t o a "c entri st" 
in early 1920 ' s . 
HORNE , Robert: M. P ., 191 8- ; lini s te r of Labour , 191 9; 
Pr eside nt o f t he Board of Trade , 1920-21; Chance llo r 
of the Excheq ue r, 192 1- 22 . "C e n trist" until 
mid-1 9 2C's. 
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IRWIN, Edward Wood, Firs t Baron: M.P., -1925; Under-
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1921-22; 
President of the Board of Educa tion, 1922-24; 
Minister of Agriculture, 192 4-25; Viceroy of India, 
1926-. "Centrist," not a "rightist" as is some-
times claimed. 
JACKSON, F. S.r M.P., -1926; Financial Secretary to the 
War Office, 1922-23; Chairman of t he Conservative 
party, 1923-26. 
JOYNSON-HICKS , William: M.P.1 Financia l Secretary to the 
Treasury, 1923; Minister of Hea lth, 192 3-24; home 
Secretary, 1924-29. "Rightist." 
KI NDERSLEY, Guy: M.P., 1923-. "Righ tist," involved with 
the Zinoviev letter case. 
KNOX, Alfred: M.P. , 1 92 4-. " Rightis t," served in Sibe r ia 
during interventionist period. 
LANSDOWNE , Henry Fe tty-Fitzma urice , Fifth Ma r que ss of: Tory 
elder state sman , an e a rly "ce n trist . " 
LAW, Andrew Bo nar: M. P ., -1923; Chance llor of the Excheque r, 
-1918; Lord Privy Se 1, 191 9-21; Pri e ~lin i s te r , 
1922-23; Leade r of the Conse rva tive pa rty, -1921, 
1922-23. App a r e ntly was a "cen tri s t ." 
LOC KER-LAM.PSO , Godf r e y : M.P., Under-Secre tary of State fo r 
the Home Offic e, 1923-24, 192 4-2 5 ; Unde r- ·ec r e t a ry 
of State for For e ign Aff airs , 1925-29 . "Centrist ." 
LOCKER-LAHPSO , Oliver: M. P ., 191 8-; Parli ame ntary private 
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